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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Idaho Supreme Court decisions consistently recognize this simple trnth: a party cannot 
possibly bring a claim that depends on unknown and undiscoverable facts. A prior proceeding 
cannot bar the party from later bringing such a claim once the party does learn the material facts 
on which a claim depends. This is so because a "claim" is defined by the material facts that 
create it. Since res judicata applies only to claims that actually were or could have been litigated 
in a prior proceeding, it does not bar claims that could not have been brought because the 
"operative" facts-'--On which the existence of the claim depends-were not, and could not have 
been, known at the time of the prior proceeding. 
The trial court here lost sight of that principle, erroneously holding that a judgment in a 
payment dispute between property owners and a contractor barred the owners from later bringing 
a claim that depended entirely on latent defects in the constrnction that were not and could not 
have been discovered until they later revealed themselves-in devastating ways. The material 
facts-without which no latent defect claim existed-were these concealed defects, so the 
"claim" in the second action could not have been litigated in the first. The material facts on 
which the latent defect claims depend are also separate "transactions" from the payment claims 
tried in the first arbitration. The trial court's contrary ruling-that all claims arising from the 
parties' contract were barred by tbe decision in the payment dispute that occurred before the 
latent defects were known-is contrary to Idaho's "pragmatic" definition of "transaction." 
Discoverability of the material facts underlying the latent defect claims is not even a fact 
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question on this appeal. The only evidence on summary judgment showed-and the court 
assumed for its ruling-that the owners (Appellants) did not previously litigate, and could not 
possibly have litigated, their claim for defects in the prior proceeding because Appellants could 
not have discovered the facts at that time even through diligent effort. 
Here are the facts from the record on that summary judgment ruling. 1 
B. Statement of the Facts. 
Sun Valley Trust (the "Trust") owns twenty acres of rural land outside Sun Valley, Idaho. 
Sun Valley Trust is a confidential holding trust, formed to acquire and improve the property 
while protecting the security and privacy of its beneficiaries, Thomas J. Hanks ("Hanks") and 
Rita Wilson ("Wilson").2 
In the summer of 2000, the Trust, through its Trustee, Lily Reeves, entered into a 
construction contract to build a single family residence and other improvements on the property.3 
The contract contained an arbitration clause and confidentiality provisions. 4 The contract also 
provided extended warranties including a five-year warranty of the roof. 5 Storey represented in 
the contract, and in requests for progress payments, that the work would, and did, comply with 
1 For ease of reference, documents cited in this brief from the Clerk's Exhibit List are collected 
in the Appendix to this brief. This brief will cite to documents in the Appendix as: "Ap, No. #, 
f· #, 'll #." 
Ap, No. 6, 'JI 6. 
3 Ap, No. 6, 'JI 7. 
4 Ap, No. 2, p. 10, 'll'll 18(c), 20; Ap, No. 3, p. 21, 'l{ 4.6. 
5 Ap, No. 2, p. 6-7, 'l{ 10. The contract states that the "Contractor shall warrant the roof to be free 
of defect for a period of five (5) years after the completion of the roof installation." 
2 
the contract documents and plans.6 By the time the construction was nearly completed in late 
2002, the Trust had paid the contractor, Storey Construction, Inc., over $10 million. Ap, No. 7, 
p. 35. A dispute arose over another $1.8 million Storey claimed it was owed. 
Storey commenced arbitration of its payment dispute in December 2002 (the "Payment 
Arbitration"). 7 Ap, No. 4. In response, the Trust and Wilson filed counterclaims on the payment 
issues, stating Storey had (1) failed to pay subcontractors, forcing the Trust to do so ($613,000); 
(2) overcharged the Trust $200,000 by improperly submitting change orders for matters covered 
by the contract price; (3) failed to meet the agreed completion date, causing increased expense to 
the Trust ($25,000); (4) failed to complete punch list items; and (5) violated the confidentiality 
provisions by deliberately revealing the names of the residents and the location of the property, 
resulting in increased costs for security at the property that are continuing ( and by then totaled 
$162,000). Ap, No. 6, p. 6, 'l['l[ 17-18; Ap, No. 7, pp. 60-66. The Trust and Wilson claimed these 
breaches of contract had caused the Trust damages in excess of $800,000, and also asserted a 
6 Each payment request necessarily represented that the owner owes the full amount for the work 
in question-i.e., that the work is in compliance with the contractor's contract obligations, See, 
e.g., Ap, No. 1, p. 2, Art. 2 (work to be in compliance with contract documents); id. p. 3, 'l[ 7.1 
(owners' payments were made only for costs Storey incurred in the proper performance of the 
construction work); Ap, No. 2, p. 4, 'l[ 6 (owners' payment for "substantial completion" was 
made based on Storey' s completion of the construction in accordance with the contract 
documents), Ap, No. 2, p. 6, 'l[ IO (guaranteeing construction work will be free from faulty 
materials and workmanship). 
7 The demand named the Trust, but despite the contract's confidentiality provisions, Storey also 
publicly named Hanks and Wilson, and sought to join them on the ground that they used the 
Trust as their "alter ego." Ap, No. 4, Demand and pp. 1-2, 'l[ 5. The arbitrators rejected Storey's 
alter ego allegations and dismissed Storey's claims against Hanks and Wilson individually. R, 
Vol. I, p. 83, 'l[ 2. 
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counterclaim for breach of privacy.8 
The Trust's attorneys, as a precaution, also pleaded a broadly worded counterclaim for 
construction defects to allow evidence to be introduced of any defects that materialized by the 
time of the arbitration: 
Storey ... has performed substandard and defective work. ... The Counter-Claimants are 
entitled to an award of damages for the costs to remedy Storey' s substandard and 
defective work, in an amount to be determined in this Arbitration.9 
This language was included with minor modifications in the Trust's Amended and Second 
Amended Counterclaims. IO The Trust listed damages for other breaches by Storey, but none for 
the place-holder counterclaim for defective construction.Il 
In July, 2002, Hanks and Wilson took occupancy of the house, which they used only 
intermittently.12 The arbitration hearing took place approximately 14 months later. After what 
Storey itself concedes was an intensive investigation, 13 the Trust and the residents, Hanks and 
Wilson, had not discovered any construction defects. Consequently, the Trust did not litigate a 
defect claim or seek any damages for defects in the Payment Arbitration. There is no contrary 
evidence in the record. Stephen Smith, who represented the Trust in the Payment Arbitration, 
explains the defect counterclaim was "drafted broadly to encompass possible claims against 
8 Ap, No. 6, pp. 6-8; Ap, No. 7, pp. 61-66. 
9 Ap, No. 5, p. 8, 'J[ 19. 
IO Ap, No. 6, p. 6, 'J[ 17. 
ll See Ap, No. 6, p. 6, 'J[ 18. 
12 R, Vol. I, p. 11, L. 12-14. 
13 In the complaint that is the subject of this lawsuit, Storey alleged that after Storey initiated the 
arbitration, attorneys for Hanks and Wilson "commenced an intensive, extensive, and very 
4 
[Storey], and included allegations for which there was ultimately no evidence presented during 
arbitration."14 The Trust's pre-hearing brief made no mention of the defect claim. The Trust's 
statement in that brief of damages sought included no damages for the defect allegation, 15 which 
was not mentioned outside the formal counterclaim allegations.16 
The arbitration panel conducted a ten-day hearing in September- October 2003. The 
Trust litigated its counterclaims relating to payment issues and breach of privacy. The arbitrators 
denied those counterclaims17 and awarded Storey approximately $1.2 million on its claims plus 
pre-award interest.18 The parties' dealings with each other appeared to be at an end. 
In the winter of 2005-2006, heavy snow piled deeply on the roof of the new house (R, 
Vol. II, p. 362, 'l[ 4), the first such accumulation since Storey had completed work. Id. The plans 
called for a "cold roof," which uses ventilation between the subroof and the outer roof surface to 
keep snow from melting on the part of the roof above the residence and then refreezing and 
accumulating (creating "ice dams") where the eaves extend beyond the residence walls. Ice 
dams formed in several places because of faulty construction of the cold roof, causing ice to 
crash through the large window over the kitchen sink in the main house, which could have 
expensive investigation ... to develop any possible facts available to support a counterclaim 
against Storey." R, Vol. I, p. 12, L. 17-20. 
14 R, Vol. II, p. 359, 'l[ 3 (italics added) 
15 Ap, No. 7, pp. 60-66. As the Trust argued below, the absence of any request for damages for 
defects in the counterclaims and in the statement of damages was a withdrawal of the defect 
counterclaim. Tr, Vol. I, p. 175, L. 9-p. 176, L. 21. 
16 R, Vol. II, p. 359, 'l[ 5. 
17 R, Vol. I, p. 83, 'l[ 3. 
18 R, Vol. I, p. 83, 'l[ 2. Although the Trust paid Storey the amount awarded by the arbitrator, the 
award itself was not confirmed until March 10, 2008. R, Vol. II, p. 240. 
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severely injured anyone standing there. Falling ice also crushed the exterior doors on a tool 
shed, and seriously damaged lower-level roofs. 19 Portions of the metal roofs on the eaves simply 
broke off and fell to the ground.20 Water began consistently to intrude into the house around 
window casings and behind the siding of the main house and other buildings, between the 
chimney and ceiling in the great room, and in the kitchen, study, and bedrooms, and formed 
pools on the floor of the master bath. 21 
When the Trust's experts performed destructive testing to unearth the sources of these 
problems, the experts and the Trust first realized that concealed defects pervaded Storey' s work. 
Storey had failed to construct functioning cold roofs22 on any of the many structures at the 
property; it had blocked the necessary ventilation with plywood;23 it had installed rafters and 
metal roofing improperly and contrary to the architectural plans;24 it had installed flashing that 
actually poured water into the buildings, behind the siding;25 it had haphazardly cut rough holes 
through the subroof, creating a direct path into the house for any water penetrating the metal roof 
and any condensation dripping from the roof's underside, and then, instead of checking and 
repairing its own work, covered up the holes;26 it had failed to install required flashing or to seal 
19 R, Vol. II, p. 362, 'l['l[ 4-5. 
20 R, Vol. II, p. 362, 'l[ 4; Tr, Vol. I, p. 49, L. 3-7. 
21 R, Vol. II, pp. 363-364, 'l['l[7, 10, 11. 
22 R, Vol. II, p. 364, 'l[ 13(a). 
23 R, Vol. II, pp. 364-65, 'l[ 13(a). 
24 R, Vol. II, p. 364, 'l[ 13 ( a)-(b ). 
25 R, Vol. II, p. 365, 1[ 13(d). 
26 ld. 
6 
the exterior at all. 27 As an experienced builder of high-end residences in Ketchum and Sun 
Valley, Storey must have known this work was defective, and even dangerous, given the extreme 
snow conditions and the potential for earthquakes. Nevertheless, Storey represented on each and 
every payment request that the work for which payment was sought complied with the contract 
and was free from defects. 28 
When the stunning symptoms of the deficient flashing, wall gaps and chimney 
construction reached a crescendo, the Trust initiated destructive testing that revealed other 
defects that would not otherwise have been found. For example, only through removing siding 
and digging through insulation did the Trust learn that Storey had failed to install properly 
connected hold-down bolts that were required to secure the shear walls, and that the shear wall 
nailing was materially deficient.29 Those critically important faults could have caused structural 
failures in an earthquake or under wind loads. 
Although obviously aware of all of the defects - having created them - Storey did not 
warn the Trust or repair them, but covered them up in numerous ways, including: (a) installing 
the outer roof surface, concealing the deficient flashing and rough holes in the subroof;30 (b) 
leaving uncompacted soil in place 'and covering it with the structures that depended on its 
integrity;31 (c) installing insulation, siding and interior walls without first rectifying deficient 
27 R, Vol. II, p. 364, 'l[ 11. 
28 Under the contract, Storey' s entitlement to payment is conditioned upon completing the work 
in conformity with the contract documents. See n.6 supra. 
29 R, Vol. III, pp. 590-91, 'Jl 5-14. 
30 R, Vol. II, pp. 364-65. 
31 R, Vol. II, p. 363, 'JI 9. 
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shear wall nailing and unconnected hold-down bolts. 32 Storey buried all these faults and 
omissions where they lay undetected until the roof fell off in chunks and water began to stream 
through windows, walls, and ceilings. 
The Trust filed an arbitration demand on November 7, 2007 (the "Defect Arbitration") to 
recover $2.5 million in damages for these and other concealed defects.33 Because the walls and 
roof of the house had to be largely removed and replaced before the full extent of the defects was 
revealed, the list has continued to grow substantially during the period after the trial court's final 
ruling preceding this appeal and cannot be fully presented through the record.34 
C. Trial Court Proceedings. 
On December 20, 2007, Storey filed this suit seeking to stay the Defect Arbitration and 
alleging abuse of process ("Abuse Action").35 Storey claimed that, because the Trust had 
pleaded a general counterclaim for defective construction in the 2003 Payment Arbitration, and 
even though such claims had been effectively abandoned by not presenting evidence or seeking 
damages, the Trust's latent defect claims were barred even though they were unknown and 
undetectable earlier. Storey again sought personal liability against Hanks and Wilson and 
against Lily Reeves (Trustee of the Trust), making the same alter ego allegations that the 
arbitrators had already soundly rejected in the 2003 Payment Arbitration.36 
32 R, Vol. III, pp. 576-77, 590-91. 
33 R, Vol. I, pp. 29-30. 
34 See R, Vol. II, pp. 364-66, 'l[ 13. 
35 R, Vol. I, pp. 8-31. 
36 R, Vol. I, pp. 10-11, 'Jl'l[ 16-17, 21-22. See R, Vol. I, p. 83, 'JI 2 (Arbitration Final Award 
dismissing Storey' s claims of individual liability against Hanks and Wilson). 
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The Trial Court's Ruling That Storey's Res Judicata Defense Was Not Arbitrable. 
Defendants Hanks, Wilson and Reeves moved (1) to dismiss Storey's Abuse Action 
because the defendants could not be individually liable for abuse of process (they had not been 
parties to the Trust's Defect Arbitration demand), or (2) to stay the action until completion of the 
Defect Arbitration based on the contract's arbitration clause, which required arbitration of any 
res judicata issue under the broad requirement to arbitrate all "disputes and matters in question 
between the Owner and Contractor" arising out of or related to the contract. 37 
The trial court ruled that the res judicata issue was not arbitrable because the arbitration 
clause did not specifically refer to res judicata.38 The court refused to dismiss the individual 
defendants, but stayed the Abuse Action against them until the trial court itself resolved the res 
judicata issue in a summary trial as provided for in I.RC. 7-902(b).39 
The Trial Court's Ruling That the Award in the Payment Arbitration Was Res Judicata, 
Barring Any Claims for Later-Discovered Latent Defects. 
On May 14, 2008, Storey moved for an order permanently barring the Defect Arbitration, 
bypassing the summary trial. 40 Storey argued that the 2003 Payment Arbitration award was res 
judicata on any claim of defects. At oral argument, Judge Elgee stated that he would assume that 
the defects currently at issue were latent-i.e., even in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 
37 R, Vol. I, pp. 63-64 (Motion to Dismiss Complaint); R, Vol. I, pp. 65-73 (Memorandum in 
Support); see Ap, No. 3, p. 19, j[ 4.3.l, and p. 21, 'l[ 4.6.l (arbitration provisions). 
38 Tr, Vol. I, p. 65, L. 21 - p. 66, L. 11. 
39 Tr, Vol. I, p. 76, L. 6-p. 77, L. 3. The order was entered on March 10, 2008. R, Vol. II, p. 
240. 
40 R, Vol. II, p. 347 (Motion); Ap, No. 8 (Memorandum). 
9 
owners could not have discovered them at the time of the 2003 Payment Arbitration41 and thus 
could not have tried those claims: 
This is an issue of law solely on assuming these are latent defects, does res 
judicata bar the claim";42 
"Latent defects do not appear to be an exception to the bar of res judicata 
under Idaho law."43 
The trial court declined to hold that res judicata hatred claims by Appellant Hanks since 
he had not been a party to the 2003 Payment Arbitration.44 The order barring the 2007 Defect 
Arbitration was signed on June 27, 2008, and filed on July 2, 2008. 45 Appellants filed a Notice 
of Appeal on June 30, 2008 and an Amended Notice on July 18, 2008.46 
Because this appeal presents an issue of law, this Court exercises de novo review. E.g., 
Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322 (1992). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether res judicata bars an arbitration claim where the claim depends upon the 
existence of latent defects which were neither actually known nor discoverable by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence at the time of an earlier arbitration and thus could not have been litigated in 
the earlier arbitration. 
41 See Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.), defining latent defect as hidden defect, "a product 
imperfection that is not discoverable by reasonable inspection and for which a seller or lessor is 
f
2
enerally liable if the flaw causes harm." 
Tr, Vol. I, p. 194, L. 7-9. 
43 Tr, Vol. I, p. 200, L. 25 p. 201, L. 1. 
44 Tr, Vol. I, p. 204, L. 5 - p. 205, L. 21. 
45 R, Vol. Ill, pp. 451-52. 
46 R, Vol. Ill, pp. 443, 537-41. 
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2. Whether any issue of preclusion under res judicata or collateral estoppel remains 
after the decision on this appeal and, if so, whether any such issue is to be decided in the 
arbitration or by the district court in a summary trial. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Under Idaho law, and under the principles and policies of judicial administration that 
underlie the rule of claim preclusion, there is no sound reason to bar a claim that depends on 
material facts that were undiscoverable at the time of the prior judgment. Claim preclusion is not 
a formulaic rule. In fact, its very origins were a rejection of the 1igid application of forms of 
pleading. Under modern jurisprudence, courts examine the substance of the claims that were, or 
could have been, brought in the prior action to determine the scope of preclusion. Just as modern 
courts do not allow a party to bring a substantively identical claim by changing the label, they do 
not impose preclusion based on an empty label in a prior pleading when a new claim, entirely 
dependent on facts that were previously undiscoverable, arises. 
In Kawai Farms, this Court allowed a claim for misrepresentation regarding the condition 
of property to proceed even though a claim with the identical label--misrepresentation of the 
condition of the same property-had been resolved in a prior action involving the same contract. 
It did so because the material facts creating the second claim were not reasonably discoverable at 
the time of the first action (remanding for a factual determination on this issue). The basis of 
that ruling controls here: res judicata applies only to claims that were, or could have been, 
brought in the first action; where the existence of a cause of action depends on material facts that 
could not reasonably have been discovered earlier, that claim "could not have been" brought; 
11 
such a "claim" is not barred even though claims with similar, or even identical, labels were 
alleged or even tried in the first action; such a claim is also not barred simply because the "same 
contract" was involved in the first proceeding. 
The "transaction" approach to res judicata is a different way of expressing the principle 
that claims based on new material facts that could not have been known at the time of the first 
action are not barred. The "transaction" consists of the material facts or events without which 
the claim would not exist. The rule is not, as Storey successfully argued below, that every claim 
arising from a given contract must be litigated in the first action or be forever barred regardless 
of whether the plaintiff had any way of knowing of the material facts underlying the claim. 
Kawai Farms would have been a very simple case if that were Idaho law, but it is not. 
Such a rule would be dangerous. It would create incentives to instigate disputes to cloak 
hidden defects, discoverable only later, with the immunity of res judicata. Idaho Jaw does not 
adopt such an obtuse policy. Under Idaho law the "transaction" here is not the construction 
contract. The "transaction" consists of the nucleus of related material facts on which the latent 
defect claims depend. In using this pragmatic definition of "claim," Idaho law emphasizes 
practicality and fairness: a party cannot be required to bring--or forever lose--claims that are 
undiscoverable simply because a dispute has arisen on other matters involving the same business 
relationship. A party is not required to do the impossible in order to preserve legal rights the 
party enjoys under our legal system. 
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A. The Trial Court's Ruling that ResJudicata May Bar Unknown and Undiscoverable 
Claims is Contrary to Both the Contract and Idaho Law. 
1. Res Judicata Cannot Be Applied to Claims that Depend Upon Material Facts 
of Which the Trust Did Not Have Knowledge, and Could Not Have 
Discovered, at the Time of the First Proceeding. 
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, holds that 
[i]n an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the 
former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter 
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter 
which might and should have been litigated in the first suit. 
Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107 (1993), quoting 
Joyce v. Murphy Land & lrrig. Co., 35 Idaho 549,553,208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922) (italics 
added). Once a judgment is entered, the parties may not offer new legal theories or new 
evidence to litigate the same claims-i.e., claims that depend on the same material facts-that 
were, or could have been, presented in that proceeding. Magic Valley, 123 Idaho at 437. The 
contract itself recognizes this principle and defines the claims that the Trust was, and was not, 
obligated to bring in the first arbitration or lose. 
a. The Contract Provides That the Trust Need Assert Only Claims 
Known to the Trust at the Time of Its Counterclaim. 
Under the Contract arbitration provisions, the Trust was obligated in the first arbitration 
to bring only claims of which the Trust was aware: 
The party filing a notice of demand for arbitration must assert in the demand all 
Claims then known to that party on which arbitration is permitted to be 
demanded. Ap, No. 3, p. 21, 'l[ 4.6.5 (emphasis added). 
This provision requires reversal for two reasons. First, the parties are entitled to define the rules 
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of res judicata for purposes of the private arbitration remedy they have adopted. Their agreement 
is controlling and enforceable. LC. § 7-901; Mason v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 
145 Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944, 948 (2007) (whether a particular claim is required to be arbitrated 
"depends upon [the] terms" of the arbitration clause). Second, under the Restatement's 
"pragmatic" approach to defining a "transaction" that Idaho has adopted ( discussed below), this 
provision defines the key criteria: whether the facts 
form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the 
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. 
Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319,323 (1990), quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24 (italics added). The parties have defined the "trial 
unit," and they have clearly stated their "expectation." Under both criteria, the "transaction" at 
issue in the first arbitration did not include unknown, undiscoverable defects. 
b. Under Kawai Farms, Claims Based on Undiscoverable Facts Are Not 
Barred by Res Judicata. 
The Contract provision permitting previously unknown claims to be brought in a second 
arbitration after discovery parallels Idaho res judicata law. Even if the Contract did not control 
the outcome, the trial court's ruling is directly contrary to this Court's prior decisions. 
In Kawai Farms, this Court addressed the scope of res judicata where a property 
purchaser had made claims against the seller for misrepresentations about the condition of the 
property and a final order with preclusive effect had been entered on those claims. The Court 
declined to apply res judicata to bar a second action for a misrepresentation about the condition 
of the prope1ty even though a) claims for misrepresentation of the condition of the property had 
14 
been advanced in the first action and b) the second action involved the identical contract. 
In Kawai Fanns, Longstreet, the seller of the real property, sued for nonpayment. The 
purchaser, Kawai, filed a counterclaim alleging that Longstreet had falsely represented the value 
of the property, failed to show Kawai the entire property, and misrepresented the condition of the 
property. 121 ldaho at 611. After some discovery, the parties settled before trial via a stipulated 
dismissal with preclusive effect. Id. at 613. Later, Kawai filed suit claiming that, in connection 
with the same contract, Longstreet had made other misrepresentations regarding the condition of 
the property-the supply of groundwater and the cost of installing a sewer system on the 
property. Id. at 611-12. The district court granted summary judgment to Longstreet based on res 
judicata, on the ground that Kawai had alleged misrepresentations regarding the condition of the 
property in the prior action. 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that there was evidence that that earlier 
claim had not been made based on misrepresentations as to the available groundwater. Id. at 
612. Although the label was identical, the material facts of the claim were different. And, 
although Kawai had ultimately learned of the groundwater problem through public records of a 
state agency, it was not clear that Kawai, through reasonable diligence, could have uncovered 
those material facts at the time of the initial litigation. Id. at 614. Therefore, summary judgment 
of res judicata was error even though the second misrepresentation claim was encompassed by 
the literal allegation in the earlier pleadings and arose from the very same contract. Id. at 615. 
In this case, Judge Elgee ruled that, because the Trust had pleaded a general counterclaim 
for construction defects in the Payment Arbitration and because the "transaction" was the 
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construction contract, "defendants had [a duty] in this case to go find out what injuries might 
befall them" in the future from any possible defects. Tr, Vol. I, p. 201, L. 13-17, 22-24; p. 202, 
L. 8°9. According to the trial court, res judicata would bar a later claim based on "evidence you 
couldn't or didn't know about" in the earlier proceeding. Tr, Vol. I, p. 203, L. 16-18.47 This 
Court reversed precisely the same reasoning when it was used by the district court in Kawai 
Farms. And Kawai Farms was a closer case: the information was available, creating a fact 
question that does not exist here under the trial court's holding. The ruling in Kawai Farms is 
flatly at odds with the trial court's ruling. 
c. Magic Valley Demonstrates that the Discoverability Issue and the 
"Transaction" Approach Share a Neutral Principle that Compels 
Reversal. 
This Court has consistently applied the definitions of "claim" and "transaction" that 
require reversal in the present case. In Magic Valley, involving the third suit in a creditor's 
(Magic Valley's) attempt to enforce a corporation's debt against its major shareholders, the 
Court made the very distinction it made in Kawai Farms and which the trial court failed to make 
here. Citing Kawai Farms, the Supreme Court barred one claim, which rested on facts 
supporting a theory of piercing the corporate veil, because 
47 The trial court relied in part on Storey's misreading of a case involving a personal injury 
claim, Houser v. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441, 649 P.2d 1197 (1982). See 
Tr, Vol. I, p. 178, L. 4-15. Storey told the trial court that Houser had filed a workers 
compensation claim for a knee injury after falling out of a truck at work, received an award, then 
filed a second claim for a back injury from falls due to the knee injury, which was held barred by 
the first award. Tr, Vol. I, p. 118, L. 12 - p. 119, L. 5. That was not the case. In fact, the court 
expressly held that res judicata applied only because Houser had actually litigated the back 
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Magic Valley was on notice ... that there might be a basis to pierce the corporate 
veil .... We can reach only one conclusion: Magic Valley did not exercise due 
diligence to discover its claim to pierce the corporate veil. 
Magic Valley, 123 Idaho at 439.48 
The Magic Valley court also held in the alternative that the veil-piercing claim would be 
barred under a "transaction" analysis. In Magic Valley, in Kawai Farms, and in this case, the 
"transaction" was not the parties' overall contractual relationship-the contract for construction, 
as the district court held. Rather, the "transaction" consists of the nucleus of material or 
"operative" facts giving rise to the "claim." The "transaction" or "claim" is the same in actions 1 
and 2 if the material facts giving rise to the claim are the same in both actions. In Magic Valley 
this Court expressly applied that definition of "transaction," as it had implicitly done in Kawai 
Farms. 
In the first action, Magic Valley had claimed that two individuals (Helen and Margaret) 
were personally liable for a corporation's debt. In the second, Magic Valley sought to pierce the 
corporate veil to establish their individual liability. This Court ruled: 
This claim [ veil-piercing] arose out of the same transaction that was the basis for 
Magic Valley's [earlier action] - the liability of Helen and Margaret personally 
for the breach of the contractual arrangement to bill for Magic Valley's services. 
123 Idaho at 438 (italics added). In this quote, the Court explicitly defines the "transaction" as 
the "liability of Helen and Margaret personally." It does not define it as the entire contractual or 
injuries and falls in the hearing on the first claim, testifying about them at length, as shown by 
the hearing transcript. Houser, 103 Idaho at 445-46. 
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business relationship between Magic Valley and the corporation. This Court did not hold that 
any claim arising from that contractual relationship was barred-the error the trial court made in 
this case. Instead, the "transaction" consisted of the material facts on which the "personal 
liability" claim depended. 
Under either of the alternate approaches used in Magic Valley, there is no preclusion 
here. The trial court assumed for its decision that the Trust had no way to discover the facts on 
which its latent defect claims depend. Under Magic Valley and Kawai Farms, the inability to 
discover the material facts ends the res judicata inquiry.49 But the "transaction" approach leads 
to the same conclusion. Here, the "transaction" consisted of a) the contractor's creation of the 
defective work; b) the contractor's proceeding with the work instead of performing the rework 
required to fix the defects; c) the contractor's concealing the defects by covering them up (by 
installing the roof surface, wall surfaces and covering up rather than rectifying uncompacted soil 
and not disclosing these time bombs to the Trust), and, d) the resulting inability of the Trust to 
discern these latent defects until they later manifested themselves, often in spectacular failures. 
Those events are the material facts on which the Trust's latent defect claim depends: the 
"transaction." Since the transaction was not the same as in the first arbitration, and since the 
48 See also Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751,754,663 P.2d 287,290 (1983) (res 
judicata inapplicable where matters raised in the second litigation had not been ripe for 
adjudication in the prior action). 
49 Storey below cited the inapposite case of Farmers Nat'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 
P.2d 762 (1994), where a bank petitioned in bankruptcy court concerning its rights under a 
security agreement, and the Shireys (through oversight by their lawyer) failed to respond or 
assert their own security rights in the same collateral under the same agreement. Id. at 66. Here, 
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operative facts were undiscoverable, res judicata does not bar a second arbitration. 
The trial comt missapplied the basic precepts of res judicata: where the factual basis for 
liability is the same, then by definition the plaintiff "knew or should have known" of those facts 
in bringing the first claim, and the first claim is also based on the same "transaction" as the 
second. Changing the label on the claim from, e.g., "personal liability" to "veil-piercing" does 
not alter the "transaction." But even where the label is the same (e.g., "misrepresentation 
regarding the condition of the property"), if the material facts underlying the claim are different, 
res judicata does not apply. 
d. The Evolution of Idaho Law Regarding the "Transaction" Approach to 
Res Judicata Issues Demonstrates that a "Transaction" Consists of the 
Operative Facts Giving Rise to a Claim, Not the Parties' Entire 
Contractual Relationship. 
This Court's articulation of the "transaction" approach to res judicata issues has evolved, 
but the Court has consistently defined the "claim" (or "transaction") by the material facts on 
which the claim depends. 
Diamond rearticulated the standard adopted in the seminal case of Joyce v. Murphy Land 
Co., 35 Idaho 549,208 P. 241 (1922). The Diamond Court noted that Idaho has followed a 
"pragmatic" approach to defining the "same claim" for res judicata purposes, 119 Idaho at 151, 
and that Idaho has "selectively examine[d]" sections of the Restatement Second of Judgments 
and adopted parts of it on a "case by case" basis. Id. at 149. Among the Restatement 
formulations approved in Diamond is: 
by contrast, the Trust's Defect Arbitration arises out of facts that were unknown, undiscoverable, 
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What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" ... [is] to be detennined 
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial 
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or 
business understanding or usage. 
119 Idaho at 150, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments,§ 24 (italics added). 
This Court's specific rulings give meaning to this general formulation: the Court has 
invariably analyzed the material facts giving rise to the claims in question. The Court has not 
deemed all claims that might arise from an overall contractual relationship to be barred by any 
prior action arising from the same relationship--the error the trial court committed here. 
In Diamond, Diamond sued Raney, a Farmers agent, in Idaho for slander that harmed his 
detective agency's business relationship with Farmers, and sued Farmers as well. Diamond also 
sued Farmers in Oregon for breach of contract and recovered a judgment in the Oregon case. 
119 Idaho at 147. In determining whether that Oregon judgment was res judicata barring the 
Idaho action against Farmers, the Court did not ask simply whether the Idaho defamation action 
and the Oregon breach of contract action arose from the same contract or business relationship 
between Diamond's detective agency and Farmers Insurance or among Raney/Farmers/ 
Diamond-they obviously did. Instead, the Court asked whether the "alleged slanderous 
statements [were] the direct basis for the Idaho action." I.e., were the material/acts on which the 
claims in the two actions depended the same: 
A review of the record demonstrates that the Raney statements were significant 
factors-perhaps the most significant factors-in the corporate defendants' 
gradual curtailment of Diamond's business which ultimately led to his 
and entirely different from those litigated in the Payment Arbitration. 
20 
termination. The record also reveals that Diamond himself relied on the 
statements made by Raney in the Oregon case as a basis for his fraud claim and 
the claim that Farmers did not honor its contract with Diamond, and his damage 
claim that his loss of business was a consequence of the Raney statements. 
119 Idaho at 151. 
The approach of defining the "claim" or "transaction" by the material facts on which the 
claim depends has been consistently followed in Idaho. In addition to Kawai Fanns, Magic 
Valley, and Diamond, the Court followed this approach in Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 
119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007). 
In Ticor, Ticor had (apparently in error) disbursed to Stanion funds generated in a sale of 
land when a substantial part of those funds should have been paid to the bankruptcy trustee. In 
the bankruptcy proceeding (Action l ), the trustee sent a notice of default to Stanion, who in tum 
(even though Stanion himself had received the funds from Ticor) filed a series of motions 
seeking to require Ticor to make the required payment to the trustee. Such an order was entered, 
and Ticor paid the trustee the same funds it had already paid to Stanion. Subsequently, Ticor 
sued Stanion for unjust enrichment (Action 2). The question was whether the "claim" in Action 
l was the same as the unjust enrichment claim against Stanion in Action 2. 
This Court applied a "pragmatic" transaction analysis that focused on the specific facts 
that were material to the issues in the two cases. The validity of the bankruptcy order of 
payment obviously depended upon whether Ticor actually owed the money or whether Stanion 
should be required to pay the trustee-which in tum involved the highly material fact that Ticor 
had already paid Stanion. As this Court explained the issue: 
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Assuming ... that Ticor did mistakenly pay Stanion the trustee's portion of the 
sale proceeds, it could and should have brought this to the attention of the 
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court could have resolved the matter by 
ordering Stanion to pay the amount in question to the trustee, thereby releasing 
Ticor from its court ordered obligation and giving it a defense to sanctions.50 
The material fact at issue in the bankruptcy case-Ticor' s mistaken payment to 
Stanion-was identical to the material fact at issue in Ticor's unjust enrichment claim against 
Stanion. It was also a fact that Ticor obviously "could and should" have known since it made the 
payment. In discussing res judicata under these circumstances, this Court articulated the 
"transaction" standard in terms of the "operative underlying facts"51 available to Ticor at the time 
of the bankruptcy proceedings: 
Ticor' s present claim arises out of the same transaction addressed by the 
bankruptcy court in the prior adjudication: Ticor' s disbursement of sale 
proceeds.... 144 Idaho at 126 (italics added). 
Storey argued below that the holding in Ticor meant that the "transaction" in this case 
was the "construction contract."52 The language quoted above shows that this Court defined the 
"transaction" in terms of the "disbursement." While there would have been no occasion for a 
mistaken disbursement had Ticor not contracted to handle the proceeds of the land sale, every 
statement by the Court on the "transaction" issue focuses on the "operative" fact of the 
50 144 Idaho at 125 (italics added). This statement appears in the Court's discussion of whether 
Ticor was a "party" to the bankruptcy proceedings but is quoted here to illuminate the Court's 
view of what Ticor "could and should" have done in that proceeding. 
51 144 Idaho at 126. 
52 Ap, No. 8, p. 13, L. 13-14. 
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disbursement-the material fact that was at the core of the "claim" in both Action 1 and 2. 53 
Nowhere does the Court state that the matter can be disposed of simply because both claims 
arose from the same contract between Stanion and Ticor. Even in stating that the "transactional 
concept of claim is broad [citing Magic Valley]," the rest of the sentence was: " ... Ticor's 
overpayment to Stanion could have been litigated in the first suit. Hence, we hold the prior 
proceeding and the present proceeding involve the same claim. "54 
It is no accident that Ticor relied on Magic Valley to make this point. In Magic Valley 
the Court did not base its ruling on whether the overall business relationship involved in both 
actions was the same; it said the "transaction" or "claim" was the "personal liability" of the two 
individuals and barred the claim because personal liability and piercing the corporate veil 
depended on the same material facts. 
The Restatement language approved in Diamond is consistent with the results, and the 
rationale, of Diamond, Ticor, Magic Valley and other Idaho cases. Under that language, the 
"factual grouping" that constitutes a "transaction" is the question. A "factual grouping" refers to 
the "operative" facts or the "material" facts creating a claim.55 The answer is to be arrived at 
53 
" .•• Ticor could have and should have responded [in the bankruptcy] that it already paid the 
amount in question to Stanion .... Thus, the operative underlying facts of the prior motions 
made in bankruptcy court and Ticor's present unjust enrichment claim against Stanion are the 
same. Both situations stem from the factual transaction of Ticor' s agreement to handle the sale 
of Stanion's property and its overpayment of sale proceeds to Stanion." 144 Idaho at 126 (italics 
added). 
54 Id., 144 Idaho at 126. 
55 As the Diamond Court noted, the emphasis on "claims that arise out of the same 'operative 
facts' in the 1973 version of the Restatement was a forerunner to Section 24 and its use of the 
phrase 'the same transaction or series of transactions[.]"' 119 Idaho at 149. 
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"pragmatically." A "pragmatic" analysis will not result in barring a claim that depends on 
undiscoverable facts; it will not require a party to do the impossible. 
The focus of the Restatement language is on what it would be realistic to expect parties to 
do. So whether the "factual grouping" forms a "convenient trial unit" is a factor-meaning, in 
light of the facts of which the parties were aware, or should have been aware in the exercise of 
diligence and in light of modern rules of discovery and pleading, what claims could and should 
have been brought. The Court should also consider the "parties' expectations" and their 
"business understanding." The Trust had no "expectation" that the home Storey had built 
contained concealed defects; the Trust had a "business understanding" that a responsible 
contractor would acknowledge and fix defects, not cover them up. And the parties agreed that 
only "known" claims are required to be brought in any particular arbitration proceeding. This 
clear contract provision removes any doubt about what a "convenient trial unit" is and what the 
parties' "expectations" were: both depend on what the plaintiff knew. With or without this 
contract provision, however, the "pragmatic" approach to the res judicata analysis that this Court 
has consistently followed does not require the Trust to make claims that depend on facts the 
Trust could not have discovered, on pain of forever losing the light to bdng such claims.56 
The Trust's pro f01ma allegation of defective work in the first arbitration does not alter 
the outcome. Kawai made a broad allegation of misrepresentation regarding the condition of the 
56 Even if there were a basis to apply res judicata to bar the Trust from pursuing its 2007 Defect 
Arbitration, there is no ground to extend the bar to Mr. Hanks, who was not a party to the Trust's 
counterclaim in the 2003 Payment Arbitration. Storey' s allegations that Mr. Hanks and Ms. 
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property in the first snit, just as the Trust made a protective allegation of defects here. But the 
claim of misrepresentation of the water supply depended on different operative facts from the 
misrepresentation claims at issue in the first case-the factual "transaction" was different. 
The Trust is also entitled to the inference that Storey knew of, but concealed, its own 
defective work by covering it up in 2002. Storey created the defects so Storey's knowledge of 
them is inescapable, but Storey did not admit to them or correct them but concealed them. 
Storey again failed to correct the defects when they revealed themselves, instead invoking res 
judicata to escape its responsibility. This element of the instant case has a parallel in Kawai 
Farms. As the Kawai Farms Court stated: 
Kawai, as with any reasonable person, might very well have believed himself to 
be transacting business with a gentleman of honor, not at all given to deceitful 
ways and words.57 
The Trust had reason to believe that a responsible contractor would acknowledge and 
address defective work rather than cover it up, and Storey had a duty to do so, a direct 
parallel to Kawai Farms. 
Storey has made a further argument, paralleling the error the district court made 
in Kawai Farms. There, the district court articulated a valid principle, but misapplied it: 
Res judicata bars relitigation of the same claim even if there is new evidence to 
support it. The claim, that false representations were made about the 
characteristics of the property and that because of the allegedly false claims the 
property has a lower value, ... is the same claim. 121 Idaho at 613 (italics 
added). 
Wilson used the Trust as their "alter ego" have already been rejected by the arbitrators in the 
2003 Payment Arbitration. See n.7, supra. 
57 121 Idaho at 615. 
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This statement assumes without analysis that the claim is the same. That is the question, 
not the answer. If the "new evidence" consists of the facts without which there is no 
claim, those facts are not "new evidence" to support the same claim; they are the claim-
a new claim. In reversing the lower court's ruling in Kawai Farms, this Court's analysis 
clarified that the prior "claim" is not defined by its broad legal label ("false 
representations about the property"), but by the facts on which it was based. 
By contrast, if a party previously has or could have litigated the material facts on which a 
claim depends, he cannot re-litigate those material facts by simply (1) changing the legal label or 
theory or (2) offering new evidence to support that identical claim. As to mere new evidence, res 
judicata 
prevent[s] relitigation by mere introduction of cumulative evidence bearing on a 
simple historic fact that has once been decided. Thus an express determination 
that one driver entered an intersection with a green traffic light should not be 
denied preclusive effect because of testimony from a new witness that the light 
was red. So much is common ground. 
18 Wright, Miller and Cooper, Fed. Prac. and Proc.: Jurisdiction 2d § 4417 at 431 (2002). 
The Court of Appeals applied the "operative fact" analysis in Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 
254, 668 P.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1983). In Aldape the "central operative fact-the movement of the 
Boise River," gave rise to the plaintiffs' first suit to quiet title in himself on the legal theory of 
adverse possession, and was also the material fact in the second suit on which the plaintiff's new 
theory of accretion depended. The "transaction" was the movement of the Boise River; that 
"fact" was known at the time of the first proceeding and was the factual predicate both for the 
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first claim and for the second. 105 Idaho at 260-6 I. 
2. The Trial Court Accepted Storey's Invitation to Rely on Out-of-State 
Authority to Define the "Transaction," but Even that Authority Does not 
Support the Ruling. 
The trial court accepted Storey's invitation to misapply the "transactional" analysis to the 
res judicata issue. The trial court concluded that, when Storey ceased work on the project, the 
relevant "transaction" ended at that point, and all possible future claims that related to that 
contract-whether the facts on which they depended were known or unknown, discoverable or 
not-would have to be brought in whatever proceeding was first filed between the parties, or be 
barred thereafter by res judicata. Judge Elgee explained: 
I think this current claim made by defendants is the same claim under the res 
judicata analysis that's made in the first arbitration. It's based on the operative set 
of facts of construction of the buildings and that operative set of facts ended when 
the construction ended. . . . So while there might have been separate causation of 
damages or experience of damages, the event here, the transaction here, to me, is 
the construction contract. Tr, Vol. I, p. 201, L. 13-24 (italics added). 
Storey persuaded the trial court to reach this conclusion in part by arguing that 
Wateifront Marine Construction, Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups, A, B, 
and C, 468 S.E. 2d 894 (Va. 1996) ("WMC'), was directly on point and supported preclusion. 
Adopting Storey's characterization of WMC, the trial court concluded that, because there was 
on! y a single construction contract between the parties, there can be only one overall factual 
"transaction" from which all claims arise for purposes of res judicata. The principle Storey and 
the trial court erroneously drew from the case is completely at odds with Idaho law. They also 
misread WMC. The actual ruling in the case is consistent with Idaho law and does not support 
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preclusion here. 
In WMC, res judicata applied because the plaintiff sued twice on the same construction 
defect-i.e., the claims were the same because they were predicated on the same material facts. 
The second action merely proceeded on a different legal theory. 
WMC designed and built a bulkhead for a landowners' association, the 49ers. The 49ers 
obtained expert engineering reports identifying defects in WMC's design and construction, and 
brought the first arbitration charging breach of contract based on these defects.58 The association 
sought damages based on the cost of work it contended was necessary to correct the identified 
defects in the bulkhead. The arbitration panel denied the association's claim, but ordered that the 
contractor complete certain additional work on the project. 59 
A storm occurred and the bulkhead was damaged. The association filed a second 
arbitration alleging the same defects60 this time on a theory of breach of the warranty provision 
of the same contract, seeking the now-increased damages resulting from the storm's impact. The 
Virginia Supreme Court held that res judicata barred the suit. 
In WMC the storm did not reveal new, previously undiscoverable defects; rather, the 
stortn--or so the association alleged--caused damage that would have been avoided but for the 
58 
"The inspection report concluded that the bulkhead design and construction were defective." 
486 S.E.2d at 896 (italics added). 
59 The contractor did not complete the work. This failure became a separate issue in the second 
groceeding. 
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"[The association claims] that WMC breached Paragraph 3.5.1 of the construction contract 
which contains the contractor's warranties against defective construction and design of the 
bulkhead." 486 S.E.2d at 900 (italics added). I.e., the second arbitration was based on the 
identical expert report of defective design and construction as the first. 
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very same alleged defects the original expert report had identified. The first arbitration panel 
rejected the association's claims based on that expert report-i.e., the specific facts constituting 
the claims of defective design and construction had been presented, tried, and rejected. 
WMC is a garden variety res judicata ruling, standing only for the proposition that a party 
may not substitute a new legal theory in order to re-litigate a claim arising from the same 
material facts-the same specific alleged defects that were identified ( or certainly were 
identifiable) in the first action. 
The language in the WMC opinion that appears to have led the trial court into error is: 
... The storm damage to the bulkhead after the first arbitration did not 
increase or alter the contractual rights the [association] acquired at the time the 
contract was executed. Furthermore, no plans were altered and no work was 
performed on the bulkhead between the filing of the first and second demands for 
arbitration. The damages suffered as a result of the alleged defects may have 
increased when the bulkhead collapsed, but any defects in construction and design 
which existed at the time of the first arbitration had not changed at the time of the 
second demand for arbitration. 
Furthermore, even though the first demand described only specific defects, 
the doctrine of res judicata applies to all claims which could have been brought, 
thereby preventing a party from splitting his cause of action. 
WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 904 (citations omitted). Storey argued that this and similar language in 
WMC meant that any claim arising from the bulkhead "transaction" had to be tried in the first 
arbitration or be forever barred-and that the touchstone inquiry was whether any "work was 
performed" since the first arbitration and whether any "defects had ... changed .... "61 If WMC 
had so held, its ruling would be contrary to Idaho law, but WMC did not so hold. 
61 Tr, Vol. I, p. 128, L. 21-p. 129, L. 20. 
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There was no claim in WMC of defects in design or construction that could not have been 
reasonably discovered at the time of the first arbitration: 
Here, the [association] had engaged an engineer to evaluate the bulkhead 
prior to filing its first demand for arbitration. Their engineer reported that the 
design and construction of the bulkhead was deficient. In the first arbitration, the 
49ers chose to limit the items of alleged deficient construction and design. 
Having made that choice, they are not entitled to bring forward additional items at 
a later date, particularly when ... there had been no further construction or design 
· · 62 activity .... 
The association knew at the time of the first arbitration of all of the design and 
construction defects that they invoked later under a breach of warranty theory; they elected to 
emphasize certain of them. The Trust here made no "election." It had no knowledge of the 
defects on which the current claim depends. The WMC ruling was predicated on the identity of 
the factual basis for the two claims. There is not a word in the opinion suggesting that the 
association based its second claim on newly-discovered defects that they could not have 
discovered with reasonable diligence initially. Rather the ruling was: 
The claim for breach of warranty ... in their second arbitration demand 
was no different than the claim for breach of contract asserted in the first .... 
Labeling the claim a breach of warranty rather than a breach of contract does not 
alter the nature of the claim.63 
In WMC, the court applied the rule that whether a claim is identical is a function of the 
underlying facts, not the label applied to the claim. Idaho law is parallel. 
62 WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 904 (italics added). 
63 Id. at 904. 
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3. The Date of "Accrual" of the Trust's Claims for Statute of Limitations 
Purposes Does Not Control the Application of Res Judicata, But in Any 
Event the Trust's Breach of Contract Claims "Accrued" on Discovery of the 
Latent Defects. 
Storey may argue (though the issue was not addressed below) that the Trust's breach of 
contract claims for latent defects "accrued" for statute of limitations purposes when the contract 
was deficiently performed and that this "accrual" rule bears upon the application of res judicata. 
This potential argument is addressed in this section. 
Whether a claim has "accrued" does not control whether the material facts underlying it 
were, or reasonably could have been, known at the time of accrual. Application of res judicata 
depends on the latter, not on the fonner. Whether a "discovery" rule applies to the accrual of a 
claim for statute of limitation purposes also does not control when res judicata applies: i.e., as 
long as the statute of limitations has not run following "accrual," a party can bring a claim that 
had "accrued" at the time of the first action but was not then discoverable. There is no sound 
policy reason for a statute of limitations accrual rule--which sets an outside time limit for 
bringing a claim--to control the application of res judicata, which properly depends on a 
pragmatic assessment of what claims the party could and should have tried in the first action. 
In this case the Trust has both contract and tort claims against Storey. Even if the issue 
of "accrual" were germane to the res judicata analysis, both the tort and contract claims 
"accrued" when the latent defects were discovered. 
a. This Court has Applied a Discovery Rule to the Accrual of 
Breach of Contract Claims for Statute of Limitations Purposes. 
The issue of the relationship (or lack thereof) between the accrual of a claim for statute of 
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limitations purposes and the application of res judicata was involved in Hall v. Forsloff, 124 
Idaho 771,864 P.2d 609 (1993), which addressed claims arising from the sale of a business. 
Hall, the buyer, had sued the Forsloffs, sellers, for a) fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the 
financial condition of the business and b) breach of contract in failing to deliver promised assets. 
In a prior action, the Forsloffs had sued Hall for breach of Hall's obligation to assume certain 
debts; judgment was entered in favor of the Forsloffs, incorporating an agreement requiring 
novation of those debts. In the second action, Hall's claims for fraud and breach of contract 
were dismissed by the trial court based on res judicata. This Court affinned dismissal of the 
breach of contract claims and reversed dismissal of the fraud claims. 
In affirming dismissal of the breach of contract claims, the Court noted that such claims 
accrue at the time of the breach. The Court did not expressly discuss whether Hall knew or 
should have known of the failure to deliver promised assets at the time of the first action, but 
held that the claim was a compulsory counterclaim in the first action; that the "transaction" was 
the same; and that the claim therefore should have been brought in the first action and was barred 
by res judicata. 64 The Court remanded the fraud claims to the trial court based on Kawai Farms, 
64 124 Idaho at 774. The Hall Court applied the Kawai Farms analysis to the plaintiff's fraud 
claim, and held res judicata did not bar the claim because there was a question of fact whether 
the plaintiff should have discovered the misrepresented value of the business and its assets in 
time to assert the claim in the first suit. Id. at 774-75. The Court did not apply the same Kawai 
Farms analysis to the breach of contract claim arising from the same facts. The Court did apply 
Kawai Farms to contractual claims two years later, however, after dismissing all of the plaintiff's 
fraud claims, in Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 560-61, 903 P.2d 147 
(Id. 1995) (holding a seller that obtained a judgment for nonpayment against the corporate buyer 
was not barred from bringing a second action to collect the debt from the major shareholder 
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holding that there was a question of fact whether Hall could reasonably have discovered the 
misrepresentations of the financial condition of the business at the time of the first action.65 
It is unclear whether the Hall court regarded accrual of the breach of contract claim as the 
key factor in the res judicata analysis. In this case, the Trust's claims are not barred by res 
judicata even if Hall is read to imply a link between accrual and the res judicata analysis. 
In ruling on the question when the contract claims accrued, the Court in Hall expressly 
relied on Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Wickam Pipeline Construction, 114 Idaho 565, 759 P.2d 71 
(1988).66 Farmers analyzes Idaho Code§ 28-2-725, the portion of the Idaho Uniform 
Commercial Code governing when contractual causes of action for sales of goods accrue for 
statute of limitations purposes. 
The Idaho UCC recognizes that contract claims of breach of express and implied 
warranties like those asserted in this case (e.g., the roof warranty) do not accrue nntil the "breach 
is or should have been discovered." Idaho Code 28-2-725(2), quoted in Farmers, states that in 
sales of goods under the UCC: 
.... A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that 
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and 
personally, because at the time of the first suit the seller had not been aware of specific factual 
gounds to assert personal liability). 
5 124 Idaho at 775. 
66 Cited in Hall at 774. For its holding that a claim for breach of contract "accrues" at the time of 
the contract, the court in Hall cited both Famiers and WT. Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Atwater, 33 
Idaho 399, 195 P. 545 (1921). Both cases held only that the statute of limitations begins to run 
on a claim for breach of contract at the time of the breach. In both Farmers and Rawleigh the 
plaintiff apparently was fully aware of the fact of the breach at the time it occurred. Neither case 
addressed whether the claim "could have been brought" in a prior action for purposes of res 
judicata. 
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discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of 
action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. 
See Farmers, 114 Idaho at 567-568 & n.2, quoting LC.§ 28-2-725(1)-(2) (italics added). 
If the issue of accrual for statute of limitations purposes properly had auy bearing on the 
application of res judicata-which it does not-the primary breach of contract claims in this case 
did not "accrue" until the defects hidden within and beneath the roof and otherwise concealed 
were discoverable. The contract explicitly recognizes that the work entailed future obligations, 
including a warranty of the roof extending fot five years after its completion. See n.5, supra. 
Storey' s construction of the roof proved to be a) a major latent defect and b) one of the means by 
which Storey concealed those defects. Even after the damage began to appear, many of the 
specific defects were not discoverable until the roof was removed and the repair work was 
undertaken in the summer and fall of 2008. Because, unlike the sellers in Hall, Storey had 
continuing obligations to the Trust (including obligations to make the very repairs that the Trust 
itself performed through the fall of 2008), the Trust's claims did not accrue even for statute of 
limitations purposes until the defects materialized, and many of them did not materialize until the 
repairs were actually undertaken. 
Hall is also distinct because in this case the trial court expressly assumed that the Trnst 
could not have brought any of the latent defect claims at the time of the first action. 67 By 
contrast, although the Hall Court did not expressly discuss the discoverability issue in applying 
res judicata to the breach of contract claims, the trial court in that case indicated that the plaintiff 
67 Tr, Vol. I, p. 194, L. 7-9. 
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had been on notice of his claim. In denying a motion for reconsideration of its res judicata 
ruling, the trial court noted that the 
uncontroverted fact that the plaintiff had operated the business for ten months 
after it was sold to him, coupled with the execution of the detailed novation 
agreement after the business had been operated by the plaintiff for approximately 
ten months, operates to shift the burden of production to the plaintiff. 124 Idaho 
at 772-73. 
Outside the DCC, this Court has applied a "discovery" rule to determine when other 
breach of contract claims accrue for statute of limitations purposes. In Galvin v. Appleby, 78 
Idaho 457, 305 P.2d 309 (1956), plaintiffs were assignees of the purchasers of improved real 
property. The seller had represented that the buildings were located within the property 
boundaries. Plaintiffs later discovered that the buildings encroached on an adjoining city street, 
apparently when the city demanded that they remove the encroachments so that the city could 
improve the street. Plaintiffs sued for damages for breach of contract. The court held the action 
was timely under the statute of limitations because the evidence showed that "the first knowledge 
plaintiffs had of the encroachments" was in 1952, and their action was brought in 1954.68 
Similarly, in Lido Van & Storage, Inc. v. Kuck, 110 Idaho 939, 719 P.2d 1199 (1986), the 
plaintiff sued to quiet title in a road crossing his property and for breach of the contract of sale, 
alleging that the seller had represented that the road was no longer a public highway so that the 
buyer could "build over the road." This Court held that the road remained a public highway and 
affirmed dismissal of the breach of contract claim based on the statute of limitations, but only 
because the public use of the road had been apparent to the buyer at the time of purchase Id. at 
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941. The court concluded: 
An action upon any contract founded upon a written instrument must be brought 
within five years. It is clear that given the above-stated knowledge of Lido that 
the injury, if any, in this matter occurred at the time the contract was executed, 
January 19, 1974. Id. at 942 (italics added). 
b. This Court Has Consistently Recognized that Application of Res 
Judicata to Both Breach of Contract and Tort Claims Depends on 
Whether the Material Facts Underlying the Claim Were Known at the 
Time of the First Action. 
This Court has applied the basic principle of the Kawai Farms case in res judicata 
analysis of both tort and contract claims. For example, in Magic Valley, a breach of contract 
case in which the issue was whether there was individual liability, the Court held that res 
judicata applied because 
Magic Valley was on notice in Magic Valley I that there might be a basis to pierce 
the corporate veil .... We can reach only one conclusion: Magic Valley did not 
exercise due diligence to discover its claim to pierce the corporate veil. 
Magic Valley, 123 Idaho at 439.69 The Court did not hold that the claim had to be brought 
without regard to knowledge of the material facts simply because it had "accrued" for statute of 
limitations purposes at the time of the first action. 
This Court took the same approach-with the opposite result-in Durrant v. Quality 
First Marketing, Inc. 127 Idaho 558, 903 P.2d 147 (Ct. App. 1995). Durrant, the seller in a 
contract to sell pinto beans, sued the buyer, QFM, for nonpayment, alleging breach of contract 
68 78 Idaho at 463 (italics added). 
69 See also Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754, 663 P.2d 287 (1983) (res judicata 
inapplicable where matters raised in the second litigation had not been ripe for adjudication in 
the prior action). 
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and fraud. In Action 1, Durrant obtained a default judgment. In Action 2, Durrant sought to 
pierce the corporate veil to hold the sole director and shareholder of QFM personally liable for 
the breach. Durrant's fraud claims had been dismissed in Action 1, so Action 2 (like Magic 
Valley) involved only the breach of contract claim. The trial court upheld the breach of contract 
claim against the shareholder in the face of an argument based on res judicata. In affirming, this 
Court did not ask whether the claim of breach and individual liability had "accrued" at the time 
of Action 1, but held: 
... unlike Magic Valley, in this case there was substantial evidence indicating that 
Durrant was not on notice of a basis to pierce the corporate veil at the time he 
brought his initial action against QFM. 127 Idaho at 560 (italics added). 
The Court thus distinguished Magic Valley. The key point is that both Magic Valley and 
Durrant approached the res judicata issue in a breach of contract case by asking whether the 
material facts creating the claim were known at the time of Action 1, not by asking whether a 
claim for breach of contract had accrued at the time of Action l. 
c. The Hall Decision Does Not Supporl the Trial Courl's Application of 
Res Judicata to the Trust's Tort Claims. 
The Hall v. Fors/off decision does not support affirmance of the trial court's ruling here 
for another reason: Hall squarely held that, at a minimum, Kawai Fanns bars application of res 
judicata to tort claims based on facts that were not known or reasonably discoverable at the time 
of the first action. Hall, 124 Idaho at 774-75. 
As in Hall, the Trust is entitled to pursue tort claims against Storey for the latent 
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construction defects. Such non-contractual claims are expressly acknowledged in the Contract.70 
The Trust's arbitration demand in the Defect Arbitration sets forth facts concerning the defects 
that support both contractual and tort liability. 71 It states in relevant part: 
This claim arises out of defective construction and/or design of the improvements 
commonly referred to as Church Camp 2 ... (the "Property"). The Property 
consists of a main house and three guest cottages that have suffered problems, 
including but not limited to the following: snow dams, roof failures, improper 
roof ventilation, water intrusion, improper ventilation of chimneys, underground 
water leakage, surface drainage issues, improper structural connections, and 
[shear] wall failures. Each of these conditions have resulted from both 
construction and design deficiencies, errors and omissions. Claimant's 
investigation is ongoing and the list of defects and design errors set forth above is 
not intended to be a complete list. ... (Id. at p. 1.) 
The Trust's briefs to the trial court also emphasized that the Trust had tort claims for latent 
defects that could not have arisen until the defects were known or discoverable, and thus those 
tort claims could not be barred by res judicata. R, Vol. II, pp. 380-82. The trial court's ruling 
implicitly-and erroneously-holds these tort claims are equally barred by res judicata. 
70 See Ap, No. 3, p. 36, 'l[ 13.4.1. ("Rights and Remedies" provision states that "[d]uties and 
obligations imposed by the Contract Documents and rights and remedies available thereunder 
shall be in addition to and not a limitation of duties, obligations, rights and remedies otherwise 
imposed or available by law"). 
71 R, Vol. I, p. 29. The Trust's arbitration demand in the Defect Arbitration is governed by the 
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules ("CIAR") of the American Arbitration Association, 
which require that the Trust's arbitration demand state only "the nature of the dispute." CIAR 
Rule R-4. Even in a civil action, the complaint need not list specific legal theories and must only 
inform the defendant of material facts on which the suit is based. Idaho Civil Rule 8(a); Quinto 
v. Millwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162, 167, 938 P.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1997). In 
general, arbitration demands need not be as detailed as a civil complaint, and are liberally 
construed. See, e.g., Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Donau Corp., 981 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Haase Construction Co., Inc. v. Strohmeyer, 738 So.2d 152, 156 n.2 (La. App. 1999). The 
material facts stated in the Trust's demand are more than sufficient to support both contractual 
and non-contractual theories of liability. 
38 
Idaho law permits the Trust the opportunity to plead and prove well-established common 
law causes of action for constructive fraud, misrepresentation and breach of express and implied 
wananty. For example, this Court ruled in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698 
(1966), that where a contractor creates construction defects that are known to the contractor, but 
unknown to the purchasers, and not discoverable upon reasonable inspection, the contractor's 
failure to disclose such defects supports claims for constructive fraud and breach of implied 
warranties. Id. at 59-61, 67-68. In Bethlahmy, the contractor during construction filled in an 
irrigation ditch adjoining the house, unknown to the purchasers, thereby concealing the cause of 
subsequent water intrusion into the house. The Court, relying on the Restatement of the Law 
Second, Torts,§ 551(1), held that the contractor's superior knowledge gave rise to an affirmative 
duty to disclose, the violation of which constituted fraud, regardless of the contractor's intent to 
deceive.72 Accord, e.g., G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 520-21, 808 P.2d 
851 (1991) (seller' s failure to disclose like! y unsuitability of irrigation system that could not be 
discovered until after purchase and installation stated cause of action for fraud, citing 
Bethlahmy). Any representations by the contractor as to its expertise or the quality of the 
construction may also give rise to oral express warranties. 73 Here, the record shows not only 
Storey' s nondisclosure but also active concealment of major defects, together with untrue 
72 Id. at 59-60. This substantial disparity between the contractor's knowledge of the defects and 
the owners' inability to discover them parallels the disparity in the consequences for each of 
them if the owners' claim is not allowed to proceed when the defects are discovered. It is not an 
excessive burden to require a contractor to defend its work in the face of substantial evidence of 
major defects, but it may be catastrophic to a homeowner to be barred forever from recovering 
for major flaws in the construction. 
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representations that the work was performed according to the plans and specifications and free 
from faulty workmanship, giving rise to claims for misrepresentation and constructive fraud. 
This Court has also recognized that a contractor may be liable for negligence where a 
contractor negligently fails to construct the building in accordance with the architectural plans, or 
follows plans that contain defects the contractor should have noticed. See Craig Johnson 
Construction, L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 802-803, 134 P.3d 648 
(2006) ( defective construction caused ice dams to form on roofs, causing leaks and property 
damage). As explained in the Brief of the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae, 
this Court recognized in Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987), that 
the law should be protective of homeowners' claims for latent defects because the contractor is 
in a better position both to prevent latent defects and to spread the financial loss from such 
defects when they do occur. Id., 113 Idaho at 47-48, 740 P.2d at 1032-33. 
The trial court's ruling barred the Trust from presenting evidence in support of its 
tort claims, but even the limited facts contained in the record on this appeal indicate a 
basis for the Trust to plead one or more of these non-contractual causes of action under 
Idaho Jaw, compelling reversal even on the narrowest possible reading of Hall. 
4. The Trial Court's Ruling Violates the Policy Underlying the Res 
Judicata Doctrine. 
The trial court's ruling ignores the policy reasons underlying the res judicata doctrine, all 
of which are inconsistent with its application here. In Ticor, this Court held that res judicata 
73 Bethlahmy, 91 Idaho at 61. 
40 
must be applied in a way that serves its purposes, which the Court listed: 
(1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the 
corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to 
inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against 
the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in 
repose from the harassment of repetitive claims .14 
None of these policies are implicated here. There is no risk of inconsistent results, repetitious 
litigation or repetitive claims where the claim in Action 2 was unknown-and by definition 
untried-in Action 1. There will be a second arbitration, but it is not "repetitive," and, under the 
inferences to which the Trust is entitled, the need for a second arbitration arose from Storey's 
tortious failure to acknowledge and repair rather than cover up his own defective work. 
For these reasons, the Comt should reverse the trial court's ruling and enter an order 
requiring arbitration of the Trust's latent defect claims. 
B. The Parties' Contract Required Arbitration of Contract Defenses Such As Res 
Judicata, and.the Trial Court Erred in Deciding the Res Judicata Issue Itself. 
There is no basis on this record for the application of collateral estoppel: i.e., there is no 
basis for any contention that the latent defect claims were tried in the Payment Arbitration. If, 
however, any such issue did survive the ruling on this appeal, the parties have agreed that any 
issue of either res judicata or collateral estoppel will be decided in the arbitration. Under Idaho 
law, there is a strong presumption that issues in the dispute are within the scope of the arbitration 
clause. See Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944, 948 (Idaho 
2007) (recognizing "a strong public policy which favors arbitration"). Idaho's version of the 
74 Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123 (italics added). 
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Uniform Arbitration Act, adopted in 1975, provides: 
[A] provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy 
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
LC. § 7-901. 
Under the statute, a party may challenge the agreement to arbitrate by raising grounds sufficient 
for the "revocation of [the] contract." Id. A court may consider and resolve those challenges-
such as fraud, mistake or duress-to the validity of the parties' agreement to the contract 
containing the arbitration clause, or to the validity of their agreement to the arbitration clause 
itself.75 Here there is no dispute that there is a valid "agreement to arbitrate."76 
If there is doubt or ambiguity as to whether a particular claim or dispute is subject to 
arbitration, Idaho follows the established rule that those"[ d]oubts are to be resolved in favor of 
arbitration." Mason, 177 P.3d at 948 (italics added), quoting Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 
No. 672 v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 162, 168, 30 P.3d 940, 946 (2001). An issue is within the 
arbitration clause unless "it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers" the issue. Mason, 177 P.3d at 948. 
Storey and the Trust agreed to a sweeping arbitration provision that includes not only 
claims "arising out of' the contract but also disputes that are only "related to" the contract: 
Any Claim arising out of or related to the Contract, except Claims related to 
aesthetic effect and except those waived as provided for in Subparagraphs 4.3.10 
(consequential damages), 9.10.4 and 9.10.5, shall, after decision by the Architect 
or 30 days after submission of the Claim to the Architect, be subject to arbitration. 
75 See Loomis v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 109-110, 656 P.2d 1359 (1983). 
76 See Mason, 177 P.3d at 948; Loomis, 104 Idaho at 110. 
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Ap, No. 3, p. 21, 'J[ 4.6.1 (italics added). The clause has exceptions, but none for res judicata. 
Storey could rebut the presumption of arbitrability only with concrete evidence of an agreement 
to exempt res judicata or collateral estoppel from the arbitration clause. There is none. 
There is nothing special about the application of claim or issue preclusion principles that 
requires decision by a court rather than arbitrators, and, if the question were whether specific 
issues raised in the first action were the same as those litigated in the second, pragmatism 
strongly supports assigning this question to those who will hear the second dispute. Storey's 
assertion of res judicata is an affirmative defense. 77 It is obviously as much an issue "relating" 
to the contract as the claims that Storey argues are precluded. To the extent any collateral 
estoppel issue exists (none does), it makes little sense for the trial court to conduct a "mini-trial" 
to compare the specific issues raised in the second arbitration to those raised in the first when the 
arbitrators will be ploughing the identical ground simply to hear the case. See North River Ins. 
Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (arbitrators are equally capable 
of addressing and applying doctrines of preclusion arising from prior arbitration awards); 
Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). 
The trial court erroneously applied what was effectively a reverse presumption: Judge 
El gee ruled that Storey' s res judicata defense could not be arbitrated unless the clause 
77 The construction contract is governed by Idaho law. Res judicata is an affirmative defense 
that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Ticor, 144 Idaho at 122. Idaho's Rules 
of Civil Procedure specify that res judicata is among the affirmative defenses to be pied in 
response to a preceding pleading. I.R.C.P. 8(c). 
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specifically provided for it.78 For that holding, Judge Elgee again relied entirely on the Virginia 
court's WMC decision,79 but the Virginia court's decision in WMC was at odds with Idaho's 
declared public policy favoring arbitration and honoring the parties' agreement to arbitrate their 
disputes. Under Idaho law, the patties' contract controls, and resolves doubts in favor of 
arbitration. Courts may not selectively impose presumptions against arbitration of patticular 
issues. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's July 2, 2008 Order and 
remand with directions to dismiss Storey's Complaint for Abuse of Process with prejudice and to 
enter an order requiring arbitration of the Trust's claims. 
II I 
I II 
I II 
II I 
. I II 
I II 
78 Tr, Vol. I, p. 65, L. 12-17, p. 66, L. 5-9 (emphasis added). 
79 WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 903. In addition, WMC relied cases that simply hold that the trier of fact 
in the second proceeding may determine whether a prior decision has res judicata effect in that 
second proceeding. See id. citing, e.g., Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 
1352 (11th Cir. 1985). Here, the second proceeding is the Trust's Defect Arbitration. 
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DATED this JO-!!) day of January, 2009. 
n, ISB#l866 
DANIELSON HARRIGAN LEYH & 
TOLLEFSON LLP 
~~~~ 
ArthurW. Harrigan, Jr., WSBA #1751 
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und .the Contractor: 
(Nam• ""dqddrm) 
Stmey C!>nmniction Inc. 
323 N •. Lewis sireet 
Ketcbmn, ID 8.3340 · 
. Attn: Gary $1!)ri)y 
· l'h!>ne; (208) 726-11816 
Fa:x: (208) 726-218.0 . 
The Projectis: 
. (Name41Jdl0$Xlilo1i} 
·The Archit¢ct is: 
(N;.,,.®d~ 
· · Ll!kWFJato A.rehit¢cts, lni: •. 
311 Thi!'d Sireet, S}nte 200 
S'°' Antonio, TX 78205 
Attn: David Lake, fAlA 
Phone; (210)22703335 
. Fax: (210) 224-9515 
The OW'1er and Co11tracmr.agreeas follows. 
1211so11..;.5.ooc 
,/ 
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ARTICLE 1 THE CONTitACT bOCIJMl:NTS 
The CpiiJrnct Po-ts cpnsist Q{lbis Agreement, ConiJijiQDS ·Q:f lhe Contr;ict (Oeile,ai; Suppl~ llll!l olher Conditions), 
,.··"•\ Drawings, Specifica\iolis, .Addenda issued ·piior I!) .execution .of Jbis Agreement, 91her docume~ lislei! in Jbis Agn,~ent .811(1 
.,fi\·.\ 7 ~oilifications. ~ ~ ei<eclJtipn of Jbis ~j\t!lem!lllt; ~ fprm tbe ~9!m3\'t, 1md ale as Mly a van of tbe i::ontrru:t ,as if 
·· · ) . ) .attacbed to Jbis !\.gn,ement or ti,peall:d liete.m. Th.e Contract. to(lelher mth the p~ bo)ld a)ld payment l,ond; 1f any, 
' 1·el'ri,sent lhe entir!l a)ld integmted ~ment between !he J1arties hereto and snpQde prior negoµ;itjons, repre$ti®lti!>US . Qt 
ligrelen:tilllts, ~it.her written or oral. !l,n .AAmil\lr;,tjon ()f ti)!) Contr!,tt ~ Plh!lr tbJm Mlidilications, app.e!IIII ln Article I~. Jf 
~g inlhe olher Comract DQl:urnents is lncons~nt with this.Agreement, lhis Af,reetnent shall govem. ·· 
AR1'1CLE 2 THE WORK Of TlilS CO~RACT 
The Contractor s!tl!ll Mly eXi:tllte lhe WoJ!c d~lled ~ Jhe ~ Doc1!lllents, excepttothe ~t specificallylndiCl\ted in 
·Jh<:l Conll'l!ctl)ocwnents w be ti)!) ri,spo11Sit,il/ly of others. · 
M11C.LE 3 RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARllES 
The -ConlrlwlQr acci,pts the :relationship eslablisbed .by Jbis Agreement and covenants witb'lhe Owner to cooj>emte with-the 
Architect .and 1>Xetcise the Conttactors s:ldll an.ii J11dginent in :furlh!ll'ing the interest,; of lhe Owner; to furilisb. efficient J>usiness 
~tiol) IJJlit supen,jsion; to funµsli Jlt all times an adequate supply of workers and materials; il!ld JO perform the WQrkin an 
1>xpeditio11S and economi® Jl)liJmer cons~nt with the Owners intereirts. The ~r agrees tl> furnish and approve, in a timely 
manner, .informati1>il regli)red by .the C1>ntractor .IJJld w ~ p;tyments ti> the Conll'llctor in accordmice wilh the requirements pf 
the C!>ntl.'act DQtuments: . 
ARTICLE 4 DATE: OF COMMENCEMENT AND SUBSTANTIAL CO!','IPLETION 
.4.1 The date .l>f co)Dllleilcement of.the Wilde sball be :the !late oflhis Agreement unless a different date is stated below Qr provision 
ill made fpr :the date to 'be fixed in a notice to ptoi:ced issned by the·OWner • 
. (lnwt th~ ¢ate ofcor,unenceinent. if it differs.JTfmuhe dale o/Jlns.4_greeme'Jl or, .if applicable, stat, that ihe.~te w/11 ~d In a notice .to proceeil.) 
July 21, 2000 
If,_prior tl> commencement oftheWorlc, the Ownetrequires time to file mortgages, mechanic's liens:and other seCllrity interests, 
the Owner's lime require/llCllt.sball :be as follows: 
4.2 The Contract Tii:ne .i;bal) be measured fu>m the dare of comme11cement 
4.3 The Cpnt@ctl>; sbal) achh:ve .Sid>stantial Comvletion pf the entire Wo~ oot later than (lays from the date •llf connnencement, 
~r:as f'l>llows: . . 
(Insf!(I nu»!b.er .(!/ ca/e,¢ar days.:Alternatively,,a ,cqlemkrr .date may ~ used when .coordinated }!Ith t/u?. dat_e of commencement. Unless stated il.MPltere .In the Contmct 
DoCUJnelJ/S, in:serlany requirements for earlier-SulMtanJiol CompJeiion .of ~tainp:ortions ·of ihe Work) 
Tf,e Work sm:,!l he (:f}mpleted by M,,,<:h :/'!, ;JOQ.2 i11o .at:t:ordance with the s.cheilule oJtached hwet,;, and incorporated 
herein.os.Exhi/iit I. See 4d41!ndum q#pched hereto and int::Prporated herein by re[erem:e. · 
, s11bjecO!l adj11Stmenl$ _l>f this Contract Tone aspiovided in the CoJJtract Docurnenjs. 
(I>ueitpr(Wisions., tfany,for ltquldaleddamages Ni/QtlrJ_g,tofoi~e to .complete tm time, orfor,bpnusfl(ljmentsfor earlyet;,11qil¢on-ofthe ff'prk.) 
A!mCLE 513ASIS .FOR PAYMENT 
' ) 
. ) 
~.1 CONTRACTSU.M , . . . . 
•5.1.1 the Own.er.sltllll pay the C::on~r the.Contract SUIJ) in immediately available U.S. funds for lhe Contractor's performance 
pf the Cl>nlract. The .Contract Sum is the Cost of thi:Work as defined in Article 7 plus the CpnttactQrs Fee. Contractor 
aclo)PW!edgi,s baving received as .1>f1anl!llfY25, 2!>0l fr()J)I Owner the amllllt of the Contract Sum indicated in Ei<hibit.3 .attach~d 
hereto and incorporated heriiin by refeyence. · 
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5.t.;z The Contr;ictor's Fee is; . 
. ~ea ~ sunt ~$e '!fCt,st_.ojffie Wo.rk or-0tf,erp.rovlsfo»/or iklerminb'!g ,Jre c,»,tractor's Fef!;. an,Ide3!:n1Je the metlw4 of 4q/ustmP'd .o,f lhe (:ontrqctor~ 
Feefi,r~intheWork.} · · · . · 
..... ,.) ~ .. ·. ··H. andred.· '.fbicy.. . • • ·N~ Th-d Eight ~dred~ixty-Nine and?SllOO J;>ollars. . ($339,8!>9 .. 95) 1-d ".na Glll!lllllt?ed . 
·. . ·.· MllXJlllum Cost for the Main m>nse ofFow Million N!lle Hl!II~ Thirw"Three TuonsandNme Hl!ll!lred Eiwiteen at1d 42/100 . 
·. • pollilrs{$4,?33,9l8.42), .The C~l)\n!Ct9r's Flie for the l,llltire Wot~ ineluding1he .Main HPUSe, Cju:elaker's llPuse, Guest Houses 
) 
) 
· (2) and te.lil»S court.and.~ JS Three HJllldre!I NU).ety-Nine ThPIIS8lld Nine m,ndred Fifty.Six and 74/100 l)PlllltS ·· 
($399,956.74). . . 
. 5.2GUARAN:rei;D IVIAXIMUM.PRIC.E 
~.1 Tuo swn pf,dte Cost .of the Work, .Olntractpl's Fee aml $$,000,000 wibiJjty !llll)1fl!llce ill gpar;mtee!i by the Contiacti>r for 
Plmse I nQt to exceed One Handred Eiglrty-Nine TbQ11Sll)l\l Three HJllldred.and 99/100 DolllltS ($1.89,3.00.99) subject to l!d~ili'ollS 
;md dedu!;ti1>l!S by Change ·Pr®r as. prwided in the Cmi!nlCt 09eum\lllts. The Budget for :r• I is co.lJlllined in l>xln1>.it 2 
allllched hereto ;u:i!l'incc>rpQI?tl!d herei;n.by ref ere nee. The Glla(ante!ld ~.Prl\le to epnslruet the Worlds Si1c Mil)ion Fo.ur 
Jlundred Forty-Five TbQas8lld Three lll!lldred 'Thirfy•l'wo and .55/100 Dollatil ($6;445,332.55) inclui!ing the Allowances 
in!lici$ld "in .Exln1>it 2 •atlache!L .After "having revlewed the C<l!JSln!cni>I) l)!>C)llilents lisilld in ruder IS.IS,. Contiacti>r confjrin$ 
that the Cost of.t!te Work will n!>texceed the Gnaranteed Maxhniun l>tice. After pricing the Specifications at1!1.final P;.iwfugs of 
1he C~r's Hoµi;e, Guest 8011Se .#1 ;md Guest Hol!Se #2 {''.!)ut!,µilding Improve me$"), the Contracwr inay msistQn c)langeS 
to redui:e the .cost .of i:o.nsiructing the Outbliilding 'l!llprovel)lents beti>re !:<l!lllnitting to J>fOCOed with the Outbuilding 
Improvel)lents, at1d .. the Architect !llld Owner will coope;.ire in expedlently reviewing .Contt:actor's suggestions. If c,mtr;ictor's 
suggestions .are acceptable .to OWDlc!r 811d Arcbiti,i,t, An;hitect will r¢vise the Plans for the Outbuilding Improvel)lents ti> 
incorp911,1te Coµtr;ictor'$ reCOlllll)endations .at no additional ~nse to Ow;ni:r, ;m<l Coµtracyor, .upi>l)receiving such Plans, revised 
· accordingly, willcon.miit to pr!>Ceed with the Outbuilding Imprpve!llents. lf.Contr;ictor's suggestions are ilotacceplableto .Ow;ner 
and Architect, Architect will revise ·the PJ1U1S for the Outbuilding Improve!llent at no. additfonal: expense to Owner so .i!Jat they 
· col)form to the Allowance fo.r the .Outbuilding Improvements. Costs wine!) would .ca11Se the G!13!81lteed Maitiinwn Price to be 
excee.ded·shaU be paid by the Contr;ictor withoutre.imbursemellt by the Owner. 
((nseri specljic prm#ions if the Contracwr is 10.particip(,le inf11!Y mvings) 
5.2.2 The Glll!lllllteed !M\oomum Price is based on the following alternates, if any, which are described in the Cont;.ictPocuments 
.and~ hereby.accepted by the Owner: 
($tale the nnmben Q.T o,th!:, ~ cf<ltcepted alterna/U, If decisions:~n Qt/rer .'!ltentaJes art to ·be made by ·tne -Owner ~seq~nt-to the ~cutif)n .. of.this 
_Agrnme,,t, attach,f,I.SChedtdecf :ucb odt,r a/.tem!Jles sh.owi,::g,lhe an,r»mtfor eµch_and_th,t dale ~hen ·the amr,unt.expires.) · · 
'.5.2.3 U11it.ptic!lS, ifany,are.asfollows: 
.5,2.4 A.llQwances, if any, are .as follows: ,See .Eldll.1>.it ;?. IJi .p;!J1icular, theWoit describeq in Plans E 1.0-E l; 7 ·are allowances 
in the nuilget (S!Je category 16,00 Electrical). Any ~ or decrease in the ll!D1>unt of this Work will be docmnented by 
· Contractor for approv;il by il)e .Owner andArcbltect. In no event will the Co11t;.ictor'.s Fee l>e increased or decreased with respect 
to these line i.tems as described in the referenced ·Plan$ rega:cdl~s the ll!Dt>uut of !lie W<>lt for those itemi;. 
(Identify (1/tef stale .ihe .amDUl1t$ _of ,my alJuw,qnces,. (lJtd $/ate -wlte1"!,er·the.y.include .Tabor, .materials, or both) 
s.:u; Assumptions,if any, ,in which the Guaranteed Maximum Price 'ill based are as follows: 
5 .. 2.6 To the extent that the l>rawiiigs and SJ)llllifications .are anlicipated to require furlb.er development by the Archite.ct, lh!> 
Con)tactor bas prt>vided in the .Guarant(led MaxhnlllII Price for .such further de~elopment consistent with the Contl'll.ct ))ocuments 
andn1\ISOnably infer.ible therefrom Jhrough the date of this Agreem«mt. 
.ARTICLE &CHANGES IN THE WORK 
· SeeAd~ndum atJachedhet\:t!) at1d !fiC(lrporated her~ by reference. 
ARTICLE 7 COSTS to 131: R$M13UR$1:0 
. ' .. 
7.1 COST OF.THE WORK . 
The term Co$t Qf the Wotk :;hall l)leatl costs necessarily incurred by the Contl'llctor in the proper performance of the Work. Sµcb 
costs shall be at rates ilOt high!lr Ihaµ the standard paid at the place of the J>rpject except with ptior,consent of the Owner. 'The Cost 
of the Worl,. shall include only the items setfoJth in this Arti<;le 7. · · 
) 7.2 LABOR COSTS . . .. .. . . 
1 7.2.1 . Wages of construction worki>rs directly employed by the Contractor to perform the cQnstruction of the Work .at the site or, 
· with the· Owner's approval, at off,site wotksh1>pi · 
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7.6.4 JI~ PtlaboratQriilS for tesb reqiiired)>y the Conmu:!: ~IS, except:1h1>se relared IO <lefective Qr 119nconfomrlng Work 
for,wmch J:llJl!lb.urse111ent js excl11&1iLby Sl!~h 13.SJ of AIA DocllQlent A201-1997 or other provisi1>11S ofthe C~ 
Do.CllQlenlS, an<l which <lo not fall within the seope ofS~h 7.7.3. · 
• '.' {') ·. 7 .6.5 · Royal(ies 8l1<I Jie¢11Se fees pai<l for the use of~ p;i.rtitular design,~ or ptod\l!:t ~ by the Contr.l!:t.D~UU)ents; 
· ') ) the .cost of de~g suits 1>r cb!i1ns for ~ent 1>f ~t righ!S .arising from Sll!lh requirement of.the .Conttact P~ents; 
., · and paymen!$ made.·bt .llllCordance wi~ 1~ j~ against the Co~ rll$llltiJlg from .sµch sul.ts or claim$ ancjpayinc!)ls ilf 
sefllei,nents made with the Owner's CO;J)$1ll!!. Howev!ll', Sll!lh cosJs 1>f I~ 4ifenses, jJJ~ts .and .settlell)ents shall not be · 
included .in the .c;tlcu.fation of the .Conlrl!ctllr's Fw .!>f $11bject to the Olllll'3l)teed Mal!innnn hi.t!l. lfsuc)l royalties, f~ and Cl>Sts 
iu-e excluded by the )l!St$elllellC!l ofSubp;iragtapli 3;17.1 of All\. D~ent A20l 0 1997 .or olhetprovisions pf the Contract' 
D~, then they $U not be \ncluded in the Cost of the Work. 
) 
i .$.$ Dsta pt()cessmg costs r¢1ated to the W:9rlc. · , 
' ' 
:t.6.1 Deposits lost for c311S¢s pther than the Con1rllctofs .l)e!iligence or fuill)re to ll!ltill a specific resp1>nsibility .It> the .OWner as 
set forth in the Co!llract })ocUU)ents. , 
7 .l:i.8 Legal, meiliation and aibilmtiim .to.$, iilcludlng attorneys' fees, other ,1hiµJ thosii arising from disp.utes biltween i!\e Owner 
.aud ·Coniractor, reasonably incurred by the Co!llracti>t .in the p¢ormance of tJie Work and with .the Owner's prior wrluen 
approv.il; which approval shall not be wireasmi;ilily withlield 
7.6;9 Expenses inc.um,d in accordance wilb the O>ntrai:IOT'$ standiird p.ersonnel policy for relocation .l!lld telllporaty living 
allowiinces of~el reiiuired fur lhe Wolk, ii approvecj byihe Ownet. 
7,7 OTHER COSTS AND EMERGENCIES 
7 .1.1 Other cosis incurred io tile perfonnance,1>f.the Worlc if.and to the extent approved io advance in writing by the Owner. 
7.1.2 CQSIS due to emergencies incurred in.taking acti!ln to prevellt tb,reatened.d;,m;,ge, inj!UY or lpss in case of an eme1¥ency 
.affecting.the safely ofv,,rsons alld propeny, as provided in Paragraph 10 .• 6 pf AJA DPCIJQICjltAZOl-1991. 
7.7;3 Cl>sts pf repaiti11g or com,cting dan)age(I or ponconfomiingW orlt exeC11ted by the Contractor, Sl!b.conttacwrs or suppliers, 
provided that s11ch dl$aged Pr nonconfurmiog Workwas not caused by ne~gence or milure to fulfill a specific respousibilify of 
the Contractor and only to the extimt that ,the cost of repair or comction is not recollllr.ible 'by ·tile Cot.iti:al'lor from insurance,. 
sureties, Sµ)Jcontractors or SIJPPlieF,1. 
ARTICI.E 8 COST.S NOT T.0 BE IU;IMl:3URSED 
11.1 TheCQStottheWork sµall not include: , . 
8.1 .. 1 Salaries ;ui(I other compensation pf tile Contract!lr's personn¢l st!tio11ed at the Co.ntractor's principal office or ollice.s other 
than the site office, except as SJ>llcific;tlly provi!led in Subparagraphs 7.2.2 and 7.23 or as may :be pr1>vided in Article I 4. · 
8. 1.2 Expi,ns~s pf jhe Contractor's principal office and. <>ffi~es other than the site office. 
. 8.1.3 Overhead and g¢neral expenses, except as may be expressly included in Article 7. 
8 .• 1.4 The Contractor's capital expenses, including interest on the ConllllCt!lr's capital employed for .the Work, 
8:f.5 Rental costs oflllilchine,y and eqliipme11t, except as specifically provided .in $µbparagrap)l 7 .5.2. 
a.1.8 Except as pr~vided in Subpar;igraph 1.7.3 of11iis,A$f00ment, costs dtte to the 11egll~ce !lf fa,ilur~ to fuifi,11 a specific 
responsibllil}' 9f the Co11tra~r, Slibl:ontractoi:s and suppliers or ;myone directly, or indirectly employed by any of them or for 
whose·acts any oft!telit may be liable. 
8.1,7 Any cost not specifically and expressly descnoed in Artie.le 7. · 
·) 8.1.8 C1>sts, o!her .than costs included in Chm>ge Orders approved by the Owner, that would cause the Guanmtee!l Maximtim 
Price to 'be exce!l(led. 
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.ARTICI.E 9 OISCO!JNTS,REBAli;S ANO ~FUNDS 
9,j ~ discPlµllS pbiained on ~nts imtde by lhe Cpntracti>r shall actruetc> the Owner if (1) pef()l'!l llllikjng lhe.paym¢nt, the 
:'c1 Conira.cwr mcl\ld~ lheJn. Jn an Appli~1>n/1>r Payment and received ~ lh~efor :from ,the .OWner, P'r (2) the Ow,n.er bm; 
. cc\, .· 1 dep,;isiwl! funds Wllh the Cpnlµlctor with which tc> llll® pa~ ~. ,Cl!Sh dil!c!lunts shalbccrue t!l t)!e Comractor. Txai!e 
·· • ..···· •) : · 1!fiscll)l!lts, reJ>ates, re,funds l!lld ainounts .recciived.fi:om sale.s of surplus materials and equipmept sbaii a~ci:ne tc> the Owner, and the 
· j · Conjnlctor .sbid! l1U!ke provisiO!IS,SO th;,t they can be secured, · · · ' . 
9.2 AmoJlllls tlll¢ aci:rue tc> )he Owner .in ~,dl!llce with the prpvi$ions of i>aragr,1ph 9, sball be credited to the OWner .as .a 
dedµction from the CPst ,;ifl)w Work. 
AR!ICLE 10 SUBCOIO"AACTS ANP OTHER AGRE!=MENTS 
1.Q.1 Those portions of 11\e Wox)c \llal: the CPntr\ll'lllr dol'S npt c;IISIOmarily perfunn with .the (:pnµai:tor's 1>wn persolliiel shaU ® 
,perfonned under J1Ubc!lntracis.or by o.ther appmplWI' .l!gteeinents with the Co!!lr.lctor. The Owner !llllY designa«, speci.fic pers.ons 
9r entities from whom lhe Contractor shall ohtain.bids. The .Conll'actor shidl QbJain bids ..ft:om .Subc9ntrac1ors ;ind frQm supplieJ:i; 
.ofmatemls or ,eqµipmen! !librlcated especW!yfor the W1>rk lllld shidl deli'lrer $11Ch bids tc> lhe A.white.ct. the Owner sl)all then . 
detennme, wit.It t.he advice oftbe ConttaclJ>t.and !he Architect, which bids will be accepted. The ContractPr shall noi be tequ!reilto . 
conll'act with ll!lyone ti) whom lhe Contractc>r h!ll' re.asonable objection. · 
1P,2 :If .a specific bidder .l\lllODg !hose '.W'hpse bi\ls are: deli'lered by the C.onll'actPr to the An:hliect (1) is recommend~ to the 
Owner by lile Contracti>r; (2) is qnalilied to perfol"!ll ihat portion 9f the WO!:k; .and {3) 1w snbnmted.a bid lbat ~1>nfollllS to tbe 
reqµjrements of.the CQntrac.t OoctnneQIS without rffl:rvatiO!J.$ or exceptions, but.the Owner requires ihat .l!llother bid be .accepted, 
then the C1>ntractor may requir!' that a Ch!mge Order be issued tc> adju,st the Guar;mieed Max(mµni Prlce by the difference bet.ween 
the hid !lfthe pers<m or entity reco~ended to the Owner by ihe Contrac\or and ihe am0unt of the sJ1bcoptnmt .or other ,agreement 
actnally slgJJed with the pers9n or entity designated.by the Owner. · 
10.3 Sllbco:ntracts or olber.agree!];lents shall confurill to the applicable p,aymel)t provisions of ibis Agreement, and ,shall not be 
awarded on the bl!Sis ofcpst plus a fee without thl:,.prior consent of the Owner. 
,_.kTICLE 11 ACCOUNTING al:CORDS 
)/ 
' The Conttactor shall keep full and detailed 11!:counts and .exi,tcise such conmils as may be nece8$ary for proper financial 
) 
management under this Contract, and ,the ~ounling and control systeJ,ns shall be satisfl,ctory tc> ihe Owner. the Owner and ihe 
Ownefs accountants shall .be afforded access tc>, and shi»l be permitted 19 audit and CPJ>Y, lhe Contractor's records, books, 
correspomlence, instructio115, drawings, receipts, .subcontracts, ·purebiise orders, vonchers, memorll!lda and :oilier data relating to 
thill Contracl, .!llld the :Contractor sh!tll ~e these for a period of three y~ 'after final payment, or·for s.11ch longer period m; 
may be requjred by. law, 
ARTICLE 1;! PAYMENTS 
12,1 PROGRESS PAYMENT$ 
12.1.1. Based upon Applitaii!>ns for l'ayment submil!ed to tile Architect by the Contractor.and. CertiJ;icate.s for Paymentissµed by 
the Aro\Jjtett, !he Owner shall make progress payments ,on accmmt of the C<>ntrac\ Sum to the Contractor m; provided ·below and 
els\lvihete in the Ci:mtractDoi:uments. 
12.1.2 '.!be perio!l CPvered by each .Application for Payment shall .!le one .calendar month ending PD the last day pf the month, Qr 
m; follows: · 
12. 1.3 Provided that an Application for Paynlent is .i:eceived by .the Arehite.ct .not lal!ir ihilD the last day of a month, th~ Owuer 
shall .make p~yment to the Contractor not )atet .!ban .the ~nth day of ihe fuliowing month. Jf an Application for Payment is 
receivl'd by the Architect after ihe .application date.fixed above, payment m,all 'be made .by the Ov.lner not later !ban ten days aftl)r 
the Artbitect approves the Application for 'Payment An Applicati® for Payment may be .approved in :Pint pr in whole by lh.e 
Architect if the \Vodc h!ll' been performed in accordance wllh the .approved bµdget. Otherwise, the requested :~ must. be 
presented as a Change m; set forlh in Paragraph 1 of the Addendiun lll!d is required to be approved by .Owner .and Architect before / 
, Work Is performed. Wilh re.sl?e,ct to the budget, Cimtractor may reallocate and expend any amount allocated for !Illy particular lme / 
· / item in )he pµqget by reducing other line i~ where !he line ilem action has be.en I 00% .completed and lhe actu,j] CPsts .of the line / 
item are less .than !he budgete,d CPsts, and ,tran;sferiing such redµction to line items Vdiere actual coslS ex~ b11dgeted coslS;/ 
provided ihat Contrac\or deliver prior written notice to Owner and Arcliitect of any Sl!Ch realloi:ation. If iµi underage in a catego17 
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) 
) 
is 119t i:le;ir to Owner .and Ar!:bitect based upon tjJe b~et, (or example, bei:a11$e lhe ~n 1>f an nem aUeiecho be compl!,te 
. is not.r~clily i<!entiliable in the bud&et. such fim$ shall .not be realloc;,l,le. lftbe  re)e!il/l any pm,ti<,n of an Appli~aticm 
Jor P,1yment, it shall in<lic;are its f\laSllll for rej!:Ctln& 1he requested siln). the.Arpbjtect bas agreed to review and forward to Owne.r 
··.") its approval, in ,:whole or in part, pr its dis:ipptov,ai 00f .efieh Application for Payment not 1iiter .than ten days l!ft<lr the Architect 
rllCl}iye:i eachApplicatl0n for Payznent. 
. ) 
1Z'l.4 With el!ch Application fut l'ayment, tbe C()llmictof shalt SUOll!it pllyl'()lls, petty .cash aecounlll, m:eiptecl iilv1>ices i>r 
inv0iecs with cbeck vo)li;hel:s 1lll;Jched, .and .any ()!her .i:vidence ~ by tbe Owner .or Arcbitect to <lem~ tl1at Cl!Sh 
diii\>!ltsem~ ~~e by .the C!>ntractor pn ll!lt0unt of the Cost of the.Work .• ore~ (r) pri>Jlre!lS payments .already 
received by the Contractor; less (2) tbat portion .of tbi>se pi,yments atm°bull!l>le to the ~r's l'ec; plus (3) payrolls for the 
period c°-vered bytbe pteseilt Application for l'ayment; · · · · · · · 
12.1 .• 5 1',icb Application for Payment sliall be reconcil®to Jhe m0$t recent schedl\1¢ ofVlllues J!ll!>miltlld byJhe Cimlllllltor in 
acc.ordance with tbe Contnwt O~µmenl/l. )'l).e schedul¢ ofvlllues $W!ll.alloc;are tbe e• O~J•faxunmn l>riec am.on& the 
various p!>rli!)ns. pf.the Work, ~t that the Contrac!llr's F¢1., shall be shown as 11 single ~ item, l'he scbedl\1e of villlllls 
.sb;iJ.l be preparC!I in ,s.uch form 11Ud .supported by .such ¢1!11 to substantiate its ;iccur;,cy 'as lhe J\.rcbite.ct fllas!)lllibly llijly r!l(jllire. 
· this schedUle, unless pbjected to by lhe Architect, shall 0be used as a basis fur reviewing the c,mtractofs Applicatioas for 
Payment. · · · · 
12.1,!l Appliciitions fur Payment shall set forth the percentage of eompletion of each portion of the Work .as .of t!:te end of the 
p!)rlod covered by die ApplicationforPay,µent The-estimated percentage.of cQmpletion shall be the lesser of (I) the percentage .of 
tbat portion of the WOik wbi!:h has actually been. completed; .or (:Z) .the percentage obtained by dividin& (a}'dle expense that bas 
ac\Ually_ been incum:d by the Contra!)tor ou iiecoqnt pf that portion of the Work fur winch 1he (!oµtrru;tor ba,s made .or intends to 
make actual Jmyment .prior to the.~ Application for Payment by (b} the sb;ire .of the Guarante¢d Miµtmtum 'Price alloca!C!l 0to 
that portion of 1he Workin th1>,$Chedule of values. 
12.1.7 Subject to Qtf)er provisions of the ContractD!>l:lllnents, the amiluut pf ~ch proJlre.sS p;iyn:ientshall be .computed 'as follows: . 
. l t1ike .d\at portion ,of the Glla,Tl!lll:eC!I Maximum Price properly .allocable to completed Work as determined by multiplying 
the percentage of completion of each portipn, of the Work .by the ,share of the Guanm,teed Mrodmum Price allocated to· 
tb\lt pol'lion ofthe Work in :the schedµJe 0fyalues. Pending linal determin;i!i(Jn of cost to the OWner ofchan!les _in the 
Work, amounts not in dispute shall be included as ,provided in $ubplw,lgtllpb 7.3.8 of AJA D.ocument A201-1997; 
.2 l!ild that portion of1he Guaranteed Maximum Priec properly allocable Jo,materials and equipment delivered and suitably 
s!Qred at tbe site for subs!!quent incorporation .in the Work, or .if approved in advance by the OWner, suitably stored off 
the site at a !Qcatipn<lgi"eed upon in wrilin!l; · . ' . . . · · · 
.3 add ti,e Coniractor's Fee, jess ,retllinage of ten percent (10"/4). the·.Conti:actor's Fee shall be cPmputed upon the Cost of 
1he Work described bLthe two pre ceiling C!auseS at the raw stated in $ubparagraph SJ .2 pr, if the Contractor's Fee 'is 
stated as a fixt:d s!llD in that Siibp;iragrapb, shall be an amouut that b.ears the s.mie ratio .to that .fixed-sum fee as the CPst 
of the W!>rk iii the two preceding Clauses ·bellrs to a reasonable .estimate ofihe probable Cost ofthe W11rk upon lts .. 
completion; 
.4 .· subtract the awegate of previous paymenfl; made .by the Owner; 
-~ subtract the shortfall, if any, .indicat\ld by tbe Contractor iii the documenta(ipn required by Pl1f11Jlfllph 12.1.4 to 
substal)tlate prlPr Applications .f()r ·Payment, .or resulting iivm errlm! subseqneutly di,;covered by. the Qymer's accountant$ 
iii such .documentation; and · · · 
,6 subtract amounts, if any, fo~ which tbe Archltecthas wilbhe\d or.nullijied a Certificate for Payment as provi,ded in 
Paragrapb9.5 ofi\iA.DocumentA201"1997. 
12.1.8 Except Wlth the Owner's prior 1,1ppro'llll, payments .to Sub.c•;mn:ai:tors shall b.e subject to retainage of not. I~ ,than ten · 
.percent (10%). The Owner and the (:pntractor sbaU a&ree upon a mµI\Jally acceptable procedure for review and approval of . 
, paylilents 11Ud retention-fur Subcontryu:tots. ·· 
) 
12,1.9 In taking action on the Contractor's Applicatio!iS for Payment, the .Architect shall be entitled to ,rely .on the ac~cy .and 
completeness of the information iiunlshed. by tlie COlltrJlctor and ~hall not be deemed.to represent that the Ar.cbitect has made a 
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detailed ~011, ;i:udlt or .uil!m)etlc veri/icati1111 <>fthe d~ sul>mi~ ln ~ :wilh S\lbpll!1lgtaph 1;!J.4 or 
otltet supporting data; th;,t lbe Architect has .made exliausiive w contln®us onm.iJlwectiollS .or that the Ar.chi~ has \llllde 
,e~ to -aw~ bow or for whiit .J'IIIj>OSCS .tlte Ci,n1Il!Ctor has J1$ed ;m1ounlsJ1tevi!l11Sly pl!id !Ill Meount llftbe Coomict 
Srich e)ClUllinations, audits l!lld Vlltilic;,tio11$\ ii' required.by the Owner, will be per;roroied by the Ownc:t's accQmi~ra acting in the 
sole in~ ofthea()wner. · 
12.2 flNAl,. l'AYMl,:NT 
12.z 1 final payment:, wnsliluling tbe entire unpaid ~ce of lhe Comr.ict ·Swn, sb;llI !>e ntade by the .Owner to !he Cl,n111!clor 
whell: · · . 
;1 · the Cpnttaet(,r.b;is µilly perfonned the.~ except for the Conttactor:'s fe$p011!li!>ilily to correct Work as provided 
in Sul>pl!IllJl[llph 12.2.2 of AI4 DOC\llllent .UOl-1997; ,llld to $8U$fy other teqlliren).ents, .if !IDY, wbich .extend beyond 
finalpayment; .and . . 
.• 2 a final Cemfi!'llle for Payment ha:; beenJs~'\ly the Arcllire4 See A.i!Jlembnn. 
:12.2.2 The Owner's lwil pilyD)ent to tile Con1r;1ctor sball be ll)ade no later than 30 da11< .after the issuance of the Arcintet:t's final 
Certi!ici!le fur P8)'1llenl:, or as follows: · 
1ZZ~ The Owner's a~tanl!J will review ,and rep()rl .in writing on the Conttiictor's .final accounting wllhln 3(l days after 
delivery oftl!e final ,iccoun~ to lhe Ar¢hitet:t by the Contractpr. Based upoll such Cost of.the Work as .the Owner'i ,iccount;mra 
repprt to .be substantiated by tbe Contr.u:t!>r's final accounting, "1ld provided .the Olh.er .conditiollS of Subpara,graph 12,2.1 have 
been met:, Ille Ar¢hitect will, ·Within seve11 days after reci;ipt of !he-~ report of the Owner's accountants, ei!ber issue to Jhe 
Owner a final Cerlifi!'llle for .PaJIJ!lllllt with a CIJJ)Y to the eontmtor, .or notify the Conti-actor ·lllld Owner in writing .of !he 
Architect's reasO!lll for withholding a certificate as prilvided in Subparagraph 9.5.1 !lf the AIA. DocUD1ent A.201-1997. Thii :time 
periods stated in tl)is Subp~h 12.'.2.3 supersede tl)ose stated in Sul>paragraph 9.4.l of the ,AIA Docllmel)t A,201-1997. 
. 1~,2.4 If the Owner's uccomitants ,eport the Cost of the W:Qik.as substan\iated by tbe CQmr.ictor's .final accol,lllting to he leS$ !han 
claimed by the Contractor, .!lie Contractor shall be elltitled to dell)alld l!Ibitration,of!be dispured amount WitJloµt a further decisio1' 
oftlle Architect Sll!lh deroaud for arbitration shall be lll!lde J>y the Contriu:!or wi1hiil 30 days after-the Contractor's .rei:eipt of a 
copy 11ftbe A.rchiiect's final Certificate for P.tymenl; /ilil!lf(l ti! dt:mand arbitraflQri witb)n this 30--!lay period shall result in:.the 
substantiated amount reporte!l by .the Owner's a~lJll)ts .becoming binding on ihe ConttactOr. Pending a Dlllll resoluti!ln by 
arbitration, the Owner sb;llI pay the Col)tractor -the amOIUlt,certilied in !he Archite.ct's final Cerlificate for Payment. 
12.2,5 lf, Slibseq11ent to final payment and at the .()wner'.s reqllest, .the Contractor incurs coSls described in ,Article 7 .and not 
excluded by Article 8 to correct def®tiVe or nonconfllmiing WorJc; the Owner .sball reimbiirw the Contrac.tor suc)u:osts l!lld the 
Contractors Fee :applicable th~to on the same basis ail if such wsts had been incurred prior to final payment:, bµt not in ,excess ,of 
the Guaranteed ~ Price, If .the Contractor has participated in savings as provide4 in Paragraph 5.2, the amount of su!ih 
savings sl1all be recalculated and appropriate credit i\iven 'to the Owner in determining tlte·11et.amount .. to be p~d by the Owner to 
the -Conb1!ctor • 
. ARTICLE 13 TERMINAT.ION OR SUSP!:N!>ION 
13.1 The Contrai:t may be terniina~<! 'by the Contrlwtor, or by !be Owner for co11Yenience, ,as provided in .Article 14 of AfA 
DQcument A.201-1997. However, the amount tl> be paid to the Comr.i.ctor under Subparagrai:lh 14.L3 of AIA DocUD1ent 
A2!H-1997 shall not excee4 !he amo111lt !he Co~ wo:ujd be entitled to receive under l'aragraph .13.2 below, ,except tbat th¢ 
Conttaclor's fee shall be calculated ,as it the WPrk hail been 1:idly co111pfoted by the Conlm\:tor, 'in¢1µding a rcasonable estimate or 
tlie Cost of )he W:ork for Work not actually complet!ld. · · 
13.2 The Coo.tract may be terminated by the Owner for ~e as provided in Article 14 of AILA PocUD1ent A201·1997. The 
amount:, iI lilly, to be ·paid to the ContracU>t ll!lder Subparagraph 14.2.4 of AfA Docnment .,A;!Ol-1997 s'1a]I not cause tl)e 
Guar,mteedM3lWllnm Price to be .exi:ewed, nor shall it exceed ~ ampunt ,calculated as fullpws: 
13;2.1 Take the ,Cost of !he Wprk incurred by the Conltactor to the date .oftermlnanon; 
13.2.2 Add the Colltractor's Fee compnted upon tile .Cost.of the Work to the .date p(temilnation at !he rate $ted in Subparw:apb 
5. l.2·or, if the Colltral:tor's Fee ii, stated as a fixed s.um in ,fhat Subpatagrapb, M amount that ,bears lhe same .rmio to !bat fixedasunl.· 
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Fee as th!> ~ of the Work at the time of t!'l]llllllllion b,:ars to .a .reasonable estim;ite 9f the pn:,1,,.1,le Cost of the Wotk u~n.i!ll 
completmn; Mel · 
,.r"Ci 13.2.3 Su1'1ral:tthe ~ of previQU,S p~ts m;tJJe by the Owner. . 
. , . . )13.3 The Owner sbal1 also pay ;he Contractodilit colllpensat/Qn, eitlier by 1Jlmiha$e or rental ;it the elecfion of the Owner, for any 
!llJ\liplllO)lt owned by the Contracwr that the OWner elect$ to re)ain and that ill n<lt .o~ Sru:;luded in -the Cost of the W01t 
!lllder S~h l3.2J. to the eirtent -th;lt tl)e OWper ¢ll'l)IS to truce legal assigµment .of sul,cQDll;lctS 1111d purchase oniers 
(iru;ludm8 rental ~ents),.ihe Contra$r sh;ill, as a condition of receiving the p;lY!llents I!lfen:ed to in thili. J\$111 13, 0l(e\lllte 
and deliver allSJICh ~ Mel take lj)i SU!lh stel1S, inchidinglhe leglll llllSignment of $1Ch ~~ olher .co~ tigbts 
9f the Conlr.lCl\lr, as .Ille -Owner Jj}ay require f1>rJhe purpose .otfully vesting; :in the ~ the nghls Mel b¢11\l1;'i\s 9f 1h!, Conltactor 
llnder SU!lh subl:oiitr.u:i,; or p!l[Chase orders. · · 
UM l'lie Wotk may be ·suspended by Ille OWner aswoviqed ,in Article 14 .of AJA l>ll~.A201 - 1997; jn,such case, Jhe 
(lu;,ranieed,lviaxhnimi l'rice and Co!Jlr,let Time .shall .be increased.as provided :hi Subparagraph .14.3.2 J>~ AJA J)ocument A2lH, 
.1997 ~cepl that the term ''profif' sl!all be un<lerstood to me;m the Contractor's Fee .as llescribed in ·Subparagraphs .n:i and 
Paragraph 6.4 of this A.~ent. · · 
AR'tlCJ.E 14 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
14.1 Where -reference is made in this ,Agreement to a provision AfA Docmnent A20l-l997 or '.another Contract Docllll1ent, the 
reference re~ tp that provision as -nded or supplemenred by other provisions of-the Contract Documents .. 
14.2 Payments liue and unpaid under the Conlrnets'1all b.ear interest m>m the date payine11t is .dlle lit.the rate stati!d .below, Qr 
hi the absence !hereof, lit the legal rate prevailing fi'om time to time.at the place where the Project is lo.~ 
(lnserl.Tlilel/lintere#a~uppn. ifail)!.) 18% per....,,, · 
(Usury_ law, ti,,d ·requif.emmt.s · under .the Federal Trudi in. Um/inc Jci. slmilfJl' stale and local, .. co)fSUnter .c,:edil Jaw, .and o,ther re,wl~o~ lJt the pwners .~ 
Co~IPr'I ~ p/ap:;1 ofb1JS.t~i. the /pt;a#Qn of the .Project·p:mJ.ekewhe,re..111'!1 affect lhe,valiilityo/,thls prpY~i(?n.Le$al atftiice ~hould.be o!,tain¢·.wJth respect 
.to delelioliS fJl' morlift{:a#ons~, pnl/.also re'gaiding re,:pdrernlmts FllP1, a,y wr.jJtei,, illscl(!SUTJ!3 ,or wah!er.J.) · 
· . ') 14,3 Uie Owner's representative cis: 
··)· , (Namemid~) 
•. 
1 Llly Reeves, Tmstee 11f tlie S)JD Valley Tnisi-wd/t JattUJIIY 3, 1999 
·· c/o lvleschures, Canipeas, Thompson & Snyder 
7(i0 N. La Clenega Boul1mu:d 
,LosAngel!lS,·CA 90.069-5;231 
A.ttn: ,Steven J. CIIUI~, CPA . 
Phone: (310) 65:2'-0:22:2 
Faic: {310) 854,,543.8 
14.4 The Cl)ntractor's ,:epresentative is: 
(N- mida,JiJ,,,,) 
Storey Coll,SlrUcti0nlnc. 
323 N. Lewis Stteet 
. Ket.chum, ID 83340 
A.ltn: (illry Sto!lly 
PbOll{l: (208) 726-8816 
Fax: · {:208)726-;2180 
14..5 In thi:-i1!>se11ce ofi)ll emergency, neiiher the Owner's nor the Contractor's represent;,tive shall be changed without ten days' 
writt¢n noli!'C·to the other party. · 
'14.$ Other pn:,visions: 
See A.ddendum. 
.. ) 
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AIUIC!-1; 151:NlJNIER.&,TION OF CONTRA.Ci DOCUMENTS 
15, 1 Th(1 coninu:t Dilcumenl/!, ex{)C!>t fur ~ons 'iSllued<a&r ex~oll of !his Agreement, are enum~~ed as follows: 
15:i, 1 The Agr(\ement is Ibis executed 1997 edition pf the Stand;ird Fprm <Of Agreement l3etween Owner <and Contractor, AlA 
I>oJ;miientAlU· 1997. < 
< 1.6'1,2 The Gen!l1111 Cond\tiPDS are )he 1997 edition of the General ConditiPDS of )he<Contr.ict for ~ction, AlA Doeument 
AZOl-1.997. << < 
15:1.3 The Supplemenl;try and otht:r Corulitions pf the CPlliiatt ate thQlle contain\ld in the PJ:oject Mam,ial <dated Md <ate as 
follows:< 
Title Pages < 
15,1.4 The SpeclfiCl!tiOilS are !hose wmained in.the Project Ml)nnal ,dated as in Subpanigraph 15< J.3, and are as <follows 
(Either li>t the $pecijica#ons~re or refer IO ,m e;d,;bit Qltoihed to thi><Agr:eementl < 
Section Title 
Specificatlon Manlllll <wl)h Strikeouts unde<r cover of letter from David Lislllr !l;rted February Z8, 2001 4:31 P:M. < 
1$.1.5 The Dmviog$ ate as follows, and are <&led uniess a different ¢,te js shown below: 
(Either /i,tlh, ~ here or refer to on e;d,;W attacl,ed to this Agl-eement,) 
Number Title< Date 
< <Rider 15.l.5 is attached hereto and incorporated herein by ref(1t~<nce. 
~) 15.1.$ The Addenda, ifany,<are asfpllows: 
Number Pages 
Portions ofAddC!l!la relating to ,bidding requirements are not part of the Cpntract Documents uniess the bidding requirements 
<are ;ilso enume~ in this Article 1<5, < < < 
15.1.7 Other Doc!!ments, if any; fo!lllIDg part Pf'the Contmct Do¢nments<areas fpllows: < 
{l.isf here .01()' adi!itwna/..d()CUl11en~, such M" /~ .Of qltetnates that. are infr!nded to /onh part of thi, C~nJract Documents: AIA:Dqcum.ent A20!~1997pruvideJ that 
bftfding ,:eqmte:ment.s such .ps mh.t?rtisement or invil4J}Qn 10 bid. Jnrl1'1lct/.ons 10 JJiddp:s, sample Jo~ and -the Col)lracjof s bid rrre n_ot part .of the Ctmtrat;t 
boc¢ne~·wrless e,µ,m_eT/J!ejl fn,lhiS Agr!!em,mt. lheysfw,ikfbe listed here Qnly if intended to be_part.ofr~e Contra~ ~entsJ 
ARTICI-E f$ INSUl'W)ICE AND <BOI\IDS 
< (µ,,t .,.,,uired /i,,i/t; uf llaliil/Jy forf11S111'411ce Ofld bt>nd,, ALI ~ A201· l997gi,es~ther ,p,,;jjic rti/fiir-for i11S111',mce <Ofld bond,;,) 
This ,Agreement sball <be executed ,011 the date ofll)e last to <sigu below, The ,Parties agree to si,gn at le<ast two original copii:i,, one of 
wbi<;h !II <to <be delivered to <the Contr;,ctor and one of which .is to be delivered to owner, with~ accurate copy to be delivered to 1he 
Archltect for use<in 1he aqministration of the Contrl!Cl 
Gary Storey, President 
(Frmtedriame mtd title) 
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A9.0 
A9.I 
A9.2 
A9;3 
A9.4 
A9.5 
A9.fi , 
A9.1 
A9.$ 
. A9 .. 9 
A9 .. l0 
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llllain House,, C.onstructlon 'Documents Sheet .Index: .10.21.00 .Issue 
_Contl!IIIS 
liwl,x/Al>~on's 
Ov):rall Site Plan . 
Enlarged Sile pia,,, 
Main l.!lllel ,Colmlin.ite .Pl;,n 
West Fki\:Jr.Plan 
Wesl/El1$t i=lo!>r P!;ln 
East Fl!>Qr J'~ 
lJ~.~ Plan 
Ba$elllllllll,.evel Plllll 
Overall R!>llf Plllll 
Room Finish Schedule 
Exterior l,Jnil Scbedule 
Interior Unit $:hedule 
Reflected Cellin9-Plans 
Exterior ,EleWili!ins 
. Exterior ErevatiQns 
BUilding Secilons 
Buililinfl Secilcms 
Building Seclicms 
Building Sectlons 
Wall Sec!ion$ 
W11II Secifpns 
wan Seclioos 
interior Elevations 
lnt!)ijor Elevati.ons 
Interior Elevations 
lnterii>rl:!evalions 
fnrerior ~"" lnterior.Elevalions 
lntl*iar Bevalions 
Interior El!lVll!ions 
Interior l;levajions 
Interior Eleva!ions 
.Fireprai:e Details 
l'ireplllC!> O!!l!ills 
Fireprace Del;llls 
Sectlon Dettuls 
Sei:tion ~ 
Seclil>nDetails 
Section 0111,iiis 
oetaita 
DeteRs 
Details 
Details 
· Details 
Detail$ . 
Detail!l 
Detail$ 
El.O Pow<l<Plan(.Revi~ l,i4.0t)• · 
El.I P1>wer P.hµi (Revised 1.24.01)* 
.. El.i l>.owerPlan ~ l.i4,0l)' 
El.3 l>pwerl'lan~~ 1..24.01)* 
1;1.4 ~-RCP (l~ed 1.26.!)1)~ 
et,:! aectri!llll RCP ~llSlli!l!l 1.26,01)" 
1;1,6 Eleclrical<RCP (l\lSlled 1.26.01)* 
Et7 '.Eleciti"81 RCP (Jssned l.26.0l)* 
.S102. 102 
5103 
5201 
$202,203 
.8.204 
$205-208 
$30.1-a07 
5401-403 
$5.01-503 
5801;602 
$701-703 
General Nom/Al>brevia11Qil$ 
R.oot"Sii!>w Loading~ 
!l!lsern.ent.Level FnmungPlan 
M;iin .Level flppr Plllns 
CeiUng Fr,3m!ng P!a!1 
RPQf Framing Plans . 
Conc«ite Sections and .Di,lails 
~00ft.evel $ectiQ11s · 
Structural .Sleel Det;iils 
Frame SevatlPns 
Cp~on Delails . 
Mechanii:al/Plumbiilg Plans by Sub C!>ntractors. 
•Art i;heets list~ above w.ere include<! In the 10.27.00 Construciion 
DQCl.lrilents Set Sheeti; with an ast!lrisk were reVi$!!d .imd/ot-added 
After the 10.27.00 CO .issue for bklding purp0$es am! have_ date of 
revitiio11 Jndlcat!!d. Th~a items .are a1Jl)W8nce$. 'See Subpara(Jrllph 
5.2.4 regardihg .1he Costofthis Work. 
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ADDENDUMTO 
CONSTlUJCTIONCbNTRACT 
TIHSADDENDUM TO coNsm.ucnoN CONtRACT (" Addendum") is 
entered ipto .as of this 21st day pfJuly. 2000 concnrrentlywith t1:)at certain Standard form.· 
pf Agreementbetween 1>W!'ler and C1>ntract1>r Al 11 (1997) <lated. Jllly 21, 2000 ("$tlmdard 
Foon"), by lll',ld between S:t!>rey Constrnetion Inc. ("Contractor") Ill').~ Lily Reeves, trustee 
of the $un Valley Trust uliflt Janlilll'Y 8, 1999 ( CPllectively "Owner"), wi.th·respeet to the 
development imd,collStruction of a project ref~ to as ·REJ>ACTEJ> (the "J?r1>$Ct"), 
· · located•!¢ REDA<:t~ ·'(a/k/a . REDACT:EJ> . :fBadowSubdivision, 
'Blaine C1>1lllty, Idaho (c1>llectively the "Property"), which.Addendum tPgether with J:he 
Standard Fi>rm shall be deemed the "Cpntract" heremafte1\ This Project is .sometimes 
. . 
referred to as ''l REDA~~J> .;" To the extenttl).is Addendum adds to, changes or is 
inconsistent with the Standard Form, this Addendum shaU. prevail. All capitalized terms 
used hetein and not otherwise defined shl:tlrhave Jhe meanings ascribed to them in the · 
Stillldard Form. 
. . 
In consideration ofthe mutual promises conU!ined herein, the parties agree as 
follows: 
1. 
(a) Contractor agrees to perfonn and completely :finish in a good and 
workmanlike manner free of any and all li¢IIS and cli'lhns pflaboters; artisans, 
maierl.almen and subcontractors employed by Contractor :and in oonfonnity .in all respects 
with all applicable building codes, zoning regulatiPns, and any and all other applicable . . 
laws .as outlined in the Plans, :as detailed in Artitile 15 of the Standard Form, the Work 
described below. · 
(b) Contractor shall apply for .all necessary l>uildjng p.ermits, including, 
but notllinited to the grading, constmction, gas, electrical and plumbing permits; · · 
excluding,· however, ~Y special use permit required from a municipality or public· 
agency. Contractor shall also represent Owner in obs~g the salvage of building · 
material$ or personal ptQperty at the Property by a charitable organization authorized by 
Owner or the removal of existing residential improvcinents fu»n the Property as a 
charitable donation or otherwise. 
(c) Contractor shall require its employees who are performing Work in 
.the field, .and the mechanical; pllllllbing, electrical and heating and air conditioning 
subcc>lltractors to agree in wri:tin,g to maintain thrpughout the Projecta11 accurate, legible 
·and fully detailed set of mechanical, electri.cal and plumbing tecord drawings., 
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"redtnorked" to show m-field changes, including but not.limited 19 circuit numbers, the 
location of w~g,Ioad factors and the·location of ducting. At the Substantial . 
Completjon of Construction and as .a .condition 19 Contractor'sreceipt of its final 
payment, Contractor shall be required to deliver such record drawings to Architect und to 
Owner, If Architect determines that such Drawings are not legi1>le n,or complete, 
Architect shall notify Contractor pf this C<lllclusi<>n .and if Contractor fails to cause 19 be 
delivered within thirty {30) days after receiving such notice w Architect and owner 
corrected record drawings, Architect is hereby authprized to undertake such revisiO!lll, as 
best it can, .at the Contrnctor's e:xpeiise. Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement . 
to the contrary,_ Owner shall not be obliged to pay Contrnctor the iinlll 11n:ee Thousand 
Dollats ($3,-000) payable by Owner to Contractor untilrecord drawings that complywith 
this provision, upproved as to form by the Architect, have been delivered to Owner. 
2. Mechanics' Liens. 
(a) Upon Sub$1ltial Completion of the Work, and prior to the 
Completion Date. of this Agreelilent, Contrnctor agrees to submit to Owner, mechanics' 
lien releases .from Contractor's major suppliers, defined as suppliers of materials for the 
Work: exceeding Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000), and.subcontractors. Contractor shall 
make pii,yment to all labor and materialmen and take such action to prevent :the fi!hig ,of 
any lie11s 011 the Property. If any .liens are filed, the Co.ntractor shall take timely actio11 to 
remove such liens, including without limitatil>n by specification, the innnediate posting of 
a l>ond pursuantto the provision of Idaho Code §45-518, l)tseq. lfContractor fails Jo 
·. perform his obligations pursuant to j:his paragraph, .Owner may elect any remedy which 
. . . . 
Owner deems necessmy t9 rem9ve said lien, including without limitation ·by.specification, 
. the tight to withhold an amoimt equal to the illlloi.Jnt.claime(l :Under .such lien .from any 
payment to Contractor. Owner shaU h!lve the right to recover reasonable attorneys' fe.es 
and costs incurred thereon from the Contractor. 
(b) Contractor agrees to obtain conditional lien releases for all Work 
p.erfo:rmed and for materials tumi;shed on the Property ftoni all subcontracl:oril and .. 
materialmen described in subparagraph 2(a) hereinabove up.on payment ofal! draws and 
partial payments. Such releases may be c(ll)ditioned only upon clearance of the check for 
the period for which the latest Application for Payment peitained. All subsequent 
payini'lnl:/1 made to subcontractors and ma~rialmen shall contain an imconcutional release 
for all Work performed and for materials furnished on the Property for the prior 
conditional lien :release. 
. ( c) Contractor shall ijSe an endorsement stamp containing the text below 
on each payment to a subcontractor, supplier or materialman on this Project: 
. . ' . 
T/K/2!7388]D0c 
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:By endorsement, pa,ree acknowledges r~t of :the amount of 
:this check in full payment and satis~ti<m for.all work perfonned 
and for materials furnished on :the property as described on :the · 
~ he~ofto date Shown thereon, and waives all rights to 
mecfumie's and/or m,merialman's lien. :Paye.e:l:!ereby indemnifies 
and holds payor and owner of :the property harmle$ from all . 
mecbanie's liens .filed by its sub¢9ntractors and major s11ppliers 
agiililst :the property prior to :the date henro:f. 
3.. Insnrance. :Notwithstanclit)g any provision to tlii: contrary in Article 11 of 
:thf;l General ConditiollS of the Contract for Construction (referred to hf;lreinafter as :the 
"GenetalConditions"), Contractor will obtain, at an additioMI ~stto Own~r ofa oni:-
time Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollar ($Z,500) charge, .all necessary insurance 
covering its performance Qf :the Work, including policies of gi:neyalliabllity insurance 
wi:th coverage provided on an 9ccurrence basis (with limits of not Jess lhan $5,00.0,000 
combJned i,ingle limit) .and worker's compeni,ation in$urance. Owner i,hall be named as 
an additional insured on such liability insurance pplicy .. Proof of each such insurance 
policy shall be delivered to Owner prior to the execution her1Jof, together with a 
commitment on the part ofeachinsuranc.e carrier to notify Owner tbiey (30) .days prior to 
an amendment or c!lllcellation ofthe policy. Contractor shall insert a provision 
substantialiy similar to .the .above.in any subcontract covering 1;1.nyportion ,of the Work, 
except that Contractor may retain a .subcontractor lhat Jll8llltains a lesser ainount of · 
li&bility insurance, in no .event less lhiui $500;000, depending, in Contractor's rellSonab~ 
judgment, whether such subro,ntractor shall be involved in low risk Wo.rk and for a 
limited time. Contractor shall requite each .subcontrlletor to maintain i,uch insllrance imd 
to deliver to Contract<)r proof ofcompliance llS stated herein. At 11ny tune thllt Owner 
requests, Contractor will deliver to Owner proofof each subcontrlletor's compliance with 
the insurance requiremeriti, set forth above. 
4. Creation of Punch List. As construction of the Project nears Substantial 
Completion, the Architect shall review the Worf( on the J>roJ<:et and with the aid ,ofthe 
Owner and ~ontractor, the Architect .shall develop a "punch list" which Shall be 
submitted to :the Owner and Contrlletor. A final Certificate of Payi,nent shall not be issued 
by the Architect until the Contractor bas completed or repaired. llS applicable, all of the 
items on the.punch list to the rellSonable satisfaction of the Architect and Owner. 
5, Excused Delays. Contractor guarantees that ''Substantial Completion of the. 
Work" (as used in Article 4) Sh&ll occur by the date set forth in Subpar.igr.iph 4.3 
("Completion Dwdline"), subject only to delays caused by any governmental or 
administrative order to cease or nuninuze transport across the bridge that connecti, the 
· Property to public fQllds, or to cease construction until conditioris related to the bridge 
have been resolved to the satisfaction ofthe governmental or administrative agency that · 
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issued the order; or by acts of God; unforeseeable causes beyond Contractor's control, 
interference or delaY.of Owner, e.g., ifOwner bas been provided by Contractor · 
swficiently far enough in advl!llce of Contractor's need for the Owner's selection several 
choices 0~ for example, a detmt, finish or paint color, yet, for r~ons unrelated to 
Contractor, Owner fails tunelyto make a sel~on; acts ofpublic utilities, pul:>lic bodies 
or JllSl)ectors (but.not ~lated to possible d!id'ects or ovemi~ts in Contractor's .. 
performance); .extra Work requested by Qvvn!!l'; failure of Owner to make progress 
payments when due; delays in delivery by Ownerldesigner of materials; agoVellllllent 
moratoriilin that affects tlie Work; strikes, if all Work is precluded as a result and to the 
extentthereot:weathei; conditions that prevent any Workor the majority pf the Work 
. :from proceeding on one or illPre days; delay$ caused by Owner's contractors, ifany, as a 
result ofOwner/designer supplil:d plans, clarifications or specif'icatlons not yet reviewed 
by Contractor by the date of .this Agreement. With reference to the sitnatlot1 wherein 
Owner is asked to choose between Silll).ples, Contractor or Architect, .as the ease may be, 
shall inform Owner when choices are ptesented to Ow:tlet .of differential pricing or 
delivery dates estimated by the supplier affecting each selection; failure to do so shall 
relieve Owner from responsibility for any-delay occasioned by a delivery date tfult 
e~ends the Work beyond the Completion Deadline. 
6. P!W}ent on Substantial Comgletion. Upon Substantial Completion of the 
Work, Owner .shall pay Contractor a sum sufficient to inereas.e the total payments to 95% 
of the Cost .of the Work and 95% of the Contractor's Fee less 100% of the sums 
reasonably esfunated.by .the Architect to be required to pay to complete all of the Work .·· 
. and to pay any unsettled claims, SubstantialCompletioti ofthe Work shall be defined as 
whe:ir:the Work has passed final inspection by the BuildingDepilltinent of Blame Co~ty 
and any other :iµunicipalities or government agencies having jurisdiction .over the Project; 
Contractor shall have completed the construction in accotdance with the Contract 
Documents with the exception of the final punch list; the Project is .free of mechanic's 
liens; and alLfinal and unconditional mechanic's lien releases have been delivered by 
Contractor to Owner with .the exception of releases from :those subcontractors still 
working on the Project. 
7. Change in Work. Prior to providing Owner with a Guaranteed Ma:idroum 
Price for the Work, Contractor shall have checked the avllilability of parts or materials 
which Contractor deems, in its professional judgnient, necessary to install, set, affix .or 
complete the Work. Any delays that arise in :the availability .of :5µch parts or materials that 
would delay the completion ofthe Worlc shall excuse Owner•,s decision to substitute more 
readily available .parts or,materials. A change to more readily available parts or materials 
will not result in any additional cost to Owner exceptthe .cost exclnsively of such parts or 
materials. The Owner or Architect may request changes to the scope ofWork required by 
the Contract Documents by adding or deleting work, niaterilds, or equipment. Contractor 
will provide a cost or reduction of cost for each change order and indicate any extension 
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or reduction to the Substantial Completlon Date as a result of the change order in .a 
writing to be delivered to Owner and Architect Contractor will photograph on.a digital 
caniera the area and detml of any Work that Contract<>r .advises should be changed from 
the :Pl~ and will transmit same by electronic mail to Owner andAn;hitect at the el.llail 
address provided by each. The Archjtect will review the written change order and advise· 
the Contractor ofadditionalmatters that would require modification as a resµlt ofthe 
change order, if any. If the Architect approves :the change .9rder, it sball signihe change 
. order .and deliver it to the OWner Jor execution. Once execmed, a change order will · 
become.a change to the Work ("Change") and the Contractor sballJ>erfonn the Work 
required under this Contract as thus nmduie4. In the event of aCliange, no adjust!nent · 
will be made.w the Contractor's fee. or overhead to the e;x.tentthe Change entails only a 
ieplacement of materials, eM if the new materials are more costly than the original ones, 
or if the changes are rel;rt:ively insignilicant given the overall scope of Work. However,.if · 
a Change entails an expansion, other than an. insignificant on!; ofthe .scope of Work, 
Contractor shall be paid ten percent (10%) of any increased Cosi of the Work exclusively 
related to the Change as the Contractor's Fee for the Change. No change, as deseni>ed 
· above, shall be authorized unless executed by the Owner prior to im.plement.mon of the 
Change. A Change signed by or approved by electronic mail sent by Contractor to Owner 
at an electronic mail address provided by Owner and responded to from the same 
electronic mail address sh.all be binding and effective as a signed approval of Owner. · 
Any one of • REl>~EJ> or Lily Reeves .shall be au:thorized to execute a . 
Change for Owner and for purposes of this provision shall be included in the definition of 
Owner. A Change must be signed:byGary Storey to bmd Contractor. After pricing the 
Specil:icatlons and final Drawings of the Caretalcer's House, Guest Bouse #1 .and Guest 
House #2 ("Outbuilding Improvements"), the Contractor may msist on changes to reduce 
the cost of consti;ucting the Outbuilding Improvemen!S before committing to proceed with 
the Outbuildingbnprovement.s, and the Architect and Owner will .cooperate in 
expediently reviewing Contractor's suggestions. If C9ntractor's suggestions are 
acceptable to Owner and Architect, Architect will revise the Plans for the Outbuilding 
Improvements to incorporate Contractor's recommendations .at no additional expense to 
Owner, and Contractor, upon receiving such l>lans, revised accordingly, will commit to 
proceed with the Oqtbuilding Improvements. If Contractor's iruggestions. are not 
acceptable to Owner and Ai:chitect, Architect wi11 revise the :Pl~ for the Outbuilding 
Improvement at.no additiona.l expense to Owner .so that th~y confoun to the Allowance 
for the Outbuilding Improvements. 
8. List of Subcontractors. A$ soon as practicable after execution 9f this 
Agreement, Contractor shall furmsh in witing to Owner imd Architect the nl!llles, 
contact, address, phone and fax numbers of each subcontractor that will be involved in 
the Wotk. Contractor shall not contract with any subcontractor to whom Owner oi.-
Architecthas made reasonable and timely objection. Contract9r shall not be required to 
contract with any subcontractor requested by Owner to whom Contractor has made 
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reai;onable objection. Contracts between Contractor and its subcontracto,rs imall (1) 
requite each subcontractor, to :the extent .of the Work: to be per(onn!ld by :the 
subcontractor, to be bound to Contractor by :the terms of the ContractDocuments, and to 
assume toward Contmctor all :the obliglltions and resp.onsibilities which Contractor, by the 
· Contract Documents, assumes toward Owner and Architect, llild (2) allow to 
subcontr®tor the benefit pfall rights, remedies and redress afforded to Contractor by 
those Contract Doc1llllents. - · ·· 
9.. Work Standards. 
(a) Contractor shall devote its time and:energy to the Work until lt is 
completed on a non-e)rolusive basis. A project manager tluentin English shall be 
informed of, and knowledgeable about, the Progress ofthe Project at all times and shall 
personally review each Application for Payment for the Project. 
{b) Contractor will exercise due care for supervision of all Work done 
by any of its subconlractors. The Contractor shall not ernploy anyone or:hire any 
.subcontractor thatis unfit or unskilled for the Work be oritis to p!)ffon;n. 
(c) It is understood that Contractor will:meet with !lach subc(mfractor at 
th!) Prop.ertybefot!l a subcontractor begins its respi:cnve tasks, Contractor. will promptly 
visit tht;1 Property at any time that Owner st:> reasonably requt;lSts durlngnormaJ bus.mess 
hours, and take .all other steps nt;leessary to properly supervise the Work ofsubconlractors. 
Contractor's responsibility for such supervision shall include all aspects ·.of such Work, 
.including, without limitation, the speed, quality and safety thereof. All subcontractors . 
employed by Contrllctor shall be competent to perfonn the-Workthey have been: hired to 
perform and shall have liability and worker's compensation insurance currently .in effect 
as provided in the paragraph captioned Insurance. 
· 10. Warrantr. Contractor guarantees that .all matenals, applillilces (if provided 
by Contractor), mechanicai devices, and supplies incofPOrated in the Work will be new as 
of the date of installat;iol).1,lll}ess otherwise specifioo in the Plan$ or by a Change, and 
shall strictly meet the specmcations set fodh in the Plans and all Changes. Owner 'Shall 
h. av. e .the benefit ot:, and Contra.ctor s. hall deliv. ,er. to Owner, no later than upo. n S. ubstan. · ti; . -'[A\ 
Completion of the Work. all unexpired assignable warranties and guru:antees given by a ,f"""'jY 
m. anufacturer,retaiieroranyothersupp.· liet.t:>f. ma.terials.usedin .. th .. eWork. .·Co ..ntr• actor ],;yl / · 
hereby gnarantees that the Wol'k performed hereunder will be free from faulty materiali ~ . 
and faulty workmanship. Owner shall give Contractor written notice ofany defeet or 
nonconforming work. On receiving notification from Owner, Contractor agrees to 
remedy, by repair or replacernentimmediately, without cost to Owner, aUdefects and 
non-conforming work appearing in the Work within a period of eighteen (18} months 
after the later of Compl!!tion of the Work or the date on which the Work jn qt1estion is 
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completed. ContractQr shall warrant the roof to be fux: of defect .for a period of fiye (5) 
years after the ¢0mpl!ili.on of the roof installa1fon. Owner'eS first remedy (pdor to availing 
itself of remedies implied by law or .otherwiiie, pr-0vided such remedies shall not, by virtue 
of a statute of limitations·expiring, be waived nor forsaken) against Contractor in 
connection with such defects sbali he to requb:e CQntractor to cotrectthe defect. lf 
Contractor doei; not timely nor adequately perform thil! wananty, Owner may avail itl!elf 
of a11y remedies intpliedby Iaiv or otherwls~ •. However, if the Plans, applicabie lllW or the 
mamlfacturer provide fora guaranty ot wananty for any·~ or "\YOrkroanshlp i.tl 
exc.esii of the eighteen month or £ive~year period, a11 the case may be, then said guaranty 
· or warranty shalfbe controlling .as to the covered materials or workmunsJnp. Payments to 
Contracto.r $hall not nilieve Coritracto.r of any sucll obligation. CONTRACTOR MAKES 
NO REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY CONCERNING.ANY GEOLOGICAL OR 
ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS.AND SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES GEOLOGICAL 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MA'ITBRS FROM ANY WARRANtlES GIVEN UNDER 
. ' . . 
THIS AGREEMENT .• WITH REGARD TO ANY Al>PLIANCES OR OraER.ITEMS 
OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PR:Ol>ER!Y, CONTRACTt>RDISCLAJ;MS ALL 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FORA PARTICULAR USE. 
l l. Indemnijiy. The Indemnity· in Paragraph13.8 .Qf;the General Conditions 
shall survive the completioo of the Work and/or the termination of this Agreement. 
12. Contractor's Refusal or Neglect. If ConJractor, at any time during the 
progress ofthe Work, but afterthe expiration .of the time provided for the completion of 
any phase of the Work pursuant to the Work Schedule,.refuses or neglect/! without a11y 
fault ofOwner to suppiy s'1f!:icient materials .Qr workmen t<> complete such phase of the 
Work for a p.eriod of more than th.rec (3) b)lsiness days after havmg beei:t instructed by 
· Owner in writing to do so, OWner shall Imve the right to fui:rush i;md provide such 
materials and workmen .11$ are necessary to finish such phase of the Work, and the 
expense thereof shall be deducted from the ru:nount of the Contract Sum.. Th\:l foregoing 
procedure shall be in addition to, aI:td shallnot operate as a waiver ot ,my and.all other 
rights or remedies to wluch Owner may be entitled at law ot in equity. 
13, Independent Busip.ess. Contractor hereby declares tbatContract<>r has been· 
engaged by Owner all .an independent business and agrees t<> perform the Work as an 
independent contractor and.not as an agent, empioye¢ or servant of Owner. Coi:ttractor is 
a general contractor, and shall remain so for the duration of the Work. Contractor has and 
hereby retains th~ tight to exercise full control and supervision of the Work and full 
control over the employment, direction, compensation and discharge of aUpersons 
assisting in the Work. C<>ntractor agrees to be solely responsible for all matters relating 
to payment of its employees including e<>mpliance with .Social Security, witl!h.olding and 
all other regulations governing such matters and shall indemnify, defend and hold 
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hatmless OMWr and Owner's a~!lnts and servants. and each .of them, from and ~llinst 
c·) ITTlY an<l all claims, costs, expeIISes relating thereto. 
) 
) 14. Owner's Rigp.tto Terminate. 
(a) Notwithstanding any provision. to tbe con.trary m,; Gen.era! Condition.s 
or th!l StllndardForm. if Owner terminates the Con.tractor'ssel'Vices, withoutlunitin:g any 
of Owner's rights with respect to a bl!lach by Cootractor, Own!lr'S sole obligation to · 
Contractor shall be to pay Contractor for all Work perl'.onned up to the date ofsuch · 
terroin.mion together with the Contractor's Fee .on .such Wor~ which sball }le caleulated at 
7 .4o/o of th!l Costofthe Work that has b!len compiet!ld. and the JloldbackAmount 
withheld pursuant to Article 12 less a sum equid toa reasimable estimation by the 
Architei.:t of outstanding correction.s; repairs or inadequacies in the Work ("Corrections") 
· for which the Con.tractor has received payment. Any sum due to Contractor shall be 
promptly paid; any overpaymen.t by Owner after taking·mto account the Corrections, shall 
be promptly refunded to Owner by Contractor. 
(1>) Upon Owner's delivery of written notice to the Con.tractor of such 
termination, the Contractor shall: .cease .op.erations as directed by the Owner in. the notice; 
take actions necessary, or that the Owner may .direct, for the protection and preservation 
of the Work; ;rod enter int() no further.subcontracts or purchase orders after ·the receipt of 
such notice. Additionaily, Contractor shall provide to the Owner within iliree {3) business 
days after the notice oftennin.ation b;lS been delivered, a complete copy .of.the 
subcontract$ which.are then in. effect and purchase !>rders that are pending. Within. three 
(3) busmess days llfter Contractor has delivered such information to Owner, Owner shall 
notify Con.tractorwhetbet the Owner desires to have such said subcontracts assigned to 
owner. iri which case Owner agrees to pay Contractor's reasonable hourly cost to deliver 
to its subcontractQrs a Notice of Assignment that includes a release of Contractor for the 
executory portion.of the Work and, if possible, to obtain. their cQnsentto perform for 
Owner the balance of their respective contracts with ContraciQt. Contractor.shall assign 
such subcontracts to Owner. Owner anp Contractor will discus~ whether one or more of . 
the purchase orders should be terminated. Such o.rders would be terminated at Owner's 
expense, ifthe same were authorized by Owner, orat Contractor's expen.se, if the same 
were not previously approved by the Owner or contained in the Contract Documents. To 
the extent a sµbcontractor of Contractor agrees to perform pursuant to the assignment of 
its agreementto Owner, 0wn!lf .agrees to use its good faith effbrt to dissnade the 
subcontractor from involving Contractor in any claims that arise between Owner and 
subconttactor relating to a subcontr:actor's. Work pursuant to the assignment. 
15. Final Clean-Up. In 11ddition. to general broom cleaning, the Contractor shall 
perform the following final cleaning for all trades at completion of the Work: 
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(a) Remove temporary protections; 
(b) Remove nuukll, .stains, vlsible-fingeypnnts ®d other soil Qr dirt from 
painted, decorated, and natural :finished woodwork and other work; 
· ( c) Remove spots not.inh.@rent in the material, mortar, plaster, soil and 
paint from ceramic tile, marble, and other £h:tish materials and wash or wipe clean; 
(d) Clean fixtures, cabinetwork (md equipment, rem()~ stains, paint, 
dirt, and.dustand leave mmidamaged, new condition; . . . 
(e) Clean aluminum in accordance with recQmmendations .of the· 
manufacturer; and · 
(f) Cleilll :resilient :floors :thoroughly with a well-rinsed mop containing 
· only enough moisture to clean off illlY surface dirt or dust illld buff dry by machine to 
bring the surfaces to sheen. 
1.6. Owner's Rigpt to Issue Joint Checks. Provided a supplier or suJ:>corttractor 
.has notified Owner of a failure to be paid by Contractor, at any time thereafter that Owner 
elects, Owner may decide to issue checks pursuant to Contractor's Application for · 
Paymentpayable to Contractor and ali subcontractors who have furnished labor or 
· materials which are the'8ubject ofsuch Association for Payment. · · 
. 17. . Damqge to .Material. the improvement$ located at the .site, work in 
progress, .stored materials illld public and private improvement on properties adjacent io 
the site shall be protected by Contractor from damage .az'.ising.frolil the Wwk lllld other 
causes which reasonably .could be avoided .. Other than for insured property, all damage 
occurring shall be repaired or dam~ed items replaced by Contractor at no cost to ()wper. 
The Contractor shall be rem,onsible for broken glass, lllld .at completion ofthe Work shall 
replace such dam~ed .or broken glass at no additional cost to OWner. After broken glass 
has .J,een replaced,the Contractor shall remove aU labels, wash, and.remove streaks or 
spots on both sides .of all glass .. 
18. Miscellaneous. 
(a) Time is of the essence of the Agreement and every term and 
provision hereof. 
(b) . Contractor may not assign its rights under the Agreement or assign 
any rights to any money due or to become due. Owner mal freely assign this Agreement. 
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Any entity which shall succeed to the righ:ts of Owner shall be entitled to enforce the 
rigb:ts of Owner hereunder. 
(c) . Any arbitration arising out .of this Agreement or :my of the Contract 
Documents may include, by consolidation, joinder or iil l!RY other manner, additional 
persons or entities no:t a party to this Agreement upon written request of either Owner or 
Contractor. 1he forego mg agreementto ad:,itrate coutained in this partigraph shall be. 
specifically enforceable in accordance with applicable law in any court having. 
jurisdictionther~f. 
(i) The award render!c)d by the iirbitrator or arbitrators shall .be 
fmal, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any .court 
having jurisdicticin thereof. · · · · 
(ii) Contractor shall require iu all agreements between Contractor 
and any subcontractors of Contractor tbail any disputes under each such agreement shall 
be submitted to and decided by binding arbitration iri Blame County, Idaho in accordimce 
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules ofthe American Arl>itration Association 
(''AAA") currently in effect (or comparable rules .of the successor :to the AAA) unless the 
. ' ' 
parties mutually agree otherw'i$e. Demand for arbitration shall be :l:iled in writing with the 
other party to this ·Agreement and with the AAA. In no event shall the demand for · 
arbitration be made after the date when institution of legal oi: equitable proceedings b$ed 
on such claim, dispute or other matter in ,question would .be barred .by the applicable 
statute of litnjtations. In any arbitration, ·the parties shall avoid public disclosure ,of the 
arbitration, except.as ne~ed to pursue the .arbitration, and fu the arbitration, neither party 
shall mention the uames of the beneficial owners of the other party in their capacity as 
owner except as expressly ordered by the arbitrator. · · · 
( d) Owner will endeavor in good faith to maiutain the involvement of 
. Architect's John Grable and Brian Korte iri the Project, however theirru:m-partjcipation 
shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement. 
(e) Any notice required or permitted hereunder shall be given to the 
respective parties at the addresses set :forth below: ' 
Ifto Contractor: 
TJK/217388 _7.DOC 
Storey Construction Inc. 
323N. Lewis SJ:reet 
Post Office Box 1877 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Attn: Gary Storey 
Phone: (208) 726-8816 
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) 
Fax: (208) 726-2180 
With a copyto: . 
If to.Owner: 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis.& Hawley. LLP · 
540 Second Avenue North 
Post. Office BPx.297 
Ketclnnn, ID 83340 
Attn: Edw11td LawsOll 
l>hone: 008) 726-1700 
Fax; (208) 726•9743 
sun Valley trust · 
c/p Meschutes Cm:npeas Thompson & Snyder 
760 N. La CienegaBoulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90069 
Attn: Steven J. Campell$ 
Phone: (310) 652-0222 
Fax: (310) 854~5438 
With a copy to: 
. BloPin, Hergott, Diemer and Cool!:, LLP . 
150 So. Rodeo ))rive, Third Floor 
Beveriy Hills, CA 90212 · 
Attn: Tina J. Kahn 
Phone.: (310) 859-.6833 
Fax: (310) 860-.6833 
{f) · Such ,addresses may be changed by written notice from one party to 
other from timeJo :fune. Notices herellllder shitll be given by personal deliveiy, prepaid 
telegram, United States .certified, registered or first-class mail with p.ostage pr.epaid or 
te1ecopy. For purposes hereof, the ,date of llotice shall be cOD$idered the date of such · 
personal deliveey, .telegram, or telecopy or three days after mailing. . 
. . . 
(g) · . this Agreement, including the Addendum, Contract Doc.uments. and 
General Conditions cons1ltute the entire agreement betWeen the parties. No other 
agreements oral or writt(lll peytaini:ng to the Work to be performed llllder the Agreement 
exists between the parties. · The Agreement can be modified only by an agreement in 
writing signed by both parties. 
{h) · Each. provision of this Agreement is intended to be severable from 
the other so that if any provision or tenn hereofii; illegal or invalid for ap.y reason 
-11-
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whatsoever, such illegality or invalidity snail not affect the validity of the r~g (1) provisiQns or terms hereof, 
·, 
) 
) 
) 
· ... / 
(i) The AIA. D<>eumentA20l~l997, General ConditiQDS of th1: Comract 
for Constructi9n ("Geneml . .Conditiomi").applicable to this Agreement shall be the version 
. attached .hereto, as revised therein, and .in the event of !lllY conflict ofany provisiollS of 
sai(l Geneml C.onditfons and provisions of this Agreement, the provisions ofiliis 
Agreement shall control •. 
19. COUirtm>arts. This Agreement ml!-y be executed.in any number of 
coJ.lnterparts, each of which so exei;uted shall be deemed an original, but all ofwlµch 
together shall constitute one and the smn~ instrument. · 
20. PromotionalMaterlals. Contract<>r shall not be permitted to photograph, 
use, show, display, discuss with parties other than as requi_red to perform the Worlc, Qr 
pubHsh (collectjvely "Publication") any photographs, drawings, de$criptions <>t other 
materia):; relating to or of the Project, the Owner, the beneficial owners, or the Property. 
Owner's authorizati!>n .in writing t!> any .one instance of Publication shall in no eYent be 
c<>nstrued as authorizatfon by Owner to any pther Publication. None of Contractor's 
office files, plans orwritten lllllterials, whether pubHc or not, shall refer to the trustee of 
Sun Valley.Trust, or the beneficial ownex(S) of the Property, nor shall they identify the 
Project address, unless approved in writing by Owner orrequired by a, goveniment 
agency. Contractor will refer to the Proj.ect otherwise as '1 :REDACTED :/' 
21. DueExecution, Contractor represents and warrants that itis.aduly formed, 
validly existing ldaho corporati1>.n under Jdaho law, that the party executing this· 
Agreement on behatfofContractor is duly authorized by Contractor, pursuant to Idimo 
law, to do so, and pnce it is executed by the signatory for Contractor, .it will be binding <>n 
Contractor. The undersigned Owner represents that she is authorized to sign this 
Agreement and ooce she ha$ signed it, it will be bindllig on the Trust. 
IN WI'tNBSS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed their names below as 
of the date set forth above. 
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STOREY CONStRUcTIONlNC. 
By:_.·-------,-------
TJK/217388_7.POC 
"Owner'' 
SUN-VAU.EYTRUST 
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·I>iunagestorDelay . 
6.l.l, 8J.3, 9.:5..1.6, 9.7, 10.3.2 
Date of Cbmmi.'!Dcei;ne)lt of ihe Wprk, Definition of 
8.1.2 . 
Date of 1,nb$111.ial CoJw)letion, Pefutltion .Qf 
.8.1.3 
Day,'Defuiitipn.1,1f • 
3.1.4 
Decisio!is,ofthe Arclµtect 
42,6, 42,7,4.2.11,42.12, 4.2.13, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4,4.6, 
4.5., 6.3, 7.3.6, 7.3.t, s.u, 8.3.1, 9.2, 9.4, 95.1, 9.8.4, 9,9.l, 
13.52, 14.2,2, 14.2.4 . 
Decisions II> W"JljmoldCertificati1m 
9.4.1, 9.5, 9 .• 7, 14.U.3 
Defective .or No/lCOnfom)ing Wotk, Acceptmice, .Rejectipil and 
·Correctfon 1,1f 
2.3, 2.4, 3.5.1, 4.2.6,6,2,5, 9.5.1, 9.5.2, 9.6.6, .9.8 .. 2; 9.9.3, 
9.10.4, 12.2.1, 13.7.l.3 
Defective Work, Deli/lilion Qf 
.3.5.l 
Definitions 
1.1.,2.U, 3.1, 35,1,3.12.1, 3;12:2, 3.l;!.3,4.1.1, 4 .. 3.l,S.1, 
6.1,.2, 7.2.1, 1.3.t, 1.3.6,$.1,9.I,9.8.1 , 
D.elays and Extensions of Time · 
3..2.3, 4.3.l, 4.3.4,4.3.7,4,4.5, 5.2.3, 7.2.1, 7.3J, 1.4.1, 
7.5.l,,8,3, 9.S.1, 9.1.l,. 10.3.2, l0.6.1, 14.3.2 
Disputes · 
4:1,4, 4.3, 4.4, 4.S,4.6, 6.3, 1.3 .• 8 
l>ocl!lllents and Samples at the Site · 
· 3.U 
Drawings, Definiiio)I pf 
}.1.5 
Drawings !llld Specifications, Use and Ownership ()f 
1.1.l., IJ, 2.2.5,3.U, S.3 
Effectifj) Date oflnsoratn;j, 
8.2.2, ll:l.2 
Emergen¢h:s 
4.3.5, 10;6, 14.).1.2 
Emplo)'e!lS. Contraetwi: 
3.,3.;l, 3.4.3, 3,8.), 3.-9,3·.1·8.2,. 4.2.3, 4.2.6, 10.2, 10.3,J 
l}~ . / 
Insurance, Coiltractor's'Liability 
-4- . 
l.l.3, 1.i.6, 3.4, 3.5:1, 3.8.2, 3.8.3, 3.12,.3.13, 3.15;1, 4.2.6, · l).l . • . . 
4.2.7, 5.2.1, ~.2.1, 7.3.6, 9.3.2, 9.3.3, 9'5.l.3,,9.10.2, 10.2.1,Insuram:e, ~~of 
.• - l0.2.4,J4.2.l.2 . · · . S;t.2,U.l.2 . 
,,ce:,{ )e(;llt;iQll and~ of the WOik . . · . Insur;mce, L!>S!U\fUS!l 
: '\ 1.1.3, t.Zt, 1.2.2, :Z.2.3,2.2'5, 3.1, 3.3, t4, 3.S, 3.7, 3.10, U.4.3 
/ · . 3..12, 3.14, 4.2,:t, 4.i.3, 4.3.3, 6.2.2, 7.1.3, 7.3.4, 8.2, 9.5, ln.snrl!ni:e, ()wner's Lialiility 
9.9.1, J0.2, l0.3,.12.Z, 14.2, l4.3 ll.2 
}j,aimsiODS·!>fT"mie ~ l'rojei:t Management:Pwtectiv!O LilMJlty 
3 . .2.:3, 4.3.l, 4.3.4,4.3.7,4.4.S, 5.2.3, 7.2 .. l, 7 .. 3, 7.4 .• 1, 9.:5.1, ll.3 
9.7.l, 10.3,:t,.10.6.l, 14.3.2 . ~l'tllperty 
Failµre of Paynte11t l0.2.5, U..4 
4).6, 9.S.1.3, i}.1, 9.10.2, 14.1.l.3., '14.2.1.2, 13.6 Insur;mce, Sll>Jtd~ 
l'aulty Wonc 9.3.2, U.4.t.4 
(-5¢ Pefecti~ !)f Non!lQ~\lfork) IN.SURANC!; Mfp l30NDS 
Final Completion aJ1(1 1'.i!illl Paytnent ll 
4.2.1, 4.2.9, 4.3,2, 9.8.2, 9.10, t l. l.2, J 1.1.3, I t.4.1, 11.4.S, ~O>lnp!lnies, Co!l5e!lt to Partilll Occupsmcy 
. 12.3.1, 13.7, 14.2.4, _14.4.3 9.9.1, U.4.t.5 
Fi!iaociaJ Arta11getnen1s, Qwner's . JnSlllaJ1CC Compam!lS, Settlement·with 
. 2.2.1, H.2.2, 14.1.1.5 · 11.4.10 . 
Fire a11d ll:l!:tend!ld Coverage Insur;mce Intent of.!heContract .Dll!:1m1ents 
l!.4 l.2.1, 4.2.7, 4.2.t:2; 4;2.l3, 7.4 
GENEAAL PROVISION$ ~ 
1 · Dj' 
Goveniing "Law Jnierpri:tation · 
_13.1 1.2.3, l.4,4.1.l, 4.3.l, 5.1, 6.1.2,.8.!A 
Glllll1!nt.ees (S!O!O Warranty) 1nlerpretalions Wl';ilten 
Ikzarclous Materials 4 . 2.11,4'2.12, 4.3.6 . 
10.2.4, 10.3, io.~ ioinder and Consoijdation of Claims Reqµired 
. . · "\dentific!ltion of Contract DocUl)lel)ls 4.6.4 
_j L5.l Jndgmenton:ilinaJAward 
·i1entificatkm ofSubrontractors$d Suppliers 4.6.6 .·. 
. 5.2J . "LabOr andl,iaterials, Equipi.n\lllt 
Jnderonil'ication 1:1.3, } • .l.6,.3.4, 3.5;!, 3.8.2,,3.8.3, 3.12, 3.13, 3.l5J, 42.6, 
. 3.17,.J.18, 9.!.0.2, 10.33, 10.S, U.4.l;2, H.4.7 4.2.7,5.2.1, 6.2.l, 7.3.6, 93.2, !i.3.3,!t5.L3, 9.10.2, 10.i.l, 
Informat;ionandServices Requiredof~e-Ownw 10.2.4, 14.2.l.2 
. 2 • .1.2, 2.2,3.2.1, 3.12.4, 3.12.10, 4.2.7,4.3".3., 6J.3, 6 .• 1.4, Labor~ . 
6.2.5, 9.3.2, 9.6.1, 9.6.4,9.9.2, 9.10.3, 10.3.3, 11.2, 11.4, .8.3.l 
13:5.1, 13.5.2, 14.1.1.4, 14.1.4 Lam; andRegulat;io~ 
Injury .or D.amage toPe~n or,Property l.6,';t2.2,J.6, 3.7, .. 3.12.10, 3 .• 13,4.1.1, 4.4.8, 4.6, 9.6.4, 
· 4.3.8, to.2, 10.6 9,9.1, 10.2.2, 11.1, 11.4, 13.1, 13.4, 13.5.1., 13.5.2, 13..6, 14 
lnspectiphs . Liens 
.3.).3, 3.3.3,.3 .. 7.1,4.2;2, 4.2.6, 4;2,9, 9.4.2,9Jt2,.9.8.3, 2.l.2,4-4JI, 8.2.2, 9.33, 9.10 
9,9.2,.9.10.1, 12.2.1, 13.5 · LimitationMConsolid!lti1>n.or )oinder 
Jnstmctions to ,Bidders 4.(i.4 
1.1.1 "Limi\ations, Statlltes of , 
Jnstmctions to.tJ1e.dintnwtor 4.6,3, ll.2.6, 13.7 
3.2.3, .. 3..3 .. 1,.3:8.1, 42.8, 5 . 2.1, 7, 12, 8.2.2, 13.5.'.2 Limitations ofLialiiliiy 
lnsuranci, · 2.3, 3.2.1, 3.5.l, 3.7.3, 3.12.8,.3.12.10, 3 .. 17,3.18, 4.2.6, 
3.18.1, 6.1.1, 1.3.6, s.2.1, .9.3.2, 9.s.4, 9.<.u, 9;1-0.2, 9.10.s, 4.2.1, 4.2.12, 6.2.2, 9.4.2, 9 •. 6.4,.9.6.7,.9.10.4, .J0..3J, 
11 . 10.2.5, 11.1.2, ll.2.1_, ll.4.7, 12.2.5, 13.4.2 
) 
TJK/fil!?.r<y Constructionctxx;;!!§6~1 ;! P9C218m_1 DOG 
2122101 7:00 PMY;!WI .6:43 l>Mal,'lll/l H~ l'j\11,QAAJO 19:57 A',! 
-5-
fusluante, BPilfl!'l!nd Maclm\eJy LlmitanOllll pf'fiille 
2.1.2/Z.2, 2 .. 4,.3.2.l, 3.7,3;3.IO, 3;11, 3.125, 3.15.1, 4.2.7, .O!:cupaJ)cy 
/'.''.\ 4.3, 4.4, 4.5'. 4J;,.s.2, 5.3,SA, 6.2.4, 7,3, 7.4, 8.2, 9.2, 93.1, 2.2.2, ~.6.(i, 9.8, H.4,15 
,c:}Wjj) 9,3.3, 9.4.l, 9;5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, !>.10, UJ.3, 11.4.15, ~' Wnue.o.. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
• . >l ·. U.4.6, ll.4.10, 12.2, 135, !'3.7, 14 . Ll.l, 2.3, 3.9, 43.6, 7, 8.2.2, ll.4.9, t:U, 12.2, 1~.5.2, 
/ Is ofUse lnsuraru:e 14.3.l 
H;4.3 · OWNER 
M;llerj;il;Supplifll'S 2 
1.6, 3.12.I..4, 4.Z.6, ;i:2.l, 9J,.9.4.2, 9.6, 9.10.S Ow!iJlr,Pefinilion llf 
Mate,tjal.s, Hazan:)Q!1$ 2.1 
J0.2.4, 103, 10.5 ()wiler, lnforoialionan!iS¢?Vil:e!IRequirfld oflJ).e 
M~teri;lls, Labor;:Eqµip~t !!lid 2.1.2, 2.2, 3.2.1, 3.12.4,:3.ll.lO, 4,?-.7, 43-3, 6.13, 6.l.4, 
1.l.3, l.1.6,l.6.1,}.4, 35.l,.3,il.2,.3.8.23, 3.12,3 .. 13, . 6.2.5, 9.3 . 2, 9.6.1, 9.6.4, 9.9.2,!!.103, 1033, ll.2, H.4, 
3.i.S.l, 4.2.6,4.2.7, 5.2.l,6.2.l, 13,6, 93.2, 93.3, 9.S.13, 13 . $.1, l;l.5.2, 14.l.l.4, 14.1.4 
9.10.2, 10.2.l, J0.2,4, 14.2,l.Z Owner'.s Authority 
Means, Me$o<ls, techniques, Sequencl*! and J:>rpc~ures pf 1.6,.2.U, 2.3,2.4, 3.4.2, 3.8.1, 3.12.10, 3,14.2, 4.l.2, 4.P, 
Cp!J$tructiOll ., ' 4.2.4, 4.2.9,43,6, 4.4.7, 5.2,1, 5.2:4, 5,4;1, 6.t; 63, 1.2.I, 
3.3.l, 3.12.10, 4.2.2; 4.2.7, 9.4.2 73.1,8.2.2, 8.3.1, 9.3.1,.93.2, 9.5.J, 9,9,1, 9 .. l!J.2, 1().3.2, 
Mechanic's Lien l l.1.3, ! 13.l, ll.4.3, 1 I.4.10, 12.2.2, 12.3.l, 13.2.2, 143, 
4.4.8 14.4 
Melfu!tion Owner's Financial Capllbllity 
4.4.1, 4:AS, 4.4.6,4.4.8, 4.5, 4.6.1, 4,6.2, 8.3.l, 10.5 2.Z.1, 13.2.2, 14.1.tS 
· Minor Changes in the Work Owner's Liability InsJu,lnce 
1.1.1, a .. 12,s, 4.2 .. s, 4.3.6, 7.1, 7.4 11.2 · 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS Owner's Loss.Pftlse Insurance . 
U 1~ . 
Modlficntions, De/iniiion of OWil.er's Relationship with .Snbcontr,u:tor:s 
1..l.1 . J.1.2, 5.2,.5.3, 5.4, 9.6.4, 9.1().2, .14.2.Z 
yodjficati-Ons to the CO!ltrau . . . . ·. . Owner's Right to Carry Ont the Wor~ 
•• 1.1.1, U . 2, 3.73, 3.11, 4.1.2,.4.2,l,.5 . .2.3., 7, 8.3.1, 9.7, 2,4, 12.2A, 14.2.2.2 
1().3.2; JI.4.J Owner'sRigbtwClel!llUP 
11\tuid Respo11$ibiilty -6.3 . . 
6.2 Owner's ~ to i>erfunn C1>!1$tructl1Jµ and I!> Award Separate 
Nonconli>:mling Work, 1):cceptmi;e,!lf Conmicts · 
9.6.u, 9.9.3, 12.3 · · ,.1 
Npnconfu:mling Woiic, Rejection and Corn,ction.of Owner's lllghttp $tpp :the Work 
'.:/.3,2.4, 3.5.1, 4.2.6, u.2.s, 95,l, :9_.s.2, 9.9.3, 9.10.4, 12.2.1, :2.3 
13.H.3 · .Qwner'sR.igbtto Sn$pend the Wor)c: 
Notice 14.3 · 
2.2.1, 23,2.4, 3.23,3;3.l, 3 .• 7.2, 3.7.4,.3..12.9, 4.3, 4.4,8, Owner's.Rightt!> Terminate theContr;ict 
4.6.s,.s.2.1, s.;t2, 9.'1, 9.10, 10.2.2, 11J.3, n.4.6_, 12.z.2, 14.2 
12 . .2.4, 13.3, 13.5.l, 13.5.2, 14.l, 14.2 0wnfll'SbipandUse!>f'Drawing&, Specificationsl!nd()ther 
Notice, Written ·· · · ~ents l>fSe!Vice · · 
2.3, 2.4, 33.1, 3.9, 3.12.9, 3.12.10, 43, 4.4.s, 4.6,s, s . 2 1.1.1, 1,6, 2.2 .• s, ;1.2.1, .. 3.H.1,3.11.1, 4.:u2, s.3 
8.2.2, 9.7, 9.1(), 10.2.2, 10;3, U.l.3, 11,4.6, 12.2.2, 12.2.4, Parti;ll Occupll.llily pr Vse 
13.3, l4 . 9.6,6, 9;9, H.4.l.5 
Notice of Testing and ~oils Patching, Cutting !!lid 
13.$.J, 13.5.2 3.14, 6.2.5 
Notice to Proceed Patents 
8.2.2 3J7 
1:JK/Stor<;v Cons1ruction.DQ8!llGt.l 3,00£,ll UtllJ!lOG 
2fl2JO! 7:00 PM¥$'QI 6:43 PMi!{Mll 2:JfPM7/2SJGG 10:57 AM 
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NoJices, Permit/!, Fees and J.>ayrnellt, Al>Jl]iclltions ti>r 
2.2;2, :.t,,.:{13, 7.3.6.4, 10.2.2 4.i.5, 7.3:3, 9.l, 9,3, 9.4. 9.5.1, 9.6.3,9.7.1, 9.85,.9,10.l, 
Observaiions, C~s ·· 9,i0.3,9,10,5, l l.l,3, 14.2.4, l4.4.3 
,,,(;) l.S.2,J.2, '.t 7 .3, 4;3.4· . ·.· . . • . · payment, Certificates for 
·"······.\ ... 4.2.:5, 4.2.9,.9.3.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6.1, 9 .. 6.6, 9,7.J,9.10.1, . 9.10.2 1 
· / .1 9.10.3, 13.7, 14.1.l.3, 14.2.4 Re~ _ . 
· iaym!)!}t, )'ajll)re of 1.5;2, 3.S.I, 3 . .12.6, 6.2.2, 8.2.1, 9.3.3, 9.4.2, 95.J, 9,8, 2, 
4.3.6, 9 .• :5.1.3., 9.7, 9.10.2, 14.1.1.3, 14.i.1.2, i:u; 9.10 . .1 
Paymellt, Final Represematives 
4.2.1, 4.2.9, 4.3.2, 9.8.2, 9. W, 11.1 .2, I 1.1.3, U.4. !, H.4.S, .2J.l, 3.U, 3.'>, 4.1.l, 4.2.l, 4.2. lP, 5. I.t, :5.1.2, U.2;J 
12.3.1, 13.7, 14.2.4, 14.4.3 · · Rllsolution.QfC~ anil Pispule$ 
. Payment l3i!nd, P!lm)1'lllllilce l3o!!d and 4.4; 4.S, 4.6 · 
7.3.6.4, 9.6.7, 9.10.;l, 11.4.9, 11.5 · Ri:,spl))!Sll,ilityti>rthose:P~lhe Work · _ 
Payments, Pro~ 3.3.2, 3.18,4.2.3, 4,3;.s, 5.3.1, 6.J.3, 6.2, 6.3, 9.5;1, 10 
. 4.3;3, 9,3, 9.6;9.li.5, 9:1.0.3, 13 .• 6, 14.2;3 Relalnage 
PAYMENTS AND COl\,'IPl.,l;ilON · 93.l, 9.6.2, 9.3.5, 9;9.1, !U0.2, 9.10.3 
9 · Review of ContractDOClllllents and Fie1dComUtipns by 
Payments to Snbe1mn:actors Contra.ctor 
S.4.2, 9.5. l.3, 9.6.2, 9.6,3, 9.6.4, 9,6;7, 11.4.8, 14;2.l.2.. 1.5.2, 3,2, 3.7.3,3.J;?.?, 6.1.3 
· i>CB Review of C1>nl(aeto!(s SnbmilJals by Ow!lcr and Architect · 
10 .. 3 . .1 3.10.!_, 3.!0.2,3.ll,3.l2, 4.2_, 5.2, 6,l.3, 9.2, 9.l!.2 
Performance 13.ond and Payment Bond Review .of $hop l'.lr!IVlings, Produi:t Pata and .Samples 11y 
7.;l.6.4, 9.6;7, 9.10,3, l 1.4.9, 11.p .Contta¢tor . 
Permits, Fces aildNotices · 3.12 
2.2.2, .3.7, 3 . .13, 7.3,6.4, 10.2.2 Righ!S andRemedi.es . 
PERSONS ANO PROPERTY, PROTECTIOJII OF . !.l.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.S.1, 3.15.2, 4.2.6, 4.3.4, 4.S, 4.u, 53, SA, 
11J 6.1;63, 7.3.I, .8.3, 9.5.1, 9.7, 10.2.s, 10.3, 12;2.2, 12.2, 4, 
Polycblorinated Biphenyl 13.4, 14 
· '\ lO .3. l · . Royalties,. Plitel)ts :and Cl>P,yrights 
· .. ,l'ro(luct Data, Definition of 3.17 
· , 3.12.2 Rules and.Notices for Arbitn!tion 
· ) ,'<>du.ct Data and Samples, ,Shop Drawings 4,6.2 
) 
3.11, 3.J2, 4.2. 7 Safety of Pe!:$ons anil'Property 
:Progress and,Comp)etion 10.2, 10.6 · 
4.i.2, 4.3.3, 8.Z, 9.8, 9.9.l, 14,1.4 Sidfty ~ecautic,ns ;l!ld Pri>grilrils 
Progress Paymell)S 33.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.7, 5.3.1, 10.1, 10.2, 10.6 
4.3.3,.9.3, 9.6, 9.8.5, 9.I0,3,{3;6, 14.2 .. 3 Samples, Defuiitipnof 
Prpject, Delinitionc,f1he 3.12.3 
l,l.4 . .Samples, Sl!op ;i:>r;twings, Product Data and 
Pr(?ject Manllgement Protective Liallility Insuranc~ 3.11, 3,12, 4.2.7 ·· 
11..3 Samples at the Sire, DOCl!inelllS and 
Projll!'t Manual, Delitlition of the 3.11 
1.1..7 Schedule,;,fV:,tlues 
Project Manual$ 9,2, 9.3.1 . 
2.2 . .5 $¢h!lliules, Constructioµ 
Projll!'t Represenllltives 1.4.1.2, 3.10, 3.12.l, 3.12.2, 4.3.7.2, 6.1.3 
4.2 .. 10 ·. Separatt,.CbnlillctS.and Cimtraetors 
Property;Insurance I 1.4,3.12.5;3.)4.2,4.2.4, 4.2.7,4.6.4,6, 8.3.1, ll.4,7, 
10.2.5, ll.4 12.1.2., 12.2.5 
PROJt:CrtOJII OF PERSONS ANO PROPERTY Shop Drawings,Delinition of 
10 3.12.1 
Regulations and Laws .. . Shop Drawings, Product Data and Samples 
1.6, 3.2.2, 3.6, 3.7, 3.12.10, 3.13., 4.i.l, 4.4.8, 4.6,.9,6.4, 3.ll,.3.12, 4.2.7 
. 9J>.l, 10.2.2, 1 I.I, 11.4, 13.1, 13.4, )35.1, 13S.2, 13,6, l4 Site/U:se of 
~ejectionofWork ·· 3.13,6.1.1,.6.2.1 
.. ./ · 3.5.1,4.2.6, 12.2.l Site Inspections 
TJK/Storey CoiistructionJJOC2l86Gl 3.El0C218GGJ LDPC 
2112/01 7:00 PMm:YOI .G:4'! PM~ll,<Ql 2'3G'!>!.!712§ioo to:S7.AM 
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' .. J 
. R!lle/lseS and Wruvim.ofLieJIII 1.2;2,,311, U.3,3.1.J, 4.2,43.4, 9.4.2,.9,10.1, 135 
Site Visits,J\rcllitect'.s 9.li).2,9Jll.3 
_ 4.2.2, 4.2;9,4.3.'\,.9.4.2, 9,s:1,, 9.9.2, 9.lll.l, 13.5 Sµrveys .. J,i)ed;ii )'nspections 1111d testing · 2.2;.; 
,'Y,'\ 4,2 .• 6, 12.;2.), 13 ... 5. SllSP!lll$ionbythe ()Wl!C)"wrC~l'fice 
I . \cificatiol!S, De:fuiitil)ll ofthe 14.4 
' J.J.6 · S~e~onofthe Wilrk 
Specificatiol!S, the 5.4.2, 14.3 
t.1.J, .LU, 1..1.7, J.2;2, 1.6, 3.U, 3,12.l0, 3.17 $uspeiii;ll)ll.or Termiplilion,ofthe Cl>JI1ract 
SllltUtl: llfLbnit>tii>nS 4.3.6, 5.4.1.1, U.4.9, 14 
4,6.3, 12;2;6, 1,3.7 "i'axe,i 
Sioppjng the W:ork . . 3.6, 3.8;2;1, 7.3.6.4 
. 2,3; 4.3.,6, 9.7, 10.3, 14 .• 1 T~,bytheC~ 
storettMate~ . . 4;;uo, i4,t · 
.6.2.l, 9.3,2, 10.2,1.;2, 10.2.4, JlA.l.4 Tenninationbythe~forQlu$e 
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(") .• 4.3.10, 9.!0.5, 11.4.1, 13.4.2 · 
"j"WlllVe,rofCl/lill!sbyiheOwner . . . 
1 14.3._10, 9,9.3, 9.10.3,9.10.4, 11.4.3, 11.45, U.4.7, 122.2 
. 1\1.42, '14.2.4 . 
' · Cono•m--ol I) Waiver .of . · . ..,,,.,.~~u- amllgt1S 
.4,3,111, 142.4 
Wl!ivet !!fL!eµs 
9.10.2, 9,111.4 
W'aill~;Of~ 
. 6.1.l. 11.4.5, 11.4.7 
w~ 
3.5, 4.2.9, 4.3;5;3, 9.3.3, 9.3.4, 9,9.:1, 9.}0.4, U.2.2, 
13.7.l.3 
Wfll4her Del~y$ 
· .. ) 
) 
·\ ) 
TlK/Storey Construction,DQCill86H lD00,1!8661) hOC 
2/22/01 7:00 PM:112:¥Ql 6:43 PM!,q,11)1 296 PM7t2SI-OO rn:!i7 AM 
Waiver.of~ byihe Architel:t 
4.3.7.2 
Wo,tlr, bllfimtlon.of 
1.1.3 . 
Wntten Consc:nt , 
l,l.6, 3.4.2, l,12 •. 11,.'.U4.2, 4.l.Z 4.3.4, 4.(i.4, 9.3.2, 9,8.5, 
9,9;I, 9.10.2, 9.10.3, llA.1, 13.2, l3ifa · . 
Wtittell Jnleip,elldi!>,118 
-4.2Jl,4.2;12, 4.3.6 
WrjttenNO!we 
2 . 3, 2,4,.3,3.1, l.9, 3,12.9, :M2.10, 4,3, 4A8, 4.6.5, 52.l, 
8.2.2, 9.7, 9;10, .10.2.2, .10.3, ll.1.3, 11.4.6, 121.2, 12.2.4, .- . 
13.3, 14 
Wrjtten Orde!'S 
~9-
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14.3.1 
ARTICLE 1 Gall;AAL PROVISIONS 
. 1. f 13ASlC b~ITION$ · . · . · . · · · · 
.. 1.1.1 THE CONTAA(rr DOCl,IMl:NT$ . · . .. . . · ·· . (J ThiiContract Poc.1n11ems~nsist pf Jhe ~einent ~twl!en ~ ;md C~ -~ ~ A~nt), Conllili~JlS of the 
:,>··)··". _ Contract (Genml, Supplemeµtary and ot\ler .Condili!>ns), Drawinwi, S~catl!>DS,Ad!ien® ~ pnor to execution oflbe 
. . i CO!lt:J:act, ot\ler dOCllllleiltS listl:d in the A~ment an(I.Moillficlllipns issu!ld after exe~ 1>f1!ie Confrt!Ct A Modification is (l) 
l 
.a written am~ent to the O:mtract c5!gne_d J,y bpth piirties, (2) 11 Cli;lnge ()(der, .(3) a Qi)lS)r:ll!mon Cli;lnge Dk!iclive .pr (4) .a 
written prder f(;r a .minor dlange .in 1lw Wort- is!l!Jei.l by lhe .Archilect. . Pn!l'l!S speciliclilly en\11DeI8ted in lite ~nt, thi, 
Contract DOCU111e1!1$ !lo Mt include other docmnents,such as bi\hling req_1!iremll!lls (advertisement or invitation to .pia, ~ons 
- to l3illders, sample forms, Jlie Contractor's bi<! or J)OllionHifMdendarellltin,gto !,idc;ling requirements). • 
1.1.2 THECO~CT 
·r4e. O;,niract -~ form llte C~ fPf Co~on. The Contract rep~ thi: entire and mtegll4!ld ~t 
.. Pe~ the J)l!Ilies heielo and Silperse®s pripr Jle$Otiati.cins, rep~entati!lns Qr ~ eii4er wti!te!l or oral The Ci>ntmt 
may be amended pr f!IOilifieil only by a Moditicllli1>n. The•~ Dl"lcmnlll!ts shall Mt 'b,e -~ti">~ .a c~ 
relati!>l)Siiip of .any kind {1) l>e~n the Arobitllct and Contractor, (2} !,et;ween the Owner ;md a. Sul>contractor .or 
S11bcsubcontractpr, {3) between the Owner .and Architi,ct pr (4) '.l>etween .any perst)ns or_ entities other -t\lall· the OWnet and 
Contractor. The hebite~ shall; hO'N.e>.'8J', b.e entitled ta p~e arul -eefer;Gi>meBt at~gati9Jl5 lltld8)' file Ca!llraet i!tlendea 
_ta iaei!itat!l JJemmnan~ ofllie .'.rehiteer s d!llies. · ·- · 
1.1;3 TI-IEWORK 
The tenn "Wo,l," :means the._ construction and services reguired I!)' the Cpntract Docuinents, whether ,CQlilpleti,d or partl;illy 
completed, and Jll!lbides-all other labor, IJlilte!ials. equipment and services prpvided.Qr ti> be provided by the Contractor tQ fulfill 
. the Contractor'11 obligations The Worklill>Y cp~tute :tlie whole ot a p@rtof the Project. . · · · 
1.1.4 !HEPROJECT 
.. The l'rojectis the :total@nstrulltioJ1 of which thi, Worlc perfonned under .the Contract D~ts may be the whole or a part and 
which .may_include constrnctlonl>y the Owner or by separate wntractors. )· 1:1.li THE DRAWII\IGS 
The Drawings .are Jlie llf3Phic .and pictorial portions of the Contract Doclll)lents shpwlng the .ru:sign, location and d)Ine)lllioµs of 
the Work, generally incluc;ling,plans, e1eW11ions, sections, details, sch!ldliles and diagmms. 
1 .. 1 .. S THESPECIFICATIONS . 
The Specificlllions are '1ll>t portion of !he Conttac1: Docmnents consimmg of the ~ reqllireme11ts for materials, .equipi!lent; 
systems, stam,fards .andworkmailsbip for thi, W,Qik, and perfol1JJllllce of related services. · 
1;1.7 THE,PROJECT MANUAL 
The Project Man!lai is il v<iWllle a,ssembled for the Work whichmaymclu\fe the bidc;ling requirements, sl!lllple fonm, Conditions 
of the Contract and ·Speeificatipns. · · . _ · ·· 
1.2 CORRELATION AND INTENT OF THIE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS . 
1.2.1 · The illtent of the Contract Docmnents is t11 include ,all lteins neces!ll!fY for the proper execution and completion of the 
Worlc by the Contractor. The Contract D-Ocmnents are CQlllJ)lement_ary, and what Is required l>y one -shllll be as bjnc;ling .its jf 
requireq by .Ill!; perfonnance by the C11n11l!Clor shall J,e·r!:quired only to the extent consistent wi1h the Contract Doclllllents and' 
-r~asonably inferable front themas being Qecessary to prodnce the _indicated r~ts.-
·1;2.2 Organization of the Specilicatiol!S into !fivisions, secyiol!S and iirticles, and iirrangemel)t of!)r;lwings sh!lll not _control the 
Conti:actor in dividing the Work lln11>ngSul>co11tractors or in establishing the eitt,mt of Work to be perfonned by ;my trad!l- _ 
1.2.3 Unless otherwise stared in the Contract Document$, words which have well-known tecllilical or ""~clion in!lustry 
meanings are used in theContractDoc.uments in-ac¢wdance with SllCh recognized meanings. 
-10· I 
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1.3 CAPITAUlATION • 
1;3.1 Tel'III$ ~ in tm,se Qenenil Co!lditions include !hose which are (1) specifically dilfined, (2) tile titles ofnwnbereil 
.articles and i~ references to Paragr;q,bs, ~hs and Claj!SeS in lhe tloclnnent or (3) !he titles of otltm' documents 
pub)¼he~ by1he.American_II\Stitut\l ·Of Arcllitects. 
1.4 INTER.PRETATION . 
1.4.1 Jn lhe int\lrest pfJ>revily lhe C11ntract DoCjlll1¢nts frequently l)l!)it n11xlifyinii word!; .such as "lill" ,ind ~any" and art;iclt:S 
such 11S ''the" .and "an,• but 1he ;fact that a Jnodi/ier or an article is absent m>JU ~ stat\lillent and llP,Ptllll'S in .another is not intendi,4 
to affect lhe bltetpri,tation oreilher sl;l!tnlent. 
Ui 1:XECUTION OF ¢0NTAACt DbCIJl\llENlS 
t.5.1 theCoiioactD~ sbllll be.Si!!l).ed.by1he OWuer and Cpl)1rllct0r. If~.!lti, ~er .&T ~air,,eter .&T h.etii de .n.at 
sign ~lib!, Cen!r;,etPeGJllilell15, t1!e ~iii shall id ntit)' ~eh \lllSigltlld,D,,_. up.mi Bllfll~ 
1 .. 5.2 Exeendon of lhe Contract by1he CP'1tmet0r js a representation tl!at ine CP1ltnlCtor has viSlt!ld !he site, beeoJUe generally 
f~iiir with !!)1);11 CPDditions under wbith the Wi>rlds to be perfonned and i:orrelated personalobs!ll"Vations witlueguirelnents !>f 
!he Conttaci:Doi:11!11ents. · · · · 
1.$ OWNERSHIP ANP USE OF PAAWINGS, $Pl:CIFICATIONS AND OTHER INSTRUMl:NT.S OF Sl:RVICE 
1.$.1 The Drawings, Specifications and other po!;IIJilents, including those in ell\CII!inic 1iinn, preplll'.ed by .the Arclntectll!ld tbe 
Architect's co-1tants are Instrwnronts i>f Service thri>uglt wbi!:h the Wotk to ,lie ,t>Xecuted by the .C!llltracror is i!e~1>ecl. The 
Contra!)tor Jnay ~ .~record.set. .Neither the Contract<lt nor lilly Subci>ntrill:lor, $ti.b-subcontrac1Pr or !lll\terial or equipment 
supplier :;hall own ilr clabn a .copyright ;in the Drawmgs, Spe,cifications and other ~ellts pn,parecJ by the Architect ~ 
~et's ••11srl$o11ts, (!Iii! Ullless !lthetwise .i!i()ieate.d t1!e .'\r611lteGt mid tlle )l.!'Ghite.t's ee11S1~!anl5 shall be cleem!'lf the l!Uthors of 
tlteJU !llld will .r:etain all colJJ)llon law, sllmrtozy .;1114 other reserved rights, in addition to the copyrighm; movided, however. the 
Owner is hereby gr/!!lted an exclusive license to use the Drawmgs, and either doC111Uents in connection with the i'roie!)tand/t>r any 
futnre remodels, additions or construction at the smne site. NI co_ples oflnslrulnents ,of Service, except the C!lntractot's recorll 
set, sqall be returl!ed Qr suilably .aCCOll!lled f9r to ilie Owner,<\flihitellf, on ~t, upon.Colllpic:flQn ofthe Work. The .Drawmgs, 
Specincati1ms and other docl!lllents prepared by the 4reltitect an4 the .Architect's ~ and copies therepffurnish?d w the 
ContractPr, are fur use solely with rewe!)t to ·this Project.. 'l'!iey Ne not to be ~ by the C!lntracior or illlY Subi:ontractor, 
Sub-subC!llltra!:tor or material or equ.ipJUent suppliet iin either proje!)!S oi- for .additions to this Project o:uts(de the .SCl)pe .lif the 
Worlc witho.ut the spepific written .consent of the Owner; Archite!)t and ihe Arcjntect's consultants. The Conttacror, 
Sul,contractors, $nb-subcontractoxs .an4 ·material or equlp,nent suppliers are anthom.i,d to ·IJS!l an!! reprqduce applicabl* pi>rtions 
of the Drawings, Specifications 11114 pther d~nts prepared by the Architect ancJ the .Arcbit«:ts c11nsultants appr:opriate :to and 
fQr use in the exei,utii>n ofctheir Work under the Col!U'llCt Doc11111eots. .NI topjes made nnder this authorization sh:ill be;,r the 
statutOiy copyright notice, if any, shown .pn the Dlmvin$8, ,Specificati&ns ancJ other docmn~ prepared by !he Archilllct and .!he 
Ai-chit!'ct's consnltants. ~liniittal or 4~outi(JII to meet officia) reg!tlatory~IDeirts or for i>ther purposes .in connection yiith · 
this Project .is 110t to be construe4 /lS publication in derogation pf !he Architect's or Architect's c.onsultants' copyrights or other 
reserved rigllts. · 
ARTICLE 2 OWNER 
2.1 GENERAi. · 
2.1.1 The Owner is 1he person or entity iden~e<I as snch in th!> A~ .ancl is referred .tp thrtmghout the Contl)lct 
D.ocuments as if singullll'. in number. The ~r shall desigii~te in .writing a ~ntaiive who shllll have exp= authori,ly to' 
bind the OWner with respe!)t to all m.allers ~g the OWner's approval or n()tho!)Zjl!jon. Ex®pt ·;is utherwise pro:vi<!ed in 
Subpiu:agrapli 4.2.J, the Architect does npt have such authorily. Tlte tmn "Owner" Jneans the Owner .or the Owner's !lllll)otiucf 
representative. 
2.1.2 The Owner shall t\lmish to the C!llltractonvilhin fifteen clays aftey receipt of.a wrltle!l l'.Cqi!e$, infonilll1ion necessmy an4 
relevant for the Contra!)tor tJ;i eval\lat!l, giye notice of pr enfurce Jnecbanic's lien rights .. Such infonnation-.shall include a correct 
stallll)lent of the rec9rd !eJ!lll title to the p.r~ on which .the Project is located, uiruaJlY referred to as the site, anli the ()Wl)er's 
ll)terest therein. . 
2.2 HllFORMATION AND SERVICES ~QUIRl;:D OF Tl:l'E 011!/NER 
.\ 
; 
/ 
\ 
) . 2.2.1 1'he Owner shall, Ill Ille vlfi#ell re~at of$\, Ca~Gtef, prier to a-eooem8l¼t af $1 Woilc llll.d tli!!Fellfi!ll', i\n,iish to ; 
tho CeimaGtef reasotlllble e·,ioonee that fiBanci~ ammgemon!s !Ja,;o been made to llllfill llie Ow!,er!s ebligations ,ma!ll' 1he ~ 
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.CelmaGt, ~ ef sueh evideaee shall b.e a oonditiea ~ee_, m se111Bl eaGllllleBt on,entinuatien ef$e V.~ .• \iler S)leh 
wA~se has baen ti!mi$,,J, the OwB.er SBlil! net ma~ var;· susJ> firm~ ;lll'i!ngemems witll~ Jwier aellse !!I ·ine 
~- .. 
f.,,() 2.2.2 .Except for perml1s and n,e:,, incl)llljnJ tllUse ~ii under Subparagraph 3.,7;1, wbicl) at\' .the responsil>ililY .of the 
·.) 1 Contr.actor under the Contract DoCl!IDell!S, the Owner shall secµte and pay fur~ approvals, easCJDents, ~nls and 
·. · cb\lrges required for constrµction, use 9r oecup;nwy of pennanent .stmelllreS OT forpeI!lll\1lenl,cbanges in existing iacilities, 
) 
) 
2.2.3 Upon reguest of.the Architect, ~ Owner shl!ll :furoi$ surveys ,kscribing phy~ ~mti~ le$li) lbnitatiPns anil 
nti)ity Joi:imons for the site of the Project, .and .a Ie$li) des~li01i of the sjte. the Conmictor .shall be !)Dtitleil to rely on the 
;)C!)Jll'llCY of infomia\i1,n funii$heil by the Owner but shall e;;ercise pr.oper precllllli9ns .relating to th~ safe perfQrutallCC l/f tne 
Work. . . · 
2,2.4 . Jnfonnalioo · w semces reqllire<l of the OWner .by the C-Ontf1'Ct ~ shall be .furniweil ·by the Ownllt with 
reasoQlible pro.mptn~. Ally o(ber information or se,vic~ rel~ ti> \he Contr;lclOI's perfontlaOl» o;f thfW<>xk unc:ler l:b<l'Ownei's 
· .Cllnlro.lsball be filmi$eil by lite Owner atter receipt from the Contracl!lr ofa written re<jll~ fur such infonnali811 l/T services, 
.2,2.s Unless .otherwise provided in the Contract Docllll)enls, the ContractPr will 'be :fiunished, im· !lf charge; .:me/I cOpiei; of· 
Drawings 1111d Project Manuals .as are reaso.nably nei:essaryfor eirec1)1:ion o:f theWQrk. · 
2.3 OWNER'S RIGHT .TO STOP 'tHl:WORK 
2.3.1 If the Contractor lilili to ,e<>rreet Wolk which ls not in accorilance with 111.e reqµirell'ients of the Contrac1:Documents as 
requireil by l'~ph 12.2 or persistently fails to /l8fl'Y .out'Workin acc!lrdance with the Cpntllict D,ocumen$, tbe OWner IIN!Y 
issue a written prdertp the Contrac.tor to stop the Wmk; or any J)Prlion ther!lO~ until 111.e cause f9T S11Ch or!ler has been f.Jimroaled; 
however, the> right of the Owner to stop !:be W9rk s!mll not give rise .. to a puty on 1he pari.<if the OWnerto exercise this right for !lie 
benefit of the Contract.or or any other perspn or entit}', .except to lbe elrte!lt required by SubpilJ'llgl'llph (\. l.3. 
2.4 OWti!ER'S RIG.HT TO CARRY OUT THE WORK 
;?.4.1 If lhe.Comract!lr 4efu!llts or ueglecls to carry out !he Work in accordance wltlJ. ihe Cl)ntract i)pcllll)enls and fails within.a 
;;even-day period ,after receipt of written .notice .ftQm the ,Owner to commence and ,continue Cl)rrectipn of such def.i!llt or neglect 
with .diligence and promptness, .the Owner may after such seven-day pt\l:iod give the Coutract!lr a second written notice 19 co.rr~ 
such deficiencies within.a tbr~y period. If the Contractor within such tbree-day peripd after receipt 0!$11ch ~ond notice fa11s 
to c(llJlmence .and COlltinJII' to rorrect 111\Y deficiellCies, tl!e Owner may, witbout prej,!dice to ollter n,meilies the Owner 11ll1Y .have, · 
correct SllCh (\eficiencies. In such ease an appropriate Change Oriler shall )!e issued dedll!lling li:om pa}'lllenls then 9T thereafter 
due. the Contractor .the reasonable c!lst ·-0f .correcting S11Ch deficiencilll!, mchiiling Own!:r's eltp!3l)Ses and compcnsmion for the 
i\rchite!:t's additii>nal sel'.Yices made uecjlSSlll)' by :rncb \!ef.iult, neglect or~: S11cb iiction'by the Owner and am9unls charged 
to the ConrractOr ate both subject to prior approval of\he Architect if an Architect is then involved with the Projel(!. Ifp;lylllel)ts 
then or thereafter due .the Contractor ilJ"e ootsufficient t-0.rover such amounts, 1he C!!Dltaetor shall pay the difference to the Owner. 
ARilCUS 3 CONTRACTOR 
3.1 G.EIIIERAL 
3; 1.1 The Contr;,ctor is fue person or l:JlliW ide11tified as .s11ch in .the Agreenifll)t .and is referred t<> lhro~put the Contract 
Poctm;enls as if.singular in mnnl>CI-. · The lerm "Contractpr" m!lllllS the Contractor or the Contraclot's auih()rized representative. 
$.1.2 The C!lntract!lr shall perfurm th!, Workoin accordllnte with lhe ContractDocumenls. 
3,1;3 The Contracior shall not be relieved of Pl>Hgations to perform the Work in acCPrilance with the C!lntractJ>ocWilents 
eifuer by activities Qr duties of the i\rchife,ct'in 1he Architect's administration oflhe Contract, .Qr by tests, inspections !lr approvals · 
required orperfonned by persons pther than the C!lntractor. · · · · 
3,2 Rf=Vll:W OF CONTRACT DOCUMl:JIITS AND FIE;U) .CONDITIONS BY CONTRACTOR. 
3.2.1 · Since the Contract l)oCIJlD!ll)ts are complCJDenll!ly, befure $rling .each iwrtion of !he Wl)Tk, the Contrllclor .s1il!ll 
Catl'thlly study an<) compllre the ·various .Ptawings and pther Contract Documents relative to .that portion 9f the WQrk, as well.as 
fue inf«:1rrnatil>n furnished by the Owner pllfSllilllt to Subpariw;ipb 2.2.3, sbal) ~ field mea$11reme~ of any existing conditions 
. 1 · related t9 that pomon of the Work and shall observe any conditions at !he site affecting it th~e oblig;rtiQm; are for .the purpose 
i of facilitating collSWction by lite Contractor and at\' not for the pmpo~ of discovering errors, omissions, or incoll$i$tencies in~ 
1JK/Storey Construction,OOG!!8661 3.00C2l866I u,oe •
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C<!ntraJ:t~ts;.h1>wever, .ally m9IS, inconsistencieJl i>r OUllllSiOIIS ~re!l by tile c:;:onJraclµr .shall be reported promptly ti> 
!he Ar!lbitei:t as 11 requeJltfot infon:rullion •in l!l!Ch fOl'll).. as !he~ may require. 
(-) 3.2.i . Any de$ign .eJ;l'!Jm .or ~ons no~ by the Cpnli'actor during JhJs reidl:w shall be reported promptly to !he Architect, 
t,>) ,· . but W~m~gnil.ed that ~e ~or's revi~ is ~!le :in !lie Contractor's capl!City as a c~ and ~t as a ~ !lesign 
. ; . 1 profe$$iomiFunJess olherw1se specifiCl!llypiovide4 m the ~ D.O!lllllll\lllS. theQ>ntra®r IS n1>t reqllll'.ed .to ascmtnn tbatthe 
·· · COJJtract Poeum~ts are in aci:orlhlnc~ wjth applicable laws, statub:s, ordfuiln~ bllilding colles, and ruleJl and ll)gµlations, but 
) 
') 
@l'.iynpnconfor;mity di$.covered by or1llllll\l known to the Con~r shall be reponell promptly to the.Arcbilect 
.3.2,3 U: the Contr;letor believes that additipnal cost or time is invol~ be«ruse of clariiicatio)). or ins\nl!lllons ;issued by )he 
Mbitect in rnspOBSll to the ConJrl!ctor11 n11tic.tl,S O[ n:quests ror infllillllllion pmsoanc to Su~[ilis 3 . 2.r .and 3 . 2.2, .the . 
Conl@cli>r shall make Clahns as pr!i\li</e<I in Subpllfllgrilp~ 4j,6 and 4j.1. U: the Contra®r 1ails to ~roithe obligatio)IS of · 
· Sl!l>p~p\l!; 3.2,l and.31.2, the C!mtram shall pay .Slllll, wsts ap(I damages t.i !hi' Owner ilS womd have )le11n avoided if !he 
Contrae!br hail per!o~ sucb 11hligations. The Coruractor shall not l>.e liabl.e .to tlie Owner or .Arcltitect for ~eJl res!iltin$ 
n,pm emirs, incons~ncies Pr pmissioI1S in !he Contract Docomcnts orfor 4nt~ces between :fietil meilS\llllmemi; pr·conditions 
and tile Contract D!>cilmimts unl¢ss tlie Contriicl{Jr recognized such eil'Or, incl>~cy. 11mission .or diffi:rellce .and knowingly 
failed "to report it to the A;rchi!ect. 
· 3.3 SUPERV~ION AND CONS"ffl.UCTJON PROCEDUR!::S 
3.3 .. 1 Tb\: Contractor shall-supervise·1111d .direct fue Work, IISing the Conttacmr's best sldll Qlld attention. The ContraclOr shall 
'be solely responsible for ll!ld havi: contrl>l over ~ctioll ·meil!I$, mefuods, techniques, seqw:riC!lll and procedll!'es .and for 
C!!Ordinating all portions .of .fue Work llllder ,the Colllr;u;I, unless the Contract DocJll)lents gO'!l o.lher &p11citic ~ctions 
conceniing lhese matter.;. U: die Contract PocJll)lents give specific instrncti!lns concerning cl)IIS!rUctio!) IllellllS, methods, 
tec~s, sequcnces or protednres, fue Contractor shall evalua_te the jllb~ :safety then:of and, excq,t .a/l :;lated below, shall be 
fully and solely responsible fur .the jobsite safe!y of SJJCh means, metimds, techniqueJl, .seqµepces or proce!l~s • .If lhe ~r 
determines that sucb mellllS., mefuods, tecbniques, sequences or procedures may not :be .s;,fe, the Contractor shall give timely 
wri®n notic.e to the Owner llllP Archi!ect llll!l shall n.ot proceed with -that portion of tile Work wiihout further written inslrJICtii>ns 
from the .Architect .If full Ci>l)lr;lCtpr is then instructed ro proc~ wiib lhe n:quired means, melhods, techniqueJl, seque11@s or 
pri>cednn:s without acceptance of changeJl proposed by the Co~, fue Ownet shall l>e solely reJlJ>Onsible for any resultjng loss 
or~. · 
3.3.2 The Contractor shall be resp9nsible to the Owner for acts and ol)llSSii>ns of fue Ci>lltract!>r'S empfoyees, SubcontractJ>Ill 
and ;lheir agents 1111d ~lllJll(1Yees. and other persons or entities perti>rming portiOIIS of the Work for or on behalf of lhe Coutractor 
or any of its SlibCOl\tr/letorl<, 
3.3,3 't):ie ContractPr J!hall be responsible for inspection of portions of Work~ perfonned to determu,.e that l!l!cb pPrlions 
~ in proper condition.to n:ceive sl!l>seqµ~ Work, · 
3A LABOR AND MATERIALS 
3A:i l}nless Qthetwise provided in the Contract Docmnents, . the ConlractQr shall provide @Pd pay for· labor, materials, 
eqiripment, tools, cimstruction eqµipment ll!ld machinery, water, heat, utilities, traIISp~on, and Pih.er f4cilities and •services 
necessary for proper e1¢cution and COIIlJlletion of the Work, wh~ temporary or permanent and whether er not incorporated or 
to be incorporated in the Work. COntracu,r·will not charge.OWner fur the eqqipment. tools and machine!Y that the Contract!»'. 
.oWIIS to perfurm the Work other than on the Sllllle bas.is .as Contractor used in determining1he origma!Cost of the Work. · · · 
3.4.2 The Contrnctormayilll!ke slibstitntions only with tbe consent pf the ()wner, after evaiulltion by the Arcbitei:t llnd in 
ru:cor<lance with a Change ()nler. · 
3A.3 The Ci>n\l'a¢tor .sball enforC\: ~ <liscipline and good order among the CQntractor's employees and other persons 
.can,'ing out .the Contract The Contractor shall not perniit ¢mploymeni of unlit peillOns Qr persons .µot skilled in tasks assigned to 
them. . 
3.5 WARRANTY 
3.5.1 The Contractor wammts to J!ie Owniir and Architect that materials and equipment lµmished under the Contract will b.e of 
') gpod 'l'1!llity ;md µew Uilless otherwise reqUD1ld .eq,eflllilteEI by the Conln!Ct Documents, thet the Work wiU be lree from .defects 
, not inherent in the quality req!lired or permitted, ,ind that the Work will conform to fue requirements offue ContractD!Jcuments. · 
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'WOik not conforming 10 ~-~ including~ n!)t ;prpp,;,rly appro~Jmd auth,onzed, may be con$ideml 
defective. The Contrl!CliJr's warranty excludes i;e,nedy for d;ilnage or defuct ii1111Sed by abl!se, lllodificati<ms not.el(eCU!ed by the 
Contractor, improper or il.lsufficlent l!lllimemmce, improper operlllion, or@nnal wear and te;ir .and normal i!Sage, If teq\rited by 
the l\ri,l\itect, lbe Contrac;tor shall ~h satismctory ~denee llS to the kjnd arid ijwlily of llllllerials and equipmei¢. This 
warranty is not limitedtp tlteprovisions of Paragraphs 12.2.and 12.3, · 
u~ . . . . .. 
3,o.1 The Contrac;tor sbidl. pay !;ales, ¢!)11Sl\Jl1er, 11$e .and ·siJnilar lilxes fllr the WOik provided )>y the Conttaetor which .are 
legQl)y enacted w~ bids are ~eived or iregotiations concluded, whether or not yet eff"eclive or merely sch!lduled 010 go in«> 
efti,ct. . . • • 
3.7PE~ITS,FEES~NO'i'ICts . 
3.7,1 . :Qnless otherwise prll'llided in lhe Conu-act :i>Oi:\1!11\mlS, the Clinu-actor shall sll!)llr(l 1111d pay fur the !>uilding permit 1111d 
1>ther p~ .and !lOvJiJninent,d .files, licenses and ~DS DeCessa\Y iPr proper ~n and ooin_pletion pf the W1>r\c which 
are 1:UStoroarily secured • lil\el:lllion ·.of the -Contract l!lld 'Which are le¢Jy required wh¢!1 bids •;m, xeceived or negotimipns 
concluded; · 
$.7:l The Ci>ntI'actOr shall comply wilh.and give notices r:equired by laws, tlrdinances, ndes, regulatipns ani! biwlii.l orders of 
.pub Uc aulhprities applwable 10 w(tll'J)lllDce pf the Work. · · 
$;7 ,3 It is UPt the Cc!nu-a<;tor's respoll$ibility to l!llcertain IJNit tile Conn:act PoCUinCllts lll'e:in accord,lilce with applicable laws, 
statl!teS, orilmanel'S, .b!illding ~odes, and rules and regulations unless ~ are ~ or modified hx ConJnlclor, in whi<;Jl,event 
_the ,Contractor shall be ~nsible. Jlpwever, if the Contractor observes that portions of the CQlllnwt Dooilnen!/l are at vatil!llce 
there:witb, the,~ shall promptly nptcy the ,Art:bitect and Owner in writing, and necessary c!ian$es sbJul be accompllsheil 
by appropriate Modificatiim. 
3;7 .4 If the C!l,itractw pe!forl)l)I W<!fk Jmpwing it .ro be .oontrary t1> laws, statutes, ordinl!nces, building rodes, and rules .and 
regulations without such ootice .t!l the Architect and Owner, lite Contractor sba)l 11$Sllme appropriate responsibility for s11cb Work 
and shalt bear the costs atlnlmtable tP correction. · · ) 
., . 3.8 ALLOWANCES 
) ' 3.8.1 · The ContractPr shall .include ln :the ;Contract $Jun all allowances stated in the Conmwt Do.clllllents. Items co~d by 
~ "\ 
) 
\ 
allowances shall be sllpplied fot,sucll .amounts and by .such !)erl)ODS or.entities as .the OWnf!r may direct, but the Contnwtor shall 
not be reqwed Ill einp!Py persons or entities 11> whom theCol)lraetor bl!$ reasomible objection. 
3.8/Z · Unless Pliierwise provided in .the Conu-act DOCUD1ents: 
.1 .lll_!Pwances shall cover the cost to the Conu-actor of materials and equipment delivered at the site and all required 
lilxes, less applicable trade discounts; · 
.2 CPllll'llctol's ePSts f'or unloa~g anil handling at the &ite, labor, instalhltion costs, P~ead, profit and other eiq,enses . 
conten,plated foroslated alloWQDOOJllllpunlsshaH be includedJn the Cmrtract Slim .bnt not in die allowances; 
.3 whenevJll' !l(}sts are mpre tl!an or l\lSS tlillJl a)il>wanci:s, the Contract S!llll shall be ai!justed accordingly by Change 
Oldet:. The ammmt of .tbe Cliailge Order shall re.flei:t (1) the <liffl,rence between ac!ulil «>s!S and the allowances 
under Clause .3.S.2.1 and (2) changes in Ct>nu-aciur's costs under Claose 3.8.2.2. 
3.8.3 Materials and eguipment Jlllder an.all<!wanee shall be selected by the Owner in sufficient time tpav9iiJ delay in the Work. 
.3,9 SUPERINTENDENi 
3.9.1 The Contractor .shall empltly a ,competent snperinteni!ent a1;1d ~aiy assistants wh1> shall be .in .atu,ndance at tl)e 
Project site during performance pf the 'Work:, The superintendent shall repre$ent the Contractor, .and col!llllwlicatjons given to the 
superintendent shall be as binding as if given t!l !he Coittn!ctor •. fuqi0$Dt connnnnications s1$ll be conflniled in writing. Other 
colll)l)unic,1tio~ sbJul l>e similarly.confirJlled on written ttquest in each case. · 
. . 
3.10 CONTRACTOR'S CONSTRUCTION SCHl=DULES 
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3.10,1 the Conlr.!c«>r, pr1>mp!ly • -~ •awari!ed lho c~ ~prepm:e llJlil J1Ubmit for th11 OwJi.ets anli An:l)itect's 
inilmnl)tion i ~ i:i>J!sttuction .schedule for 1he '\'Vol){. lbe ~e :;ba'll :not ex~ ·ijiile U!ni1s-.cunent Ulll4,r tbe 
• . Contract~ .slt,ill be reviooli 1¢ appU)P!.iate i.!t~ llS 1equireli •by die ~BS -of lhe Wonc and l>.roJect, shiiu -be 
,.;{~ J related_ to the e!ltln: Project to lhe extent required by1he Contract Do®menl$, !ll)d .s}lall provide for e~!IUS !ll)i\ practicable 
··"···)·· '. execolll)ll ofllll' Wrult, · 
. . . } . 
. 3,10.2 lbe C!)l)tr.lctor shall prepare !ll)d'keep current, for lhe Arebitecl's ll{lprov;il, .ascl1edule of su.bndlt!U!l whlcb is toP111inated 
~lh 1he Conlraell>r'S co~Qn.scheduleand allows the Architect ~le time til.review suhmitta)s. 
3.10,3 The Cj}J\tr3CIOrslll!ll perfonn lhe Wol'.k in !!,l1neral aeC(Jr!)ance will1 lhe •most recent schedJJles snlnnitted to the·Owner 8l)li A.rcmte4 .. 
3.11 POCUr;!ENTS AND SAMPLES At THE; -$JTI; 
3.11.:1 Ihe Conlracwr shall mai~ lit the site for lhe Ow!ter one ret!ml clJPY of lhe Drawings, SpecU'ica\iOilS, Addendll, 
Cba11ge Otiws mu! other N:odificatiOl!S, in good onier and IIU!l'.keil cllirenlly til m:ord field cba11ges ,;md selecti!>llS IJ)lli\e !li!rint 
constrµction, and !)Ile . .--rd copy of.iipproved $hop Drllwin~ Pro.duct Dam, Samples _;md ~ar reqllired sllbJnitlals. Thes.e 
shall be 11vailableto the Architect an/I sb;d!. be delivered Jo the Architect for.su.bn,ittal to the Owner upon complelion of the Work. 
3,12 StlOP DIV,WINGS, PRODUCT DATAANP SAMPLl:S 
3.12;1 Sllllp Pr;<wiiigs are /lrawin8S, .<llit.grams, .scbedules and otller data specially prepare.d for the W<1ik by the CQnir,iclQr or a 
Subcontractor, Sub-subco~, inanul'actwer,.suppller or dismoutor IQ ilms19ite somePQllio11 of the Work~ 
3.12.2 ProduQt ·D;ila ljl'.e. illnslratiom; .slllndard $Chedules, perfimnaiice charts, instruclions, brochures, diagrams and otber 
· information furnished by the Contractor .IQ lllu$traw ~s 11r equipment for ,s1>me portion of the Work .. 
3; 12;3 Samples are.ph;ysical examples whicll illustrate mat!}rl.als,. equipment Q'r wodm,imship and es!abllsh standards by which 
· the Work will be judged · 
· _) 3.12A Sliop DraWin8s, .Product 'Pata, Samples and silm1ar su.bndl1als ljI'.e not ,Contract :PPCUments. lbe p)lil)ose of tbeir 
. submittal is to demonstrate .fur those porticms of the Work fur wbjch su.bmittals ljI'.e required .by the. CQntr;lct.Docwnents fue .way 
l... .· ) by :whJ.ch the C1mtractor ptoposes to -conform to lhe infurmation l!iven 811d the de$lgn co11cept .expressed 'bl lhe Conirai:t 
D®umep.1$. Review by the.An:l)itect is subject to tile linutations of Subparagrapb.4.2.7. •. fufurmational subndtll!ls UJlOI) wbjch tile· 
.Archltect is not eXjl!'cted to .tiike re~n/iive action may be so identijied bl the Contract Do.cuments.. Stabmittals which are not 
required by the CQlltraet Pbeurilents may be returned by the Arcbitectwithont acti1>11. · 
3; 1U The CQnnactQr slt1ill review for compliance with tbe Contract Docll!nents, appro\'e and submit to the Architect $hop 
Drawmgs, Product Data, Samples .and s.il!iilar .submittals requ.itw by .the Contract Do®ments with rel!Sllnable promptness 1111d 
such sequi,nce as to cause no (lelay bl the Work or in the activities of 1he Owli.er or of sepl!Illle .contractors. Subnd!tlils which are 
not marl!:e<l .as n,viewed for compliance with the Contract Documents ll!ld approved by the Contractor may be retume_d by fue 
· Architect without action. 
3,12.G By approving ll!ld submittillg Sb9p Drawings, Product Pma,. Saniples 811d similar $\lbndttals, the Contractor tepresoots · 
that the CQntraclol'h.is detemiined and verified~ field.meilsur¢ments and field c0Jl$b'Uction criteria rela)ed ihereto, or will 
do so, !llld !las checked .and coPrdmated the infomuilion contained witbin •sucb submittals with tbe requireme11ts .oftl)e Work and 
of the Contract D_ocuments. 
3.12.7 :rlie Conttactor .shall perform no portion 9f the Work for whi!:h the Contract D.iJCUlnents require subll!ittal and f!lview of 
Shop Drawings, Product Ditta, Samples orsimilar'.Sllbll!itll!ls )lllti] the respective.submittal bas bllen approveil by the Architect. 
3.12.8 The Work .$ball be ill accordance witb approve/I subndttals except tlu!.t the ConlJ"actor sbid!. not be ,relieved of 
respousibility. for deviations from require~llll! .<>sf the Contract DoCllllleI!ts by the Archltect's approval pf Shop Dn!Win!l$, Product 
Data, Samples or similar submitta)s unless !lie CQntral:fOr hlis specifieally informed Ille Architect.ill writing i>f sncll d.e\iiation at 
tl!e time of ~l>mitt,,l 811d (1) the .M)bitect bas given writtlm. approval to the ~ciijc deviation llS a minor change bl lhe Work, or 
(2) a Cba,ige Order or Co11$1mcti!>n Change Directive .has l>een issued aulhotizhlg lhe deviation. The Contrae!Qr shall not be 
relieved of responsibility for errors or ol!lissions in Shop Drawings, Product Data, Salnple$ or si,mlar siibndttals by the Arclrltects 
approval thereof. · 
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3 .• 1:M> The: C(lll!raelor .sha1Ldmt ~c .atli:Jllii>n, .in w,riJing .or on IesQDll)itted Shop Dr,,,wings, PrmluctPata, Samples or 
,·., .sinill!!r suhlriiltals, to l'\wi$if>i\s other than those n:guested by ihe Ar!:lmect oopreviPUS suhmittals .. In tile a!>Sence of such written 
\. ) ntitice·the Arehitect'si!pprl>val of a resu:lmlission)mll}IIIPt apply to sµch revisions. 
";;~ . ' 
) ) 3.12.10 The Cl>ill!actor .sli;ill llllt he requireil to.provide profe:;sion;il services-wbil;h ®nsut!lll> lhe p~C\l l>f !!r~hltecture pr 
engineering unlel!II 5.IICh sen4ces are specifically tllqUired by_ the Contract Doeinnents fl>r a pprtion of the Wl>i:k or Wileiis !he 
Con1Iac111r needs to provide ,sudl s~ in lll'derto ~ j)ut tbe ~ ~ilities fur i:pJ$\lclion means;.)nethods, 
tee~~lll)d~es. The ~r $h;lll not .he·~ w pwviile profession;il services in viplation ot 
ap_plic!ihle h!w. 'Ifprpfe,ssion;il desi/j.il .services or eertifi!llllions ·1>y a design profession;iltebitedti> system$, ~.or eqnipntent 
aril Sl)lll:incally ~ ,Qf the C<,Jrtf<lC!ot 1>y lbe C~ 0:ocumenl/l, 1he Owtfer and the Architect will.:;pecily J!]} J)tnOUllllllOO 
;in!'I design mlffi'I fuat s!Jdl services .JllUSt satisfy. the Cimtracto.r .slulll .caillle sm:h $1rviees or certifications to be provi!'led l>Y a 
pll>Jl~ly licensed design prol\lsllionill, whl'se signature and seiil $h;lll appear on a)! -~whigs, eiileullltions, '~calioos, 
Cllrtifw.mons, S~J)iawillgs im,d other suh!nit!als ~ 1>y 5.11Ch profession;il. $hop Drawiilg:I and olher,suhlniUals relawd to 
lite Work desi~ or c¢.ified by sui:h pnlfesswn;il, if prepared by olh!trs, ~ war 5.IICD profi\$ion;il's wti®n appi:oVi!l when 
S)lmnitted to lhe l)rchitll(;t. The ,Owner .and the An:ltitl'llt $h;lll be tJ,llitled .ti) rely !IPl>n the adeqµ.lcy, JI.CClll'llcy·and complet!lness 
of ihe services, q,mficati9ns .or apprll\ll!ls · ~rmed by SJJch design profession;ils, provided .the Owner anll ,Ar!:hitect Juwe 
spetiijed ro the Contnu:tor 1!11 performance and desig,) i:rltena fuat SJJCh services .must satisfy. Pnrsilai.it ti> mis Su!Jparagraph 
· .3 .12.iO, the .Architect wi1I review, approve l>r take .OJher appropl'll!te ac1fon on snl,miJ;tals l>nly .fbr lhe Jimired purpose of chec!dng 
for coniotmance wi!h infonnation given and the dtlllign C!)llcept '*J)ressed,in the CQnlriict:Documents. 1he Contracto.r shall n!lt be 
resP9nsible iorlhe ade(!Ullcy l>f Jhe performance l>r de&ig,) ¢reria required 1>y the C!>ntract :Documents. 
' 
3.13USEOFSITT: 
3.13.1 The Contract()r shall confine .operations .at the .site .to areas permitted 1>y law, ()rdinances, .permits and lhe Cpntract 
Docum!lllts and sb;ill not unreasonably encumber die sire with marerials or eqnipmoot · 
3.14 CUtTING ANP .PATCHING 
3, 14.1 The Contra.cror shall bnesponsible :ror cutting, fitting or patclllng required to comple~ the Work or Jo make ils parts fit 
·.) 
... 
together properly. · · · · · 
. . 
) .• · .3.14.2 the Contractl>r shall not ,damage l>r endanger a p;,rtion of lhe Wox:Ic-0r fully or partially coniplere!'I cpnstruction .of the Owner or separate contracrors by cntting, .p~ or oth\ll:Wise alrering such constructio11, 11r:by excavat!PiJ. T)ie Contractqr shall 
not .cut or otherwilie airer S)lcb.CO!IStrllctipn by die Owl)er or a separate .contractor excq,t with written conse11t l>f the .Qwner and of 
such separate comractor; SJJCh i:onsem: $h;lll not.be ~nably withheld. The Co~ shall not ,unreasonably withhold ii-om 
.the Owner or a separate cpn1Iacl()r :the Contractoi's consoot t<I cutting or otherwise allering tbe Work. 
. ' . ' 
3;15 CLEANING UP . · · · . 
3.15.1 The C<>ntractor shall keep the premises.and surrounding area free from l!CCumlilatioo of Waste materials Of rubbish caused 
by ope;.itiQns under Jhe Contrac · • At·compl!:tion l>f the Work, the .Contractoc shall remove ft:om and _alx>ut the Project J 
waste marerials, rubbish, the Cootractor',' tl>Ols, consl!'UCli<!n equipment, ml!Chinery and snrplus materials and shall leave the site in 
broom clean condition free of debris, marJs;, stains and other.soil. · · 
.3.15.Z · .If the Contractor tails ti> .clean up as pro'Vided in the Contract l)peuments, the Owner may do SQ and the cost the~f shall 
hi, charged ro lhe Contractor. 
3.16 ACCESS TO WORK 
3, 16.1 The Contractor shall provide the Owner lmtl .Ar¢hitect access to lhe Woi:k ill preparatiQil and progress wherever l1>cated. 
3.17 ROYAi.TiES, PAtEt,ITS .ANP COPYRIGHTS 
· 3.17.1 The Conlral)tpr shall pay all roY!Jllies and Ji!:ense fees. The C.ontJwtpr shall defend s.uits or claims for infringeinent of 
.cl>pyrigh!$ and patent rii;hls i)lld shall li.Qld Jhe Owner and, Architect harmless from loss on account thereof, l>ut shall not be 
responsible for such defense or .loss when a pamcul!!r ~lgn, process or product of-a p'!rticnlar man\11'acturer or Illlltluliicturers -is 
required by the Contract Documi,nlll or vmme the eopynght violatilln& are cimlamed in Drawings,. Speci:iications or other 
. documents prepared by the ~ ()r Architecl; However, if the Contractor h;ls reason ro believe lhat the required .!'fl'Sign,process 
) or product is an infringement oh copyright or a patent, the Contractor shall.he ~1>le for such loss 111iless such information is 
pmmptly i\rrnished tl> the Architect. · · 
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:.t18 INOl:MNIFICATlON , 
=) ~ ... 18.,1 T ..o. the Ml!:$t C)(te;nt ~.·. by law,lllld :to the extcµt claims, ~es, lO$SllS or elql~ .;ire not cove.red. · by l'roj~. 
( · ¥anagerneat. J>i:olllCtive Lial,ility .insnrabce pllre.hase/1 by the ~m wi!h P~ l IJ, the .Contracmr shall 
,·i\ .. in~ and lwh:I. b-1~ the Owner, Architect,.. Ate~. s tllllSllllimls, llild aJlelllS anch:mploye!l)l of any of .. t1iem jrom {llld 
) ) against claim$, ~s, I~ .. and expenses, includlng .but not limited to attorneys' fees; arising ol!t of or ~g fu>!n 
pem>nnl!IICC of the Wllrk, provided that SllCh ¢1aiul, .~ J\lSS .l)r llJqle»se js .~"bulaJ;le tl) lii>dJlf Jnjll!Y, $.ic)mess, ~ .Ot 
d!llllb, or to m.JllrY to or~ of1lmgible JIIJ!perty (ethl!l"tlma iie W!ilk.jtseli), .but only to the extent i:lll!Sedby the neglige))t 
. acts or Qmissioos ofthe CP!llra®r, .a S~r, anyooe direl'l1y or ~.. employed by )b.em or anyone for whose acts 
. they niay be lial,le, regardlllSS of'Wh.ether pr not Slll'b cWin, .clamlige. }QSS or expense js caused in .part by .a j)llrty inde!ilnilied 
he)'.ellllder. Such .c,bligation shall J,>ot be COOSlrUed to ~. 11\lridge, or 1'.!'ilµce other Jjglrts or obligati!lil$ of indcI!mity which 
would othcrwisll exist ilJI to a pl!rty or ~on described in this P~ 3.1$. · · · · 
· 3/18,i In i;Jaims against any pe~ or elltity :imleinllified ·!l)l®r .this P~ 3.18 ,by .au .el)lploylie 1>f the C!>lltractor, a 
Suboontra.cror, ;myon!! i!itectly .or irullrectly emplO)'ed by tllem or anyooe for wJiose acts they l!lllY be !iilhle, tbe indell!llifiC!llion 
obli~on !lllder Subp;n-agraph ),13.1 shall not be linlited by a!hnitatipn on amount pr lype of.damages, l>Olllpensllliort pr ~1Wfits . 
payable by or for the Contrai:tor or a Subcomrl!Ctor !lllder wotkt;rs' CQIDpel)Satic:>n .ai:1$. .disab/ijty b011ellt acts or other emplqyee . 
benellt.acts. · 
. ARTICLE 4 ADMINISTRATION OF THE C.ONTRACT 
: ) 
._,_./ 
4;1 ARCHITI;CJ' . . 
4:-1~ 1 Toe Architect is the persiln lawfully · licenslld to pracijce arebitec:tu:n, Qr an entity !awfully practicing a.rc}l)leeture 
identified as .such in the Agreement and is referred to !hroughout lhe Colitract DooiunOll!il as if sin_gu)ar in number. The term 
".Architect" l)leans the Architect or the .Archi~ .s authetize!I rep.tlll!entalive. 
4;1.2 Dulii,s, xesponsibilities llild !inlitations of authority of the Ar.chitect as set fcmh in lhe Con!ract J)j)c:umenis $all not be 
restricted, modified pr . extended 'Witheui written co.J1Sent pf the Owner,. Conll'.al'tor and Architect, Cot)sent shall uot be 
unreil)lpilably withheld. · · 
4. 1.~ If the employl)lent of the~ is .tem!inated, the OWner .sball !!!'!Y, dewnding on the stage of the Proie.pt, .employ !I 
·. new Architect against whom lhe Contr;,ctor billl no ~le objectio!I and whose sJatus under the CJ1Jtract Do¢UlllenlS shall lie 
that of:the former.Architect lfan Architect is not awointed, Owner and Contractor will make alternative ar,;mgements to . 
delegate the Architect's r~nsibilities. · · · · · · 
' . '' '. . ..... 
4.2 Al'tCHIT'.EC'.r'S APMINl$TRATION OF THI: CO.NTRACt 
· 4.2. 1 The Architect will provide admlnislratioo,of 1he CQn!ract It.§ described m: the Contract Documents, and will be:an Owner's 
representative· (l) dining constnJcijon, (2) ,unti) finl!l payment is due and (3) with ,tlie Owner's .concurrence; from time .to tirµe 
d)lfing .the one~year .period for C0JT¢l:ti!>u of Work der;cnf>ed ii! Paragraph 12.2. Toe.Architect willhave authority to act on be)!alf 
of :the Owner only tQ ihe extent provided in the Co$Ct .Documents, null,lS!l .otherwise moclined .in writing in accordance with 
other,pl'.!lvisions ofthe Conlrl!ct. · 
4.2.2 . The Architect, illl a:representa!ive .pf the Owner, will visi.t the site at int.ervals appropriate io tile SU/81' of the Contractor's 
.operations (l) to become genetally fumiliar with and to keep tile Owner.informed .abo:uUhe progress and quality ofthe portipn of 
the WPtk completed, (Z) to Olldeavor to l!lllll'd the Owner against def~ and deficiencies m the Work, .llJld {3) to dete)l!iine .in 
general lf lhe Work.ls being pedi>!lll!'II in aJl)ilnner inqiC)lling ibat lhe Work, when fully complet!ld, will be in accordanC!: with the 
Contt:act Dpeum.en!il. However, 1he Archite.et will not be i:eqllired·to ,rualce exhaustive pt co1Jtlnuous pn-site ~ii$ .to ch.eek · 
the quality llf quantity pf the Work. The Architect will neither have conltol over or charge ol; nor .be re,wPnsible for, the 
col)StmctiO!l means, meth!Mls, technj(jlles, 3~nces or ptpcediJres, or fur lhe safety precl)Utions and progral)IS in col)llecti!>n with 
the Wotk, since lhese ;ire solely the Con~i's right$ and ll'SJ)Onsibi)ities under the Co!ltract Doel\ments, except as provided in 
Subparagraph.3.3.1. 
4.2,3 The Arc~ct will not be responsible for the Conltactor's fuiJiu:e to perform the Wotk in accordance with !he 
reqliireme11!i1 of tbe Contract D®ll!neil\s. The Architect will not have control over or ch;lrge of and :will not:lie l'!>sponsible for 
,. acts or omissions· of ihe Conlrl!cror,. Subcoiltrilctors, or tbeir agents or emplpyees, .Pr any ofuer persons or e11tities perfomuug 
t portions oflhe Work. · 
/ 
./ 
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. 4.3 CJ.Alli/IS AND:Dl$PUTES • . 
4.3.1 l>eliliition. A .Clahn is a d-4 or assel'li!>n l>y ®" o:f lhe parties .seeking; as.~ J)1l!lte)" of tight, adju&tl!Umt r,t 
.,, il!terpretatiill! !>f Clil)tr,lct terms, payment !If money, ex1eI!Sion !If time .or other relief wiUirespect ro file 1ernlS Qf the C()ll\Tljct. The (. J tenn "Claim" ~inclrldes ~ ~utes ~d ~ ii! q~on~ the O)vner '.°Id~ mill~ ?ut of or.1111~ ro 
~".'.~v· .,Y file C~tra. ct. Claims must.be initiated by wn~nnottw. '.fhe r!)SpOllSlbility tl) S1lb$ntiate Clauns sb;lll rest with the Plll1Y m;iking 
. \ · I tne Clami, 
; ' •' . 
4.;s.2 Tbne.Limils on ClaiQ!s. Claims by ,eifher Pl!flY ID\IS(be il!ilia!ell W!l1nn 21 ~ .llftllr OCCUI)'eDl)(l of the CVil!Jt giving me 
to S!)Ch Cl;lim .!)r will)in 21 ~ llftllr the chiimant first T~gni?.es the condition giving me .to lhe Claim, wbicbeYer is-~. 
Claims must be inimited by written n1>tice to.lhe Aft~ !lllli111e !l~party. · · " . 
. . 
4.;3.3 C!>Dtll!!ling CoDtr.ct Pei1ol'll)aoe¢. .Pen<ling ~ 1"$0lutiOD of a Cl;lim exllePI as olh~e agretld .ll! wriling or .as 
Jlrovided ii! SubJ!atagraph 9;7.1 and ,Article 14, the C!»ltriu:ll>r sh!IU pr0"'1lld @lg¢111:ly ;vhJi Jl"~ of lhe CODtract and the 
OWJi•r sh;ill <:Qillil)m,to lOllke paymenls in~rclllnce .wiJh the (;ontract Do;;ume,nts, · 
4.3.4 · Clllbn.s f!lr Con~le!I or tfnko(iml Conditions. If cpn(litions a,re ,el)CO!llltered at the site which a111 .(1) Sl!bsurlal;e ot 
othehvise coDce;lled physical contlitil>ns which dif!e.r niaterially lrom tbose .indicated in the ~ bo;;uments or (2) \lnknoWJi 
physical conditl.Ollll pf an unll$!llll nature, which differ materilllly from !hose ordinarily fmmd ·ro exist and generally recognized as 
.inherent in constrm;tlon.11ctivities of the character pn>vided fur in the Q>ntract J)ocuments, then notice by the observing party .shall · · 
be given to .the Qth!ll" party promptly before conditions 11\'.C dis1utbed and in DI) event }aier thfln 21 .days lifter first observance !lfthe 
conditions. '.fhe Architect willpro111ptly investigate such conditions .and, if they iliffer,mat~ri;illy.and cause an increase or deerease 
in the Contm:ll>r's cost !lf, ,!)I' time requlredfor, p~Qn!UIIICe ,of any part of the Work, wj)J.ret!llilmend 11D .equltable adjjlst!nent in 
the Conttact Sum !>r CiinJract Tun,e, or both. If !he Arc~ ilewrmines fhat the con!litions at the site are not matei;iaily dilrere11t 
from thPse in<licated in lite ·Coolract Doc\llllenls and fhat no change in the terms of the Contract is ~ed, .the j\rphitect slia!I so 
notify lhe Owner ani! Contracror in writing, sll!ling thereasODS, C:lahns by eithet party il!.opposition tl> such deternjination must 
.be made within 21 days aftedhe Architect has given notice 1>f the decision. If.the .conditions enc0untered are Illatetially dift'erent, 
lhe ConttactSwn and Co,ntract Tune shall be equitably ,ad_iilsted; but if the Owner and Co,nti"actOr cannot~gree !>D an adj~ent ii! 
the Conttact Sum hr Contract .time, .the adjusll!lent shali be rererred to .the Architect fur initial detcnninatlon, subji:,:t to fiu1)ler 
· · , 1 proceedings pl!<Suant tQ Paragr;,ph 4.4 . 
. .J 
4.3;5 Cllllms for Addilional Cost. If the CODtractPr wishes to make Cl;,itn fi>r an .il!crease in lhe ci>ntract Sum, wmten uoti.ce 
' .. as _provided herein shall he given before proc~ «> exe<mte .the Work. Prior .notice is ni,t required for Clilinis ,relating ro an 
emergency endangering life 9r prop.erty iµising under Parajltaph .. 10.6: 
· 4.3,6 if the Contta<;tor he~eves additiQDal cost is involved for reasons mci11dint: but not limited to (1 );a written interp111t;ltion 
from lhe Archfuict, (2) an order !>y the .Owner to stop ,the Work where the C!lnlractor was .not at :lault,,{3) a wtilten order for a 
minor Ch!IJ\ge 'in the Wl>rk issµed by the Architect, (4) failure ofpaymeiit by the Owner,($) ~GB efthe CelllraG! &y the 
O>lll!er, (6) Owner's suspension or (7) oth!ll" reasllnable groun~ Claim shall be fj)ed in accordllnce with this Plll'3graph 4.3. 
4.3.7 Claims for Ad<!iUonai Ti~ 
4.3;7,1 If.the Ccmtractonrlshes .to make Claim for 1111 increase in Ifie Col)lraet Time,~ notice as provided liereil! shiul be 
l!iven. The Contractor's Claim sh;dl include an estimat!l or cost and ofprobl;tble e/i'ect or delay on progtess of the W1>1k, In the 
. case of.a continumg delay oniy ,one Claim is netesSllfY. · 
4.3.7 .2 If adverse. weath!ll" cooditions 31'.e the .basis fot a Claim fur additi!Jnal time, S!lCh Cl;,itn sh!IU be documenied by dam 
slibslantiatll!g that wealhet conditions were abnormal for the ~od oftime, could n(lt have been reasl)rumly anticipated and bad 
an .adverse elfect on the ,si:Jied!iled consttuction. · 
· 4.3,8 Injliry or Damag~ tJ> :t>en;on 11r·Propj,rly. If either,party ro the Cpntract suflets .injury or .daniage ro person orproperty . 
because ofao. .act or omission of the other party, or .of.others for whose acts such party is legally respoosibJe, written notice of sllch 
injury or dll\'.oage, whether <>r n(lt insured, slia!l .be givi,n ro the other Plll1Y within a reasonable time not exceeding 21 days aJ.ter 
discovery. The notice shall provide sufficient detail to enable the oth!ll" party to investigl}te the matter. · 
. . 
4.3.9 If unit prici,s are stated in the Contract DOCUDlenls or subsequently agreed .upon, and if quantities oi;iginally con~plaied 
· ) are materially changed in a propP&ecl Cmmge Order or Construction ,Change Directive so that applii:atlon of such unit prices to 
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quantiiies pf Worlc poposed will cause su~ ineql)ity t11 the Owner or C<iJllnlctor, the applicable 111)\t prices shall be 
equitably adjusti:d. 
· ') 4.~.10 Cl.aims f11r Cb!ISel}nential Damagl$. The Conlnlcti>r and ,Ow!ier wmve Claims against CllCh ·other for cons~tial 
:')'.''. '·; damages prising o:ut ofor relatln/l to this Contta4 TltlsD'IIIUlal V/lliver incW}!lll: 
:I · .~il$ .i!teurred ~ the Ownerfor renl!li e~, for ~~ pfnse,Jn~ profit, nnailcing, bJJSin<:$$ iind 
repµtatil>n, and for loss of~ent or ~loyee pr11dnciivity or oOhe ~ pf$U!:hplll$DllS\ and 
.• 2 ~es ill!:l!i!'ed by .the Contrat;torJbt prin!llp,11 pflice ~ inclu.ding lhe ~onipensallon of personnel.Sllltion!l<I .. 
!here, fur losses of ~ing, busiruu and repiilatipn, .and for loss .of pro(it except.anltcipated pr11fit tnising dirtclly 
from theWoi:k. 
'.f!ii.s mutual waiver is applicwle; witho:ut limiial'iPn, 'k> all cpnse(l1,lC!llial ·~ dne to either p;nty's ~on 'in.accPrdance 
with Article 14. Notbin!l contained .in ,this ·~ 4.$.10 ·sball ~ ~ed .ti> prectru4l rm awl!l'd Qf li<J1Ud\lt!ld wect 
.<,lamagllll, when applic;ible, in accordance with ihe re(JIUrements of the C11nlract Po~. 
4.4 .RESOl-UT.ION Of CI.AIIIIIS .Alllb DISP.IJT.ES . 
4.4.1 i>.ecision of A,rchitect. Claims, including those alleging an error or onlission by the Ar!)~bl!t excluding those ai:ising .', 
und.er i>aragi:aphs 10.3 tbroµgh 10.5, .. sball be refened initially w the Architect for decision. An ·inilial decil;ion by the Architect 
s.hall be ;requir!ld.as a condltiQJI precedent .to :QJediati.on, amuratiOI! or lili,!laliOJt of all Claitns be,tween .the Contr,wtor and Owner 
Jlril;ing pripr to the date final payment .is due, IIJi}ess )0 daYs have passedlll.wr lbe Clliilll 'bas bll!'ll referred IQ !he .. Arcbitllct with Ill> 
decision having been rendered by the An:hltect. The Architect will not decidll disput!lll between the Contractor and. pi,rs9ns !>r 
!'lltities other than the Owner. · · 
4.4.2 . The Architect will review Claims and within ten daYs oflbe recei)lt ofthe Clliilll 1;lke l)lle .!)r more .!>f the followin,g 
iiclions: {l) .requ~ additional,supp,orting.data fro111 ihe clai!mu)t c;,r a r~ wi!h supporting .data from the 9ther .Party, (2) reject 
thi, Claim in whole Qr in part, (3) approve .the Claim, .(4) J~t a c!)Jl)pI!)lllise, Qr (SJ advise the parties du!t the . .Alchitect is 
, .1111able to res11lve the Claim if the Arcbitect lack$ sulficient W'onnatiOI! ll> .evaluate !he ~ ,of the Claim or if 1he .Architect 
. ) ,concludes that, in the Architect'.s sole di:;cretion, it w<iUld be inappropriate for the .Arehitectt!> resolve the Claim. 
. .\ 
4.4.3 In evalnatir!g Claims, the Arcbitect may, butSfuill 11otbe obligated to, ronslllt with or seek informau.on Jrom either party 
or from persons with ,special kn1>wledge or expertise who may .assist !he Architect in rendering ,a deiiisiQn. ~ Architect :QJaY 
request,the Owner to authlli:ize retllntion of such persons .at the Ownets expense. , · 
4,4.4 lf the Architect re<Jll"Sl!I a party to .provide a )'eSl'onse to a Claim or ti, fumish additional,supportjng data, such party shall 
responll, within ten days after receipt of such request, and shall .either pro'l'ide a reypOl!Se .w !he reqnested suppoi:ting data, advise 
ihe Architect when Ute response or supporting data will ·be fumished !>t advise .the Arcbitett dtat no supp!>rting data will be 
furnished. Uponreceipt of the response Qr supp.orting data, if ii,ny, the Architect will either reject or approve ihe Cll!im in whole m 
. . art. 
.m P . 
4.4.5 .. Th.e Architect will appr1>ve or reject Claims by ~n .!lecision, which shall.state .the reasons theref!>r and which sh!ill 
119tify the parties. of any change in the Contract .Sum or C!>ntract Tl!ile Qr bo(lt. The Jilpproval or rejection 1>f a Claim l>y the 
Architect shall be final and binding on the parties but subject to mediation and arbjtra\ipn. · · 
4.4.6 Wlien a written decision of the Architect.st!tes that (1) !he decision is final b:ut subject w medi\rtion,and arbitration and 
(2) a <lemand for .arbitration ota Claim covered by such decision m11St be made within 3.0 d,ays after the <late .on which lhe party 
inaking the 4emand receives the fin!tl written d!lclsii>n, then mi1.ure to demand arbimrtion within said 30 days' period s~resiilt m 
the Anihite!:t's decision bile!>11Jing final and blnding upon the Owner and Contractor, 1! the Archit~ l'.ll!lders a d®lslon .after 
arbitratiim proceedings have been initiated, .such decision may be ,enteh,d as evid!'llce, but .shal'I not supersede .arbitration 
proi:eedings unless the.decision 'is iwceptable to all parties concerned, ' 
4.4.7 Upon receipt of a Claim against the Cmm:a.ctor or at .~y ,time therelll.wr, the Architllct or !he Owner may, !,ut is .n!>t 
obligated to, notify the surety, if any, of the n\Ulll'e ffl!d amount of the Claim. If the C.ll!im relalllS t!> it possil>ilil}' ofa C91lttactot's 
'
·). · defuult, 1he Archiiect .or the Owner may, but ·is oot ol>ligated to, notify the surety and ~equest the surety's .i!SS~ ln resplving 
,the ci,ntrovel'Sy. · · 
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4.4 .. 8 If a Claim .relares to or is i:hi, subj!'l:t of a mei:ha'1lc's Jiell, lhe party asscrlingsullh Claim !llllY proceed.ill ai:C!)rdance wilh 
11pplicable law to ¢omply with the lien notice 9r filing \ieadlines prior ti> rescibmon of !he Claim by the Architect, by '!llediatian er 
~jjration . 
. . i 4.5 Mi;PIA TlQN 
i 
.> 
· 4.5.1 Any Clllinurlsing 8llt ahr wlated ta Iha ~ eiwepl Cla~ r,iJatiag w aes!ltetis &,!fest_11nd !ll;eept lhese wai·1ed !IS 
provided fer iR s~ 4.3.lQ, 9.lQ.4 a!ld9.1QS sliali, ~er inilial ~-by !he J\;!lhitest er 30 !lays• .~sien .af 
the Cl;1im to the -~.Gt, Ile s~eet ·.*!J .eeEliaaaa .as a seediii/i,n jl[eaedent te am~ er the ~ ,ef )ilj;al ·!lr equital,le 
;!>£8'11!.eilmgs by eitl,$, p;g,t;y. 
4.5.2 . 'The parties .slillD ~.w te resalve ft,ejr ClaiiBs by rnediati€1i! :whieh; 8'iless the !)arties mntn.ally agn,e elherwis.e, sli.ill 
'.lie ill as.,8I'llalltie ,viill 1he C~o&lj. lti~ Mediati~n ll.ule.s .llf the i\..eeriGl!ll f~lj. Assaaia!iQB ~ in e$st, 
R;e~est fer m,,l;iiaiien shall \,o filed in wming ·,viill ille !l!her l'l'fl>' ta !he C8lllrlll>t li!ld with !he -~~~lj. M•eciaafl)', 
·J'l,.e reqnest may 1,e mede se;,,,111,enlly with the filing eh dereae~ ·1'9.r arli~n 1ml, in llll4 w.•.ellt, .mediaiiQB sbaJl JJ!!BGM-m 
;!dl'll!lee .eferbi!f;llien ,tiI li>,ga] et equitable f>t8roe.diegs, y,'hleh _sl,;!Jl lie !,layedp!llldmg me,Jiati0)l fer ~ perfod ef 6Q Elays li:oo1 Iha 
II.ate effi1ing, ualeS/! stayed fer a lellgOI' peried by. agreeilleBI eflhe parties. er si>mt erdef, . 
4.5;3 the parties shall share !he me dialer's fee ood.any :filing fees equally •. •:i:lie meEli'iuie.n sball he !le!El in Iha p!aae viii~,,. .lho 
l'fajest ls la.ealed; unless .aaalher lesail01j. js JBl!tllallY agi,eed l!jli>B. · Agreements l'!la!ihed in mediat!ll!l shall be O\lf,,r.oeablo ·"'5 
s.e.tt!emeet a!lfe.einelj.fs_in aay seurt 1iwliegjll!'lsilistiell lhimief. 
4:6 AJU3JTRAtlON . . 
4.6.1 . · Any Claim ;itil'll\g out .of or related to the Conmu,t, exrept C)ai:ms relating tO'.lleSthetic effect and except lh9se wmved as 
provided for .in Subplll'll/l[llphs 4.3.10, 9 .10.4 ,and 9.10.5, ~1ia1i after decision by the At:thitect .or 30 days afwr submission of ti\e 
Claim to .the Architect, be subject to arbitration. Priar·ta arhi!rJ!liaa; ll\e !'arties shall en.deavllli tll resalw <;lisp!lteS 11)• meaiali01;1 in 
a,senlanse wilh the pra•1isi0!!S af P~ 4.$. 
4.6.2 . C,laims oot resa1'10d l,y mediatiee shall be.decided by arbitration which, unl~ the parties mutually agree ptherwise, sliall 
.bi, ,in accordm)ce with the Co,nsti:uction Industry Arbitration }lµles of the Amenc1111 Arbitratio(I Asso.ciation currently in .effect, 
The ,Iemand fot ari>itration shall be (lied in writing with the .other party to the Contract and with the American Arbitration 
Association, and a copy sball be .filed wilh the Architect. · 
. • • 1 
· 4.6.3 · A a-i1 for ari>llrlltion shall be ·Ula!le within the time limits spepjtied in.Subwagral'bs 4.4 .. 6 and 4.6.1 as l!P)llica))le, · 
and in .other cases wiihin ll reas911able lime l!fter the Cla.im !las arisen, J!lld in np ev.ent shall it be made afti,r t~w • when 
instimti!m of legaJ or equitable proree\iings b.ase,l Ph s11¢h Claim would be barred by the applicable statute pf limitatio11$ as 
detennined plll'.Suantto Paragraph 13.7. ' · · 
4.6.4 Limitation on Consoli!lation or Joi11der. 'tile lll'l,i!rJ!lien arising 01;1t ef eF relating .te Iha C8ll.tfaet sball 1ll!lll!de, by 
senselldatian arjeinder ar in any at!lei-manaer, the .~et, ti,,, A.ral!itest's empleye!'!l ai.sl>!'!S!lltaals, 01roept br~ sruwent 
eentaiaieg speajfis .referei,ee :to the f.g>eement .and signed by the . .A.<fllliiteet, Owaer, Centraeter ood any ether persan .er entity 
ooaght kl be joiBed. Na arlimaliib:B. s)laj! mlllude; by eruw.eli_Elatien arjeiRder er in llllY ~er-mailn0£, parties ether !h3£I tlie Ov/flilf, 
C~, ,a separate saal!;l6tar.as e!essrih!ld jnf..rtiele 6 a!ld et:l!erpei'Senssab~ ifi>rolvedin aeemn100 ~estiaa affallt 
er lavt whese presenoe is Feqliirl,d if semplete relief is ta lie .aeeaided in .1111,il!alien, l\lo persan a.r entity a.lh!lr *1lan the Owner, 
Ceiltrae!er ar a sepilfflte e~ter as das.srihed in .'\rtiele 6 shall he incl!ldei! as w i,,iglnal lhiril p.iey Qr ai!.ditianal lhird Jlj!rty *ll 
oo arliitra\!oo whase mterest arresp~ility is ~$11lial .. Cans.eat ta arlii!mtien iw,oJ,,,mg oo ailditilmal persaa er entity sli.ill 
ne.t saestitu!e eeasent w lll'B~tijlll i,fa Claim net des,;ribe.d lhlll'0lil er wilh a !'!!lllan er entity n!ll -eil er .dessrihed lheFein. 
~ agreement te ar1,ilrate a!ld elhe;r agreements kl ar\iitrate wllli an .adaitiaeal !'eJ'Sa& er entity ~ eensented te ·i,y 
11araes ,ta the .",gri,eJ)'lOBt sl!all l>.o sj,e,Mieally enferaeable l!llder appl~abl<! law ill ,!i!y sourt !uP/lngjuris<;listien 11ieteaf. 
4,6.5 Claim.s l!nd '.l'.illlely Ass¢rtion pf Claims, The party IDing a notice of dl'IORlld for artiitratipn must assert in·the demlllld 
all Claims then Imown to that party on which ari,itration is peruiitted to be demanded. 
. 4.6.6 Judgment on Final Awa.rd. The award rendered by the l)tbitrator o; ~ors shall be final, and judgment may be 
entered Upon it in .acc9rdiµice wilh appli¢able law in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
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ARTIC~.s SUBCQHTRACTORS 
5,1 DEFINmONS . . · 
5,1.1 A Su!x:o11tntctor is .a perwn or .eJ)lity who bail a ilirect rontractwith the Ci>!llta!)jQr to pe!'form a portiQn of (he W,Qil,: at 
, ··1 the site. The term "SubJ:i>ntractot" is .refeJ:red t\l throughout tho Contra!lt P\le!l,lllelllS as Jf siial:Jlll!r in n~ amt mean$ it 
";,".,; Subcolltrllctor .or an autlu1~ re~ta!ive of lhe Su~tor ... The temi "Sul>cpntractor'' does not 11iclude a sep.mue 
.. ) : .! .contri!Ctor or sub!:011tractors ofa:separate conttactor. .. · , · 
,, 
.) 
I 
I 
5,1.2 .A ~ontntctor is a person or en1,fty who bail a~ or indm:!:tcOl!lra!lt with a Subcontractor .to perform a portion 
oHhe W\lllc at11ie site. The term "$m>-,s!l}Joontracto,:'' is ¢ferred to throughout lhe Contract Doc!mleuts ,as lhingi1la1"in 111DDl>ct 
and means a Sub-l!llbcontractQ,r or .an amh!>iizeil reprtsenlllti've \lflhe Sub-subco!ltrac;!Qr. ' 
5.2 AWARD OF SU$CONTRACT$ AND Oli-leR C,ONJAACT$ FOR PORTION$ OF li-lE WORK 
,5J.1 Unless \l1hetwise stated ln lhe Contract D.ocJDDel!ls or l!ie !lidding r~. lhe Contractor, as wail as i,ractlcable 
.!ltler. aw,ird of1he Contracl, shall .winii.h Ju writing :to lhe Owner tbr!>ugh die ~ lhe DamllS flf ptrso)lll or entities (mcluding 
thos.e w!\o ,ire to l'i!mish ·~ or eqllipml'l!l fabricated 1P a spec.jal !lesign) propl)$Cli /iir each princip'!I portiQn 1>f.(hc W!>l"k. 
The Archi~ wiJl promptly j:eply :to ilie Coutriictor in 'Writing stating wlielher or .not lhe .OW!ll'l' or lhe Architect, atl!lr due 
'in:vestigaiion, h!l$ reasolllll>le objection to any such pri>po~ person or ~ty. Fllihm> of :die Owner or Architect to reply promptly 
,shall consiitnte notice of no r~nable objectiop, · · · · · 
5.:;!.2 The ContractQr shllU npt c.ontr;l!:t with a proposed person (lr entity ti> woom the Owner or Architect bas made ~ruilile 
and timely objectio11. The Contractor shall not be ,required to contract with anyone to whom the Contractor Jias made reaspnable 
objection. 
5.2.3 If the Owner !lr .Architect has reasonable ol!jectipn Ill a person or entity prop.llsed by lhe Contractor,the C~ntractor shllll . · 
propose another to whom .the Owne.r or Architect bas nil ~onable objectipn. If tlte proposed l!µt rejected Subco.ntractor was 
reiisonably capable of performing the Wutk, the C11ntract .SuJII .and Contract Tune shall be increased or decrease.d by the 
difference, if.any, .OCCll$iQned hy such change, and an appropriate Change Order shall be ~ed bef'ore. commencement of the 
substitute Subcontractot'i; Work. However, no increase in the Contract Snm or C9ntract Time s!tllll be allowe,d for such change 
unless the Contractor has acted promptly and respons1v~ly in submitting namllS as required. · 
5.2.4 The ,Contractor $!tall not c~ge a .Subcontractor, person ,or ,entity previonsly sell}Cted if the Owner or Arcllitect makes 
reiisonable objection io such substitute. · · 
.5.3 $1JBCONTRACTUALRELATJON$ 
$.3,1 By .appropriate .agreement, written where 'leg;illy required for Vl!Udity, the Contractor shl!)heqmre each.Subl:ontnu;lbr, to 
the extent of the Work to be performed by the Subcontractor, to. bl' bound to the Contracwr by termS of thli Contract Pocuments, 
and to asSUllle toW!IId the Contractor ,ill the obligations and ,responsroilin~ including the responsibility (or sal\,ty of the 
Slibcontract9t's Work, which the Contractor, by. these Dociiments, asS)llll,es tOW"1'.d the Owner and Archite.ct. .Each snb!:Ol!tract . 
agreement shall preserve and protect the rights. of the ownei al!d Architect .unde, the Con)l'act t>ocnments wii!t respellt to the 
Wprk t!)'be perfoJJDed by the Subcontractpr so that sul>conltacting there11twill not prejudice l!DCli ri~, and shallaUow to.the 
Subcontractw, unless specJfJc.illy :Jlr1>vided otherwise in !he silbi:ontract agrei,ment:, the benefit of all ri!Jhts, remedies and n,dfess 
against the Co!liractor that the Contractor, by the Contract ,Documents, ,has against the Owner. Where appropriale, the Conllactor 
· sh.illrequire each Subcontractoi-t1> enter into similar agreements with Sul>-s11bcontractors. The Contract!lt ,shall make available tP 
e.ach proposed Subc®tractor, prior to the execution -0flhe 11.u!>.ontract agreement, copies,of the Contract D!lclliUCnts to which the 
Sulicontractor will be ·bound, and, :upon Written request of the Subcontractor, 1dimtify to the SubcoJJtractor .terms and condi!:ions of 
the proposed subcoJJtract agreeroent which may lie at V'!Itancewith the Contrll!:t Documen\s.. Sub!:ontractors will similarly malre 
copies of applicable wmpns 11fsuch docnmenis available to their ~ective iiroposed Sub-subcontractors. 
5A CONTINGENT ASSIGNMl;NT Of' SUBCONTRACT$ 
5.4,1 ):lacb subconiract agreement for a portion of the Worl<: is assigned by the Contractor to the OWner pr1>vided that: 
.1 . assignment is effeclive only !lfier terminati1>n .of the Contract by the Owner for ca~ pursllll!rt to Paragraph 14.2.!ll)d 
only lbr thoi;e subcontract agreements which the Owner .iccepts by notifying the Snbcontr.ai:tor and Conlract()r in 
writin.g· and · ·. · · 
, ' . ' 
.2 · ?,!Signmentis subject to the prior.rights of the surety, if any, obHgated under bond ri,Iating to the Contract. 
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S.4.;?. ~5'16;!1 llb<Jigmtl..J; iflhe V.¼>.tk llas bell115llS}lemleil for- *liar ~I} ~. lite Suli.G~ 8a!ll)'".asrli/t!l $HI be 
e~.adjusleilfeda\;l'llases 1B eest!'\l$1111mg~the S!ISP~Wll- · · 
.f,:;~TICLE $ ~ONSTRUCTION BY OWNEl'l ORBY SEPARATJ: CONl'RACTORS . . . 
• 1 ) 6.1.()WNl:R'S.RIGHTTO .Pl:RFORM CONSTRUCTION AND TO AWAAP S:EPARATJ: C.ONmACTS . 
· 6.1.1 The Owner reserves •the right to perlbrm ~on or ~ns Jl.'Weil to t)!e Prqject wiil) lhe Owner's own forces, 
l!lld to awaril .SllPIIJ1lle ~ in conneetion •with other p!)rti()DS of the Project .qt other i;o!JSWction .ot opll!lltions on the sile· 
w:ider Condililms of .the Colll!ilet id~,;al .Qr Sllbstimlially slmnilr to these jneluili!lg.these ponions r(ibilell to insurl!i!ce.an!l waiver 
, of wbrogation.- If the Coamictor clail!ls fbi!t· delay or ad$i1>nal cost is invollled ·\>ecin$e of such action by the Owner, the 
Contt,,ctor sliallmalre such Claim as provide!! in l'aragraph4.3. · 
' i 
,./ 
6 .. 1.2 When separa1e ~ l!fl> .awaided for <!illl,rent portiPnH>f the Project or Clther c~o"' Qr Clper;dions on the site, 
thi, lertn •C<,mra,,tw" in the Contt;ict D.ociU!lenl$ in eii;,h cilS!> $ill m!>l!ll · the Con1l;letpf wbo tlX~ .each separirte 
· Owner.Conlractor Agreeme))t 
$. 1;3 The Owner ,shall provide fot .i;oordinaii<m .of1he .activities of the Owner's own twces .and Pfe/ll'h separate contmctor·with 
the Work of the ContJactor, who $li1l coopel)lle with theni. The Contractor $li1l p;irticipate with other separale ,Cl>Dlfacl!)~ and 
the Owner in reviewing their constructi1>n schedules ·when .~a to do so. The Contracl()r shall mllke any revisions to the 
construciion schedule deeme!l necessary after a joint .teview l!lld mutual agreement The i:onstructi.on schedltles shall thlln 
constitule the sche!lules Wbe11Sed •by lhe CCl111mCtl>r, ·separoti, ~QJrtr.lCtors and the Other µntil subseqm:ntly revised. 
6,1.4 Unless atherviise pr&".Adea in the COBlmet DoelJBIWllS, when the 01>111er p~ ~~. er eperatwas relatea to ihe 
l>feject,,,ilh.~ 0WaeJ's 'il'llB fe!'e!lS, the Owa\lf $ill be de.emedte·m, 6$,jestte the same .l1lrligatiens IIIUlto .00'\'e the /!IIIB8righ!s 
)\~eh ·"l'Jlly .to ~ Ceatmeter ll!Uler the Ceaailieas efthe Cent,;wt; iawiding, vil\}09* .eiooluiliBg etl!ers, Jhase sl;ltea in Atli<;la 3, 
.this Ar#ele 6 and Ar#Gles lo, 11 and 12. · 
6.2.MUTUAL RE$PONSIBI._ITY 
6.2.1 The Conttactl>r shall .afford the Owner an!! separale ,cQntrac;tors reasonable .opportunity .for introduction an!! stoi:age of 
their ~ and tl9uipinent .and perfonnance o? their activities, and shall ronnect and coordinate the Contract9r's coll$!nlclio.n 
.and opmtions with theirs 3$ required by the Cpntmct Documents. 
6.2.2 If part Clf the Contrlletor's :Work depen!ls fut proper execlllion or results upon oonstructfon or operatiClns .by !he Ownft or 
a s~arale · contmctl>r, the Contrac)()r s)lall, pl'ior to proceeding with lliat pllrtion Qf the ·wont, vromptly report .to the Arcbilect 
,apparent discn:pancle$ J>r defecu; in $Ul'h other conslrµction lliat woul!lxender it nnsuitable fQr sµch proper execution and i:esului, 
Failure .of the Conimctor .so to report shall constitute ,an ac!mowloogment that the Qwner's or separate contractors comple!ed or 
partially completeil construcii,:,n is fit and proper to receive the Contractor's Work, except 3$ to .deibc:1$ r;iot then reasonably 
discoverable. . 
6.2.3 The Qwner shllll be reimbursed by .the Contmct9r for COS!$ in~ by Ille Ownw which are pay;ible to a separale 
contractor because i>f 4elays, improperly .time!! actMties or del'ec:tm c/lnStrll\ltion .of the CClntractor. The Own¢r shall ·be. 
resPOnsible to .the Contrac;tor tbr tQS1s incurred by the Conlfacl!)r bec;ause ;ofdelays, improperly time!! activities, damage lQ die 
WorJ.C:or defective construciion pfa sepai:ate contractor. 
. ' 
6.2,4 The Contractor shall pro1Dptly ~y damage wrongnilly Cl!l1Se!l by the Contractor to compleled Qr pin-tia!Jy compleled 
construction Pr to p.roperty of the Owner or separate contractors as provide!! in Sµbparagraph 10.25. 
·, . . 
6~.5 lhe Owner an!! each sepiirate c~tor shall h;we the same responsibilities for cutting and patching as .are describe!! for 
the~or in Subparagraph 3.14. · 
6.3 OWNl:R'S RIGHT TO CLEAN UP 
!1.3.1 lf a !lispute ru:ises am1>ng the cimtmc;tor, separate cimt1;1c1Prs and the Owner .as to the ~sponslbility Uiider tlteir 
respective contracts for maintaining the premises and surrounding area ftee. m,m ·waste materials and rubbish, tbe Owner may 
clean .up and the Arcbitec.t will allocate the cost among those responsible • 
. · ·~RTICLE .7 CHANG!:$ IN THE WORK 
7.'I GENEIW. • 
7.1;1 Changes in 1he Wo* J!)lly "be ;ill'Clll)lpli$hed after executiC!ll oflhe Contract, l;lii.d without invalidating the Coll)ral:t, bj' 
Cban~ Order, ~Gtioo ~ Pife1;tj,.,e pr or®r (or a minor change in 1he Work, s!lhject to I.he .limit:ations stated in tbi$ 
i'.'"\ Arµcle 7 and elsewhere in tbe Co!ltract Documents. · · 
~J . 
) - 1 7,1.;2 A Cb!Ul(le Oro!li' shall be l)ased up1>n agret,lne!lt !l!llOllg 1he OWl)er, CPntractor .aiJd ~~ a C~ Cb•llg(' -.1 
Direil!i','!l reqllirJ,i, agie~ by the Owner and .~_and may ar QtB¥ !lilt \le.agree!! to byt,he .and an O;der for .a 
minor~ in t,he Woikma)'. be is_sJJed by lhe.Arcnitect.alpne. · · 
7.1.3 C~ .in lhe Work sball beperfi1nn\ld ll!lder appliClll>le proyisiflns of lhe Conlrjict DQCl!lll!lnts;.and the Cf:llltraclt!r ;;bJlJl 
prpceed proinptly, )lll!i,ss j)jherwise pwvided in the Change 01'.dror-, COJl$Wli!ffi Change PifeGtP.•e .or order -for a minor cb,)nge in I 
!he Work. · 
7.2 CHANGE ORDERS . -· _ . - - · ·. 
7 .2.1 A Change Order is a written inslt:u!ne!lt prepared by !he Al:chit!lct and sign~d by tire Owner, CQDtractor an.t Arclrlteq, 
sl;ll;mg lheir _agii:enient upon all of I.he following: 
.1 cbange in the Work; 
;2 t,he jmlOllllt of !he IICljusti:nent, if any, ill !he Contract Sum; and 
.3 -the extent of'.the adjustment, Jf any, in the Contracflime • 
. Methods use!! in determining adj!istments to the Cflntract Sum may include those listed in Subparagrl!Jib 7.33, 
7.3 CONSTRUCTION CHANGE DIRECTIVE$ 
· · . 'i'...3,1 A C!>nstruction Change l>irective is a written .order pn:pared by the Al:cbt'te_ct and signed by !he Owner and Al:cbitec.t, 
directing a change in .the Work prior to agn:el)leDt .on adj~ent, if any, in 1he C!>ntrl!ct .$\Im or Ci>nlra.ct time, or hoth. The 
, _ Owner may .by C!>nstruction Cb\lllge Directive, without invalida)ing lhe Contrl!ct, ,order cbanges in the Work within the general 
_ _) scope of the Contrl!ct consisting of adilitions, deletions or oth¢r revisiQns, tbe ContractSµm and Contract Time being adjl!Ste<I 
accordingly.- . ) 
7,3.2 A Construction .Cbailge Directive shall .I,;, used _in the .absence of.total agreement OD the tel'IDS .ofa Chllll(le Order. 
7 .3.3 If the C!)DSlruction Change Directive prpvides for an adjllstlnent .IP the Contract -Suln, the adjustment shall b;, based on 
· one of the il!lfowing methods: 
.1 mutual accept:ance of a llllllp smn .properly itel)lized and supported by sufficient s11bstantiating data .to pennit 
evaluation; 
.2 unit prices stated in !he Contract Doclllllents or subsequently agreeli upon; 
;3 -cost to be determined in a manner •$feed upon by !he parties:and a mutually acceptal)ie fixed or percentage fee; or 
.4 asprt>videdinSubparagraph7,3,(j. 
7.3.4 UJ,oo f!lGeijn ef a CeBSb'lt®oo-Cllange ~/e_, Ille C8111i®t!lr shall pre.aptly ~eeed vli;h lhe ~ in t!ill W!lfk 
iw1e1'1ed and atMse lhe Afi>~Gt .ef !he ~ agFe!lfflent .or disagreeinent v,'i\h the :~ad, if any, !)fe'iided in the 
C01)5tr)letien Chau~ Piresti-\ll! lilr deteanlaii,g the prepesed ad,justm$! in .!he C8$/Wt SWB or Oi,n!JMt Time. 
' . . . 
7.3.5 A CeBStt!lGlioo .Change DireGti>;e sigtled bytbe 09!1t!;aeler inilieates Ille agreement eflhe Cenl!asto_r therewilh, insludlng 
a<ijt1Slm611t ln .Oeu!met Sll!il .aad Cen!met Tiille or .!he melhed fm' ~eteF!nining- tbem_. Saeli agreement shall .be ell\,B1P1e 
-~dialely aBP .slw11 b• f!lGerded ~ ;, Change Order. · 
, 7.3.6 If the Contrl!ctor .does not respond promptly or disagrees with the method for adjustment in the -C\>Dtract Sum, th~·metbod ) ' . 
and the adjustment shall b_e derermined hy the Architect on the basis of reasonable expenditures and sayings of those performing 
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the Work a)tn1>u1able to the d)ange, including, in ~e of an~ in th!tCon1l'aet Sum, a re;ison;il,le l!llo~ fur omead 
and pn>tit. m ,such case, and also ,under Cbius, 7.3 •. 3.3, the CQntral)tor sb;ill keep~and pr!,lS\lllt, in. ~ forl!l '11$ the Architect 1nay 
presc.t:ihe, an itemized. account!ng 4!gether wilh apprP~ · supporting ,dala. . J.Ti!l$s otherWise pr11villed in the Conuact 
( ')·· l)o~e»ts, costs for lhe pwposes of.this .Subparagraph 7.3.(i $ball be limited to the fo)l~ · 
\ . . 
'''":? 1 · ,1 COSIS .of.labor, including soci;,l secjll1ty,,old age .an!! unemployme)!t insurance, :ftinge benefit$ ,equired by apeement 
· ' or custom, and wo,rl\ers' c1>mpens.itlon insuranoo; 
.i costs of materials, 511pplies and eqr,ipm!)llt, including cost of transpol1ati1>11, whether incorpo~d .or consumed; 
.3 r!ml3l costs of JnaC!Jinery and equipment, i,xcll!Siv¢ ofl\lmd tools, w~er l'.l'ntedJrom the CQnu:actpr ornthers; 
. . . . 
.4 costs of~ for .l\11 l>onds .and insurance, permit fe!:f!, and siiles, ~e or~ talre/1 relatl:d to the Work; 1111d 
,5 additional costs.of 511pervisron m.td.field office personnel.dJrect!y attrllillllibJe to the change. ·· 
.7.3.7 The aim,unt of credit Jo bi, ;,llowed liy _the C(lllttiu:tor to the Owi;ter for a !lele\ion or changi, which feSlllts in a ,net 
decrease in the CoiltrJlct Sum.sbllll be .a~ net cost 1\5 .confi$e!l by the Architwt. When both additions and credits cove~ 
·rel~d Wor!\'. or sµl>s\itnlions mi, involvi:d in a cb;inge, .the a)loWlll)oo 11:>r overhead and profit.sha'1.be figqred on the bl!Sis of net 
increase, if any, with respect to dlat change. 
. . 
7.3.8 Pee;!ing final •. ,~atill!l ofih!l tatal Gest efa Ceaslf!letio11 ~e :Oifeeli·,<e te ill!! Owner, anwunts no.t in dispute fur 
.SllGh Ghanges In the Wclirk shall b.e inGluiled in.I\Pfllillillions fur Paynient &GGomJl(111jelJ by a Change oa!eF iadi~ the Jllll!*ies' 
;igre!lin!lat wi!h pt\l't ar all efsooh Gosts~ F!)r .any pertien ,ef !!11$ sest that .1.emains in l!isj!ll!e, ill!! ArGbiteGt wi;II make ,an illlerim 
~i4n fer plll'JleSl!ll of m.enlhly c\lrtifisa!ien fer payment fer lhese easts, T\Hlt ,deterinma!ien ef ,.est shall . ai!iust ,the 
,C!)Blraet ·Suffl en the same basis as a Chaege Ord;,r, ,sabjeGt te the righ* ef eithar party .te rusilgl'e.e a!Jll assert II shim .oosordan68 
y,iih Artisle. 4 • . . . . . 
7 .3,9 When .the ~ .and Contracter agree with the d~a\ion Jnadi: by tne Architect concerning tne adjll$l!nlll)ts in the 
) Coll!I1lCt .Snm and Con~ 'tnne, .or otherwise reach ~lllent upon the adjgstments, SllCD, agr~ment sb;ill be .effecJ;ive 
innnedial!llyand sban be lllCPnled by preparation ;ind cxecutio11 ofan appropriate Change bt!ler: 
7 .• 4.MINOR CHANGES IN THl:tWORK 
7.4.1 The Architect will have authorily to order mfu11r changes in the Worlc.not involving adjustment .jn the Conlract .Sum .or 
el!tem;ion of the Conll:llCt Tinte and l).ot il)coµsisient with ,the mtent of the Contract Docwnents. Sµch chariges $ball be effected by 
wrltten order and shall be binding on the Owner :md Ci>ntrnctor. The Ci:>nlractor sb;ill Cl!fiY out such written orders promJ>t1Y. 
ARTICLE 8 TIME 
8.1 DEFINmONS 
8:i. 1 Unless olberwise pn,vided, Contract Time is the period of time, including authorized adjll$!ments, a.llo.tted in .the Conb'act 
Pocuments for $ubstautial Completion .of the Work. · · 
.8.1,2 · The (late of~ement of the Work js,the (late llS1ablished m•the A~ment. 
8:J.3 The dim, of$ub$1an!W Completion is the dat!i,ccrtitied by the Archltwt in 1WCOrdanoo with Paragraph 9.8. 
8,j.4 The term "!lay" as used in the Cont:11!et Do~enis sh;tllmean calendar dl\Y unless 1>therwise specifically d¢fined. 
8 .. 2 PROGRESS AND COMPLETION . . 
8.2.1 Time limits :stated in the Conlract Po~ents are of the ¢ssence of the Contr;,ct. By executing the Agri:ement the 
Contractot confirms that the Contract Time .is a reasonable period for perfopµlng·the Work • 
. 8.2,2 The Conb'a!;IO.t ,sh;tll not knowingly, e.xcept by agri,ement or ii)sttµc\ipn of !he C>wnet in writing, prematl)rely comme!lce 
o~ration~ on tne site pr,elsewhere prior to the .effective date oflnsnranllil required ,by Article 11 to be furnished by the Contractor 
. ) and Owner. The (late ofi:ommenC!lment of the Worksha!l n\11 be change~ by the effective date of such ll)Snrance. lJn)ess the dlltt\ 
of commenooment is estliblished by the Contract Documents or II notice to pro~ed given by the Owner; the Contractor sball JJo\if}, 
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tlie ~ Jn wriling l1Pt less than nve days or 1>ther agre<\Cl period before &ollll!l~ing the Work to permit the timeiy filing l>f 
mortgagei,, mecbm)ic'sJiensand otherseeurity~ · 
8.2.3 The .Contr;,ctor .$hiil) proceed expe(litionsly-with adeqllllill forces and shall l!Chiew .Subsiantla! C1>m11letitm within the 
Col)tn,ct Tjme. _ . _ _ _ · . _ 
i . 
.. . 8.3 DELAYS ANO ~NSIONS OF tlME . 
8.3. 1 lfthe .Coll\IaCl!)r is delayed at any time _in !he C\)lllil)enCemem 1>r progress of 1he Work by an iict w neglect .\lfthe Owner 
11r Ati:hil!let, or of an employee of either, or of a separ;ite Cli>~r emplPyeil.'by the ow,ter, .or by c~es Ol"deredin theW~ 
or by lab!>r~ fim, lll1USUlll llelay in,de&veries, lJllilvoidable c.isualriei, ot 111ber Cllll®,'! be)'Olld th11 ~r's .CJ>ntrol, or by 
delay authorized by the Owl)er pending1118itiation .aad $tl>ib1Uii>n, er by etb.ef ~il!ll;e$ whiGh 1he .~et W'$liin•q tl!ay ~· 
~ Contractor shap no!!fy Owner and.~ that th,;, C~ Time sb.111 he ~d by Cbaligll ~er fur inle~ 
rjl,1$0J!ab)e time l>S the Architect.and <>wner may de~ti. . . 
8;3.2 Clain!s reJaµngw .time ,sball be~ in acc~'Withappli¢'1ble provWllllS ofl'aragraph 4 .. 3 .. 
8.3.3 This Paragraph 83 does not preciiide rej;(}Veiy of damagi:ll fur (lelay by either party cllllder o1)1er ptovislons or tlie 
Co11\ract Docllll)ents. · · 
· ARTICLI; 9 PAYMENTS Al\lD .COMPLETION 
9.1 CON'rRACT SUM 
9, 1.1 Tlte ,Contract Sll11l is stilted m tbe A~ement and, incmdini authorized lidjnstments, is the tpta) amount pity.Ible by the 
Owl!er to the Co1111'ltctor for performance of the Work unde_r the .Con\ract DpCIII1)ents.. · 
l! •. 2 SCHEOUL_E OF VALUE$ 
9.2.1 Before the fusJ: Application ror Payment, the Col)tractor ,shall snb!!Ut to the Alchitect ,a schedt!le of values alloca.ted to 
various portions ,of the W!ii:k, prepllfC(l in >$llch form ,and supported by such data to su~tiate 'it$ aC¢1!raey as the Alchitect lllllY 
require. This schedule, llllless objected to ·by the Architect, shall be used as .a basis fpr reviewing the O>ntracmr's Applicatfons for 
) Payment 
. )•' 
9.3 APPLICATIONS FOR PAYMENT 
,9;3.1 At least ten days before .!he date established for each progress paYJl)ent, ,lhe Contractor shall sulmiit to the Architect .an 
iten)ized Applii;ation f\lf Payment for operatio115 ~l\lted in accordance ,'WitJi the schedt!le of valui:ll. .Such app1icali11n shall be 
notarized, if-required, and supported by such data .substanfiati)lg the Conu,wtofs right to paymel)t as the Ownei,or Architect lllllY 
te<prire, such as J:Opies .of req11isitions from Subcontractoriumd ll)llterial suppliers, and reflecting rell!h\age if provi!led for ili-tbe 
Contract DOCIJlllents. 
9.3;1.1 As provided in S11bparagraph 7.3.8; such applications may ,include requests-for .payment on accoUl)t of changes ln !he 
. Work which have beel;l properly antborlzel) by C~a C!iallge Direeti'feS; pr'by interim .dotemlillatlans ofthll .'\r.ehitllst, !AA_ 
al}tyet 11)$ded in Cbange Orders. · 
9,3.,1~ Such applications may not incl11de .reql)eSts for payment for ppmons of,the Woit for which .the ,Contractor doe.s- not 
jnu,nd to pay to a Sµbcoutractot or malernll supplier; uniess such_Wotk bl>S been performed by pthers whom the Cl>ritractor 
intends to pay. . 
Unless otherwise provided in the Coutract 'Documents, payments shall be made on ;1ccount i,f mau,riaJs and equipment delivered 
l!l)d suitsbly sliired at the siu, for subsequent incorporation in the Work. lf approved in adv,mce by the Owner, payment n,ay 
similarly be made for materi.als .l1J11) .eqwpment ,SJiilably siored pff the site at -a locatiolt agreed upon in ~g. Payment for 
.materials and !lqllipment ,;tored Oil ot off the. site shall )le ®ndilio)led · upon compliance by the Contractor with procedures 
satjsf?l:tory to the Owner to establish tbe Owners_ title to such .ll!llterials ,and equipment 9r 9tberwise pi!ltect lhe OWner'.s interest, 
and shall include the costs ofapplical>le insurance, ~e and trausp!>rtation to the site for .Sllch materials and equipment Store.d 
off the site. · 
9.3;3 :The ContractPr wammts lh;it·.title to all Work.covered by an Application for Payment will pass to the Owner np later than 
) the time of payment, Tlte Contractor furth!lr Wlll)'lll).ts lh;it upon submittal of an Application for l'ayment all WPtk for which 
Cerlificate,s for Payment have ~en previously issued and pa:~ts .receiv~ :from the OW!let.sball, to the best of the Contra71-_ . 
'l'TVl<'¾~~,.r> ... ~,. ...... ,..i-; ...... IVV'>'l1od1 , 00r1106!1P -, nor , Al . . 
.r- ~ .... 
Jmowledge, information llllc! bellet: be lree ancl clear of lieJIS, i,Jaims, ~interests or encumbn)llces in mV!lr of the Contta¢,r, 
$ubcilmrllC!ors, material suppliers, or .olher pe,sons .or entilitl$ m;iking .a claim by i:eawn ofbavjng provic!ed labor, materil!ls and 
eq!lipment@latinglOthe.Work, · · · · · 
.... c:) 9.4 CERTIFICATES FOR !>AYilllfNT 
) ) 9.4.1 · The~ will, wilbin seven days l!fter receipt of.the~~ Applh:aiion fpr b~ ei1her issue to .the OWiler 
·· a Certincate tor Peyment, with a copy,io the Contractor, lw 11U<;h amOJlilt.as the.~ detennines ,is propi;rly due, or noti:ly the 
ContractOr .and Owner .in writing of the Aro~! s- reilSons for witlillolding certification in whole or in part as provided in 
Subp.ph 9.5.l. 
94.2 The ·issu,mce of n .~~ for Payment will~ n ~n by the~ to the Owner, b~ Pil 1he 
Ar.cbitm's ,::valuatioil of the Workl!lld the .dai;l compnsii1g,the Application forP~ th!ltthe Work hasprti~ to tne point 
indicateil and tbllt, to the b!lSt of the Aro1iile!:J-'s lmowledge, infurmati!>n l!!ld beliei;. the IJlllllity !>I the Work ,is in aeci,rdance With 
the ~ ~ts. The foregoing reim:sentations .are S11bject 4> !In ev~ .of lhl, Woxlc .for .confomnince with the 
Conliil\1t D~ upon SubslantliiJ Co!IIJ>l~!>n, to res!l1tll .of~~-~ons, to co~on pfminor devill!ions 
.frl,m tne Contract  .pripr .to COJnpletion and. to specific qualifiq,ijnns expressed by the .Mhiti:cJ:. The issuance pf a 
CertffiCl!le fur Pa:ylnent will furlh.er CPnstitute a tep.re$lllllatfon .th!lt the ContractOr ill ootitled lo paym~ in the ;unonot ~eif. 
flowi:ver,-the issuance of a Certificate for l'aylllent will not be a rep~on th!lt .the Arl:bitect has (I) mad!> eid1a!istlve or 
continui>ns ol)-sjte inspei:tions lo check lh\i <juality .or qt!IU)tity ottheWO)"k, (2) tevi!>wed construction menns, m!>fuod.s, teclmil)Utl$, 
sequ~ or pr~ .(3) revi!nYec! copies 1>fl'llqulsmons te!:eiVeii lrom S!lbcOllltactol'S anc! in;iterial suppli1m1.anc! 1>1het clam 
requested by the ()wi)er to sgbstantiate the Cpnmictofs tjght to payment, i>r .(4)made examination to ascertain how or fur :w:h.it 
purpp~ Jhe Contractorhas used money p~uslypaid on m:count of the Contract i;i»n. 
9.5 QECJSIOl'IS TO WITHHOl.0 CERTIFICATION . 
9;5.1 The Arl:bitect may widihold a C\lrlilicate for ).'ayment in whole or in plllt, lo the extent re:isonably n~ary to prolll.ct 
the Owner, ifin the Architect's ppinfon 1he representatipns to the Owner required by Sullpmigraph 9.4.2 cannptbe l!la<le •• lf the 
Architect is unable to cerlify paym!>nt in 1he ;unount of the Applw.ition, the Architect will notify 1he Cpntn¢tpr an\! Owner as 
provide!) in ~h !!.4.l. lf the ConJJactor and Architect cannot .agree on n revised amount, 'the Architect will promptly 
. ) issue ,a Certificate .for Payment f1>r .the amount for which lhe Architect is .able to lllllke .suclJ representations to the Owner. The 
.J Architect lllllY al8P withhold a Certfficate for Payment or, .becaiise otsubsl,quently discovered evid.ence, may nullify the whole or .a 
part 1>f a Certificate for J>ayment previously isSIJed, to sµch el(tel)t as m11y be.lie~ in the Architecfs opini!>n .tp protect 11,le 
· : Owner ft9m .loss for which the Contractor is responsible, in¢1ndmg loss resu1tmg from acts .and .omissio1JS described in 
S,ubparawaPh 3.3a, ;l>ei:ause of: · · 
.1 .<letective Worlcnotremedied; 
.. 2 third. party c!ahns ;filed or reasonable .evidence in~ciml!g ptQbabje fiJing of $II Ch cJanns unless security acceptable tQ 
the Owner is provided by the Contractor; · 
.$ fuillll'e of the Contractor to make payments properly to Subcontractois or for labot, materials. or tlljuipment; 
. 4 reaso!)ab)e evidence that the Work cannot be completed for the unpaid balance of the Contract Sum; 
.5 \Wllage to the Owner or anolher contn1ctor; 
.$ fel!S!)nab1e evident¢ that the Wor\<: will ilPt be completed within the Contract Tiin!', and 1iiat the unpaic! balance 
Wi>uld not.be ac!equate ti> cover ~ct!Jal pr liqµid.ated damages for the anticipatec! delay; or 
.7 petsistent laih!re to carry out.the Work in accord.auce with the Contract Poi:11!1lellts. 
9.5.;? When the above reasons tor withholding certific;,ticm are temoved, ~cation will be .made for ;unoJ1Dts previously 
wilhbel(I. ' 
9,!l PROGRESS PAYMENTS 
1 9;!1.1 After.the Archi!e!:t has issued a Certificate for Payment;.the Owner'5hall make payment in the manner imc! wit1iin the tiJne 
·" provided iu the Contract i>ocuments, and shall so n!)lifylhe Architect 
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· 9.6;2 tbe Contractor shall promptly pay .each .su,I,.comractor, lipPn ~!pt pfpayi!lent nom the OMier, out pf the amnunt.pald 
Jo the Co)!!raelpr on account of.such ~l's porlipn of the Wolk, the ~ .to which .said Stib!'Ontractor is e!llitled, 
reflecting jlllm'Dfll$e& actu;dly ret;iiJted :fmin payll!ents to the Contractor <1n account of such SiibcO)llra!:tol's portion of.the W!>Ik. 
The Cmikactor shi!ll,· by lq)propriate agreeinent with .e;ich Su~r, require e;ich Snbcontiactor to 1)lllke payinents · to 
Sub,sullc<\ntraclJ)rS in a sbnilar.mauner. 
$.6.3 The Are))itect will, \lil request, furnjsJ} Ill II Stibconmu:tot, if pm:!icable, inform!tlion regarding percentages of completion 
or !ll!lOUUts applied for by .the ConlillCtOr and action taken lbereon by the Arehitect,and Owner on jl!)C!)unt of portions <1f the Work 
·d .. such Siibcontracro~ . . . 
. one .,y . . . . . • 
9.6.4 Ne~ .the Owner nor Arel!iteet sludl have ·an Pbligation to pay or to .see to the payment of money to .a Sub!)Qillr:wtbr 
ei<l'Cl't as-Yo~ be r•e(I by law. · · · 
9.,6.(; 
9.6.4. 
9.6 .. 6 .A CertifiC1lle for Payment, a progress payment, or partial or entir!O nse or OCCUJ)ll!lcy ,of the hoj!>Ct by the Owner .shall not 
cimstitirte acceptance ofW<1rlc not .ln ac.cordance with the Contract Documents • 
. 9.6.7 Uliless .the Contracl!>r provides the Owner with a payntent 1'-ond in the fiill penal Sinn of the Coi:itract Sµm, payinents 
received bylhe Conttactor fur Work prpp,erly pi,rfonned by SllbcontnwtllrS arul $Uppliers shall be held by theC9IilI1ulll>f for those 
.Stibcontract(lrs or suppliers who performed Work or furnished materials, or bi>lh, un!)er co!llt3ct with the Cllntrac!or for whi.eb 
pa)®e11t was maile by the bwm:r. Nolbillg ,c1mtainlld herein shall requlrl, mone;y .to be pliteed in a separate ai:count lllld not 
cllmmingleil with money of lhe Contracmr, sball create .any fidncia,y liability .or tolt li;ibility .on the part of the Contractor for 
bre;ich of ,ti11St or sball entitle any person llr entity to an award .of punitive damages ai:l!inst ,the Contractor for breach or the 
requir~ents oftbis provisii,n. · 
9.7 FAILUREOFPAYMENT . . 
9;7. 1. If !he Architect does .not issue a Ceytjfjcate for J;>ayment, througlt no liwlt of the Ctlntractor, within ,seven days .afult 
!'f'ceiptof the CliJlll'al'tol's .Applicat:ion for Payment, ,or irthe Own~ does notp~y the Contractor wilbill seven days after the date 
established in !he Contract Pocu;ments ,the .ainount celtified by the .Architect or aWl!l'ded by arbitratioi:i, then we Colitracto.r may, 
upon.seven ;idditional days' written notice to the Ownlll' and Arcbilel:t, stop the WllJk un1il payment pf !he animmt o~g has bee11 
received. The Contract 'rime shall -be extended appropriately and. the Contract Slllll .i.hall ~ .incre!l$eil by !he ,amOJIDt .of the 
Contractor's ri,asom,ble ci>Sls ofi,hut-d11wn, delay and start-up, plus·~.as providell for in the Contract Doclllllents. 
9.8 SUB$TANTIAL COMPLETION . 
9.8;1 Sµb$nti;!) .Completion js the stage.in Ute progress pf the Work whe11 all occl!PallQY c.ertificates and permits have.been 
issued a11d lhe Work pr designaled portion thereofis sutlici,mtly .complete in acc1>rdal1ce with the .ConiI;,ct Docun11mts so .1bat the 
-Owner can occupy or utilize the Wonc forlts.il!tended use. 
9.8.2 When the Ctlntractor toimders that the W!>,;k, 1>r a ~ortion. theteof which the OW11er agrees .to accept separalllly, is 
substantially complete, the Contractt,rand Owner shall prepare and submit to the Architect a C!lmprebeqsive list llfitems to be 
completed or oorrected prior to finllJ payment Failure to include 1!i1 :item on such list does npt alter the responsibility .ofthe 
Cqntractor to complete all Work in accordance with the Coi:iiract Documents. 
9.8.3 Upon receipt of the Contractor'.s Jjst, the Architect will make an inspectiPn to determine whether the Wonc or designaled 
portion thereof is substanlililly complelll. If the Arcbit.ects an/I Owner'~ inspection ilis9loses any item, whether ot not .included on 
the Contractor's _Jjst, which is µlit sutlicienily complete in accordance with the Contract ))ocuments {;1> that the Owner can occupy 
,or utilizll the W9rk or designated portion thereof for its intended nse, the Cllntractor shail, before issu;mce of the Celtilicate of 
SlibstantialCompletio11, complete or co~ such item 1lpo1!. notilicalj~ by the Architect .or Owner. In such case, .the Contractor 
sb~ll tbe11 submit a request for another iiispectio11 by the Arcbit!lCtand OMlerto deteQ!iine Substantial Completion . 
.\l.8,4 When ,the. Work or designated portio11 thereof is substantially complete, .the .Ar~hite.ct will prepare a Certificate .pf 
) .Substantial Cmnpletioit which $l)all establisl) the date ofSubstanfial C!))11Jlletion, sball.est!iblish respomiibilities of the ()w11er imd 
ContractQr for security, maintena11Ce, heat, utilities, damage to ihe Worlc. and insurance, and shall fix the time within which the 
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comme11ce oo the daf!l of $ubstantilu C1m1pleti1>n 1>f th~ W!l!k ,or .d<-sign•ted portioo· tbeteof Uiiless oth!'!Wise provided in th~ 
Certiticate 1>f $ubst;mtial Col!ipletion. 
() .9.8,5 1he Certwc.ate !>f Substan1ial Completion shall bl: sulimilted to the Qwoer ,1mLCo~r for.lheir written acceplance .of 
.... r~ibilities,,assl!lned to llietll .in such Certificate. Upon $®h acceplllni:e .and consent of sµrety, if any, the Owner sball ma!\:e 
,' pay!llllnt of~ applying to such Work .or i!esi~ porlipn tltenlot: Such paymeJlt .sball be adjusted for W!>rk that is 
inCl)ID!)l!lle or not in accordance with the requirements of the Comract llPclnnents, 
9.9 PAATIAJ. OCCUPANCY ()fl U$E 
9.9.1 ~ OWQilr may e~ aF,use any ~d .'*P@titillt r .1 1 letml pel'lie11.!lf ,ll)e )Ve!iluit My .stage waen $ll$h p!)ftiea 
is ~igeatedby sopa.iatt ~wl!li the C~, pi-e"liileiJ~lt es~' 11F11Se is ee115•dte llytbe ~ es required 
-.l<!rCkiuse 11.U,$awle;rtb~oi;,j,d llyp,ll;,lie anlllemia.s l!&vmgjuasdi!lliOII O\~the\\fer!{ Smilt Jlll'~ eeel!P-r .e, 11$8 may 
. eemmeRGe 'l\'lle!lte.- .Ill' li1>Ul1e pertum is ww$Pti;:lly sell)pi!lte, pre'Ailed the OW!le)-~ Ce$'1WF h:vlli llllilopl\ld ln ~ the 
msp~as ~~d,w llll£!II !>f~fer pilyllll!$, F#froga, ii'.lllly, $o.8l!tity,.mai I . WM, heat; utilities, ~1mae,, t0 the V.'1lfk 
·,ind msJ11'1111;1l&; lfi!!i ~ ag,eed in~ G!lllGeming tb.eferied fer ee)fel;li!lll !lf!lie \1.1,e;k .asil es . J!)rneement .!lfv.;mant/es 
mq!llnl<! by the Cenffiil* DO!l~- · %ea Jhe c!i~r s~ider$ 11 ,11emen i!llb$!11iolly •empl!>lll, the ~~tw sblill 
PfepaFe lll!il Sl$mit a ·Jist to the .'\r!lllllellt as previdr!l uruier Sulljl.,..aph: 9,82. C81!Sellt .~the .ca111t11el<!r te f'!1$1! eesupaney 
.Ill' .l!Se shall not be llllfellS8!lably ·n\tbheld. t!ill slage !If the pFO!l1'!JS$ af Jhe \¼Irk sball be de.U::mlnail lly Written agreeii!ent 
b.etween 1lleOw11er and (,el!!r;is!oi .&r, iJ'!l!l ilgfeement is reaeheil, lly desisieli efJhe .<\rowlellt, 
.9.9.2 :(mmediat!'ly prior to .such partial occupancy Qr use, ~ Owner, Coofrllp!Qt l!lld .Arcbitel:t !IDl1II j!)intly iD$pe¢t the llreii to 
be occupied or])Ortion of the Work to be useii'in otder to @tennine and record the ~oodjtion .of the Work. 
· 9,9.3 Unless oJherwise agri:ed 11po11, partial .OCCilpancy or use of a ,portion or portions of the Work shall 11ot cmJStitufe 
.;icceptance ofWPl'.k not~lying with the r•'l\lll'.Cme11ts of the Contract Documents. 
· 8.10 .F.INAI. COMPl.a!ON AND FINAi. PA~ENT 
.) .9.10.1 Up.on receipt of writle11 notice that the Wolk is r~y for llmil ll!Spection ami acceptin!ce and upo11 .n:~ipt of a final Application fod'aymei:it, .the Architect will ptomptly make SllCh iD$pection and, WhCII the Architect:and fumer fmds th~ Work 
acceptable 1mller1he Q>nlµlct DocJllilenlS and the Contract fully perform~ lhe Architect and Owner will promptly issue a.final 
Ceitificate fur Paym"'!t .stating ·that to the •be$! of the Ar1:hitect's know:led,ge, b)formation and belief; and oo Jhe ba,,;i/; pf .the 
Archite!>t's pn-sue.vi$its and inspections, the Work ha$ ~n comple.ted in ilCCOt'dance with te!lnll and .conditions of the C<iniract 
D®!l!llents .and .that: the ~ hlilance found to lie .due the Contractor and l10te!i .in the tioal Q:rtilicati, is .c)ne Jmd payable. The 
Archite!>t's final,C~ JQr PJIY!llent will cmistitute a further represenlation that conditions li$ted in Sllbparagraph 9.10.2 as 
\ 
I 
prei:edent to the ConJ;ractol's being enti.tled tp nnal paymentblive been fulfilled. · 
.9 .• 11> .• 2 Neither fin.ii payment nor ·•1UIY remaining rel;lined percenlage .shall become due until the Co11ttactor submits to the 
Archiwet (!) an affid;lvit that payrolls, bills for mateiials and equipment, and other indebtedntl$8 ,coJ11lected wit/1 the W:ork for 
wbich the Owner. or the Owners ,Pl'l>perly might be !!lSPJ>IISl"ble Qr eilcumberell (le$s ;111101J1lls withh¢ld by Owner) have been paid 
or otherwise satisfied, (2) a ~enificate eyjdencing .that ·lnsuraiice requnw by the Conir;l!:t PIWUlnents .to remain in force aftedin;tl 
· payment is .cmrently ·in effect and will not be i:a111:eled or allowed to exp~.l!lltil at least 30 days' prior written n11tice 'has b~n 
given to thi, .Owner, {3) a written stawment !hat the Contractor .knows of no subslalnW IellSQn that: the Insurance will not be 
· reneW!lble to <»vet !he perl!)ll n:quired by the Con1r;lct Document$, (4) ,col)Sell! of sµrety, U- any, to final payment ,md (5), .if 
required by the Owner, other .data est;iblishing paymeot or satislilcti<m pf obligatio)ls, .mch as ieceipts, releases l!lld wai~ers of 
lie11S, cl;rims, securil¥ interests or encumlmmces arising 01¢ of the Contrac.t; to tile ~m and in Sile\ form as may be designated 
by lhe Ow!ler. If a Subconlr;lcwr refuses to furnish a 1'!>lea$e or waiver requnw by the OWner, .the Contractor may fun:rlsh a bQnd 
salisfui:tory to the Owner .to in!leJilnjfy tile Owoor ~ such jien. If such lien.remains JillS3tisfiw •r paymen!il are made, tile 
Co11trai;ror shall relimd .to the Owner .1111.mojley that tile OWller m.ty he ccimpelled to Jll!Y in ilis¢harging Sl!Ch lien, including all 
costs and n:asonable attorneys' fees, · 
9.10 .. $ lf; .after $ubstantial Completion ,of the Work, final completion thereof is ll!lllimal!y delayed through no fault of the 
C<>ntractor 1>r by ~ce of Change Orders affecting .final completion, and !lie Architec.t .so ·coJJfirrns, the Own.er shall, upqn 
· .applicatiiJn by the Cootractor illld certification by the Architect, .and without ~ati'1g the Contract, mal<:e payment of the 
) halance due for ,that portion Qf the Wprk fully compleied and accepted. lfthe remaining bala:ni:e fpr Work not Mly co!llpleted or 
' ~orrected is less than retainage •stipuliited in the Conttact Documents, illld if h!>nd$ have been fur!lish~ the written ~onseot of 
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~ly to payment .oflbe balance due for lhat portion of tbe Wor)t 1idly,complete!l ilu411ccepllld sball be ·SIi~ by ihe 
COJ!lractor to the Architect prior to ~c.itlon of Sllth pa)'!lle1lt. Such ~ sba!I be made under terms .and Cl>!Jdili!)ll$ 
goveming tlnal payment, except.11,at it sball npt Wll$lilule" waiver of cJajms. 
$.10.4 The ~g.oftlnal payinent sball constitirte a muv!ll" ofClaiins jiythe Owl!er~ptth~ .msingii:om: 
.1 liens, Cloons, $1lenrify interests 11i enClllllhlitnces arising i>Jltoftbe Comract lllld .unsettled; . 
.2 failure of tbe Work'to comply with !he~ i>flbe Comract Doc:mnents; or 
. . . 
. 3 terms pf~ w,immties required bylbe COJllrllctDlltnmimts. 
$.10;5 Accep!;mee .of tlnal payment by the Co~. a Subeimb:lll:tor or IJ)aleiial$1pplier.~hl\lfeoll$1ltute II WllMll" of claim$ by 
lhat pay¢1> excepithpse pteVipµsiy made in writing !l!ld identified by jbat payee ~ JIIISettllld •at tbe time of~ .Applicali!>ll for 
l'ayn,imt. 
ARTICLE 1!lPROTECT,l()N OFPERSONSANPPROPl:RJY 
10.:1 $AFl:TY PRECAUT«>NS AND PROGRAMS . .. 
10; 1.1 The Contr.wtor &hall be resp1insible .for initiatiD:g, maintaining ~ .snpe;vising an sarety precautions and pro~ in 
connecliO)l witli t1te perfe>Il)lance of t1te Conlrilct. · 
10 . 2,.SAFETY 01" Pl:RSONS AND PROPERTY . 
10.2.1 The C!>n1ractot shl!ll take reasonable .precautions. for safety oJ; and sllall provid¢ reasonable protecliO)l to prevent 
damage, injury or loss to: · 
,1 employi,es 1>11 the Work and otber persons who may be affected !hereby; 
.. 2 .the Work and mllterl;us and eiplip~ent to be .incol'pOrated th~ein, wh~ ln stoi:age on or off .the site, under can,, 
custody i>r,colltrol of the Coll!r;lctor or the Contractor's Subcontractors or Sul>-subeontractors; and 
.3 oilier property~ .the site or adj~cent·thereto, snch a$ trees, s)irub.s, lawns, -w•, _paV!'ments, roadways, structnres and 
Jiillities not designated for ~oval, relocation pr replacement in the.course of.constructi()n. 
10.2 .. 2 The-Coll)raetor shall give notice/I and comply with applii;able laws, .Qrdinimces; !\iles, regnlaliol)S and lawful or<lers of. · · 
public authorities beining on~ Qf p\lrsllns or pfoperty or their proteclion fulm damage', injury !l1' loss. 
10.2.3 The Contractor shall erect and maintain, J)S required .by exislmg conditions ;uid performance of.the Contract, reas<>lllible 
safeguards -for safety and pro)ecli!)D, .inclµding posting danger signs and .other wan'Jlr\gs against hilZl!tds, promulg;,ting s?f!,ty 
•regnlalioiis and notifying o'WileIS and users of adjacent sites and ntilities. 
10.2.4 When ,:use .or storajle of ·explpsives or other hazardous IJ)alerlals or eiplipment .ot unusual methods .are 11e9essary fur 
execution of the 'W9rk,-the Contractor,shall e)lercise Ul!l)ost = and carry on sm:b ~vitles nnder 511pervision of.properly .. ·· 
qllllli/iedpersonneL 
10.2,5 The Contractor shall promptly r~edy damage and loss (other th!m damage or loss insnred und!'f pl'Pperty inslll1li)Ce 
reqnir!ld l,y the Con1ract D~uments) to property referred to in C~ lil.2.J.2 and l0.2.1.3 clll!Sed m whole ilr .in part by the 
C1>111ractor, a Subcl>lltractor, 11 $nJ,.$uj)contractor, or anyone directly or indirectly employed b>' any of them, pr by anyone for 
whose acts they may .bi: liable and ;for which lh!, Contractor is responsible .under Cl1111Ses 10.2. 1.2 and 10.2.l.3, except damage or 
loss attributable to a,:ts pr omis$iollS of the .Owner or Arcliitei;t or anypne llirectly or .indirectly employed by either of them, or by 
.anyo!J.e for -,,hQ$e acls either of them ~y be liable, and n!>t atml>utible to llie :lil9lt pr negligence pf the Contract!lt. The · 
foregoing obUgalions of the Contractor are in ad!filiiin to the C1,ntractor'o11 obligalions nnder Paragraph 3.13. 
10.2.6 The Con1ractor s))all designate a @S!'PllS!l>le member .of the -Contractor'.s o.rganiz,Jti1>n at the site whos11 duty sluill be llie 
prevention of,accidents, Tins p¢!Son shall be .the Contractor's' SUp!>rintendent unless otherwise designated by 'the Contra1:tor in 
writing to the .Owner and Architect. 
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1.0.2.7 The Contrlll:l!ir shall n!>tload or]llllllnl any Jllllt·of lbe CimSmllllil>n Qr sill> l!iJJ111oode!i so l!S l!i ®danger its safety. · 
.. -) 10.3 HAZARDOIJ$ MAT6RIA1.S . . 
: .·. 1(1.3.1 If :reasollllble prei:antiOl!S will be inadequ;rte ti> prevent fores®able lw.dily i1ijllry Qr d!:ath to pe.!$0!IS tesultlng ~ ii. 
.,: ,;;-•-~ .· IJ)llfer/lll or ,sul>Slal!ce, inc!Jliljng bijt npt li:o!illl<! to ai;best<JS pr. polychlorin/lted lilpbenyl (Pel3), enepunteJ:ejl P!l .lbe site by the 
· .·· · -· ·) ·. '; Comractor, lbe Colllracti>r shall, .upon rt1Cognizing lbe ron!lition, ~ly stop Work _in the atfected area and rewrt lhe 
' roniliiion to the Owner imd Architect in writing. · · 
1.0.3.2 The Owner shall ob1ain1:lie $Ct\'i11CS oh. licimwd li!b!>ratory ti> verify lbe ~ence or absence of thel)lll(erial or $1U!$lance 
repo*d by lbe Ci>lllractor imd, in the event suc)l material or l;\l\>$il.lce is fi>llnd ti> be present, to verify·tbat it bas ·bel\ll re.u!l!ired 
·lil!nniess. Unle.sii otherwis!l Illljml'.e\i by .the Colllract Dotmnents, 1he Owlier -!!ban fi!rnish in ~ tll ihe Contnlc19t imd 
Architect lbe n;lJoes an~ ':P!ll)jfu:,jljons of pmons -or -entilks v,iJio m:e ro ~ ~ verifying the _presem:e or a!,sence ot such 
mat!lrial or substance or w!io m:e to perfunn.lbe tl!Sk of removal or-safe rontliiinnent of ,;och_~ or~bstimce. Th.e ConU!ICW 
. and the~ willprpmp!Jy repiy to Ille Owner m writinsstating whether Qr not either !t1!S° :reasPlllll>le pbjecti011to tl\e-p,:rsoll$ 
.or entities propo~ by the ~- If.either lbe -~ or ~ bas im objection t\l .a person or entity proposed by !he 
Ownet, ihe .Owner shall i:>rowse an1>ther to whom the Contractor and the Arcllilect ~e no re!l,S(l!lllOle objec!ioi:i. When !he 
maU:rilll or subslance •bas bel\ll .rendered ~. W01t in lhe_ a/'rected area shall resume Uj>9n written agremnent of the Owlier . 
and CP!l\ractor. Th¢ Colllract T1111e sh!fil ~ extended approJ>riaMy and the Contract Sum shall ~ .h!creased in the amollllt ,pf the 
· COilll:llclOr's reaslll)able additional costs of $hut-down, delay.and start.up, winch, adjustments shall be ;ictomplished l!S .provided in 
Arlicle 7. · 
10.3.3 Te .the fullei;t ~ellt,Peamlted by law, the ·Owi!er shall inde. · it; i,wflieid hmm!ess the Cel!lalG!El!', Suhoonlral'lefS, 
Ari;l\iteG!, ,".fGhilest's --~ .arul agents 1111G empleyees of ~ ef th8!11 tfOBI .and ~inst G!aims, hn~, l9S5es 11>1!1 
.. mq,.enses, mslJJ.ding hilt W!t !!mited te attemeys' fe~S; arisieg .aut efer resullingfi'OB1peifermlme.e ef the Welk m-thl! a!feeled .. llF<!a 
ifmfaet the ~al et Slibslllllse p>!!se$the rlsk.efbeiijly injury er dealh as iles.srillediP: Sabpamgmph 10.;.1 and ha$_aet beOB 
r!!!ldered hmmless, pro>Adeil that SBGh lllaim; damage, less er eiq,l)ijSe is attrilmtable 18 laeiijly Hli1HY, si!lla!ess, .Elisease .er dell!h, e.t 
18 _iajwy 18 er,de$1.sli.OB ef la!lgi))le ~ (ether than the \V-Ol'k itseli) !!!Id pre'Jided that SBGh .i!WJ~ge, le.ss er .eiq,eese is Wl! 
d!le le the s~le .negllge~e efa paey seelang iwlemnily. · · 
,._) 1.0.4 The Oll'Jll)!' shall not be reSj)/)!ISibll, im.(ler P;,ragraph l0.3 fur .lllll!erial$ and snbstances brought to .1he site by. •ihe 
:,i 
Conlt'.act,;,r unles.s SJICh materials or substances were required by the Contract Docmnents. 
10.5 . u; wilbotit J1egligtl)ce ,;,n the part -of the Contractor, the Contracwr is held liable for the •C!)St c,f remediation of a 
ba?llrdol1$ material pr subslance solely by reaso)l pf perfonning Worl(. as-~ by the Contract Documents, the Owner shall 
indenmify .the C11ntrJu:tor for all cost lU)d "llj>e!)Se thereby incui:red. · 
10,6 EMERGENCIES 
· 10,6.1 !)l an eme~®CY affecting .s.afety of .persorui -0t property, the Contractor shall act, at the Contra.ctor's dis¢n)tion, t1> prevent 
threatened damage, injury .or loss. Additional .compensation .or exte!)Sion of 1ime claimed by the C.ontractor OB acco1U1t of :an 
emergency shall be determined as provided in Paragraph 4.3 .and Arlicle 7. · 
ARTICLE 11 INS!JRANCI: AND aotilos 
11.1 CONTAACTOR'S LIABIUTY INSURANCE 
11 .• 1.:1 Thll ContrJu:tor sh.all pUrcfuise ftom aJ\d mainiain in ;a company-0r companles lawfully authorized to do busin11ss in the 
ju.risdictit>n irnybich lite l,'7oject is lol:aled such insurance l!S will -protect the Contractor ftom.clahns set forth below·wbich 111llY 
arise out of or result ftom .the Coalillctofs .operutions under lite ContrJu:t and fur which _the C0lllractor may be legally .liable, 
whelher s11ch oj>eratiOl15 be by .the Contractor or by a.SubCP!ltraclor or by anyon~ dm,ctly or indirectly employed by any ofd)eni, 
or by .anyone-for whose acls any oflhem maybe lil!hle: 
. . . 
• 1 claims under workers' ¢ampensation, disability benefit and other similar employee benefit acts which are applicable 
to the Workto be .perfo!'Bled; · , . 
• 2 claims for damages becaJl$e of .bodily inju!)',. occu.palionlll sickness or disease, or /leath of the Contractor's 
-employees; 
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.3 claims :fur damages because 11f bodily injwy; sicllness or disel!lle, .or ~th <If l!llY J)e1'Sl>n oth!:r than the Con\rat;tor's 
employees; 
.5 clair.rui ftir .~ !>th!:r than to the W11Ik itse~ ·bec;wse of injUly to or desb;tll)!ion of taDJ!lole property, incl!tdillg 
loss of nse resulling thmifu>m; 
.6 claims fQr ·Qlllll3gejl b~ of bodily injJlfY, dei,th of a pe!'S(>n or pro~ damage arising IJ.ut pf OWl).erniip, 
xnainteml!tce,j)f use ofa m11torv¢bicl!i; . . . 
.. 7 claims for bodily injmy _or~ !lalnage ;nising out of C!l!BPleted j)perations; and 
.8 claims inv9lving cpntrilC!ual liabimy insinimce .applicable to lhe Conlrac1or's obligati!)IIS ll!lder P~h 3..18. 
. . 
11.1;i T)ie .insinimce re<J!l.ired by S~ U.l.l.shaill be~ for ~tless than limits of liability specified in the 
Contract Dpenment; or reqmred by law, whichever .covei:age iS greater • .Covefa$es, whelher written on an occµrrence or 
clajms.m;l!ie :basis, i,haU be maiutaincxi withQut interruption ftoin date of ooimnenc1m1ent of lhe Work until date OI 1in,4 payme11t 
andtennination of any C!lverage reqnired to bemain\ain•.d ~final payinent 
11.1.3. Ce.rtificates of insurance acceptable to the Owner .shall be fil!l(i with the .Owner prior to C11111111encement o(the WPrk. 
These ce.rtificates and the .insurance p<ilicies ·~ by 1his P.aragraph l l.l i,haU ,CPntain a provision that ci>vetages aflorded 
llllderthe wlicies willnorbe canceled Pr allowed to expit:e lmlil ;it le;ist 30 days' prior wri~n n!)tiJ» l!as .been givenfo the Owner • 
. lfany .of the foregoing insurance CPVefa$es are required to remain .in force m Jina! payment and are te;ispnably available, an 
additii>ll!ll certificate !lvidenlling CPntin!)alion of .such C9Wl1!ll!l shall be sub!nilwd. with the final Appliel!don for Pitl'Jllent as 
reqiured by S11bparagraph 9.10.:2, Information 1:9ncerning reduction pfcovel1!llC-O!I .aµ;vunt of teviSed limits Pr claims p/iid nnder 
th.e General Aggri,gate, or both, shall be furnished by the Contractor with JllllSPnllble promptness in accor.d;ulce with the 
Cl:mtractor's information and belief. 
_) 11 .. 2 
11.2.1 
OWNER'S LfABILITY)NSURANCE 
T)ie ()Wl).er shall 'be ~nslble for purt:hasing and maintaining the Owl!er's ns!lal liability insinimce. 
. 11.3 PROJECT MANAGeMENT l'ROTECTIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE . 
11.3.1 Option!lliy, the Owner D)llY ~ 1he Ccintractor .to pun.base .and DllUllll!in Proj~ Manl!gement Protective Lll!hility 
ins!llance from tbe Con1tact0r's ns!lal SQ'ur~ as primary 1:9v:ei:age for the Owner's, Contractor's and .An;hitect's viCl!rious liability 
for construction operations ajlllder the C11mt11ct, ·unless 11ther,wiserequin,d by ~ Contract Dl>!'!linents, the Owner shall reimburse 
the Contractor :by incre;ising the Contract S!!m ·to pay the !)Ost 11f pun:hasing and maintalning .such optional ins!llance ooverage, 
and the Con1ractor shall illlt be responsible for purchl!sing ,31\Y other liability insorante iln behalf of the Owner. the mininl!lm 
liniit! of liaJ,imy purchased with S!lch covei:age shall ,be equal to the aggregate of the liniit! required for Contractor's Liabili1Y 
lns!llance underCmuses 11.1.1.2 through tl.J.1.5. . 
11.3 .. 2 To the elllent da!nages .are covered by />roj~ 'Management Protective Liability insurance, lhe Owner, Contractor and 
Architect waive all rights against .each Pther for damages, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of .such insurance. 
The wlicy shall pry,vide ror S!lch waivers of subrpgation by endolsement or otherwise. 
11.3.!J The Owl!er .shall not require the Contractor to in.chu!e thll Owner, Architect or other perspns or entities as additional 
iimureds on the Contractor's Liability Insurance covei:age under Paragraph 11.l .. 
11.4 PROPERTY INSURANCE. 
1.1.4.1 Uriless otherwise provided, th1> Owner shall .purchase and l)l3in1ain, .in .i i:!)mpany i>r companies lawfully al!thorized to do 
.b!ISincss in .the jurisdiclion in which the Project iS IOCilled, propei:ty insorance written <in a bµijder's riSk "all-risk'' pr .equivalent 
policy form in the amount of the initial Contract Swn, · plus v"1ue of subsequent Ccinltact moi'lifications anc;l cost Qf rii.ileri/lls 
supplied ot installed by others, comprising total v;due for the entire Project nt the site ,on a repl!lcement cost basis without j)Pliilnal. 
deductible.s. Such propei:ty insinimce .shall be ll)l)iniained, naI.e$$ otherwise provided in the CPntriict Documents ot otherwise 
1 agreed in wri.tin~ by .all persons and e11tities who are bene(ic)ariei; of S!ICh inslirance, until final payment hit$ been .made as ·· 
' prOvided ·in Paragraph 9.10 ormml no person or entity otb.er than 1b!3:-Dwne:r ha$ ~ ~le jn~r~ in the.'property ,required by . 
) TJK/StoreyC~nstructio~l 3,IXX:;218~6~ u)oc ,11 ~ 
·11ns Par.,grapn U.4 .to ·be cpV!)llld, wbicheYer is latet. ·This~ s!iall include iiltetests -11f the Owner, the Comract:or, 
-S1ibwti1Iilctors and Sub-sµbcontractl)rs ln thi, Project. · · 
/'·)·  . 11 . 4. 1-1 P,operty ~ shall be pn an ''iill--Jisk" or equivalent policy t\>tm l)ll(l ,shall include, with!>ut lJimtadon, 'insurance 
<"-o'{: .. , a~ tile pi:~. of tir!l5wi!h eld!mdeil covetagli)•aud ph~i~ i0$S or ~I' inc~ wilhout duplic;i1io1} of cov~e, thefl, 
· ) · ) vandalism, malicious mtschiet; collapsi; earth~. flood; WJJJds.tonn, li!ls\,wprk, ·te$1:inll and ~, tempon,ry bl\il!Jings .and 
· debri$ r¢moval including demolition .~ioood 1>y enti>rcement of any .app~ca!,le legal IllljJDilllllents, 1111d slu!ll covi,r r~le 
compi,nsimon ti>r.Architects ljlld Contract~;remces and~ requir!'d 11$.a.resJtlt of such insurll(IJO$S, 
-, 
) 
11.4.1.:,! If lhe Owner does not ln~d to Jlim:• • property insutimce Jllqllired by the Contract .11114 wilh ,i!U of Ille 
co\'etilges in tbe 111111>llllt ~ above, .the Owner shall :so· infol'IJI the CQlllnletw in writing. prior to COmin\filcelµent of lhe 
Woi!<. .ne Coti1Ii1Ctor ~Y tben ·elfect lnsiu;mce Which will Jmll!lct the itlterests pf !he Conlractl>r, ~rs and 
Sub-sµbcontractors ln the Work, l!Dd by .appl'Opri;rt,e ~ Ol-der the . CllSt ~fslu!ll be chm:ge4 tp the Owner. If lhe 
Contractor is .~ by !he !in111re or~· of !he Owner to p!J[Clla,;e or rn'litllam mMl!Dce i!Sdes!ltibw. !Jbove, withPut so 
nptifylng lhe Co.ntracti>r in writm~ !hen !he Owner .s!iall.bear !'II rea$01!llble costs p~perly .attriliutabfo tbereto. 
11.4.1.3 lf lhej>ropel'!y inillm!llce reqttires deductibles, the Owni:r shall pay ~ noJ co~ becau);e of such deductible~. 
11 .• 4.1.4 ~ propel'!y ins1mince shall cover portions of lhe Work stored off the site, .and.also portions .of.the Work.m ~rt. 
11.4,1,6 .Partial occupanc,y or USll in accorda,nce wilh l'aragrapb 9.9 s!iall not cimmlence until the insurance company .or 
.compllllles providing pr_opel'!y insin.mce have consented to such partial ®cupancy or US!l J;y endolllement or otherwise. The 
Owner and the ContJ'ijetor shall ,take reas(>l)llble steps to ~btam wnsent of tbe insurancii WlllJl8llY ,or companies and sh!ill, without 
mlltUlll wriite,i consent, talce no action with respect to partial occupancy or use thljt would cause cancel)ation, lapse .or reduction of 
. insuranc1>. 
11.4 .. 2 'Blliler and Maehinery lnsurance. '.The Owner shall purchase and mamtain boiler and n:mchinery insurance reql!ired by 
,Jbe Contract Doc)nl)enfll ,or J>y law, which shall specificlllly cover su,ch insured objecls dl/rmg insfaUatlon .and un1;il final 
acc.eptance by the Owner; this insurance sl!a)I iii-elude .Interests of the Owlier, Co)ltnllltor, Subconttactors and Sub-subcontracl!JJ'S 
in the Work, l!Dd the Owner and Contractor shall be named 'insureds. · 
11.4.3 .Loss of (Jse lilsuranci>. The Owner, at jhe Owner's option, may p11Tch;,se and m$tam such :insurance ;,s will lnsun, the 
Owner against loss of 1l$e 9f the Owner's pr.opel'!y dJie io ;tire or other ha7.ards, however caused. '.The Owner waives all rights of 
action ,agaiust the C!>ntractor tot Joss of use of the Owner's propel'!y, i)tcludmg .consequential lo~ due to fire or otbi:t ha7.arlb 
however cl!i!Sed. · · 
11.4.4 Ifthe Contractor requests in writmg 1luit insutance fur risks 11lher lhan !hose d!:i!cribed herein or Qther speci;d causes.,.of 
loss be included in the property :insurance policy, ihe Owner shall, ifpOSS11>1e, mclude.such insurance, and !he cost thereof shall he , 
charged to the ContraclQr by appropriate Chl!Dge Order. 
11 .4,6 Jf during the l>roji:ct constructi(ln period !lie Owner 11\SUfeS properties, rel!! or persoiml or bollt, at .or adjacent to the siie 
by property insurance under POiicies separate from those ins\lrini the :Project, or if.iifu:r fimd payment propel'!y insutance is to be 
provided on lhe completed Project jbrQuglt a policy or POlicie11 o\hl'f lhan those insuring the Project ,during lhe ,constructiPn 
period, the Owner shall widviH!ll rights 'm accorda,nce with the terms of Subpimi~h 11,4.7 for $!1ages c.ansed 1>y .fire or oth!'f 
causes ofloss coveted bY .tins -separate propel'!y /usµrance. All separate policies shall prowde this wiuver of subrQgalion by 
endorsement or otherwise. . - . 
11.4.6 Before ,ari exposure to .loss llJllY .occllf, the Owner shall file with lhe Conltllctor a copy 11f each policy lhat includ!lS 
insurance coverages required by this Parav,,ph 11.4. lil\ch policy·shaJJ contain .all generally appliCl!hle conditions, definitio11$, 
exclusi,ms and .endorselllllnts related to this Project Each POiicy sba11 conlllin a provision 'that the POiicy will not be eanceled .or 
alJowed to !lJCPire, ~d that ils lirnits will nQt he reduced, :until at 'least 30 days' ,prior Wrilten l)otice h.as been given t11 the 
Contractor. 
11..4.7 Waiver$ of Snbrogation. '.The Owner and Contractor waive all rights against (I) .each other and any of their · 
) subc.ontracto,:s, llllb-Sub'cotilt:actors, agenlS and employees, each of the .11tber, and (2) the Archit:c:ct, Architects consultants, separate 
contractors i!escnoed -in Article 6, if any,.and any of their subcpntnlllrors,snb-sµbcontractors,agents and e!llployees, fur .damages 
i' 
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caused by fire or oilier __ ofl()si; to the eXfe!ltj;Ovei:e!f by property~ o~ pmsll1lllt to \bis ~h J l.4 or other 
prQperty insur.u!ce a.p.plicable to !he Work, except such ri/ihfs ,as diey b.ave to pr®i:eds of SIICh ins~ hebl by the Owner 11$ 
fiducil!JY. The Owner or ~ntractor, as appIPt>mAA, shlillreqnire of the Architect, Arcl!ilecfs consnlt.ams, se.parate,contractors 
('.'\ described in ~i:le Ji, ,if any, .and the. mdwoll~, ~IS· and~~ .ofl!i!Y or~ br ,appro.prjate 
·,,.) agreem!)llls, Wl'.itt@ wltere leg.illy~ for :validity, similar Wl;llVets ~:Ill favor ofother parttes en~herem The 
'"'1. · · i pQlieies shall piVvide such waivers oh~?n by endom~t or !)therwi$e. A~ ?f ~rogati~n ~hall be effective.as to_ a 
; · · .person .!Ir enti1f even lh!lugh that .person or ~ W!)llld .QlheJW.ISe )iave a ,dnty-0f m®"IDific;mQJ!, .contractu;ll .or o~ <lid 
not .pay .the ·ins)JraJJ.ce premi!ltn olrecdy i>i )!ldirectly, and wltether or .not 1he pc:r,ron or enllty .hiid an insurable ~ in ihe · · 
PFOJJ.erly ~ed. . 
11.4.ll A losS.~ \ll!,der Owner's propem> ~ ,$all lie ad~ by 1he Pwner as liduciary 11nd made .payable to the 
Owner.as tiduciaryfor the insureds, as the!!' lnteresls Jlll!Y~, ~ject to reqniremenl!l Pf l!IIY .appli!lllble.~ ~J;mr.e and 
of Subp,u-agr,,pb 11.4.10. The Contral:tl>r sbii1l pay Sulicl>~ their just Sn;ttl)S of~ proceed$ received by tmi· 
Co11tractor, .11nd by appropriate ligreemenls, written wheri, li,gally l'eqillred wr ~dity, s!wl require S)lb.tontrai;lol's .to majce 
pi>ymenls to their Sµb-s!ibcon~ in sin!i}ar fl1llll1l"1'.. . 
11 A,il If required in writing by a party in interest, the Owner 1111 fiduciary sliall, µpol! !>¢11rrimce of an inslll'.eii loss, ~e l>oi)d 
for proper peifo~ce of the Owner's duties. The ¢pm iif requitw b\>ruls shall be cbar~  p~ received as tiduciary, 
Thi, Owner ·sbiil! d"'l)osit in a. ~te account preceeiis so received, winch .111e Owller shall ~'b~ ln .acoordance with. such 
agreement,as the partiClll in fute.rClllt inay reach, or in accordanl'll with an,arbitrati<m award in whjch i:aSe the pr~ shall be as 
provided in Patagr;1ph 4.6. It after such loss no Qlher s.pellial iigreement is nu.iile,and llli)eS$ 1he Owner terminlites the Contract for 
convenience, replacement of damaged prpperty shall bl' )l!lrfOrme!I by the Contraclor alter notifii:atio11 iifa Change m the Wm:Jr in 
· accordancewith Article(· 
· 11.4;10 the Owner,as fiduciary shall have power:ro adjust and settle a losin11ith .inSlJrers \llll~ one iif the partfos in interest M 
object in wriµng wilhin five days aiuir iiccm;ence of loss to the Ownws exercise of 11t1a power; if SIJCh Objeclion is made, the 
dispute .shall be res.olved as prpvided in Para/_lliipbs 4,S and .4.(i, The 0Wl1ef as fiduciary rdlall, ln the case ot arbitration, make 
· si,ttlement with· insurl'l'.S in accQrdance witb ,directions .of the arbitr,i.tors. If dism'bution of insurance prooeeds by .arbitiatiQn .is · 
required, the Nbitrators will direct such diS1noution. · 
11.5 :PE~FORMANCE BONO AND PAYMENT .BOND. 
\ ' 11,5 .. 1 The owner sb;l!J have the right to require the C<mlP,c:t<>r tp fomish biinds ciiveriog faithful performance of the ContJ:act 
and payment of 9bligations arising thereun~er as wpulat!,d in bidding requirements 11r ilpjlcilically required in lhe CO)ltract 
Documenfs i,n the date ofexecutii>n of !l;te Ciintract. 
· . 11,.5,2 Upon the request of any pers11n pr eutity .appearing.to be a potential belleficiary ofoo11ds coveringpayment,of obligalionll 
arising 1111der .the Contract, tbe Contracl(>r .shall .promptly fi!misb a copy of'the bilnds or sh;iUpetmit a-copy tp be made. 
AATICLE.12 \J_NCOVERING AND CORRECTION OF WORK 
.1.2.1 IJ.NCOVERIN~ OF )NORK . 
1;2.1,1 · If a portIDll pf the Work is .cilvereil ¢ontrl!JY 10 the Arcbitect's request iir ti> :requirements specifically expressed in .the 
Cii11ttactDocuments, it must, Jf xequired in writing by the Architect, be Ulli:!)vered for the Archlte!)t's examin;ltimi and be replaClld 
.at the Cpntm,tor's 1>i<pense without change in fue Cl>ntractt'une, · 
12.1.Z If a portio11 pf fue Wo.rk has been covered which fue Architect bas not s~ifi!)iilly requesied to e:iCaII)ine i,riot to its beini: 
covered, fue,Arcllitect may request to Ile!> Sl!Cb Work and it M be imcovered.by the Contriicw • , If such Work is in 
accordance·with th1> Contract Pocuments, COSfs of ,uncovering 11nd repJacem:ent sha11, by appropriate Changi> 0,der, be at the 
Owner's ex.pens¢. If such Work .is niit in accordl!nce with the Cl>Jitract Doclil;nelllll, correctil,n shill! bl" at 1he CPntracto.r's exwim 
imless lhe !l()ndilion was caused by .the OWner i>r a seJ)lll'lde fonlractorin which event the Owner sbiill be responsible for pll)'lllent 
pf such .co$!$. 
12.2 CORRECTION OF WORK 
12.2.1 BEFORE OR AFTER $U'3STANJ1AL ~OMPi.ETION . 
12~.1.1 the Contractpr shlill .1:>romptly con:ect Workre,'iected by the Architect.or failing townform to the requirements pf the 
) . Contrl\ct Doclllllents, whether disc:overe!I. before or after .Substantial Completion imd whether or not fabricated, installe!I or 
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completed. CostS of coirecting .such rejected WoJk, lncluWJlg .~.1!lsling il!Id inspections and compellS81ion fur the 
Architect's serviceil and expenses tl)llde necessary.thereby, sblill.be ,iUhe Con!IattoJ's .expense. . 
"'") 12.2.2 AFTER SUBSTANTIAi.. COMPJ.l;TION . . . . 
, ,-:,-,.,, 12.2.2, 1 Jn ad~on to .the ConJractor's .!lhliga!i011S Jlllder 'P;lll\graph 3.S., •it within one yezir l!fie; the <late .of $µ1,sl;ll)tiJI) 
,I I Completion of !he WPnc pr d~gnated pjlrtion :lhllreof pr after the dale wr comme!IC\lil)eJ!t .of w;manties established Jl!lller 
, . .Siihparagraph 9.9.I, or .by tel'll)S of an applic;il\lle speciahvammty reqlllJed by the Conl!'alltD-0CJlll)llllls, ll!lY ofthe Wonc is fo!llld 
_) 
) 
to bl, n!it in l)CCOJ'l!anee with the requlrements l!fthe Cll1llnict D!icuments, the~ sjuill ®rrect it promptly aftill- receipt of 
wntl!m ll()tiee Jrom the Owner to do .so :unl88$ the Owne.r has prevlOU$ly givl:n the ConlraCl!lr !I writl!m ~ pf .Sll!lh 
coniliti()D. The Owner ,sball give sw:hll!>tice promptly .aft.er llisc9v.ery of the.~on, ~the Ol!e-yillll' period for ~on 
.ofWO!"k, if.tile Owner .lhll$J() notify the~ l!l1d give the Coll1raCII»' ~ .~ to·m;!ke the cO®Clion, .the ~r 
waivu the .tigl)1$ to require cPnfflii>n by the Conlr;lCIJ>r Jl!ld to .m;!ke a claim for br!llldt llf WIIIT;ll!ty. If lhe ~ iiiils m 
correct nonc<mfo!lllir\g Wqrk within .a niasonable tiine dming th/It period aft.er reeeipt obotice from .the Owner .or At:!:liitect. the 
()woermay correct it in accotd;u,.ce with P!lrilgraph '.M.. · 
,2.2.2.2 · The.lllle,.year peri11d fur correction !lfWonc•s'1all be .ellfen<led with respeett!l:}'Oltions of W-Olk fust peJormed atrer 
Sul>st,u,tial Ci>mplction by_ tile period of time between .Substanlial Cpmpletion an!l the actual performance of the Work. 
12.2,2.3 The one--year period for correction .of Work sha11 not be· extem!e(i by cotrecnve W11rlc perfunned by the Co11ttactor 
purs!Wll m .lh.is l'aragrap!t 12.2. 
1.2.2.3 The ConJractor snail remove ;from the site po!1i9ns of the Work-wbich ~ not m aci:Qnfance. with the requirements 9fthe 
C1>nJract Pli~nts and are neither c1>rrectedhy the Contractor.nor .accepted by the Owner. · 
12;2.4 The ContractQr shill! bear the CQSt of correcti!}g destroyed pr lla!naged C011StnlCtion, whl11ber C!lrnpleted or .partially 
completed, of the Owner or separate CQ!llrai:tors caused by the .CoDlr.!CIOr's C!lnJlC!ion l>r rempval of Wotk which is not in 
accordance with the reqnirements ofthe,Contract Doc11ments. 
12.2.5 No~ .colllained in .this P;,ragraph 12.2 shall b.e c.onstrued to i:stiblish a pcnod of limitation with respect lo J>ther 
J>bli!!l'llonswhich the ConJraritJ>r ))light have under the ConJract Doi:umeills Jlstablishment 1>f:the one-year period for.correcti<m of 
Work as d~ m :Subp~ph. 12;2.2.relate,s DIily to the spei:ific obliga!ion pf the Contrac10r to correet the Work, and llll&:no 
relationsblp to .!he tlme within which th.e 1Jbliga!ion to ,comply wi1h the· Con!ract DocllmeD1$ may .be songlrt .to be eoforced, nor to 
the. lime within which proceedings may be commenced to establiSh the Contractor's UaJ;ility with respect tp the Contractor's 
obJigati!Jns ()ll)er than specifically to cill:reet the Work-
12J ACCEPTANC.E OF NONCONFORMING WORK 
12 .. 3.1 If the Owner prefers to accept Work which is not .in ,accordance with the requirements of the ConJract DoCl!lllents, the 
Owner may dp ,so instead of requiring its reinpYI)! .and cPrrecliP11, in which Cl!Se the Clllllrai:t s:um will be red~ced as appr<!priate 
and equitableSucb l!lijustme11t s)lal,I be effecti,d Whether or not final paY)lle11t has bee11 ma®, 
AR:tlCLE 1.3 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
) 
13.1 GOVERNING LAW 
13.1.1 · The Contract shal,I be governed by !he I;,w of the place whe11> the Project is located. 
. . 
. 13.2 SUCCE~ORS AND ASSIGNS 
13,2.1 the Owner .and C<\nJractpr respectively bind themselves, ~eir parlners, $11ccessots, assigns ,and le~ repres\lllllmYes to 
the Pther plll'ly hereto and· to pm:tn!lIS, ~CllSSOIS, assigns and !~gal repJeSenlatives 1>f S11cb .oilier plll'ly ln. respect to coV~1$, 
agreement$ and obligations contai,,ed in the-,CllllJract Document:;. $xcept as provided in Subpar,igraph 13.2.2, 11either party ii> tb'e 
Contract shalJ assign the ConJract as a wbl>lewithOllt W!itt!On consent of the other ff either party 11tte1DP1$ to make ,such .an 
assigoment with!lut such consent, that party sball neverthel~s remain legally ruponsible for all ohligatfons nnder the Contract 
13.2.;? The Owner inay, wilhout consent of.the Cont:ractor, assign the ·Conlract to .an institlltioruil lender prpvidiog consiruction 
financing fQr .the Project. Jn such event, the lender shall assumeihe Qw1ier's right$ an<I oh ligations under the Coi1tract DPcwnen1$. 
The-CpnJractor shill! execnte all Cl)nsents reasonably reqnired to,facilitate Sllcb. assignment. 
13.3 WRITTEN NOTICI: 
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13 .• ,M . W~n ncmce shall be \lepmed .to liave been duiy .served if cJelivi;red in person to the .individual pr a.m~ pf the finn 
or entity or to an officer of !he J:J>zpol'l!lion fur wbi.cll it Wl!S Jntcnded, or if ()eij~ ator sent J>y ~ pr c!lrtitied mail to !he 
last bnsiness llddress known to tite party·g'iving notice. · 
() 13,4 .RIGHTSAN!l.Rl:MEDIES 
· · i t3,4.1 Duiie;s and Pl>ligations in'lj>osed by JI:ie Cpn1:r,1ct D9cumems and rights and remedies available 11:tereuniier shall be in 
ad!iitio!l tp and not a Umitawn.<!f il!lijes, oj,ligatio11S, rights and re!ill:llies !lthetwise imposed ouvirilal>le by law. 
. . 
13.4.2 No action or failure .to .act bylhe Ownei:, Architect or Co111:r,1ctor shall .constit!lte a waiver of aright or duty iifforded lhelll 
nn&r the Clintract, 11or shall Sllllb actipn or filil~ to .act constitute appwval ofor iieqoiescence in a~ thereunder, .e11c:ept Bil 
may be spei,ifically ~eed in writing. · 
13.5 TESTS.AND .IN$PeCllONS 
13,5,1 'fests, inspel'PllnS and apprpY\llsofpprtipl)li of the Wolk~ by lhe Cpntract Pocwmmts or 1,y laws, ordlnanc~ 
rules, ~til>llS .Qt QJdelS .of public ~ulh!>fiiies b;,ving junsilidi® .sllall be .made at .an appropriate time. Ulj}ess olherwise 
pmvided, 1he CpmractlJl' shall !llllke ~\lilts ~r sµcli tests, inspei,tions am! appr~'Wilh ail indl'j>el!lleat testing labOill!ory 
or entity 11\'Cepllible to .the <>wner, or witli,tiie appropriate public authority, imd $hall bear all.related costs of testS, inspections_and 
approvals. the C@tractor slia!l give tlte Architect timely .notice pf when and where tests and inspections .!ll"e ro '.be made so ihal: · 
tile Architect nll!Y be present for.sncb prPCedures The Owner shall be!ll" costs of tests, inspections .or appmvals which do not 
become requirements until .aftetbids !ll"e received or neg9tiations co11Clud~ 
13.5;2 IrJ:he Architect, Owmn- !Ir public authoritie$ havingj!111$iliclipn deten;nine !bat portions of lhe Worlc require adilitio1Jal 
testing, mspection or iq,prov,d nQt .included under Subp~ph 13.5.l, the An;hitect will, uppn writlen autborizatio11 ~II) lhe 
· Owner, 1J1Struct tile Contrac!Qr to ll)aJce .ammge111eats fpr such additipnal .testing, inspectlpn or approval .by an entity.accepmble.to 
.the Owner, .and .the Cpntractor shall give timely notice to !he Arc!ntect of whim.and whe!ll tests and inspeciions !ll"e t!l be ll)llde !IO 
!bat the .Architect may be prellellt fur sµch pmcedures. Such costs, except 118 provided in Subp~h 1).5,:3, sliall 'be at lhe 
Owner's .expense. 
. ·') 1.3.5.3 If such procedwes for tesli!lg, inspectiol) or .approval \ll)der Subparagtapbs )3.5.l and 13..S.2 revi:al fililure of the 
. __., porti.Qns of the Wor)c to cpmply With requirements established by .the Contract :Oociunents, all costs made necessary by such 
. failure including those l>f repeated procedures and compensation for the Ar!:bitect's services and expenses sba)l be at· the 
i Comractor's expense. · · 
13.5.4 · Requited certificates pf testing, "inspection or .apprPVlll sliall, ,ulj}ess oiherwise required .by tll.e Con1:r,1ct Documents, 'b.e 
secured by the Contr;ictor and Pl"P>:Il!>tly deliv1>red to tile Architect. 
13.!i,!i If the Ar!:hil!l.ct .is to pb,serve .teyts, inspectipll$ pr appmvals required .by the .Conttact J)ocllll)ents, .tile Architect will do so 
pr=ptly and, Where·practicable, at the nonnal place of tesli!lg. 
13 .. 5.6 "fes1S-0r inspections cQllducted pwsuant ro tile Contract Documents shall be made pr=ptly ro avoid Ulllllasomlble delay 
inlileWwk. 
13.6 . INTER!:ST 
13.6,1 Payments due and unpaid under the Contract :Opcuments shall b!l8f interest from !he date payment JS dill> at snch rate as 
the :parties may agree npon in writing or, in the absence thereof, at lhe legal rate prevailing from tim1> to time at the place where the 
Project i.s locat\,d. 
13,1 COMMENCEMENT OF StATUTORY I..IMITAtlON PERIOD 
13.7 .1 As .be.tweeu tile Owner and Conlr,lctt>r: 
.1 Before Su'bs~ntial Cmnpll'lion. As Ip acts i>r lililures tp act p~urrin~ prior ro the relevant .date of SUbstautial 
C-Ompletion, any applicable ,statule of limitations sba11 cplllinence to run and any .alleged cause of action shall be 
deemed .to.have atctned in any and all events not later than such .date of'Substai!ti!il C6mple1'ion; 
) .2 Between Substantial (:pmpletion and Final .Cer-tifi!'llte tor Paym~nt. As to acts or fui!urjlj; .to act occurring 
-subsequent to tlte relevant dii,te of Substantial Colllpletion and prior to issuance of tile final ·Certificate for Payment, 
, . _ . . .· -36- . . · J/ ,rf. 
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any applicable statute ofliinm¢ions ,s}lli!L~ce IO mn aw i\llY allegeil !:il\Jile of llCli~ 1'ball be deemed to have 
. accrued in any and all evems '10t later than.tbe c!ate of lSSWi!Ce 1>fthi,·fi!ml ~ .for.PaymCllt; .illld 
.3 After Final Certificate forl'ay!llent. As to ru;ts or jiri)µres to act occ~g afler tbe relevant W® pf lss\Jance-of the 
li1llli C!l!:tmCQ!e for:Paymll!lt, any,applicable statute .ofliinm¢ions sliall commenc,e to-l'Ull and any alleged l'llll$e of 
llClion sliall .be,ileemed to have 11®11Jeil :in any and all evems nothller than the elate .ohny act or lldl!ire to act by the 
Contt:actor pursuatll to i!DY Wl!lrl\lltY pi:ovided under P~h :3.5, tbe elate of any Clll'l'eCli<!~.of tbe Wpdt or failJJre 
to coi:m:t the Work by tbe (:®tractor under Paragraph l2.2, .or tbe date of iwtu!d· !:O!l)D)issiQn of any o\ber act ot 
lldl!ireJo perf0rt11 any duty or obligati1>n •by lhe Con1ractor QI' Owner, wldi:bever o.C!:llrS last. 
ARTICLE 14 TERMINATION. OR SUSPENSION .OF THE CONTRACT 
. 14.1 TERMINATION BYTHJ:.CONTAActo'* . . . 
_J 
) 
14.1.1 The Coll1l'!ICl!!r l!lllY ~ the Contract if the Work is stoppw for a p\ll'iod of 30 CQ~e $YS throuffe no act or 
fault Qf .the CO)llr;leti>r !>f a Snhcon!t:actor, Sid>-.511bcontrai:tor .or iheir ag~ or :e)llplj>yee,i, or any. oJher p¢l:s!>11$ 9r entities 
perth~S JK>IµODS of tbe W<lrlc µndey direct or indirect oollll'llCt with the Conllilct!>r, for any ,0f tbe foilowingreaspns: 
.1 iss!lance ofan <lrder ofa cPmt or 0th.er public lllllhority having jurisdiction w)lich reqiiir\ls all WQrk to be stopp.ed; 
.2 an act of government, such asa,declaration of mitiona) !'lllefgency Vl'hich ri,quites all Workto be stopped; 
.3 be®JSe th!l Arclntect has not issued a Certificate for Paynient .and h.is not nO\ified the-Contractor of the reason for 
withholding ~fication llS provi!led in $ubplDllgraph 9.4.l, or because :tl\e OWner has not ma\!e .payme!lt on a 
Certifjcate for.Payment within the .time slated .in the Contract.Do.cwnents; or · 
.4 the OWner ·hlls ti!Ue\! to furnish to the Contractor promptly, upon the Contracto,r's requ~ reasonable evid~ce .as 
reql!iredby Subparagraph 2.2.1. 
'14, 1 .2 The Contractor may Jenninilte :the Conllilct if; through no act Qr Jlwlt .of the Conmictor or a SubcoJllractor, · 
Sub-,subcontractor or 1h1>ir:agents or employees or ,any other ~ns or enJ:ilies perfonning portions of 1he Worlc .unc!er .direct .or 
indirei:t contract with the Contractor, repeated suspel!Sions, delays or .interruptions ,of the ,entire Work by :the OWµer as descn"bed 
in Paragraph 14.3 constilutc in the aggregate more thim .10.0 percent of:the total numb.er of <layucheduled for completion, or'l20 
) <lays in any 365,<lay period, wllichever is lesi;. 
14.1,3 ·If.one of the ,:easons dt$cribed in Subparagraph 14.J.l -or 14.1-4 ,exists; the Co!ltractor may, upon seven <lays' written 
notice to the Owner and Architect, temih)ate the Coiitract imd recover jrom the OWner payment for Work exee,uted and for proven 
Joiis witli respect to material$, equipment, tools, and toi!Slmction e.quiP1Dent and machinery, inclu\!ing r~onid>le o:verh¢ail, profit 
and c!amagei;. 
14, 1.4 lfthe Work is stopped for a period <1f60 c.onsec.utive <lays through no act oriault of the Contractor or a Subcontractor 9t 
their agents or employees or any other persol!S perfQnnini p.ortioils of the 'Worlc under contract with the Contractor b.ecaus.e the 
Owner has persiste!llly:fuiled Jo f)Jlfill the .Owner's .obligations 11Dder tl!e C!>ntract Do.cunients with respect to matters i!llpprt;mttp 
.the progress .of the Woik,.the Contractor may, upon seve!l ac!ditional days' written notico to the Own\ll' and the Architect, ,tenninate 
· the Contract.and ~ver lrom the O~ras provide!) in ~paragraph 14.1.3 •. 
14.2 tERMlNATl()N BYTHE OWNl:RFOR .CAUSE 
j4.;2, 1 the OWnermay termln.lle the ,Co!ltract if the Colltractor: . 
. 1 
.2 
.3 
. 4 
persiste!llly Qr re~ r~es or fails to supply enou,gh properly skilled workers or proper materials; 
fails to make payment to Subcontract<lrs 'for inaterial$ or labor in acci>r!lallce with:the resp.eclive agreements between 
Jhe Con1ractor and the Subcontrai:tors; · 
persistently~ laws, ordinances, or roles, regulatioos or orders or a public anthority havingjurisdictiQn; or 
othe,rwise is,gµilty of substantialbreach of a provision of the Contract Do.cumeots . 
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14.2,2 When ,my pf the aoovi, reaspi)s ~ the.~t, upon certificaoon.by the ~ 1hi¢ ~t call$e ellists wj!JSlify 
. such .il(:tion, may ·witlwllt prejndil:e ro ,my 01her ri~ts o.r rem~~ of die Ownw and -airer ~ ,the Cj)ntrlJ®r and 1be 
C!>ntractpr's s~, j(any, ~even !lays' ~ n1>tice, ~te ~loyment of lite Ci>nlta!:t!>r I\Dll lJlllY, snbject tp l!llY prioc rights 
of ihe snre1y. 
.1 .take wssessiQII 1>f lhe siti:, ruid pf all materiids, equipment, .tO!lls, and C!>llSlnll:IWn eqilipme!lt and macbine1ythereon 
·Pwned by1he Contr®t!>r; 
.2 aceept ru;signnlent of snbcontracts plll'SU!l1ltt1> .P~b S,4; .iuid 
.3 J'inisb the Work by whl!tever ~le nuith<1d :the 0w1ter may (lelml ~~I.lilt Upon ~ .pf.lite C<1Rtnwtor, 
the Owner shall fumlsh to the Ci>ntrt!cror a :det;lil¢d !lccounting oft)le .COS\S incurred by the Owner in finishing the 
Work. 
14,2.3 When the Owner~ 1be Conti:act liirnne of tbe reasons staled iid~iibplllJlglllph 14:2.l, theCoµtractouh!lll .not be 
entitled IQ teJ:eive iimherpayment µnjil tbe Wolk .ill J'inished. · · 
14:.2.4 If.the unpaid~ of lhe Conttact;Sumi,l(oeeds costs of finishing tbe Worn, inclllj)jng compensation for the)\tcbiteci'.s 
services !llld eli'.pe!IS!lS Dlllde necessary 1hereby, rutd Pthl'r d;ml~ey incurred by the OWner and not expri,ssly wanted, sm:h eiccess 
shall be .paid tp 1hi, Conlra.ctor. If such costs rutd.d;mlages i,xce!ld 1he unpaid balance, the Qll\lI'llctor shall pay the c!ifference to 
the owner. The .am.onnt !!> be paid ro the C.ontractor or Owner, as the case may be, shlillbe certified by the Architect, .upon 
,application, lll!d !his obll¢ion for payrnentshall survive tellliiru!tipn of the Conttact 
14;3 SUSPl:NSION'8Y THE OliVNERFOA¢0NVi;NIENCE , 
14 .. 3.1 The 'C>wner may, wi1hllut ,:aU$e, order the Co~or in ~ to sµspend, delay or inti,rmpt the Wock in whole or .in 
part for such pimi><I of.time /lS .the Ownennay ~e. This.proyision shall only !!P,Ply to Sll!IJlensiqns {withont:cause) fur a· 
cootinuoU$ period.in .excess of10 .days. 
14.3;2 The Contraet SJllJ!; and Contract Tune .sball be adjusled for increases in the cost au.d time .caused by suspension, delay or 
intemiption /lS d~ in Slihparagraph 143.1 (without cause). Adjusttnent 'of lhe Contract Sum sball .inclnde pr9fit, . 'No 
adjuslment shall be made to the extent: · 
.1 that perfurpiance is, was or w1>1Jld have been so sµsp.ended, delayed or inrerrupted by ruiother cause for which .the 
Conttaetor ill responsible; ot · 
· .2 that an equm,b,Je adjusqnent ls !llade or denied µnder ruiotheqtrovision of 1he C1>ntract. . 
14.4 TERMI.NATION 13Y THE.OWNER FOR CONVENIENCE 
14.4.1 The Owner may,.at ,my tune, tenllinate thi, Con1n!ct for Jhe Owner's convenience and witbPlit C'!lJS". 
14.4.2 lJpoi:i receipt.of written notice fronl the.Owner1>f such ti,rmination for the Owner's convenience, the Contractor shall: 
.1 cease operations ~ directed by the Owner in tbe police; 
.2 .tU1re actions neJ:eSsary, .!>f that the Owner may direct, for tbe prorection and pr~pn of ffteWprlc; .au.d 
.;3 el!;cept f1>r Work directed to be perfotmed prior.to the effectivi, date 1>ft!mnination stated in 1he notice, rermimiti, all 
.existing sibconlr.!cts and purchase orders an!! entl'r into no furjber suhcontrac;ts l!lld purchase orders. 
14.4.3 In case of su¢h rermination for the Ownet's convenience, .the Contractor shall be entitled tO receive pay!llent for Work 
executed, ruid costs h,.curred by reason_ofsuch termination, along with reasonable overhead ruid profit on 1he Wock pot execuied. 
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BCHllllT A 
1. Stow,y Co~n Inc; Is a eoipl)~ ~. Drg?JJiZed.and 
· exlmlng Unde,r IIJe Jaws Qf tbe ~ Qf 1!1$1\o. stonwbas fullllled all pr,erequlsile!I · 
n800$$cllYttl me mis D~nd f(II' M>ilrallml. · -
_2. sr,orey Coool(ucl!Pn Jnii._ 1$.a -~Ml ~ t1'!al ~~ In 
the eous~ol.lon !'If higlrend, luxuiy hom@ locatlld In the ~r -flun · 
Valley/Ketchum, Idaho ;;,n;i'l. 
3_. on or abo11L,1v1y 91 20® Sli:,iey Con$µQlion &XaMed a coniract 
("the .ilOniracl") wnh sun Valley Trullt _ ufd/t January 0, 1~ and Lit/ Rl,aves, 
Tl'U$\8$ of the $.un Valley Tivsf u/d/t .limilii!ly 8, 1.999 (coll$CUvely 'Sun Valley')· 
related to-tile wnelructkm Of a l'elllderu:e_k®Wri ~ Chur!ih Ci.imp 2 Residence ---
--_ -("the piv}ect") loeata,nn Ketchum, Blaine .county, l!Saho, Th~ project iilvolvild 
' ·. ' ', . . ~ ' . 
. the eons!fucll.on of .a Juxury b<mle, l!everal 911est buUi;Jlngi;, a -SIAilmmlng poPt 
tennis !:()Urt and a$!lent i:aban_~. 
4. _ The li;rrm of contract lle\viaan SIQrey and· Sun V$11ey \Ila$ a ~ 
.pl®, with a guarnm~ed mlllklmum •. Tli!! Cl)l)!ract lurlb&r oontempl~j 1hat the 
nrchlteot,- .!,al~e/F!f;lfG Architects; Jnc. flake/Fla!tl') W ~)lag., Texall W9Uld 
~dmirilstt!r llw contl'a!"it on behalf of Sun Valley. The c;;:miract tepr!!Ser,ted that 
·~un Valley .had wlail)IJd IJ!ke/FJato. The inv91Veinent pf i>lher indi!!iduals pr 
pai:tl¢$ In the admlnl~ <if the (;OnbaQt was_ tlQt andclpated or ()Oll~mpk!l.ed 
by the oorrtract. 
6. - The WOik p0mempi~d and p~ by Storey pUf$1,1Qll\ to iii$ 
-_ corrtr.ict With sun Valley~ fur the .banef!t of MIi. Riis W!ls?n iind he:' hu,sband 
1 
<" • 
\ 
. who are the m:tlpMIS or the r(,)!!Jdenl»ll9Wtmu Ith~ lw!m tompletad. FQt f)JI . 
·· purpo11es, -~ i>y their condUct dudns ctoo, co~ pha1,;& of the llmtetit. M11. 
WiI,son.ifjtJ hGi-tiµs~d simply ll$l:ld SllllV~ M ~ •r !;l!ID, . 
S. Someilme afulr executlon llfUie ct>nlJaOt by $1Mty·IIIJQ .S!it! Valley 
. . ' . ' ' . . . 
ihl!I M~t Cotn))any Wii\s hired 'lo m!:1 l:1$.tm agent ~r Ms. WI~. a1.1ll her 
•·· . . : . ; . ' .· ' ;. -. 
htl$bflnd. The Mn(!l~t»' .Cllmpany was lllred ~-i»nsullatlQn Wllh .or 1he 
·ton1100t of St.orey and wa!i unUatt!l,llly ln~ed lnio tl1$ conslnlclion p«:cas&. 
1. 1nlt!ally. McGregor Company'!> purported :w~ was lo .tG<ilst with 
$vhedUlllliJ- This did not occµr. I~, after being nl~d, Iha McGregor 
. c»mpany k>c_k uver m®t of the .contraGt admlnlmtion that µ'lke/Fl~to WllS 
. su~d ~ p';)lfo1m and lh addffiim acted as the ;g11nt for Ms. Wllllon arid h11r 
l)usband in too <!ln;ctltm pf eX!ta al)(! t;ddilior11ihvorlt 
. 8. Outing the @rse of ihe ~ ·Sun Valley, Me. Wllwri, tile 
Mc~or Ccropany and .other agent$ acting on . their behalf directed and 
:autl;iorizl'id riumeJDU$ cfrallgell to 1lie scope 6f S:tor~y's WQ~ .on file proJevt and 
ar,l,;l~ exlra work. The chang~inoluded ailding labor al'ld lllliltef'lalsi $ JbtrilctiTJg . 
Iatior Mil .rmrt,anals; •!ill~ cti;;iru:jlng ~ prnje!,lt ptana. MJJ!ill of '\tie ~ wo~ and 
· ad(lmonal worJ< th,iit Storey was direc!eil to pel!Qrm wati actually perf~rmed by 
· subcon!mctws. aecause ~my hi18 not. been p;11ld for a su!,i;!;J!Jlial P()lilon .of 
!hi$-~ ;incl additional ~-rk. many subco~ that woJked on ihe pro~ 
remllln UIJJ).!lld: · In many JnstallCel'l, Sun Yalley, \VIS. W!!Son and 1h<'> lk$regor · 
·: · Company and their agents _l;>~llller.l SltiJGY i!IIIQ'dlreeted Storey's $ubcontraetl>rs 
!O t>Blfotm e,xira :8~/l addttfortal WOIK. Certain of fu&Se SU~r.ilors retnaln . 
. . 2 
r· \ . 
• 
unpak:I fur t_h<, c~lra .11rio addltlonal W()rl< pillfonned end. ar/3 relyinti Qr. $!:(,ray to 
· pbtaln payment for th!'.l eldra -~d ~nal worts d\teotll<I by .Sun V~ley, .Ms. 
Wilson anu :th~ Mc(llrogor Company and their agents. 
9. )¾~uee ~kelflmo wall imPMt some.or an ,;>f the funds \het were 
"du.e them from Sun Ve~ay OT Ms. WUeon dullng tile coriswet\On plk"llle or the 
. ·- . . . 
pr<l)8\lt, r1~sary eooslru~n d~ ~'* notjjmelyprepared or <f~elild to 
Stor¢y then}b1/ lnCl'$8$lng ihe w~-of storeys perl\Yrma!\1$ • 
. 10. The scope, s~ ai.tdnumberdthe imanges !ilrectell bySunVeUey, 
Ms. WIJson Md 1hE! M~or Com})ilfly lilnd their ~ - l>Ubsi"amlafly In 
exo!lGS of what · was reasonably contemplate!J by stQrey at · th& .!ima . of 
®lltrirucllon. 
·. . · 11. lo atklilion to having c;han!J:8$, the ~. $Ci0p!!l end number of which 
fat ~eded ;,nyti-llng that was wntempJated ;at tlw tlrne of eo~tr.'lolit\9, ~l'.l 
Valley, Ms: Wifuon ~n~ · :lbe McGregor Company· Insisted "!bat th-3 proJ$o!, 
··1ncludlng all of the change .and eddiliortal WOil(, .be sµ\n<bnii~lly comi:le¼d and. 
n1;.Jilable f pt ¢ccupancy In July 21JP2 wltllout benElfil: of time ~nsi¢lll! •. A gre;rt 
number f.lf tllG crn.mses lilnd add!Jlqns-to tl'/!:I wolf< Oil'® In th(¾ latter staaei, cf lb~ 
wo,k. · This n~sita!ed ~my~ Its aul,wntraliQrs to wi,Jk someUme; ¢10$8 . 
to 24•liour daf$, weekends; r.il'Kl pjace-overs.fzed wews Qn lbe pro}ecit resi.dtlng lo 
stiwklng <>f tmdl\l;; ~nd pfuer- :similar dlffi¢11!w!I, 
1.2. 1'hQ Mc:$regor Ciimpany lrnpPSed on $tQp;,y iulll!i and p10,,:l!)dures 
for Stjbl"tlJUlng, r!NiE;Wirig and·. appn:iving
0 
teqUOO!$ for ®Mi t.il'ld ;'ld!,i~ral WOil<. 
. . that we~ In a¼¢e!S;s of ihe prooodu1!11S i;et forth In Stl>rey's contract Wl"'tl'I Sun 
) .. 
Valiey, The Nk;(;)r131J(lr Company 1>ec,;1111a th~ pinty .tluit ·wa11 111 ehargi> of 
·.admlniswriog U1a ch;ange.orilllr protelis tontr.w to ma Jelmii of the wn~OlWilll 
. ', ' , ' . . 
· sun V;J!)ey Wnldl lndlcated. that .Lake/Flali:i '.WQlJld '~ lmi M~r O>mpany · 
~~ and mill ~fusr,ll to appfl)Ve ~-~ Q~ •• and ~io(llll wolk 
. . . 
that St!:>rcy wa$· directed 11> fl¢!:fomi anil hrtiiP~ $Un Vi!lley ha$ net issw!ld · 
payment therl!)fOr~ As an i,iddi!lpn(:ll ~It. of the McG•r ComJ)l!IIY'$ . 
11nautborizaJ:1 .imll!lvem,mt )n Storey'$ coritract With Sun Valley, .Storey>$ 
admirllstratiV!l cost!; and expenses increased· 1n pfder to -~sfy the McGregQt 
ccrripanri demands rega!dlnfJ . llQ/iedules, ei:tci,nl!ng, bBllilgs and other 
paperwotk r\'.ICjUlremf,llJW, The demande by the ~QT .Comp!<l)y n;gardlng 
. ' ~ ' . 
lh!!.s.e administrative and overhead •nl!ITTISwe.re lil·exoos!l of What was roqu)red by · · 
Storey$ contr.act W'Jlh $utJ Valley. 
13. 1li'e Wei .cost of. Sio~ys perfonni:lne!l, Jneludlng · an ag,wo upon 
. · 11moimt for fee, 1$ Vfflil io exces:, of $12 mffrioit •. 13acau$a of the nonpai11UMI of 
· · li1a contmot balance due, Storey Conl$bwtjon, Inc. filed a 6\m on the s~b}ect · 
property In the amount .of $1,750,718;85. Sub;;equemly, a Complaint to 
. , .fore11los~-that llm'l was flied In the .Ftfitl ,luilletat Dmb!et .of.:lhe Slaw Qr ldimo,Jn . 
and for tho Co1.inty of (3laine. Storeys Complaiot .seel!;s .a stay .cif the fcmaclo$Ure 
acllQn pending re$Dl.111ion Qffhl~ clisput~ In arbitration as required by '!he colilroo.t. 
H. SI.nee U,e 1ilin9 of tho lien, Storey ha$ fl.imlshed ed<!iilona! tatinr and 
. materials _to Sun :vaU,;,y at 't1113 ,requei;t 91' .,Sun Valley, Ms. W)lsnr, nnd :tl')~ 
MoGreoor Company, an!l It Is ounelltly estimated that th1;1 unpaid ba'.a::ice due 
.4 
\ 
• 
. . . 
\· 
· storey ·1a $1.S mTI!lon 'A'hich arrw1,ml wnl be itemized wi!.h epecillc!ty at ;blil t1111a of 
·the ni:bllratiOrt hearn19. · 
.16. . $IQTlily Is .el)lilled w I»_ paid .all ~ l11(:l.11:te1f in p~ng ihe 
work reqiill'!id_ by tho collmlCt 1*$ llll extra ~ lilddlffomll • imd the ~ 
fei,,, ... $torey perlbrmetl a, sub$1111l~  .co~ .lhM was odgJnany · . 
~1emp1a~ and is ontllledto be paid lil qu1;1ntum 111$1'.\!lt.. 

\ 
J 
Ned Williamson, ISB # 3131 
WILLIAMSON LAW. OFFICE, PLLC 
115 Second Avenue South 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
(208) 788-6688 Telephone 
(208) 788-7901 F acsimije 
Attorneys For Respondents: 
I"''''\ I) 
Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, · 1999, and Lily Reeves, Trustee of the 
Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, 1999 
And Attorneys for Counter-Claimants: 
LilyReeves, Trustee of the Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, 1999, 
and Rita Wilson 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Claimant, 
vs. 
SUN VALLEY TRUST u/d/t JANUARY 8, 
1999. and LILY REEVES. TRUSTEE OF 
Sl}N \"ALLEY TRUST u/d/t JANUARY 8, 
1999. 
Respondents. 
LILY REEVES .. TRUSTEE OF THE SUN 
VALLEY TRUST u/d/t JANUARY 8, 1999, 
anJ RITA WILSON, 
Counter-Claimants, . 
vs. 
· STOREY CONSTRUCTION, INC., and 
G:\RY STOREY, 
Counter-Respondents. 
AAA FILE NO.: 77 Y 110 00066'03JRJ 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
' 
.() 
ANSWER 
COME NOW, the Respondents, Sun Valley Trust, u/d/t January 8, 1999 (''Trust"), and Lily 
Reeves, Trustee of the Sun Valley Trust, u/d/t January 8, 1999 ("Trustee"), by and through their 
attorney of record, Ned C. Williamson of Williamson Law Office, PLLC, and hereby respond to the 
claims made by Storey Construction, Inc. ("Storey"), in Exhibit "A" of its Demand for Arbitration 
dated December 30, 2002, ("Demand"), as follows: 
I. All allegations in the Demand, unless ·specifically admitted, are denied. 
2. The Respondents are without informatiim or belief as to the truth of the ailegations 
contained in the first sentence of paragraph I of Exhibit "A" of the Demand and therefore deny the 
allegations contained therein. 
3. The Respondents deny the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph l 
of Exhibit "A" of the Demand. 
4. T-he Respondents are without information or belief as to the truth of the allegations 
contained in paragraph ·2 of Exhibit "A" of the Demand and therefore deny the allegations contained 
therein. 
5. The Respondents admit !he allegations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Exhibit "A" 
of the Demand. 
6. The Respondents deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 5 through 12, inclusive, 
of Exhibit "A" oftheDemand. 
: . The Respondents deny the allegations contained in the first and second sentences of 
para~'Taph 13 of Exhibit "A" ofthe Demand. 
\ 
(). ('y 
8. The Respondents admit the allegations contained in the third and fourth sentences of 
paragraph 13 of Exhibit "A» of the Demand. 
9. The Respondents deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of Exhibit 
"A" of the Demand. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. The Claimant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. The Claimant's claims are barred, in whole or in part, based on Claimant's failure to 
fulfill the conditions precedent to file the Demand. 
3. . The Claimant's claims are barred, in whole or in part, based on the doctrines of 
estoppel and waiver. 
4. The claims against the Sllll Valley Trust fail to state a claim against a real party in 
· I interest. 
5. fu light of the existence of an express contract, the claim for quantum meroit is not 
legally available to the claimant. 
6. Any claim for interference of the Construction Contract through the hiring and use of 
The McGregor Company on the project is not legally available because a party's agent acting within the 
scope of its agency cannot be sued for interfering with the contract between the principal and the other 
party to such contract. 
7. The Claimant is barred from recovery, in whole or in part,"based on its unauthorized 
expenditures, its failure to meet the Substantial Completion Date set forth in the Construction Contract, 
its failure to perform its duties, its failure to complete items on a punch list, its failure to cooperate with 
the Respondent and_ its agents, its failure to follow mandatory change order procedures, its failure to 
C) 
receive approval of change orders and payments, and its failure to properly control and manage the 
- -
construction project which is the subject of this dispute. 
8. The Claimant's claims in arbitration for One Million Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($1,900,000) haye not been justified with reasonable certainty. 
9. The Claimant's claims are batted, in whole or in part, and/or should be offset by the 
costs to remedy Storey's substandard and defective work. 
IO. The Claimant's claims are barred, in whole or in part, and/or should be offset by the 
costs attributable to complete the items on the punch li_st and to Storey's delays to complete the project, 
which costs include but are not limited to a) the costs of a project manager since August, 2002 and 
continuing every month thereafter until the project is complete at the approximate rate of$ 12,500 per 
month, b) approximately $26,000 for the fees arid costs paid to an interior designer when Storey failed 
to deliver possession of the proj~t timely for interior decoration work, and c) approximately $26,000 
for services and .costs of additional construction workers. · 
11. The Claimant's claims are barred, in whole orin part, based on the doctrine of unclean 
hands and breach of the covenant of good faith. 
I 2. The Claimant's claims are barred, in whole or in part, based on the payment by the 
Trust of the Guaranteed Maximum Price under the Construction Contract to Storey. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
. " COME NOW, the Respondents, Lily Reeves, Trustee of the Sun Valley Trust, u/d/t January 8, 
1999 ("Trustee"), and Rita Wilson, by and through their attorney of record, Ned C. Williamson of 
Williamson Law Office, PLLC, and hereby alleges and counterclaims, as follows: 
) 
. 1. Lily Reeves, Trustee of the Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, 1999, is owner of certain 
real property and improvements thereon, located in Blaine County, Idaho, and generally known as the 
Church Camp 2 (the "Property"). Lily Reeves is the duly appointed trustee of the Sun Valley Trust 
("Trust''). 
2. Rita Wilson ("Wilson'') and Thomas J. Hanks (''Hanksj are beneficiaries of the Trust, 
and they and their family currently reside at the Property. 
3. Upon infonnation and belie4· Storey Construction, Jnc. ("Storey'') is an Idaho 
corporation, doing business in Blaine County, Idaho. . 
4. Upon infonnation and belief, Gary Storey is a married man, residing in Blaine County, 
Idaho, and is a shareholder, director and officer of Storey. 
5. For safety and privacy reasons, the Property was purchased by the Trust, a confidential 
holding trust, and the Truste.e to~k other special measures to prevent public disclosure of the address of 
the Property. The Trustee also attempted to prevent any disclosure of any connection or association 
between Wilson and Hanks and the Property. 
6. Storey and the Trust entered into a Construction Contract dated July 21,2000 
("Construction Contract") to build a single family residence and associated improvements on the 
Propeny. with a Guaranteed Maximum Price to be charged by Storey. 
The Construction Contract contains a mandatory arbitration provision which reads, in 
,, 
penmcnt pan: 
Any claim arising out of or related to the Contract ... shall, after decision by the 
Architect or 30 days after submission of the Claim to the Architect, be subject to 
arbitration. 
) 
part: 
part: . 
8. The Construction Contract contains a confidentiality provision which reads, in pertinent 
In any arbitration, the parties shall avoid public disclosure of the arbitration, except as 
needed to pursue the arbitration, and in the arbitration, neilher party shall mention the 
names of the beneficial owners of the other party in their capacity as owner except as 
expressly ordered bythe arbitrator. 
9. The Construction Contract contains confidentiality. provisions which read, in pertinent 
Contracts between Contractor and its subcontractors shall (I) require each 
·subcontractor ... to be bound to Contractor by.the terms of the Contract Documents, 
and to assume toward Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities which 
Contractor, by the Contract Documents, assumes toward Owner and Architect ..•. 
***** 
None of Contractor's office files, plans or written materials, whether public or not, shall 
refer to the trustee of Sun Valley Trust, or the beneficial owner(s) of the Property, nor 
shall they identify the Project address, unless approved in writing by Owner or required 
by a government agency: Contractor will refer to the Project otherwise as "Church 
Camp 2.'.' 
JO. On or about November 14, 2002, Storey recorded a Claim ofLien in the Office of the 
County Recorder, Blaine County, Idaho, against Lots 20 and 21, Barlow Subdivision, located at No. 2 
and No. 4 North Fork Canyon Road, Blaine County, Idal10, in the amount of$1,750,718.85. 
I 1. On or about December 12, 2002, Storey filed a complaint aga~t the Trust in the 
. District Court in Blaine County, Idaho, alleging a foreclosure of the Claim of Lien against the Property 
and requesting an order compelling arbitration as required by the Construction Contract (the "Trust 
Lawsuit"). 
12. On or about January 3, 2003, Storey filed a complaint against Wilson and Hanks in the 
Dis,rict Court in Blaine County, Idaho, alleging that Wilson and Hanks, who are not named parties to 
/' 
<.,) () ·-.. ... 
the Construction Contract, owed money to Storey for work done on the Property (the "Wilson/Hanks' 
Lawsuit"). Among other things, the complaint revealed the identities of Wilson and Hanks, the precise 
address and location of the Property, their status as beneficiaries of the Trust, and the name of the 
Trust, and provided details of the construction dispute between the Tnist and Storey. 
13. The filing of the Wilson/Hanks Lawsuit and the Trust Lawsuit provided the public with 
. . , 
access to sensitive confidential information, led to the publishing of numerous newspaper articles, and 
started a nationwide dissemination of this information. By filing these lawsuits, Storey breached a fully 
binding and enforceable confidentiality provision and a mandatozy arbitration provision in the 
Constfuction Contract, and caused significant damage to the Trustee and Wilson. This breach was 
undertaken by Storey to pressure the Trust to forego its objections to Storey's inappropriate and 
unauthorized billing in excess of the guaranteed·maximum price under the Construction Contract. 
Furthermore. Storey failed to require its subcontractors to maintain the confidentiality of the prohibited 
information as s!=t forth in the Construction Contract. 
I 4. Upon information and belief, the Counter-Claimants believe Storey brought at least two 
individuals onto the Property and revealed the identity of the Trust and/or the beneficial owners of the 
Property. without the consent of the Trust or the beneficial owners of the Property. 
I 5. The public disclosure of-private information in the Wilson/Hanks' Lawsuit and the Trust 
Lawsuit. including the written documents and verbal statements filed ormade by Storey and its agents, 
such as its attorney. are material breaches of the confidentialityprovisions'ofthe Construciion Contract 
and were not consented to by the Counter-Claimants. 
16. The public disclosure of private information in the Wilson/Hanks' Lawsuit and the Trust 
Lawsuit. including the written documents and verbal statements filed or made by Storey and its agents, 
··--······-··-·········-·· ·---
1 /'··· 
' 
'::) 
such as its attorney, constitutes an invasion of the Counter-Claimants' right ofpnvacy as recognized by 
Idaho Jaw. 
17. As a result of Storeys breaches of the confidentiality provisions in the Construction 
Contract and public disclosure of private information, the Tmstee and Wtlson have suffered damages, 
including but not limited to loss of privacy, loss of security and safety, embarrassment and humiliation. 
As a result of Storey' s breaches ~fthe confidentiality provisions of the Construction Contract arid 
public disclosure of private information, the Trustee and Wilson have continued and will continue to 
maintain security on the Property at a rate in excess of_$18,000 per month to protect Wilson and her 
family, and will suffer further damages in an amount to be detennined in this Arbitration. 
18. Storey failed to meet the substantial completion date set forth in the Construction 
Contract, to perform its duties under the Construction Contract, to complete the items on the punch list 
and to substantially perform its duties under the Construction Contract, and has performed substandard 
and defective w9rk. As a result ofStorey's failure to meet-the completion dates in the Construction 
Contract and/or as agreed to by Storey, the Trust has incurred additional costs, including but not limited 
to a) the costs of a project manager since August, 2002 and continuing every month thereafter until the 
project is complete at the approximate rate of $12,500 per month, b) approximately $26,000 for the 
cance\lation fees to an interior·designer, and c) approximately $26,000 for services and costs of 
· additional construction workers. 
19. The Counter-Claimants are entitled to an award of damages for the costs to remedy 
Storey' s substandard and defective work, in an amount to be determined in this Arbitration. 
. . 
. . 
("') . ··''"") I J 
20. The Collllter-Claimants are entitled to an award of damages for the costs attn'butable to 
Storey' s delays. to complete the project, and to complete the items on the punch. list, all of which is in an 
amount to be determined in this Arbitration. 
21. In accordance with the Construction Contract and Idaho Code §§12-120 and 12-121, 
the Co!lllter-Claimants are entitled to an award of their attorney fees and costs incurred for their efforts 
to seal the court files and defend the actions in the Wilson/Hanks' Lawsuit and the Trust Lawsuit, 
incurred to remove liens recorded on the Property, and incurred in their defense of the Demand and 
prosecution of this Counterclaim. 
22. Upon information and belief, the Co!lllter-Claimants pelieve that Gary Storey is a 
shareholder, director and officer of Storey Construction, Inc., that there is a unity of interest between 
Storey Construction, Inc. and Gary Storey, that the separate personalities of Storey Construction, Inc. 
and Gary Storey no longer exist, and that there will be an inequitable result ifthe actions of Gary Storey 
are not treated as the acts of Storey Construction, Inc. Based on the foregoing, any award in this 
arbitration against Storey should also be against Gary Storey, as an individual, and should be treated as 
a sole and separate property obligation and as a community property obligation of Gary Storey. 
DATED this ;;lf, ftlay ofFebrua.ry 2003. 
WILLIAMSON LAW OFFICE, PUC 
By: ~ \.A..lJJ_;o....,.,._.,.,, "' 
Ned Williamson ·• 
~ ,·· 
. . ' 
' . 
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CE~TIFICATE QFSEltVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that.on the A.f)iJay of February 2003. a true and com:ct oopy of the 
foregoing document was served by the method indicated below to the following parties: 
R. Miles Stanislaw, Esq. 
Stanislaw Ashbaugh. LLP 
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4400-
Seattle, Washington 98104 
Counsel For Claimant/Counter-Respondents 
o U.S. Mail o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail [{Facsimile 
~
Ned Williamson 
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Ned Williamson, (ISB #3Bl) 
WILUAMSON LAW OFFICE,.PLLC 
115 Second Avenue South 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: 208.788.6688 
Fax: 208.788.7901 
Robert S. Chapman (SBN 070428) 
Stephen S. Smith (SBN 166539) 
GREENBERG GLUSKER FIBLDS CLAMAN 
MACHTINGER & KINSELLA LLP 
1900 A venue of the Stars, Suite 2100 
Los Angeles, California 90067-4590 
Telephone: 310.553.3610 
Fax: 310.553.0687 
Attorneys for Respondents and Counter-Claimants Lily 
Reeves, Trustee of the Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, 1999 
and Rita Wilson 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Claimant, 
vs. 
SUN VALLEY TRUST u/d/t JANUARY 8, 
1999, and LILY REEVES, TRUSTEE OF 
THE SUN VALLEY TRUST u/d/t 
JANUARY 8, 1999, 
Respondents. 
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LILY REEVES, TRUSTEE OF THE SUN 
VALLEYTRUSTu/d/tJANUARY8, 1999, , 
and RITA WILSON 
Counter-Claimants, 
vs. 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION, INC., and 
GARY STOREY, 
Counter-Respondents. 
. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COME NOW, Respondents and Counter-Claimants, Lily Reeves, Trustee of the Sun 
Valley Trust, u/d/t January 8, 1999 (the ''Trust'') and Rita Wilson ("Wilson") (collectively 
"Counter-Claimants'') by and through their attorneys of record, Ned C. Williamson of 
Williamson Law Office, PLLC and Robert S. Chapman and Stephen S. Smith of Greenberg 
Glusker Fields Claman Machtinger & Kinsella LLP, and hereby allege and counterclaim, as 
follows: 
1. The Trust is the owner of certain real property and improvements thereon, located 
in Blaine County, Idaho, and generally known as the Church Camp 2 (the "Property"). Lily 
Reeves is the duly appointed trustee of the Trust. 
2. Wilson and Thomas Hanks (''Hanks") are beneficiaries of the Trust, and they and 
their family currently reside at the Property. 
3. Upon information and belief, Storey Construction, Inc. ("Storey") is an Idaho 
corporation, doing business in Blaine County, Idabo. 
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4. Upon information and belief, Gary Storey is a married man, residing in Blaine 
County, Idaho, and is a shareholder, director and officer of Storey. Upon information and belief, 
the Counter-Claimants believe that Gary Storey is a shareholder, director and officer of Storey 
that there is a unity of interest between Storey and Gary Storey, that the separate personalities of 
Storey and Gary Storey no longer exist, and that there will be an inequitable result ifthe actions 
of Gary Storey are not treated as the acts of Storey. Based on the foregoing, any award in this 
arbitration against Storey should also be against Gary Storey, as an individual, and should be 
treated as a sole and separate property obligation and as a community property obligation of Gary 
Storey. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
5. Counter-Claimants reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1 through 4 of this 
Counterclaim as though fully set forth in this paragraph. 
6. The Tn!Sf is a confidential holding trust. It purchased the Property to protect the 
safety and privacy of Wilson and Hanks. It took special measures to prevent public disclosure of 
the address of the Property or any disclosure of any connection or association between Wilson 
and Hanks and the Property. 
7. Storey and the Trust enteredinto an express, written Construction Contract dated 
July 21, 2000 ("Construction Contract") to build a single family residence and associated 
improvements on the Property. The Construction Contract was a so-called "cost plus with 
guaranteed maximum" contract. Neither Hanks nor Wilson is a party to the Construction 
Contract. 
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8. The Trust performed all of its obligations in the Construction Contract, except for 
those obligations for which its performance was excused. 
9. The Construction Contract required the parties to arbitrate any claims or disputes 
arising out of or related to the contract, and prohibited the parties from making any public 
disclosure of the arbitration or the names of the beneficial owners. The Construction Contract 
required Storey to include in all of his subcontracts a provision requiring the subcontractors to be 
bound by the terms and conditions of the Construction Contract. The Construction Contract 
further provided that "[n]one of Contractor's office files, plans or written materials, whether 
public or not, shall refer to the trustee of Sun Valley Trust, or the beneficial owner( s) of the 
· Property, nor shall they identify the Project address, unless approved in writing by Owner or 
required by a government agency. Contractor will refer to the Project otherwise as '" Church 
Camp 2.'" 
10. On or about December 12, 2002, Storey breached the Construction Contract by 
filing a complaint against the Trust in the District Court in Blaine County, Idaho, which arose out 
of and was related to the Construction Contract (the ''Trust Lawsuit''). 
11. On or about January 3, 2003, Storey breached the Construction Contract again, by 
filing a complaint against Wilson and Hanks in the District Court in Blaine County, Idaho, which 
also arose out of and was related to the Construction Contract (the "Wilson/Hanks Lawsuit''). 
The complaint in the Wilson/Hanks Lawsuit revealed the identities of Wilson and Hanks, the 
precise address and location of the Property, their status as beneficiaries of the Trust, the name of 
the Trust, and provided details of the construction dispute between the Trust and Storey. 
Furthermore, Storey breached the Construction Contract by failing to require its subcontractors to 
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maintain the confidentiality of the confidential information as set forth in the Construction 
Contract. 
12. The filing of the Wilson/Hanks Lawsuit and the Trust Lawsuit provided the public 
with access to sensitive confidential information, led to the publishing of numerous newspaper 
articles, and started a nationwide dissemination of this information. By filing these lawsuits, 
Storey breached the confidentiality provisions and mandatory arbitration provisions in the 
Construction Contract, and caused significant damage to the Trustee and Wilson. This breach 
was undertaken by Storey to pressure the Trust to forego its objections to Storeys inappropriate 
and unauthorized billing in excess of the guaranteed maximum price under the Construction 
Contract. The public disclosure of private information in the Wilson/Hanks Lawsuit and the 
Trust Lawsuit, including the written documents and verbal statements filed or made by Storey 
and its agents, including its attorney, are material breaches of the Construction Contract and were 
not consented to by Counter-Claimants or Hanks. 
13. Counter-Claimant is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Storey 
brought multiple individuals onto the Property and revealed the identity of the Trust and/or the 
beneficial owners of the Property, without the consent of the Trust or the beneficial owners of the 
Property, and by doing so further breachedthe Construction Contract. 
14. As a result of Storey' s breaches of the confidentiality provisions in the 
Construction Contract, the Trust has suffered damages, including but not limited to loss of 
privacy, security and safety for Wilson and Hanks. As a result, the Trust has continued and will 
continue to maintain security on the Property to protect Wilson, Hanks and their family, that it 
otherwise would not have maintained, at a rate in excess of$18,000 per month. 
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15. In accordance with the Construction Contract and Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-
121, the TIT1st is entitled to an award of its attorneys' fees and costs incurred for its efforts to seal 
the court files and defend the actions in the Wilson/Hanks Lawsuit and the Trust Lawsuit and 
incurred in their defense of the Demands and prosecution of this Counterclaim. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
16. Counter-Claimants reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1 through 8 of this 
Counterclaim as though fully set forth in this paragraph. 
17. Storey breached the Construction Contract by failing to (a) meet the substantial 
completion date set forth in the Construction Contract, (b) perform its duties under the 
Construction Contract, (c) complete the items on the punch list, (d) substantially perform its 
duties under the Construction Contract and ( e} pay the subcontractors the sums they were owed. 
Storey further breached the Construction Contract by performing substandard and defective 
work. Storey's failure to pay the subcontractors also violated Idaho Code§ 45-511. 
18. As a result ofStorey's breaches of the Construction Contract, the Trust was 
damaged as follows: (a) by failing to meet the substantial completion dates in the Construction 
Contract, the Trust incurred additional construction costs, including but not limited to (i) the 
costs of a project manager since August, 2002 and continuing every month thereafter until the 
project is complete at the approximate rate of$12,500 per month, (ii) approximately $26,000 for 
the cancellation fees to an interior designer, and (iii} approximately $26,000 for services and 
costs of additional construction workers; and (b) as a result of Storeys failure to pay the 
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) subcontractors the money they were owed, the Trust WllS required to pay approximately $618,000 
that it did not owe to those subcontractors. Accordingly, the Trust is entitled to an award of 
damages against Storey for these breaches in an amount to be determined in this Arbitration, in 
excess of $800,000. 
19. In accordance with the Construction Contract and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 
and 45-511, the Trust is entitled to an award ofits attorney fees and costs incurred to satisfy the 
subcontractors and incurred in their defense of the Demands and prosecution of this 
Counterclaim. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Invasion of Privacy) 
20. Counter-Claimants reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1 through 15 of this 
Counterclaim as though fully set forth in this paragraph. 
21. The Property is private property containing the residence of Wilson and Hanks 
and their children. Counter-Claimants, like all homeowners, have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the Property. 
22. Storey has invaded that privacy by bringing third parties onto the property and 
into the residence without the consent of Counter-Claimants. In addition, Counter-Claimants are 
informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Storey has obtained access to the Property for 
himself and these third parties under false pretenses. 
23. Counter-Claimants are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Storey 
has engaged in this tortious conduct knowingly, intentionally and repeatedly. 
3432100002-1368289.1 7 
24. Counter-Claimants have suffered damages as a result of Storey' s tortious conduct, 
including but not limited to loss of privacy, securi1y and safely. 
25. Counter-Claimants are informed and believe and, on that basis allege, that Storey 
committed the acts and omissions alleged above intentionally, maliciously, fraudulently, and in 
conscious and willful disregard of Counter-Claimants' rights. Accordingly, Counter-Claimants 
are entitled to an award of exemplary and punitive damages against Storey. 
Dated this 17th day of September 2003. 
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Ned Williamson, (,ISB #3131) 
WlLLIAMSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
115 Second Avenue South 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: 208.788.6688 
Fax: 208.788.7901 
Robert S. Chapman (SBN 070428) 
Stephen S. Smith (SBN 166539) 
GREENBERG GLUSKER FIELDS CLAMAN 
MACHTINGER & KINSELIA LLP 
1900 Avenue of the Stars,.Suite2IOO 
Los Angeles, California 90067-4590 
Telephone: 310.553.3610 · 
Fax: 310.553.0687 
Attorneys for Respondents Sun Valley Trust u/d/tJanuary 8, 1999, 
. and Lily Reeves, Trustee of the Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, 
1999, Rita Wilson and Thori:tasJ. Hanks and Collllter-Claimants 
Lily Reeves, Trustee of the Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, 1999 
and Rita Wilson 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
STOREY CONSTRUCilON, INC., 
Claimant, 
AAAFILENO.: 77Yll00006603JRJ 
vs. 
SUN VALLEY TRUST u/d/t JANUARY 8, 
1999, and LILY REEVES, TRUSTEE OF 
THE .SUN VALLEY TRUSTu/d/t 
JANUARY 8, 1999, 
Responden~. 
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' / LJLY REEVES, TRUSTEE OF TH.HSUN 
VALLEY TRUST u/d/t JANUARY 8, 1999 
Counter-Claimants, 
vs. 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION, INC., and 
GARY STOREY, 
Counter-Respondents. 
Respondents the Sun Valley_ Trust u/d/t January 8, 1999, Rita Wilson and Thomas J. 
Hanks hereby submit their Pre-Hearing Brief. 
Dil.ted tlris 22nd day of September, 2003 
.Chapman 
Attorneys the Sun Valley Trust u/d/t January 8, 
1999, Rita Wilson and Thomas J. Hanks 
3432100002-1368858.3 -i-
} 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ........... : ........ , ................................... l 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..... : ......... ................................. 4 
A. Background ...................................................... 4 
B. The Contract Negotiations •.................•................... · ..... 6 
C. The Contract Provisions· ............................................ 18 
D. The Hiring of the McGregor Company ................................ 23 
E. The Payment Applications .......................................... 27 
1. When SCI Tried to Increase the "Original Contract 
Sum" on the Tennis Court Without a Change Order, 
2. 
Mr. Campeas Objected ....................................... 28 
When SCI Began to Exceed Scheduled Valnes and 
Prematurely Reduced Retainage on the Main House, 
the McGregor Company Objected .............................. 29 
3. When SCI's Costs Began to Exceed the Projected 
Guaranteed Maximum Price on the Main House 
Overall, theTrust Objected and Withheld Payment ................ 31 
F. The Completion of Construction ..................................... 35 
G. Months After Wilson and Hanks Moved In, SCI 
Submitted $1.8MillioninNew"Change" Orders ........................ 38 
H. SCI Violated the Confidentiality Provisions of the 
Contract and Invaded Respondents' Privacy ........................... ; 40 
I. SCI Failed to Submit Its Claims to Lake/Flato 
Before Filing the Lawsuits or the Arbitration ........................... 42 
J. SCI Extorted $6B,OOO fromRespondents By 
Refusing to Pay Its Own Subcontractors ............................ : .. 43 
3432100002-136885S.3 -ii-
) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
:;l) Page 
·'"'.. . \ j 
Ill ARGUMENT ................ : .....................•.............. · ..... 43 
A. SCI Cannot Proceed on Any Quasi-Contractual Theory .........•......•.. 44 
1. Where There is·an Express Contract Governing 
an Issm; a Party Cannot Proceed on a Quantum 
Meruit or Unjust EnrichmentTheory . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . .. 44 
2. The Parties Never Waived or Abandoned the 
Contract Generally or the Guaranteed Maxiimnn 
Prke Specifically •.•....•.....•...............•......... .- .... 48 
3. SCI Cannot.Show that the Contract Was Abandoned 
Because. of tlie Increased Overall Budget of the Project .............. 50 
B. SCI Cannot Recover the Costs in Dispute Under the Contract ........... : .. 53 
1. SCI's Claim Js. Barred As a Matter of Law ....................... 53 
2. The Contract's Guaranteed Maximmn Price Can 
Only Be Increased Through Approved Changes ................... 56 
C. SCI Breached the Contract in Nmnerous Respects ....................... 60 
. . I 
1. The Trust Inteipreted the Contract for SCI' s Benefit 
Virtually Everywhere It Could, Overpaying SCI by $200,000 ........ 61 
2. SCI Extorted An Additional $613,Q00 from the Trust 
by Refusing to Pay Its Own Subcontractors ....................•.. 62 
3. SCI Breached the Confidentiality Provisions in the 
Contract and Violated Respondents' Privacy Rights ................ 62 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................... ; ..........•..•.. 66 
3432100002-1368858.3 -iii-
.,,,..,., 
( 
TABLE OF AUTHORrtIES 
.l 
FEDERAL CASES 
Interstate Litho Coi;p. v; Brown, 
255 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2001) .........•.....................•..................... 47 
· Kennedy v. William R Hudon, Inc., 
659 F.Supp, 900 (D,Colo. 1987) ................................................. 47 
Triangle Mining-Co; v. Stauffer Chemical Co,, 
. 753 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1985) ........•....•............•...................... 44, 45 
· U.S., Youngstown Welding and Engineering Co. v. Travelers Jnrupmity Co., . 
802 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir; 1986) ........... : ....................................... 47 
STATE CASES 
AA. & E.B. Jones Co. v. Boucher, 
530 P.2d.974 (Colo. Ct. AJJp. 1974) ..... , ......•............................. 7, 9, 56 
Advance Leasing & Crane v. Del E. Webb Corp., 
117 Ariz. 451,573 P.2d 525 (1977) ..••... , .........................•............. 47 
American Silver Mining Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Coi:p., 
94 Idaho 54,480 P.2d90O(Sup. Ct. 1971) ... '. ....•... : ............................ 48 
Bischoffv. Ouong-Watkins Properties. 
113Idaho826, 748P.2d410(1987) .............................................. 44 
Bouten Const. Co. v. L. Land Co.. . 
125 Idaho 957,877 P.2d 928 (Ct App. 1994) .................. '. .............. et passim 
Brysonv. Hutton, 
41 N.C.App. 575,255 S.E.2d258 (1979) .......................................... 47 
D.A. Davis Const. Co. v. Pahnetto Properties, Inc., 
281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (s:c: Sup. Ct. 1984) ................................ 7, 56 
Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. T & J Contractors, 
96 Idaho 662,534 P.2d 1102 (1975) .............................................. 4.6 
) 
3432100002-1368858.3 ·JV- . 
) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(Continued) 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp •• 
( 
'•, .. 
132 Idaho 754. 979 P.2d 627 (1999) .............................................. 45 
Guldberg v. Greenfield. 
146 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1966) ................................................... 47 
Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. King County, 
57 Wash. App. 170. 787 P.2d 58 (1990) ...........•..........•................. 51. 52 
Idaho Lumber. Inc. v. Buck. 
109 Idaho 737, 7I0P.2d 647 (Idaho App. 1985) ............................. , ....... 47 
Insulation Contracting & Sµpply v. Kravco; Inc., 
209 N.J.Super. 367, 507 A.2d 754 (1986) .......................................... 47 
J.W. Thompson Co. v. Welles.Products Corp., 
243 Kan. 503, 758 P.2d 738 (1988) ...... , ........•..................... ; ......... 47 
Kelly v. Hodges, 
119 Idaho 872, 811 P.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................................ 48 
La Chance v. Rigoli, 
. 325 Mass.425, 91 N.E.2d 204 (Mass. 1950) ........................................ 47 
M. K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover. 
_ 101 Idaho 345,612 P.2d 1192 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ...................................... 48 
Marshall v. Bare. . 
107 Idaho 201. 687 P.2d 591 (1984) •........................•.... ; ............... 44 
Martel v. Bulotti, . 
138Idaho451, 65 P.3d 192 (Sup. Ct. 2003) ..................................... 53-55 
Meehan v. Cheltenham Township. 
410Pa. 446. 189 A.2d 593 (1963) · ..• , ............................................ 47 
Merrill Contractors. Inc. v. GST Telecom, Inc., 
2003 WL 464069 5 (Wash. App. Feb. 25, 2003) ••..............•................ 50-5.l 
3432100!l02-1368858.3 -v-
I 
) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(Continued) 
Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 
r·· 
187 Cal.App.3d 1463 (1986) .......•.....•.•.........•..•.•..................... 64 
National CityBankv .. Fleming, 
2 OhioApp.3d50,440NE,2d 590 (1981) .......................................... 47 
Nelse Mortensen & Co., Inc. v. Group Health CoQperative of Puget Snund 
17 Wash. App. 703,566 P2d560 (1977), affd90Wash.2d 843,845,586 
P.2d 469,470 (1978) ......•...........•.•.•............. .- ..................... 51 
Peavey v. Pellandini, 
97 Idaho 655, 551 P.2d 610 (1976) ..........•.........•....•..••................. 46 
Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 
83 Idaho 578,367 P,2d 284 (S. Ct. 1961) .......................................... 64 
Russell v. Russell, 
99 Idaho 151,578 P.2d 1082 (Sup. Ct. 1978) ....................................... 48 
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies. 
20 Cal.4th 907 (1999) ...•...................••...•.........•.................. 66 
Stokes v. International Media Systems, 
686 P.2d 1368 (Colo;App, 1984) .•..........••................................... 47 
TRW, Inc. v. Fox Development Co:rp., 
604N.E.2d 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ........................................ 1, 6, 7. 56 
Uranga v, Federated Publications, Inc., 
67 P.3d 29, 32 (Idaho S. Ct. 2003) •.......•..• , ................................ • .... 64 
Wilhelm v. Johnston, 
136Idaho 145.30P.3d300(2001) .....•...................•..................... 44 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Restatement of Law, Restitution: 
- Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts, § 107(1) ................................... 45 
Restatement of Law, Restitution: 
Quasi Contracts and Construetive 'Trusts, §§ 110 & 111 ............................ 45. 46 
3432100002-1368858.3 -vi-
' 
' 
) 
) 
' ) 
( C 
I. 
This is a contract dispute. Claimant Storey Construction, Inc. ("SCT') entered into a 
heavily-negotiated cost plus with a guaranteed maximum price contract.with Respondent Sun 
Valley Trust (the ''Trust'').!' Each side was represented by counsel in the negotiations. Indeed, 
SCI was represented by 4 separate lawyers in connection with the negotiations. The parties 
understood at the time they entered into the contract that there would be significant future 
changes to the scope of the work, and they drafted specific contractual provisions to address the 
·changes. 
From the time the contract was signed nntil well after construction was complete, the 
parties complied with the tenns of the contract. They carefully tracked the guaranteed maximum 
price and all changes to the work. When SCI started to approach the guaranteed maximum price 
on individnal line items in the budget, the Trust demanded and received assurances from SCI that 
the guaranteed maximum price would be met, When SCI began to exceed the projected 
guaranteed maximuin price on the largest phase of the project, the Trust, in compliance with the 
contract, began withholding money. SCI's bills to the Trust vastly exceeded the guaranteed 
maximum price. Nonetheless, and despite the terms of the contract, SCI wants m_ore money. 
!! This. type of contract provides that the contractor will receive its costs plus an 
agreed upon fee up to a guaranteed maximum amount. The contractor agrees it will not be paid 
more than the guaranteed maximum amount regardless of its actual costs unless the parties agree, 
in writing, to change the guaranteed maximum amount. TRW, Inc. v. Fox Development Col:p., 
604 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 
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SCI knows that itis not entitled to any more money under the contract. For that reason, it 
seeks to avoid the.contract and sue in quantum meruit It is undisputed that the change orders 
SCI submitted after construction was complete (in the amount of$1.8 million) were not really 
changes and were not approved. Those change orders were for "additional costs" incurred on 
general construction categories that were already encompassed by the original guaranteed 
maximum price or prior approved change orders. Simply put, SCI agreed in writing that the 
costs of construction would be $X. When the costs came in at more than $X, it submitted change 
orders for the di:l'ference, Well aware that Idaho law does not permit a contractor under a 
guaranteed maximum price contract to recover for such unapproved, additional costs (Bouten · 
' . 
,Const. Co. v. L. Land Co., i25 Idaho 957, 877 P .2d 928 (Ct. App. 1994)), SCI asks for the 
contract to be ignored. 
But it is worse than that. SCI does not want the entire contract ignored. SCI actually 
relies on the contract to measure its alleged damages, by seeking to recover its unapproved 
"additional costs" plus the builder's fee for changes that is called for in the contract. In fact, the 
only contractual provisions SCI actually seeks to avoid are (1) the provisions requiring owner 
approval of changes and (2) the provisions that bind it to the guaranteed maximum price. SCI 
wants the contract enforced where it helps and ignored only where it hurts. 
SCI will argue that the $1 $ million in post-completion change orders reflect work that 
was performed at the end of the project at the direction of the Trust. But SCI is wrong. The 
Trust only directed SCI to complete the work it had previously agreed to complete for the amount 
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it had previously agreed to charge by the date it had previously agreed to meet. Insisting that SCI 
honor its written.agreements.is not an owner directed "change." 
SCI is entitled to no additional money. Indeed, Respondents. treated SCI generously 
under the contract. SCI repaid that generosity by ignoring the arbitration and. corporate liability 
provision in the contract and publicly suing. Respondents for $1.8 million in cost overruns that 
were its sole responsibility. Toe extortionist lawsuit also p1Jhlicized that SCI had failed to pay its 
local subcontractors $613,000 and blamed that failure on Respondents. Due to the negative 
publicity generated against Respondents, they agreed, under protest, to advance the $613,000 to· 
the subcontractors on the condition that they could get the money back in these proceedings. SCI · 
has also repeatedly violated Respondents' privacy and made a public spectacle out of this 
dispute. 
SCI shouldbe ordered to return the $613,000 Respondents were forced to pay to SCI's 
subcontractors. It should also be ordered to pay Respondents $387,000 for the damages 
Respondents incurred as a result ofSCl's multiple, other breaches of the contract and invasion of 
privacy, plus Respondents' attorneys' fees and costs. 
II I 
I II 
II I 
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A. Background 
As any contractor experienced in the construction of high-end, custom tesidentialhomes 
knows such projects embody the owner's hopes and dreams. The owners and architects on such 
. projects· insist on the very best in design and materials. As a result, it is virtually always the case 
that such projects will entail substantial changes throughout the construction process. Changes 
from 25% to I OOo/; or more of the original budget on such projects are common and to be 
expected by anyone familiar with this industry. 
The Church Camp JI project is a high~end, custom residential complex located on over 20 
acres of rural land bordering the Sawtooth National Recreation Areajust outside of Sun Valley, 
Idaho. It was designed by world-renowned architects; Lake/Flato Architects, Inc. 
("Lake/Flato''). It represented Rita Wilson's dream for a stunning vacation home in an idyllic 
setting. That is why she chose Lake/Flato and why she chose SCI. · 
From the beginning, Wilson and Lake/Flato contemplated that the Church Camp JI 
project would involve the design and construction of an entire series of custom designed 
residential structures, including a main house, guest houses, a caretaker's residence, carports, a 
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' Aualysis;Y 
) 
In May, 2000, Respondents and Lake/Flato invited three general contractors to bid on the 
project. · The three contractors were chosen because of their experience constructing high end, 
custom residential projects, One of those contractors was SCI, which had built high-end, custom 
residential projects for Arnold Schwarzenegger, John McEnroe, and Michaell(eaton, among 
others. Ex. 1 June 6, 2002 Bid Analysis; StoreyDepo. 45:3-12. 
From the outset, SCI was told that there would be substantial changes in the project and 
that it was, therefore, imperative that the contractor have a tightly organized control over the 
budget and schedule. Ex. 1. Given its experience building custom homes, SCI was well aware 
· of this reality. As SCI's project manager, David Lister, testified in his deposition: "It's outside 
of my experience to ever imagine a project without changes." . D. Lister Depo. 31 :15-16 
(emphasis added)}' 
During the bidding process, Lake/Flato obtained references on each of the. general 
contractors, including SCI. Those references said that SCI did high quality work but had a 
'fl · The exlnbit references in this brief are not tied to 1lle final hearing exhibit list, 
because the parties are still attempting to agree on one set of joint exhibits. Respondents will 
provide the Panel with an updated copy of their brief, with citations to the hearing exhibits 
numbers once those numbers are known. 
Ji When asked what !tls job responsibilities at SCI entail, Mr. Lister testified 
succinctly: "Build custom homes." D. Lister Depo. at 13:19. 
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repeated problem of billing clients for change orders that had not been approved or in ammmts 
that exc.eeded the l)J)proved amount. Ex.1. In. a Jnne 14, 2000 memo discussing SCI' s bid, John 
Grable of Lake/Flato wrote: 
", .. Lake/Flato has toldStoreythat any change orders~ reqnire 
one ronnd of pricing andfonnal Owner's approval. This approach 
has been taken due to a few negative responses fro~ past clients 
regarding change orders. ('1l] •••. 6. Had change orders -- some due 
to owner's request - som:e were not. Original price quote for 
change orders were inaccurate and Storeyrequested more money. 
I.JF discussed this issue at length with Storey and any change 
orders had one change for pricing and approval for Church Camp 
2.n 
Id; atSVT 00068. Determined to avoid such problems on the Church Camp II project, 
Respondents began the contract negotiations with the intent that the parties' relationship must be 
governed by a guaranteed maximum price that would be increased only through approved change 
orders. 
B. The Contract Negotiations 
In late June 2000, the contract negotiations began. They lasted 9 months. Both si\les 
were represented by counsel. Respondents were represented by Tina Kahn. SCI was represented 
by four different lawyers, John Seiller, Rand Peebles, Ed Lawson and Miles Stanislaw. Storey 
Depo. pp. 18:18-20:2.11 The negotiations focused on a number ofissnes, chief among them {l) 
defining the initial scope of the work, (2) :fucing the guaranteed maximum price for that work, (3) 
11 Mr. Stanislaw has also represented SCI .in payment disputes with other owners. Storey 
Depo. 125:20-24. 
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agreeing on a.proeessfor implementing ehangesin.tliewo:rk and ( 4) setting the construction 
schedule. 
On June 30, 2000, Mr. Grable of Lake/Flato prepared the initial draft of the contract and 
faxed it to.Ms. Kahn. From that first draft, the contractwas anAIA 111 - 1997 "cost of the work 
plus a fee with a negotiated guaranteed maximum price". contract. Ex. 2. As opposed to a 
) . straight cost-plus contract, a cost plus with.guaranteed maximum price contract provides a cap on 
the owner's financial obligations. TRW, Inc. v. For develqpment Cotp., 604 N.E.2d 626, 630 
(Ind. Ct. App. i992). The guaranteed maximum price is the .greatest amount the owner is 
) 
) 
' 
required to pay for the contracted services. Id. The owner is obligated to pay the contractor for 
its costs plus a fee up to the guaranteed maximum price ol)ly. Id. The contractor is not entitled, 
and the owner is not obligated to pay, for costs and fees in excess of this amount. id.51 
Initially, the project was to be divided into two different phases. The Trust would not 
have been obligated to use SCI for Phase 2 unless SCI agreed to a fixed price bid to perform all 
Phase 2 work. Ex. 3 [Kahn's first draft of Addendum]. The scope of the work for Phases 1 
and 2 were described by Ms. Kahn in section l (c) of the.draft "Addendum" to the contract as (1) 
preparation of the site, (2) construction of an entry gate, (3) demolition of the existing road and 
installation of a new road, ( 4) new utility upgrades, (5) new septic system, ( 6) new pUIDp houses 
for the weJJs; (7) a new underground cistern, (8) excavation for the main house and installation of 
3/ See also D.A. Davis Const. Co. v.Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 417-18, 
315 S.E.2d 370, 371-72 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1984); A.A. & E.B. Jones Co. v. Boucher, 530 P.2d 974, 
980-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). 
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a new foundation system, (9) coBStruction of the main house, (10) two guest houses, (11) a · 
caretaker house, {12) a tennis court and cabana and (13) the installation of a new bridge across 
the river. ldi at SVT 00014. 
Given the then-current state of the construction documents,:SCI was hesitant to agree to a 
guaranteed maximum price for all of these items.. On July 12, 2000, SCI wrote that it was still 
considering section 1( c) of the Addendum because ''the scope of work has increased" since the 
original bid. Ex; 4 at SVT 00005. The same day, SCI's project manager, David Lister, sent 
Lake/Flato a fax that read in part as follows: 
"We can't sign a contract with a scope of work that includes items 
that are not defined in drawings with sufficient detail to bid the 
work. [,rJ 1u order to get the·quickest start poSS!ole, we suggest 
that the scope of phase. one be reduced to just include [ certain 
items]. [,rJ We further propose that phase two ,include [ certain 
additional items]. ['II] We propose that the replacementbridge, 
guest houses, tennis court, cabana and caretaker's residence be 
constructed ina separate phase in the. spring of 2001, because these 
items are not sufficiently defined in construction documents at this 
time.'' 
Ex. 5 at SVT 00002. 
To address SCI' s concerns, on July 14, 2000, Ms. Kahn re-drafted paragraph 1 of the 
Addendum in pertinent part as follows: 
"l(c) [ ... ] Owner has no obligation to utilize Contractor for Phase 
II unless Contractor has submitted a Guaranteed Maximum Price 
accompanied by a detailed budget indicating labor and materials 
for each item or trade and at least two comprehensive bids for labor 
and materials for e;ich trade and Owner accepts the Guaranteed 
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Maximmn Price, evidenced ma writing,sigried·by Owner and 
Contractor before any Work begins .on :Phase II." 
!'l ( e) The Guaranteed Maximum Price.for Phase I is $. __ _ 
The estimated.budget for all Work required to complete the Plans 
as theyexistedonJlllle 16, 2000 ... is $5,392,547.84. The parties 
anticipate that Arehitect will provide more details and 
specifications on the Plans whiehConitactor will.use to set a 
Guaranteed Maximum Price for Phase II." 
Ex. 6 at SVT 00232-33. 
Ms. Kahn also drafted a new paragraph 7 to address "Changes in Work,» which read in 
part as follows: 
" ... The Owner may request changes to lhe scope of Work 
required byfue Contract Documeots by.adding or deleting work, 
materials, or equipmeot. The Contractor will provide a cost for the 
change order and indicate any exteosion or reduction to the 
Substantial Completion Date as a result of the change order in a 
writteo change order signed by the Contractor. • .• Once executed, 
a.change order will become a Change to the Work.and the 
Contractor shall perform the Work required under this Contract as 
thus modified. In the event of a·Change, no. adjustment will be 
made to the Contractor's fee or overhead to the extent the Change 
entails a replacement of materials, even if the new materials are 
more costly than the original ones. However, if a Change entails a 
significant expansion of the Scope of Work, Contractor shall be 
paid ten percent (10%) of the amount of the Change as the 
Contractor's fee. No Change shall be <leemed authorized without a 
written change order, as described above, executed by the Owner 
prior to the commencement of the Change .... " 
Id. atSVT 00235-236 (emphasis added). 
The l 0% fee for changes that caused significant expansions in the scope of the Work was-
substantially higher than fue fee SCI was to receive on lbe initial scope of Work under the 
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contract. As ofJuly 17, 2000; SCI's builder'sf~was fixed at$339,869, 6.3% of the budget of 
$5.4 million. As Mr. Grable wrote onJuly 17, 2000: 
"This fee was set as well ru, the 'no marlrup for any change orders' 
ui:J.less the C.O. was for work that substantially deviated from the 
original scope of the project (like barnasium, horse corral, or 
additional structure). The builder fee is, fair and very competitive · 
(+ - 6.3%) considering the high caliper [sic} of work that Storey 
. Construction will provide." 
Ex. 7 at SVT 00202 (emphasis added). 
On July 18, 2000, Mr. Lawson reviewed Ms. Kahn's proposed Addendum, and 
specifically the language regarding change in work, and suggested some revisions. He objected 
to Ms. Kahn's limitation of the 10% fee to only significant expansions in the scope of the work. 
Rather, he wanted SCl to receive a 10% fee on changes that resulted in any expansion of the 
scope of the work. Ex. 8 at SVT 00197. (As noted below, the final contract provides that SCiis 
entitled to a 10% fee on changes that result in an "expansion, other than an insignificant one, of 
the scope of the Work.") Ex. 9 [Addendum, ,i 7}. However, Mr. Lawson did not object to the 
language in paragraph 7 of the Addendum requiring SCI to set forth in the change order both. the 
cost of the change and the impact the change would.have on the schedule, if any. Id. Nor did he 
object to the requirement of owner approval before implementation of any change. Id. 
It was obvious to all parties involved that there would be substantial changes to the scope 
of the project. For example, on Augµst 24, 2000, the parties visited the site. During this visit . 
they discussed a number of possible expansions in scope of the project, including a "green l:;iwn'~ 
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play area, "Rita's beach" near the river, a ''barnasimn," a ''kazinski cabin" and/or a "modern zen 
room with a porch and a view." Ex.10 at SVT 00337-38 (August 25, 2000 e,-mail from 
Grable to Wilson . . On August 28, 2000, David Lake prepared minutes of the site visit, showing 
changes for virtually every aspect of the project, Ex. ·11. 
The expansion in scope of the project and the negotiations over the·contractual language 
related to changes led Ms. Kahn to conclude that the Trust needed one contract covering all 
phases of the project in order to determine whether ''Work" was· covered by the fixed builder's 
fee of 6.3% or was a change in scope entitling SCI to 10%. However, because the project had 
expanded in scope, SCI needed to re-bid the project. To do that, SCI needed Lake/Flato to 
provide additional and more detailed construction documents. As Ms. Kahn wrote· to Mr. Grable 
on September 7, 2000; 
Ex.12. 
" ... The reason that concluding all construction documents for all 
buildings has become so essential is that how can the Owner 
monitor what constitutes a change that would justify increasing the 
Contractor's fee if the Contractor never saw details of portions of 
the project when it submitted its bid and the owner didn't review 
nor approve the materials anticipated to be used by the Contractor 
in the first place? The last thing we want is for the prajectto bog 
down, now that you've all been so committed; But the Owner 
WlLL NOT sign the Contractor's Agreement without a Giiaranteed 
Maximum Cost for the project and the contractor's fee. · This 
cannot happen without a complete set of construction docs. I 
realize that Storey has provided the $5 .3 million and change 
number as such, but there is no ability to evaluate 'Changes'. This 
isn't about trust; it's. about entering into a meaningful 
understanding." 
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Over the nexftwomonths;Lake/Flato revisedthe constrnclfon docilments. On October 
27, 2000, Lake/Flato provided SCI with the revised plans. SCI then presented the architect and 
the Trust with a new bid package for the project Mr. On November l, 2000, Grable explained 
the reason forthis "pricing exercise" as follows: 
''The objective of the pricing exercise (to date) is to provide a cost 
by the Contractor.thatwould be based on the most 
current/complete information available so that the Owner and 
Contractor can enter into a 'meaningful agreement'. We are now 
ready to enter into a full AfA Owner/Contractor Agreement 
Contract and. can use the pricing package material as attachments 
to this agreement if all are in agreement" 
Ex. 13 at SVT 00285. 
SCI's bid package consisted of a spreadsheet thatwould be attached as an exhibit to the 
contract. It would define the initial scope of the work and provide the guaranteed maximum 
price. Although within the initial scope of work, a number of contemplated structures (and other 
items) on the Church Camp Il project were not completely designed and had not been bid. As a 
result, the bid package provided allowances for those items, including (l) ''HV AC, add AJC," (2) 
landscaping, (3) tennis court and cabana,(4) guest house 1, (5) guest house 2, (6) caretaker and 
carport, (7) "stereo, phone, TV security," and (8) "perimeter fence/entry gate." Ex.14 at p. 9 or 
10. 
The parties continued to discuss the scope of the work, the guaranteed maximum price 
and the change order language over the next two months. lake Flato continued to refine the 
plans. SCI continued to refine the budget. 
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But the contract was still not sjgned, and the Trust was concerned because construction 
had already begun. On January 18, 2001, the Trust's representative, Steve Campeas, sent a letter 
to David Lister at SCI, as follows: 
" ... We have advised the owner, who agrees, that no work {other 
than what has previously been authorized) will be approved until 
the following issues have been resolved: [,0 1. There is a signed 
construction contract between,Storey Construction, Inc. and Lily 
Reeves, Trustee of.the Sim Valley Trust for construction of the 
entire scope of the work. [,0 2, This will require that the plans 
and budgets are complete with respect to the guest houses and the 
other structures on the property and the budget for each of these 
other structures is signed offby the owner." 
Ex. 15; On January 22, 2001, Ms. Kahn also wrote to Mr. Lawson, urging SCI to complete the 
contract, and adding: 
" .•. The contract will not include in its scope either the so-called 
Kozinski Cabin nor the pool terrace and pool. It will inclu.de the 
bridge and other structures and improvements ( e.g., tennis court 
and cabana) at the new cost for the same. You will need to connnit 
to providing a Guaranteed Maximum Cost to the Owner for the 
caretaker's cabin and the guest houses within 30 days after . 
Construction Documents are delivered to you from Lake/Flato .... 
[ti Lake/Flato is separately agreeing with the Owner to deliver 
these completed Documents to you by February 28, 2001. We. 
don't want the job impeded but are not comfortable authorizing 
new work to begin without a written contract" 
Ex. 16. In sum, the issues to be decided were (I) which of the contemplated structures would be 
included in the initial scope of the work and, (2),with respect to those structrrres, whether SCI 
would provide a fixed bid governed by the initial guaranteed maximum price or an allowance to 
be altered by subsequent change order. 
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On January 23, 200i, Ms. Kahn sent a redlined version of the contract to Mr. Lawson. 
Ms. Kahn refined the Change in Work provision in paragraph 7 of the Addendum to provide that 
SCI would receive a 10% fee on a change that entailed "an expansion, other than an insignificant 
one, of the Scope of the Work," and added that SCI would not be entitled to this 10% fee ifthe 
change was "relatively insignificant given the overall scope of the Work." Ex. 17 at SVT 00660 •. 
She also added language confirming that SCI would be bound by the change orders it signed. Id. 
On January 29, 2001, Mr. Lawson provided comments to Ms.Kahn's January 23, 2001 
draft. Although the parties contemplated that a pool and pool terrace would be constructed on 
the project, Mr. Lawson did not want it included in the original scope of Work. 
" ... Albeit, Storey is willing to be involved in the construction of 
the pool ... , that component of the project has not been drawn, 
scheduled or priced at this point in time." 
Ex. 18 atSVT 00632. Mr. Lawson asked that the contract be revised to reflect that the plans for 
- the guest houses and caretaker's house. were not final and that they, therefore, should be listed as 
allowances, and he insisted that SCI have the right to require the architect to modify the plans for 
those items, if necessary, so that they could be constructed for the allowed amount. Id. 
He also asked that the substantial completion date be extended. During the pre-contract 
construction, a problem was encountered with the bridge providing access to the property from 
the road. It took months to resolve that issue. The construction had been significantly delayed as 
a result. For that reason, SCI wanted a new substantial completion date. As Mr. Lawson wrote: 
"Iu addition, it is my understanding that completion of the main house (originally phase 2) will 
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not occur until sometime near the end of 2001. Accordingly, the completion dates need to be 
changed." Id. 
On February 1, 2001, Ms. Kahn responded to Mr. Lawson's request for anew completion 
dates as follows: . 
"Referencing your fux ofJanuary 29, I agree with your note of 
changes that will be needed to Article 1, 4 [Substantial · 
Completion] and 5. Please prepare such revisions with Gary · 
Storey. Gazyis.the best.persontC> describe what phases have 
occurred, which have peen approved and the remaining scope of 
work;the schedule for each.phase and the balance o{the Work; 
and the budget for the Work." 
Ex. 19 at SVT 00624-25 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Lawson agreed to provide the budget and schedule for the project, and continued to 
insist that the guaranteed maximum price be limited to work for which SCI had already received 
adequate plans, and that the other contemplated items be addressed through allowances and 
changes. For example, on February 1, 2001, Mr. Lawson wrote as follows: 
"Storey has a budget, description of the phasing, and a schedule .for 
completion of the entire project. These. will be delivered under a 
separate cover. The proposed change to paragraph 5.2.1/l{e) is 
acceptable if the reference to the pool is deleted and provided we 
are referencing the plans dated 10/27 /00 by Lake/Flato. Otherwise, 
the construction documents must be Contractor approved in order 
to be able to obtain the price assurance." 
Id. at SVT 000624. 
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Mr. Lawson also suggested that the Paymei;tt Application procedure language be changed 
to read as follows: 
". . . 'An application for Payment shall be approved for all Work 
performed in accordance with the Contract Documents. Except as 
otherwise provided herein, an Application for Payment which 
exceeds the budg!)t shall be submitted as a. Change in accordance 
with Paragraph 7 ·of the Addendum."' 
Id. On February 13, 2001, Ms. Kahn.rejected this suggestion as follows: 
" ••• ['!I} I do not agree to the changes that you have suggestedfor 
12.13. An Application for Payment should never. be the first time 
the client is informed about a Change Order since no work is 
authorized in excess of the budget or outside the Contract 
Documents without written approval of the Owner, Architect and 
Contractor." 
Ex. 20 (emphasis added). In short, Ms. Kalm insisted that SCI obtain approval for a change 
before seeking to recover the costs associated with that change. 
By late February 2001, the parties had come to agreement on the final language of the 
contract and the exbi\>its to tµe contract. In early March 2001, the contract was signed. 
By the time the Church Camp 11 project was complete, the work on the project had. been 
divided into 21 different phases as follows: 
Phase 1 
Phase2 
Phase3 
Phase4 
Phase 5 
Phase6 
Phase7 
Phase 8 
3432100002-1368858.3 
Site Work 
Trees and bridge 
Deep dig 
Underground utilities 
Concrete and Steel 
The main house 
Landscaping 
Entry Gate 
16 
i 
' .. 
Phase9 
Phase 10 
Phase 11 
Phasel.2 
Phase 13 
Phasel4 
Phase15 
Phase 16 
Phase 17 
Phase 18 
Phase 19 
Phase20 
Phase21 
Tennis. Court 
Guestholll!.eNo. 1 
Guest houseNo; 2 
Caretaker's residence 
Underground powerline. 
Pool Cabana · 
Water and Sewer. for Guest Houses and Caretaker's residence 
Carports 
W atei line to tennis court 
Playhouse cabin (never built) 
Pool&Spa 
Not used 
Infrastructure 
At the time the contract was signed, work had begun on the first 5 phases of work. Ex. 9, 
Exhibit 4 thereto. Each of the other phases involved work that had been discussed by the 
parties before the contract was signed. Indeed, most of these items had already been included as 
allowances in the contract itseli Id., Exhibit 2 thereto at page 12 of 12. As noted above, the 
other items, such as the pool and the playhouse cabin, had been raised as items that might be 
constructed on the property before the contract was signed. Accordingly, all of the final 
categories of work on the project were expressly contemplated by the parties before the contract 
was signed. 
The contract negotiations establish the following: 
• First, the parties spent 9 months reaching agreement on the scope of work 
and the guaranteed maximum price. SCI insisted that the plans be redone 
and refined for this purpose. 
• Second; SCI knew there could be significant changes, for which it would receive a 
higher fee. The changes could include both the allowance items identified in' the 
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contract and the other it!llilS that had been discussed, but for which no· allowance · 
· Was provided, including the pool and the Kozinski Cabin. 
'Third, SCI was wel1°aware of the provision addressing changes in work. That 
provision was included in a separately-drafted addendmn to the contract. It was 
reviewed and commented on by SCI's lawyer. It was revised again, .and reviewed 
again. Some ofMr. Lawson's suggested changes were included, some were not. 
Accordingly, SCI knew (1) that no change would be effective without owner 
approval of the price and the effect, if any, the change would hav(l on the 
schedule, (2) that it was to provide that information to the owner before 
. implementing the change and (3) that once the change was approved, it would 
result in a modification of the.contract binding all parties, including SCI. 
The final contract language confinns each of the above points. 
C. The Contract Provisions 
The contract was fully integrated and could be modified only by an agreement in writing 
signed by both parties. Ex. 9, Addendum 118(g). Among its relevant provisions are the 
following: 
The Guaranteed.Maxiniuin Price: The contract is a guaranteed ma:ximmn price 
contract. The guaranteed maximum price was $6.4 million. Ex. 9 'If 5.2.l. That included $1.2 
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carports, landscaping and.other items; Id., Exhibit 2 to the Contract at p: 12 .of 12 .• The mitial 
scope of work did not include the other potential changes that had been discussed prior to the 
execution ofthe contract, such as the pool and Kozinski Cabin. SCI expressly represented as 
follows: 
"Afterhaving reviewed the Construction Documents listed in 
Rider 15.1.5, Contractor con:finns that the Cost of the Work will 
not exceed the Guaranteed Maximum Price. . . . Co~ which 
would cause the Guaranteed.Maximum Price to be exceeded shall 
be paid by the Contractor without reimbursement by the Owner.". 
Id., 'If 5.2.1 ( emphasis added). SCI also agreed that "[t}o the extent that the Drawings and 
Specifications are anticipated to require further development by the Architect; the Contractor has 
provided in the Guaranteed Maximum Price.for such further development consistent with the 
Contract Documents and reasonably inferable therefrom through the date of this Agreement." 
Id., 'If 5.2.6. 
SCI's Fee: SCI was to receive a fixed builder's fee of $399,956.74, or 6.25% of the 
budgeted cost ofconstructioa EL 9 ,r 5.1.2. In addition, buiUinto the budget for the main 
house was a 1 % fee for liability insurance and a 2% fee for overhead; Id,. Exhibit 2 at p. 11 · of 
12. These fees together with the actual budgeted costs of construction and the allowances 
constituted the total guaranteed maximum price. Id. at p. 12 of 12. 
Changes: SCI.was not entitled to recover costs incurred above the guaranteed maximum 
price unless included in change orders. Ex. 9 'If 8.1.8. If the owner or architect requested a 
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changeto the scope of the work, SCI was to prepare a written change order providing (1) a cost 
or reduction of cost for each change and (2)indicating any extension or reduction of the 
Substantial CompletionDate. Id.,Addelidum 1[ 7. No change was authorized unless executed 
by the Trust, Wilson or Hanks prior to implementation of the change. Id. SCI was to receive no 
additional fee for changes that resulted in an insignificant expansion in the scope of the Work. 
SCI was to receive a fee of 10% on changes that resulted in a not insignificant expansion in the 
scope of the Work, a60%higher fee than the fee for work within the initial guaranteed 
maximum price. Id. A payment application was not supposed to be used to notify the Trust of a 
change. Rather, SCI was required to obtain approval for changes before seeking to recover costs 
associated with the change,. Id., '!l 12.1.3, General Conditions ("GC")19.3.1.1. Once signed, 
a change order effectuated a !I!Odi:fication to the contract, binding all parties including SCI. Id., 
Addendum '!l 7. 
Allowances: · With respect to most of the allowance items, SCI was entitled to request . 
and require a change in the plans if the items could not be built for the allowed cost. Ex. 9, 
Addendum 1 ·7. SCI had to seek any increase or decrease in the cost of the allowance item( s) 
through a written.change o.rder. Id., GC ,T 5.2.4 and ,f 3.8.2.3. But "inno event" was SCI's fee 
to "be increased or decreased with resp,;;ct to 'these line items as described in the referenced Plans 
regardless of the amountofWork for those items." Id.., 'lf 5.2.4 ( emphasis added). 
SubstantialCompletion: The substantial completion date was March 28, 2001. Ex. 9, 
'I/ 4.3. Substantial compietion was defined as the stage by which all certificates of occupancy and 
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peilnits have beenissued and the wo:rk: was sufficiently complete so that the owner could occupy 
the work for its intended use (kb GC 19.8.1) and as when "the Projectis free of all mechanic's 
liens; and all final and unconditional mechanic's lien releases have been delivered by Contractor 
to Owner with the exception ofreleases :from those subcontractors still working on the Project." 
Id., Addendum. 'I 6. At the substantial completion of construction and as a "condition to 
Contractor's receipt of its final payment," SCI was ''required" to deliver record drawings to the 
Architect and Owner, "redmarked" to show in"field changes. Id., Addendum 11(c). The time 
limits in the contract were ~'of the essence." Id., GC 18.2.1, Addendum 118(a). By ex-ecuting 
the contract, SCI confirmed that the contract time provided was a reasonable period for 
perfoilning the work. Id,, GC 11 8.1.1 and 8.2.1. SCI was solely respo11S1'ble for construction 
means,.methods, techniques, sequences and procedures for performance of the work. Id., GC1 
3.3.1. It was also responsible for preparing the construction schedule. Id., GC 1 3.10.1. If SCI 
believed that a change in the work would result in an· extension of the. substantial completion 
date,. it was required to include that information in the change. order. Id., Addendum 1 7. 
Sobcontracton and Retainage: SCI was required to pay all subconfractors and to 
prevent the recording of liens on the property. Ex. 9, Addendum 12(a) and GC 1 9.6,2. If any 
liens were recorded, SCI was required to remove the liens. Id. IfSCI failed to perform tltis 
obligation, the Trust was entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
connection therewith. Id. Moreover, SCI's applications for payment w,;:re not to "include 
requests for payment for portions of the Work for which the Contractor does not inter,d to pay a 
Subcontractor or material supplier, unless the Work has been performed by others whom the 
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Contractor intends to pay," Id., GC 'If 9,3.1.2. Except with the Trust's prior approval, 
payments to subcontractors were subjectto retainage ofnot less than 10%. Id., 'll'lf 12.1. 7.3 and 
12.1.8, 3ee also GC '119.6.2. 
Limitations on Claims for Extra Costs or Time: If SCI wished to assert a claim for an 
increase in the guaranteed maximum price, it was required to submit a written claim to 
) · Lake/Flato within21 days after it recognized the condition giving rise to the claim and before 
) 
.) 
proceeding to execute the work. Ex. 9, GC 'll'lf 4.3.2 and 4.3.5. In addition, if SCI wished to 
seek an increase in contract time beyond the substantial completion date, it was required to 
submit a written claim to Lake/Flato estimating the cost and probable effect of delay on the 
. progress of the work within 21 days of recognizing the condition giving rise to the need for more 
time. Id., GC '11'114.3.7.1 and 4.3.2.Y An initial decision by LakefF!ato (as to schedule or 
.· payment)was "required as a condition precedent to ... arbitration or litigation of all Claims 
between the Contractor and Owner arising prior to the date final payment is due; unless 30 days 
have passed after the Claim has been referred to the Architect with no decision having been 
rendered bythe Architect." Id., ,i 4.4.1. 
Coniidentiality: SCI was required to bring any and all claims it had against the owner 
in an arbitration. Ex. 9, GC 'I! 4.6.1, Addendum 'If 18(c). Any such arbitration could also 
§! JfSCI believed that additional cost or time was involved becanse of clarification 
or instructions issued by Lake!Flato· in response to SCI' s notices or requests for information, SCI 
was required to make a Claim for sttch additional cost or time within 21 days after it recognized 
the condition giving rise to the claim. Ex. 9, GC 'll'lf 3.2.3, 4.3.6, 4.3.7 and 4.3.2. 
3432100002-13finB5as 22 
·.· i 
) 
) 
) 
include "additional persons or entities not a party to this Agreement upon written request of 
either Owner or Contractor." Id., Addendum 'lf 18(c).ZI The parties were required to "avoid 
public disclosure ofthe arbitration, except as needed to pursue the arbitration" and "neither party 
shall mention the names of the beneficial owners of the other party in their capacity as owner 
except as expressly ordered by the arbitrator." Id. Moreover, SCI was not pennitted to 
. photograph, show, display or discuss with parties "other than as required to perform the Work," 
any materials related to the Project, the Trust, Wilson or Hanks, or the Property itself. None of 
SCl's files, plans or written materials were to refer fo the trustee, Wtlson or Hanks, nor were they 
to identify the project address, unless approved in writing by the Trust or required by government 
agency. Id., Addendum 'ff 20. 
D. The Hiring of the McGregor Company 
Wilson had no experience with tbistype of project and, given.its magnitude, felt 
overwhelmed by the amount of work involved. By late summer 2001, there were also substantial 
changes being discussed that would potentially impact the project's budget and schedule. Wilson 
. a 
was concerned that the project had "bogged down" and was "out of control." For thatreason, she 
decided to hire a professional construction manag~ent firm to advise her and the Trust 
concerning the construction of the project. Wilson Depo. 55:19-56:9. 
ZI This provision was designed to ensure that any claim filed against Wilson or 
Hanks in connection with the project would also be resolved in arbitration, despite the fact that 
they were not parties to the contract 
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The McGregor Company asked for a meeting of all project participants for the week-of 
September 10, 2001, to discuss all material issues relating to the project, with particular emphasis 
on the budget and schedule. Ex. 21. David Lake prepared a construction completion budget for 
the meeting,, which showed approximately $2 million in approved, pending or potential changes 
from the original $6.4 million guaranteed maximum price under the contract. The vast majority 
of these changes related to the allowance items in the contract. Ex. 22. 
The meeting took place at the site on September 20, 2001. There is no dispute what 
occurred because David Lister for SCI and Chuck Cowley for the McGregor Company both took 
notes that are consistent with each other. Exs. 23, 24. At this meeting,, the parties agreed that the 
substantial completion date would be moved from - March 28, 2001 to May 27, 2001 (Memorial 
Day weekend). Ex. 21 at SVT 01276 and Ex. 23 at p. 1 of 5. They agreed to hold weekly 
_ meetings to discuss the status of all material issues on the project, and to create and distribute to 
all partiesdetailed"minutes" of those meetings, Ex. 23 at p. 3 of5; Ex. 24 at SVT 01255.-11 
They discussed the current guaranteed maximum under the contract and the changes that were 
then contemplated. Id. Chuck Cowley's notes reflect that two of the items to complete "in next 
) _ few days" were to " [b Jreak construction contract original guaranteed maximum amount into the 
Y Beginning on September 20, 200 I and continuing every week thereafter, the 
parties held weekly meetings in personcand/or over the phone to discuss every pending, material 
issue related to the project. The McGregor Company's Chuck Cowley prepared minutes of those 
meetings each week and distributed to all participants on the project. The minutes -for each 
meeting also include the minutes from the prior three meetings, so that one can see on any given 
week what was discussed in the prior meetings. See e.g.,. Exs. 54, 55, 56. 
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twenty one project budget line items [Le.; thephases]"and "npcfate guaranteed maximum amount 
per change orders signed to date." Ex. 24 at SVT 01259. 
During this September 20, 2001 meeting, the parties also agreed to set up a step-by-step 
process to track all potential changes to the work. Exs. 23 and 24. First, upon the suggestion of 
a change in the work by the owner, architect or contractor, a "Change Estimate Initiation Form" 
) · ("CEJF") would be created to track the status of the change from initial conception and estimate 
through design, pricing and final approval ( or disapproval). Those CEIFs would be listed in a 
} 
) 
·--.-, 
computer sprea.dsheet called the "CC2 Change Estimate/Change Order Matrix" (the "CEIF 
Matrix"), so that each party. could see on any given day the status of every potential change. See 
e •. g., Ex. 25. If the change contemplated in the. CEIF was approved, it was placed into a formal 
change order which resnlted in an increase in the guaranteed maximum price under .the contract. 
Second, the J?arties agreed to track the then-cnrrent guaranteed maximum price by phase 
on another spreadsheet (the "Guaranteed Maximum Spreadsheet''), showing (1) the phase 
number (1-21 ), (2) the phase description (main house, landscaping, guest one, etc.), (3) the 
original contract sum for that phase, referred to as "allowance". in the spreadsheet, ( 4) the "set'' 
builder's fee, ( 5) the total original allowance (i.e., tlre original guaranteed maximum price 
including the builder's fee), (6) the approved change orders, (7) the current guaranteed maximum 
price, (8) the pending change orders and (9) the pending totiil. See e. g., Ex; 26 {December 5, 
2001 Guaranteed Maximum Spreadsheet]. The numbers in the approved change order and 
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pending change order column came from the CEIF Matrix. Ex. 26; C. Lister Depo. at 72:1.1-
74:3. 
The parties followed this process from the time it was implemented in the.Fall of2001 
through the completion of construction in the summer of2002 to track over two hundred 
individual changes, from as small as a few hundred dollars to as high as hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. See e.g., Exs. 25, 27, 28, 29; D. Lister Depo. at 152:24, 153:18; C. Lister Depo. at 
48:11, 49:12-18, 54:4-8. SCI's Rich Brownson, with help from Carolyn Lister, David.Lister and 
others at SCI, would create the CEIFs and.the CEIF Matrices. D. Lister Depo. at90:12-13, 91:5, 
142:19-143:3, 149:12-22, 154:7-15; C.Lister Depo. at 70:23-71:2, 80:15-17. SCI's Carolyn 
Lister would enter the mnnbers into the Guaranteed Maximum Price Spreadsheet every month. 
C. Lister Depo. 43:18-44:15, 47:24-49:4, 80:15-17. The history of each change was 
documented in the CEIFs and change orders, showing the initial price estimate and whether that · 
estimate increased or decreased and, if so, why. Ex. 26A. The total of the CEIFs and change 
orders were tracked on the CEIF Matrix. See e.g.;Exs. 25, 27. The current guaranteed 
maximum price was tracked on the Guaranteed Maximum Price Spreadsheets. See e.g., Exs. 26, 
30,31, 32. 
The purpose of the process was to provide the Trust and the McGregor Company with up-
to-date information concerning the.status of(l) any and all contemplated changes, from initial 
inception to final approval, and (2) the impact those changes were having on the guaranteed 
maximum price. The process worked. 
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E. The Payment Awlieations 
SCI billed Respondents by submitting applications for payment on each phase of the 
project each month. Ex. 9, ,r 12.1.2. The first page of the payment application for any given 
phase shows the "original contract sum," the "net change by Change Orders" and the "contract 
smn to date." See e.g., Ex. 33. The contract sum to date is the then-current guaranteed 
maximum price under the contract for the phase covered by the particular application for 
payment. The second page of the payment application, called a "continuation sheet," describes · 
the work for each phase by divisions, such as concrete, masonry, metals, woods and plastics, etc. 
It shows the scheduled value for that work, which is the then-current guaranteed maximum 
amount distn'buted across.the various divisions of work. It shows the "work completed and 
stored to date," which are the costs SCI has incurred to date on each particular division,of each 
particular phase. It then shows that number as a percentage of the "scheduled value" ~d a 
"balance to :fil)ish," which is the difference between the scheduled value and what SCI has 
incurred to date. Finally, it shows the retainage withheld. 
SCI submitted these applications for payment each month to Lake/Flato. Lake/Flato 
would review, and then send them to Steve Campeas, the Trust's business manager and·the 
"owner's representative" under the contract, and later to Chuck Cowley at the McGregor 
Company to review on the Trust's behalf Korte Depo. 41 :5-20. Messrs. Campeas and Cowley 
would then review the payment applications to detennine whether the sums being sought were 
appropriate. As the following examples show, the payment application review process, like the 
34321000024368858.3 27 
) 
c· 
· change order and guaranteedtrirutimum price tracking process, continued every month 
throughout the construction. 
1. When SCI Tried to Increase the "Original Contract Sum" on the 
Tennis Court Without a Change Order, Mr. Campeas Objected. 
In July 2001, SCI submitted two applications for payment on phase 9, the tennis court . 
. 
Exs. 34 and 35. The way the owner's representative reacted to those applications for payment 
illustrates three important points: (1) SCI knew that significant changes were occurring on the 
· project :from the very beginning, (2) SCI knew that those changes were to be handled through 
change orders and (3) SCI was not supposed to reflect an increase in the guaranteed maximum 
.<·'··\ price in the payment applications until the change order was approved . 
. I 
. ,/ 
) 
The allowance for the tennis court in the contract was $140,000. On July 2, 2001, SCI 
submitted a payment application on phase 9, the tennis court. Ex. 34. That application showed 
that the "original contract sum" for phase 9 was $190,931.64,not $140,000. On July 31, 2001, 
SCI submitted another payment appli¢ation for phase 9, showing the "original contract sum" as 
$225,495. Ex. 35. As noted above, the contract provided that allowances were to be adjusted by 
change order only. Ex. 9, GC 15.2A and 4J 3.8.2.3. Since SCI had not submitted any change 
order related to the tennis court, Steve Campeas questioned the payment applications' references 
to an "original contract sum" that was higher than. the allowance provided in the contract. On 
August 3, 2001, Mr. Campeas wrote to David Lister, as follows:· 
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"Phase 9 - I thought that any new phases, in this.instance the tennis 
' 
court, were going.to .be dealt with m a change order of sorts and 
signed off on. Was there one developed for this? Also, the 
previous contract_sumwas $190,931.64. Now it is $225,495.00. 
Any thoughts onthis?" 
Ex. 36. SCI then submitted change order no. 8 to increase the tennis court budget 64%, from the 
original allowance of$140,000 to $230,058.25. Respondents desired this change, so they signed 
the change order on September 20, 2001. E:x. 37.21 
2. When SCI Began to Exceed Scheduled Values and Prematurely 
Reduced Retainage on the Main House, the McGregor Compan:r 
Objected. 
In January 2002, Lake/Flato reviewed SCI's December 2001 application for payment on 
phase 6, the main house. Brain Korte noticed that SCI had exceeded the schedule of values for 
two divisions, concrete and metals. The "scheduled value" for concrete was $376,225.66, but the 
amount "completed and stored to date" was $394,898.21. Similarly, the schedule value for 
metals was $178,864.00, and the amount completed and stored to date was $186,214A2. Messrs. 
Korte and Cowley "had numerous 1:onversations with Gary Storey about the categories in which 
21 And the October I, payment application No. 63 for Phase 9 reflects, correctly, an_ 
original contract sum of $140,000, net change by Change Order of $90,058.24; for a contract sum 
to date of $230,058.24. Ex. 38. 
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they have gone over the scheduled value;" Ex. 39. In those conversations, Mr; Storey infonned 
Messrs, Korte and Cowley that "per his contract, these categories are allowed to be over and that 
other categories that end up with unused ammmts or a surplus can cover the overruns." Id. 
Given that SCI was, at that time, no where near exceeding the overall scheduled value for Phase 
6, Messrs. Korte and Cowley initially accepted Mr. SCI' s explanation at face value, But they 
continued to watch this issue. 
In February 2002, Lake/Flato and the McGregor CompanyreceivedSCI's January 2002 
payment application for phase 6. This time SCI was over the scheduled values for three 
divisions. However, as the total over was only $40,786.68 and SCI still showed over $1.2 
million left in the budget on the phase overall, Messrs. Korte and Cowley continued to accept 
Mr. Storey's representation that SCI was permitted to and·would offset these budget overruns 
· through savings <'mother line items. 
In March 2002, Lake/Flato and the McGregor Company received SCI's February 2002 
payment application for phase 6. Ex. 40. In addition to exceeding the scheduled values for four 
divisions, in a total amount of $60,054.90, SCI had also improperly reduced retainage to only 
3.78% of the total completed and stored to date. Exs. 40 and 41. Objecting to this reduction in 
retainage, Respondents withheld $78,000 from their March 2002 payment. In a letter dated 
March 6, 2002, Cowley questioned SCI's Chief Financial Officer, Carloyn Lister as follows: 
'The payment application continuation sheet, the Job Cost Billing 
Detail Report and the Phase 6 summary all show work completed 
this period of$477,658.36. As such, why does the current payment 
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seek payment of $55.6,544,82. It appears as thoughSClis seeking 
to draw down on $78,886.46 of retrunage. Please explain why this 
is appropriate.~' 
Ex. 42 at p. 2. In sum, SCI had unilaterally reduced the retainage without first complying with 
its obligation under the contract to obtain final lien releases from the subconstractors whose 
retainage was being released. fudeed, in Ms; Lister's March 13, 2002 reply to Mr. Cowley, she 
explained that SCI was still in the process of obtaining final releases from some subcontractors. 
Ex. 43 • .!Q/ 
3. When SCI's Costs Began to Exceed the Projected Guaran.teed 
Maximum Price on the Main House Overall, the Trust Objected and 
Withheld Payment . 
. In the April 2002 payment application, SCI' s costs exceeded the scheduled value on the 
main house overall._ This. was of obvious concern to Messrs. Korte and Cowley, and they both 
spoke with Gary Storey about it. Mr, Storey again said that he had the right to offset cost 
overruns on the main house with savings realized from other line items. He also said that his 
cost overruns would be offset by the then-pending change orders. Ex. 45. He assured Messrs. 
Korte and Cowley that the savings realized :from these other budget items and the change orders 
would fully cover his cost overruns on the main house. Id. He also :recaffinned that if the cost 
overruns were not made up by savings from other items and the change orders, he would be 
JS!! Once SCI obtained those final releases, Respondents allowed the reduction in 
retainage, which was reflected in a $78,000 higher payment on the April 2002 application. Ex. 
44. 
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responsible for those costs. McGregor Depo. 184:21~186:5, Jn reliance upon these 
representations, the McGregor Company recommended the April application for payment, and it 
was paid in full. 
Butthe McGregor Company did not leave it at that. Mr, Cowley performed another 
calculation in handwriting on his May 7, 2002 Ietter to Mr. Campeas recommending the April 
payment applications for payment Ex: 46. He reviewed the CEIF Matrix to determine the total 
amount of change orders and CEIFs in the system. He then added that mnnber to the original 
guaranteed maximum price in the contract to see what the "total proj'' guaranteed maximum 
price would be as of April 30, 2002 if all change orders and CEi:Fs were included. That mnnber · 
was $9,419,340.88. Id. Cowley wanted to ensure that the Trust did not end up paying more than 
the projected guaranteed maximum price. Unfortunately, however, that soon meant withholding 
money. 
The May and June applications for payment showed even greater cost overruns on the . 
main house. Moreover, the amounts sought in the May and June payment applications for phase 
6, would have brought the total payments to date above the guaranteed maximum price even as 
increased by all projected change orders.lY Since SCl's costs were now exceeding even the 
projected guaranteed maximum price, the Trust started withholding payment from the phase 6 
. . 
lY Mr. Cowley's handwritten calculations can be seen on his June 12, 2002 and.July 
8, 2002 letters to Mr. Campeas. Exs. 47, 48. 
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. applications forpayment. It withheld $105,000 from the May application and$150,000 :from.the 
June application • .!Y Exs. 47, 48. 
At that point, SCI's lawyer, Mr. Stanislaw, became involved again. (He had previously 
given SCI advice concerning the contract). On June 5, 2002, SCI had submitted change order 
nos. 27, 28 and 29. But the amounts sought in these change orders greatly exceeded the amounts 
;;;, · SCI had previously represented for these changes.ll' The Trust refused to approve the new 
) 
) 
.. 7) 
) 
"change" orders. That fact, combined with the $100,000 and $150\000redtictions in payments 
on the May and June 2002 payment applications eaused SCI to demand a conference call among 
Gary Storey, Mr. Stanislaw ·and Bill McGregor. 
Toe conference call took place on July 17, 2002; The discussion is confirmed in a letter 
from Mr. McGregor to Mr. Storey dated July 18, 2002. In that letter, Mr. McGregor explains 
why the Trust refused to approve change order Nos. 27, 28 and 29 and withhe,Jd money from the 
May and June payment applications. 
''Regarding the processing and approval of Change Orders 
No. 27, 28 and 29, as we discussed onthaUater conversation, we 
would be willing to immediately process these three Change 
W This was actually generous. Respondents paid SCI all the way up to the projected 
guaranteed maximum price, which included all contemplated change orders listed on the CEJF 
Matrix. Exs. 47~ 48. 
nt For example, the amoU)lt budgeted in December 2001 for change order no. 27 
(interior adds and revisions) was $79',193. On March 18, 2002, SCI submitted a change order 
bringing the budget for this item to$107,000, including its fee. But then SCI sought to increase. 
this amount dramatically, submitting new change orders on April 29 and again on June 6th, · 
increasing the budget to $144,000 and then to $183,000,.notincluding its fee. Ex.49. 
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Ex. 50. 
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Orders in the amounts which we had expected them to be per our 
Change Estimate Initiation Form process .... ['[] We are unable to 
recommend for approval the total amount of these Change Orders 
at this time because, among other reasons, they greatly exceed the 
Storey Construction original estimates .... 
Regarding status of payment, our records reflect that to date 
Storey Construction has been paid a total of $5,866,756.48 for 
Phase 6 work. While this does not include approximately 
$250,000 that was applied for in Storey Construction's two most 
recent pay applications (No. 139 dated May 31, 2002, and No. 145 
dated June 30, 2002), it is nevertheless more than $900,000.00 
grel\ter than the contract requires to have been paid for Phase 6 
work to date. This benefit to Storey Construction is due to the fact 
that we have been willing to advanci: funds considerably in excess 
of signed Change Orders based upon the Change Estimate 
Initiation Form Log which anticipates future Change Orders of 
which the owner is aware, If all pending Change Estimates for 
Phase 6 were approved by the owner the final contract sum [for 
Phase 6Jwouldbe approximately$6,100,000.00. Our willingness 
to have made payments in the current amount and given the current 
stage of construction is more than generous, particularly given the 
fact that Storey Construction has not yet submitted Change Orders 
for many of the Change Estimates which are currently in the log." 
Mr. McGregor never received any response to his letter. 
By this time, SCI had exceeded the overall budget for at least five of the. phases -~ Phases 
6, 7, 16, 19 and 21, and it looked like SCI might exceed the projected guaranteed maximum price 
for the project as a whole. The Trust could not justify allocating any further payments to 
particular phases of the work, because so many phases were over budget. However, it wanted to 
pay SCI as. much as it could justify under the guaranteed maximum price contract so that SCI 
would complete the work and so that SCI's subcontractors would be paid. 
3432100002-1368858.3 34 
) 
) 
The McGregor Company calculated the projected guaranteed maximum price for the 
entire project,. including all approved CEIFs and change orders, to determine how much the Trust 
could pay SCI. As Mr. Cowley's notes reflect, the projected guaranteed maximum price in July. 
2002 was $10,285,892.86. Ex. 48. The amomrt paid through mid-July was $9,140;758.26 . 
. Therefore, the Trust made two payments allocated to the project as a whole based on the 
projected guaranteed maximum price as reflectedin the CEIF Matrix. On July 24, 2002, it paid 
SCI $250,000. On August 1, 2002, it paid SCI $700,000. These payments brought the total paid 
as ofAugnst 1, 2002 to approximately $10.1 million. Thereafter, in September, October and 
December, the Trust made additional payments by two-party check to SCI andSCI's 
subcontractors in the total amount of $362,073.47, bringing the total paid to SCI as of the end.of 
2002 to $10,452,831.73, which was $42,000 over the .final guaranteed maximum price of 
$10,408,147.56. 
F. The Completion of Construction 
As Memorial Day, 2002 approached, it became apparent that SCI was not going to 
complete the project on time. SCI now claims that it was unable to.complete the project on time 
because of owner-initiated changes. However, SCI never once sought more time as required 
3432100002-1368858.3 35 
) 
( r 
' 
under the contract.HI SCI never sought an extension of time in any change order, nor did it ever 
submit a claim for more time to Lake/Flato. 
Instead, SCI waited nntil it became umnistakably apparent to everyone that construction 
would not be complete on time to then inform the parties of the obyious, at which time it 
announced that further changes to the project would cause some unS,Pecified amountof additional 
delay.YI Respondents, Lake/F1ato and the McGregor Company would then ask Mr. Storey for a 
date by which SCI could complete the_ project, and he would provide them with a new date. 
This pattern repeated itself throughout the Spring arid early Summer of 2002. After 
stating that he would not be able to complete the project by Memorial Day, Gary Storey 
represented that SCI would complete the project by Jnne 4. Ex. 51 [2-26-02 Minutes]. Then, he 
said June 15 ffi!,), June 23 (Ex. 52, 06-06-02 Minutes), July 1 (Ex. 53, 06-25-02 Minutes), July 
12 (Ex. 54, 07-02-02 Minutes) and July 17, 2002 (Ex. 55, 07-16-02 Minutes). The weekly 
minutes demonstrate what occurred. Exs. 51-55. As each new date was missed, Respondents, 
the McGregor Company and Lake/Flato became mote and more frustrated. 
YI Even though the change order form themselves had a space for a description of 
how the change would effect the schedule, SCI never requested more time. Of course, when an 
owner is considering whether or not to approve a change, two issues are paramount: how the 
change will impact the price and how it.will impact the schedule. Only in these proceedings has 
SCI addressed the latter issue -- obviously far too late. 
11! Of course, everyone (including SCI) knew at all times what changes were behig 
contemplated, because they were shown on the CEIF Matrix. 
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Moreover,. Respondents could not inove in until their interior designer, Victoria Hagan, 
furnished the main house •. Ms. Hagan could not do that until SCI was finished. Ms. Hagan 
anticipated that she would need two to three weeks to furnish the house. The Trust kept 
scheduling Ms. Hagan's ''fit out'' of the house based upon Mr. Storey' s representations about 
when it would be finished. Each time Storey failed to meet a date, Victoria Hagan's schedule 
would need to be rearranged. 
As of May 29, 2002, Ms. Hagan was scheduled to arrive for fit out on June 10, 2002. Ex. 
56 (05-29-02 Minutes). Mr. Storey was told thatMs. Hagan'smoviugtruckswould be leaving 
New York for Sun Valley on June 6. Mr. Storey represented that the main house would be ready 
for Ms. Hagan and.the moving trucks on June 10. Id. But SCI again failed to meet this date; 
Unfortunately, he did not inform Ms. Hagan ( or anyone else) of that fact until June 6, 2002, after 
the moving trucks had already left. E:x:.-52 (06-06-02 Minutes). The moving trucks had to be re-
routed and the furniture stored in Los Angeles uhtH the main house was finally ready. Then, 
when Ms. Hagan arrived. at the property in July to install the furnishings, she found that the house 
was not complete. As a result, she could not :finish and had to make an9ther trip to do so. As a 
result of these delays, Respondents incurred over $25,000 of unnecessary expenses. Exs. 57. 
Finally, Respondents, the McGregor Company and Lake/Flato insisted that SCI complete 
the project. Wilson and Hanks moved.into the main house on July 18, 2003. (The other phases 
were finished thereafter.) 
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Months Mter Wilson, and Hanks Moved In.SCI Submitted $1.8 Million in 
New ~Change" Orders. 
In August 2002, after Wilson and Hanks and their family had move4 into the main house 
and as SCI was finishing up the other phases of the project, the McGregor Company started to 
see on the CEIF Matrix large numbers of 11ew CEIFs for"changes" that had never been approved 
or even discussed. SCI started submitting the CEIFs themselves in large groups on August 16, 
20, 22, etc, 2002. From completion of the main house in mid-July until thebeginriing of 
October 2002, SCisubmitted approximately $1.8 million in new CEIFs and change orders for the 
project. 
These "change" orders fell into four general categories. First, changes for $ 1.2 million 
were not changes at all. Instead, SCI simply sought "additional costs" for the amounts in excess 
of the previously approved budget for various items. E.g., Exs. 58, 59, 60. For example, 
CEIF/Change Order No. 237 was for "additional costs" to the Woods and Plastics division of the 
main house. These costs were not related to any change in scope. Rather, they were just the 
amount by which SCI' s costs exceedec!- the budget set forth in Exhibit 2 to the original contract. 
A,; SCI states in the change order itself: "The budget for Wood and Plastics [ ~ set forth in 
Exhibit 2 to the contract} has been exceeded by $364,782.73." Ex. 60 • .W None of these change 
orders were on the CEIF Matrix prior to move-in by Wilsou and Hanks on July 18, 2002. 
!ft The same is true of change order nos. 232-236, 238-239, and 273-296.1. They 
each seek a change in the guaranteed maximum price based solely on additional costs SCI says it 
incurred in excess of the previously agreed-upon budget for those items. 
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Indeed, the first of these CEIFs were not generated by SCI until more than a month later, August 
22, 2002. See e.g., Exs. 58, 59, 60. 
Second, SCI submitted changes for items that had already been approved in amounts that 
were $400,000 less than SCI was now seeking. In other words, these were not new items at all. 
They had previously been discussed and approved to proceed at a specific price. Then, after the 
work was complete,. and SClhad incurred costs grossly in excess of the approved amount, it 
submitted new change orders for the difference. For example, on May 28, 2002, SCI submitted a 
CEIF for move-in costs, which was approved in the amount of$54,000. Ex. 61. Then, after the 
move-in was complete, it submitted a change order seeking to increase the budget for this item 
by another $50,000. Id. When it cost SCI more than it said it would, SCI tried to hold the Trust 
liable for the difference, even though it had never even infonned the Trust of the additional costs 
before incurring them. 
. Third, SCI submitted changes for $264,000 for specific items that no one had ever 
discussed, let _alone approved and for punch list work. For ex31Ilj)le, change order no. 309 reads 
as follows: "Add the additional cost of Mike Nathan working on punch list items for the main 
house .... Total cost of the additional work is $1,942.15 ." Ex. 62. 
Fourth, SCI submitted changes for $8,300 for items that had been discussed but not 
approved. See e.g., Ex. 63. 
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The McGregor Company, in consultationwith Lake/Flato, reviewed each of these 
I ' "change orders" to determine whether there was anyjustification for the amount SCI sought, and 
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concluded that there was not. As Mr. Cowley wrote to Gary Storey on October 14, 2002: 
"On Friday, October 11, we received the latest and, we believe you 
intend; thefinalpackage of Church Camp 2.change orders •.•• If 
Friday's package represents the only substantiation to be provided 
by SCI, this is to advise you that in our opinion, the support and 
substantiation for many change orders is woefully inad~te. Toe 
supporting documentation, such as it is,. in many cases bears no 
relationship to any previously discussed changes, any authorized 
changes; whether in writing. orally or otherwise." 
Ex. 64 (emphasis added). 
On November 15, 2002, Mr .. Cowley wrote to Mr. Storey again. He explained that he 
could not recollllJlend that the Trust make any further payments to SCI because the change orders 
SCI had submitted were not proper changes under the contract for the reasons discussed above. 
They were simply cost overruns on items contained in the original guaranteed maximum price or 
prior approved change orders or were related to items that had never been approved or even 
discussed. Ex. 65. 
H. SCI Violated the Confidentiality Provisions of the Contract and Invaded 
Respondents' Privacy. 
On December 12, 2002, SCI sued the Sun Valley Trust in Idaho state court. On 
December 3; 2002, SCI initiated this arbitration. Despite indicating on its demand for arbitration 
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thatit intended. to join Wilson and Hanks in the arbitration and despite patagraph 18(c). of the 
Addendum to the contract which specifically allowed for their joinder, on ianuary 3, 2003, SCI 
sued Wilson and Hanks personally in Idaho state court. 
At the time he filed the lawsuits;· Gary Storey knew that the contract required disputes to 
be resolved through arbitration. StoreyDep1>. at 30:7-11. SCI's filiug of the lawsuits against 
Wilson and Hanks generated publicity in the Sun Valley area ( and nationally), including 
newspaper articles and letters to the editorthatportrayed Wilson and Hanks in a very negative 
light. Id. at 31:15-23; see e.g., Exs; 66 and 67 •. For example, one letter. argued that Wilson's 
and Hanks' refusal to pay SCI any more money threatened the livelihoods of"many people in the 
valley." 
" .... it is clear that the 'Green.Mile' of cash withheld by Mr. Hanks 
puts many people in the valley on the 'Road to Perdition.' There is 
a 'Big' trickle down impact on working people who are now 
'Sleepless in Sun Valley' because they can't pay their rent or 
mortgage or feed their kids." 
Ex. 67. In sum, SCI violated the confidentiality provisions in the contract with the intent of 
putting public pressure ?n Respondents to pay money they did not owe. 
Unfortunately, this violation of Respondents' contractual and legal privacy rights is only 
part of an. ongoing pattern. During the litigation, Respondents discovered that Gary Storey 
repeatedly brought third parties onto the property without Respondents' lmowledge or consent. 
. These third parties included other SCI's clients or prospective clients and SCI's lawyer, Miles 
Stanislaw. Storey Depo. 36:5-37:20; D. Lister Depo. at 69:6-12, 70:12-25, 71:11-22. Mr. 
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Storey brought Mr; Stanislaw to the property twice in the sprhig of 2002 as· construction neared 
completion. StoreyDepodtt 36:5-37:20, Mr. Storeywas aware of Respondents' privacy 
concerns, as he was told about them during the contract negotiations. Id. at23:20.24:13. He 
also knew that Respondents had security guards on the property to keep people from coming onto 
. . 
the property. Id. at 33:23-25: Nonetheless, he never sought or obtained Respondents' consent 
to these visits. Id. at36:5-37:20. 
Then, after the lawsuit was. filed, Gary Storey brought his testifying expert, Mr. Lembke, 
cmto the property to conduct an inspection of the property and the main house. Neither SCI nor 
its lawyer, Mr. Stanislaw, ever sought to obtain Respondents' permission for this inspection. 
Instead, Gary Storey took advantage of the fact that he was coming to the property to do punch 
list work to sneak his expert onto the property under false pretenses. Lembke Depo. 179:7-
180:11. 
I. · SCI Failed to Submitlts Claims to Lake/IDato Before Filing the Lawsuits or 
the Arbitration. 
At no time prior to· filing the lawsuit or this arbitration did SCI ever. submit a claim to 
Lake/Flato for decision as required under the contract. Indeed, SCI's only arguable submission 
of a claim was a January 7, 2003 letterto David Lake at Lake/Flato enclosingSCI'sdemand for 
arbitration, which had already been filed. In that letter, SCI did not actually submit its claims to 
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Lake/Flato for dfiisiori. · Rather, if states tlie opinion.that Lake/Flato is not even in a position to 
decide the issue. Ex. 68. 
J. SCI Extorted .$613,000from Respondents By Refusing to Pay Its Own 
Snbcontractors. 
SCI failed to payovet $613,000 to its subcontractors. As an obvious res.ult, it also failed 
to obtain lien releases from those subcontractors. The unpaid subcontractors threatened to and 
did record liens against the property. Ex. 69. SCI refused to defend against the subcontractors' 
claims. Instead, it demanded that Respondents pay an additional $613,000 so that those 
subcontractors could be paid. Given the choice of paying the subcontractors sums actually owed 
by SCI or defending against scores of different claims, and given that Wilson and Ranks were 
being portrayed in the_ local media as money-hungry scrooges who had no concern for the local 
tradespeople, Respondents paid. However, they expressly reserved the right to get those monies 
· back from SCI. Exsi69 at SVT 01856 and 70. 
ID. ARGUMENT 
SCI recognizes that the change orders in dispute do not reflect approved charges in the 
project. Indeed, the vast majority are not "changes» at all Instead, they reflect SCI's "additional 
costs" on items covered by the original guaranteed maximum price or prior approved change 
orders. Because such cost overnms are not recoverable under the contract, SCI argues 
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(inconsistently)that the contract (at least the parts that do not benefit SCI) was abandoned and 
that it is, therefore, erttitled to recover all of its costs (plus the fee for changes per the contract) on 
a quantum meruit or unjust enrichment theory. Howevei:, as demonstrated below, SCI cannot 
proceed on any extra-contractual theory because the contract was never abandoned by the parties. 
It was followed throughout the construction process. Because the c.ontract controls, SCI may 
recover additional costs only if it is able to show that each cost in dispute was the result of a 
specific owner-directed change in the pi:oject, and not merely an overage on previouslysagreed 
amounts. SCI cannot satisfy that b~den. 
A. SCI Cannot Proceed on Any Onasi-Contractnal Theory. 
1. Where There is an Express Contract Governing an Issue,· a Party 
Cannot Proceed on a Quantum Meruit or Unjust Enrichment Theory. 
Under Idaho law, an· action based on a quasi-contract theory, such as quantum meruit or 
unjust enrichment, is improper where there exists art express contract governing the subject 
matter at issue, Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 753 F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(applyingldaho law); Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152, 30 P.3d 300,307 (2001); 
Bischoffv. Quong-Watkins Properties, 113 ldaho 826, 829-30, 748 P.2d 410, 413-14 (1987); 
Marshall v. Bare, 107 Idaho 201,205, 687 P .2d 591,595 (1984). 
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Forexample, inTrfangle Mining, the parties entered into a written mining contract, . 
containing an express liquidated damages provision. 753 F .2d at 736-37. When the defendant 
terminated the contract, the plaintiff asserted claims for breach of implied contract and breach of 
quasi-contract, seeking to avoid the express liquidated damages provision and recover in 
quantum meruit. Id. at 737. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, rejecting the implied contract and quasi-contract theories "on the ground. that the 
parties' express agreement governed the question .... " lli, The plaintiff appealed, arguing that 
the express liquidated damages provision should no longer apply, "because of changed 
circumstances" that occurred after the execution of the contract. Id._at 742 .. The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed. Despite the changed tjrcumstances, the court held that the plaintiff ''must be held to 
: the contract'' and "cannot use implied contract or quasi-contract to escape the terms of the 
agreement itfrec,lynegotiated with [the defendant]." Id. at743 • .!7! 
This rule - that the existence of an express contract bars a contracting party. from 
recovering except in accordance with the contrapt terms - applies with equal force to claims 
brought against a non-contracting party that may have been benefitted by the services provided 
under the contract. See Restatement of Law, Restitution: Quasi Contracts and Constructive 
Trusts, §§ HO& 111; Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 
767-68, 979 P.2d 627, 640-41 (1999) (Idaho Supreme Court case holding that subcontractor who 
ll! See also Restatement of Law, Restitution: Quasi Contracts and Constructive 
Trusts,§ 107(1), which provides as follows: "Apersonwithfulleapacitywho, pursuant to a 
contract with another; has performed services or transferred property to the other or otherwise has 
conferred a benefit upon him, is not entitled to compensation therefor other than in accordance 
with the terms of such bargain .... " ( emphasis added). 
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. had entered into an.express agrt:ementwithgenera_1 coirtractor could not proceed against ownem 
ofthe propert°}'. on either a quantum meruit or unjnst enrichmenttheoty); Dale's. Service Co,, Inc. 
v. T & JContractors, 96 Idaho 662,666, 534P.2d· 1102, 1106(1975) (Idaho Supreme Court case 
_ holding that subcontractor could not proct:ed against land owner on quantum meruit theory even 
where contract between subcontractor and general contractor was unenforceable); overruled on 
other grounds, Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 661, 551 P;Zd 610, 615 (1976). 
"A person [i.e., SCI] who has conferred a benefit upon another 
[i.e., Wilson/Hanks J as the performance on a contract with a. third 
person [i.e., the Sun Valley Trust] is not entitled to restitution from 
the other [Wilson/Hanks] merely because of the failure of 
performance by the third person [the Sun Valley Trust]." 
J Restatement of Law, Restitution: Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts, §§ l l O & 111 
) 
--· ( emphasis added) . .!l!i Rather, again, the contracting party is required to seek relief in accordance 
with the contract itself. Id. 
-, 
!!l' The same is true even if the contracting party is deemed an agent of the non- · · 
contracting principal benefitted as a result of the transaction. Id. § 111. 
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this doctririeisthe law in .every state in the country.!:!! See e.g., Interstate LithoCorp. v . 
. Brown, 255 F.3d 19, 31 (1st Cir. 2001}(applying Mass.law); U.S:, Youngstown Welding and 
Engineering Co. v. Travelersindem. Co., 802 F.2d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 1986)(applying Ariz. 
law); Kennedy v. William R. Hudon, Inc., 659 F.Supp. 900,908 (D.Colo. 1987) (applying Colo. 
law); Advance Leasing & Crane v. Del E. Webb Corp., 117 Ariz .. 451, 573 P.2d 525, 526 (1977); 
Stokes v. International Media Systems, 686 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Colo.App. 1984); Guldberg v. 
Greenfield, 146 N.W.2d 298, 305 (Iowa 1966); J.W. Thompson Co. v. Welles Products Corp., 
243 Kan. 503; 511-12, 758 P.2d 738, 744 (1988); La Chancev. Rigoli, 325Mass. 425,427, 91 
N.E.2d 204,205 (Mass. 1950); Insulation Contracting & Suwlyv. Kravco, Inc., 209 NJ.Super. 
367, 378-79, 507 A.2d 754,:760-61 (1986); Bryson v. Hutton, 41N.C.App. 575, 577-78, 255 
S.E.2d 258,259 (1979); National CityBankv. Fleming, 2 Ohio App.3d 50, 57-58, 440 N.E.2d 
590, 599(1981); Meehan v. ChelteohamTownship, 410Pa. 446, 450-51, 189 A.2d 593, 596 
(1963). 
SCI entered into an express, written contract with the Sun Valley Trust "related to the 
construction of the residence known as Church Camp 2 Residence (the 'Project')," which 
contained a guar.anteed maximmn price and a detailed method for increasing that price. SCI'. s 
Statement of Claim 'lf 2. Accordingly, SCI cannot assert a claim against any of the Respondents 
!:!! For that reason, the only exception to this rule is where the contract at issue is 
invalid, unenforceable or otherwise would not provide the plaintiff with any remedy. See~ 
Idaho Lumber. Inc. y. Buck. 109 Idaho 737, 750, 710 P2d 647,660 (Idaho App. 1985) (holding 
that contracting party's bankruptcy. effectively "ended" the contract, thereby allowing an unjust 
enrichment daim to proceed against the non-contracting party). Here, however, there is no 
dispute that a valid, enforceable contract exists, which would provide SCI with an adequate· · 
remedy at law. 
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waived the guaranteed maximum provisions of the contract 
2. The Parties Never Waived or Abandoned the Contract Generally or 
the Guaranteed Maximum Price Specifically. 
Under Idaho law,· "[t )he party asserting that provisions of a written contract were 
subsequently waived or modified by oralagreement or by conduct of the parties has the burden of 
proving the assertion by 'clear· and convincing evidence."' Bouten Construction Co. v. M&L 
Land Co., 125 Idaho 957,965,877 P.2d928, 936 (Ct. App. 1994}(emphasis added) (citation 
omitted); see also M. K. Tram;port, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 350n.5, 612 P.2d 1192, 1197 
n.5 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (A claim that a contract has been rescinded or abandoned is "in effect a parol 
modification of the written agreement which in Idaho must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.''); Kellyv. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872,876,811 P.2d48, 52 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Our 
-Supreme Court has held that •.. a party must establish the oral modification by clear and . 
convincing evidence.'') 
Moreover, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that both parties mutually 
intended that they would no longer.be governed by f!J.e contract or provision at issue. Russell v. 
Russell, 99 Idaho 151, 154, 578 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Sup. Ctl978); American Silver Mining Co. v. 
Coeur D'Alene.Mines Corp., 94 Idaho 54, 60,480 P.2d 900,906 (Sup. Ct 1971) 
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("Abandonment is a matter of intentwith corresponding conduct and may be shown by 
surrounding facts and circumstances.") Where either party's conduct indicates an intention to be 
bound by the agreement, abandonment will not be found. Russell, 99 Idaho at 154, 578 P.2d at 
1085 ("This letter clearly indicates that seller considered the earnest moneyagreement binding 
and fully expected buyer to 'live up to' it. No abandonment can be found.on these facts."). 
Here, the parties' conduct demonstrates that neither Respondents nor SCI ever believed 
the contract or the guaranteed maximum price was abandoned. Both parties continued to track 
the guaranteed maximum price, and the effect the change orders were having on the guaranteed 
maximum price, throughout the construction. Carolyn Lister entered the numbers into the 
Guaranteed Maximum Price Spreadsheets each month until well beyond completion. C. Lister 
Depo.43:18-44:15,47:24-49:4. The CEIF Matrix was updated by SCl's Rich Brownson 
continually until well after completion. D. Lister Depo. at 90:12-13, 91:5, 142:19-143:3, 
149:12-22, 154:7-15; C. Lister Depo. at 70:23-71:2, 80:15-17. The payment applications 
prepared by SCI' s Carolyn Lister continued to show the original contract. sum as adjusted by net 
change. C. Lister Depo.17:1-4,. 39:13-41:22. When the budget for the tennis court as reflected 
on the payment applications increased before there was an approved change order, Mr. Campeas 
objected. Ex. 36. Whenever individual line items in the budget on the main house were 
exceeded, the McGregor Company demanded an explanation. See e.g., Exs. 39, 41, 42, 45. 
When SCI :finally went beyond the projected guaranteed maximum price, Respondents withheld 
payment Exs. 47, 48. 
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But perhaps the best evidence of the parties'. intent to stillbe bound by the contract are 
the post-completion change orders themselves - the change orders that SCI sent Respondents in 
October 2002. See e,g., Exs. 58, 59, 60. ·Not only were those change orders sent for the purpose · 
of trying to increase the guaranteed maximum price under the contract, SCI actually sought the 
higher builder's fee applicable to significant changes in scope as set forth in the contract. How 
can SCI argue that the contract was abandoned when it was actually seeking to enforce it as late 
as October 2002? 
In short, the.evidence will estabUsh without dispute that both parties always understood 
that the contract, and particularly that the provisions related to the guaranteed maximum price, 
was in force. 
3. SCI Cannot Show that the Contract Was Abandoned Because 
of the Increased Overall Budget of the Project. 
Anticipating that it will not be able to show any actual intent by the parties to abandon the 
contract, SCI will try to argue that the guaranteed maximum price was .. abandoned merely as a 
result of the number of changes on the project. That argument fails. 
The law is clear that when the nature of the changes was contemplated at the time the 
contract was formed, such changes will not show abandonment or justify recovery in quantum 
meruit no matter what their magnitude. See. e.g. Merrill Contractors, Inc. v. GST Telecom, Inc., 
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2003 WL 464069 * 5 {Wash. App. Feb. 25, 2003) (''Bi1! quantum meruit is not available if the 
contractor should have discovered or anticipated the changes. The Court looks at the nature of 
the change, not its magnitude.") ( citation omitted); Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. King 
County, 57 Wash. App. 170, 181-82, 787 P.2d58, 65 (1990) ("As long as the nature of the 
problems encountered was contemplated by the contract, •.. , there is no basis to abandon the 
contract in favor of quantum meruil"); Nelse Mortensen & Co., Jnc. v. Group Health 
Coonerative of Puget Sound, 17 Wash. App. 703,727,566 P.2d 560,573 (1977) ("[I]f owner-
caused delay in construction was of a nature contemplated by the parties and· specific provisions 
of their contract provide a remedy, ... , then the delay cannot be deemed unreasonable to the 
extent the contract terms should be abandoned in favor ofquantum meruit recovery."), a.ff' d 90 
.Wash.2d 843,845,586 P.2d 469,470 (1978). 
For example, in Hensel Phelps Construction Co., a Washington court of appeal refused to 
allow a subcontractor to proceed on a quantum meruit theory despite evidence that there were 
"massive disruptions" in the performance of the subcontractor's work. 57 Wash. App. at 171, 
787 P .2d at 59. The evidence showed that the general contractor accelerated the schedule and 
gave the subcontractor nineteen days to perform work that was originally scheduled to be 
completed in forty-five days. Id. at 172, 787 P.2d at 60. As a result of the accelerated schedule, 
the subcontractor was forced to use nearly 3 times the amount of labor hours to perform its 
contractual obligations and employed 26 painters instead of 9. Id. at 181, 787 P .2d at 65. 
Because the construction contract had provisions to deal with changes and delays on the proj.ect, . 
the court refused to find an abandonment of the contract. The court reasoned that "[a]s long as 
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· the nature of the problems encountered was contemp!atedby the contract, .•. , there is no basis to · 
abandon.the contracHn favor of quantum mernit." Id. at 181-82, 787 P 2d at 65. The court 
explained that "the focus of the inquiry should be whether the ~ of changes were covered by 
the contract, not the. degree of variation in job conditions from what was ori gipally relied upon in 
thebid." Id.at181, 787P2dat64. (emphasis added) . 
. As ouilined above, all ofthe various phases of the Church Camp Il project were 
specifically discussed by the parties prior to the contract being signed, and (with the exception of 
the pool) were included. in the contract as allowances. Allowances by their very nature are likely 
to change. The contract provides exactly so. The contract also eXJ)Iessly addressed the manner 
by which SCI could claim additional costs or additional time. Indeed, SCI had the absolute right 
to insiston no changes to·most oftbe allowance items but chose not to exercise that right. 
Accordingly, SCI cannot use changes it agreed to on this project as a basis for avoiding the 
contract. 
Moreover, as Respondents' expert Craig Knickerbocker, will testify, significant changes 
in scope are the mfo in higbaend .custom home projects, not the exception. By their very nature,· 
custom home projects inevitably evolve during construction. It simply defies logic to believe 
that SCJ, an experienced custom .homebuilder, did not contemplate that there might be significant 
changes in the project at the time it contracted to build it. 
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Accordingly, SCI will not be able to prove ooder any standard (cleat and convincing. 
evidence as required under B<luten or otherwise) that the contract was modified or abandoned as 
a result of uncontemplated changes. 
B. SCI Cannot Recover the Costs in Dispute Under the Contract. 
SCI cannot recover the.costs in dispute under the contract for two separate and 
independent reasons. First, the contract required SCI to submit any claims for .additional costs to 
Lake/Flato within 21 days from the events giving rise to the claim. (Ex. 9, GC at 114.3.2 and 
4.3.5). SCI never did that Therefore, its claim is barred as a matter oflaw. Martel v. Bulotti, 
138 ldaho 451, 65 P.3d 192, 197 (Sup. Ct. 2003). Second, the only costs that are allowed to 
increase the guaranteed maximum price are costs incurred in connection with changes in the 
scope of the project. The contract does not allow SCI to recover "additional costs" on work 
. already encompassed by the original guaranteed maximum price or previously approved change 
orders. If it did, there would be no purpose to the guaranteed maximum price. As those are the 
type of costs SCI seeks,. its claim fails. 
1. SCl's Claim Is Barred As a Matter of Law. 
Paragraph 4.3.1 of the Gen&a! Conditions defines a claim as ·«a demand or assertion by 
one of the parties seeking, as a matter of right, adjustment or interpretation of the Contract terms, 
payment of money, extension of time or other relief with respect to the terms of the Contract" 
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Ex; 9, Paragraph 4.3;2, states that claims "by either party must be initiated within 21 · days after 
occurrence of the event giving rise to such Claim or within 21 days after the. claimant first 
recognizes the condition giving rise to the Claim; whichever is later. Id. Claims must be 
initiated by written notice to the Architect and the other party." _ Id. Paragraph 4.3.5. provides 
that "[i]f the Contractor wishes to make. Claim for an increase in the Ci>nttact Sum, written notice 
as provided herein shall be given before proceeding to execute the W or:k." Id. Moreover, 
submitting the claim to the architect is a precondition to any arbitration or litigation. Id., GC 'If 
4.4.1. Accordingly, if SCI wanted to make a claim for additional .costs in connection with the 
work, it was required to do so within 21 days after recognizing that the additional cost would be 
necessary and prior to incurring that cost. SCI failed to do thal As a result, its claims are barred 
as amatteroflaw. Martel, 65 P. 3d at 197. · 
The change orders themselves show that the costs SCI seeks to recover were incurred 
months before SCI ever gave Respondents, the McGregor Company or.Lake/Flato any indication, 
in writing or otherwise, that it sought to recover these costs. For example, in this arbitration SCI 
seeks to increase the guaranteed maximum price of the contract by unauthorized change order no. 
237 in the amount of$412,204.48. Ex. 60. CEIF no. 237 was not initiated by SCI until August 
22, 2002 (afterthe Owner had moved into the property) and change order no. 237 (which seeks 
an additional $80,000 over CEIF no. 237) was not initiated until October 3, 2002 (two and half 
months after the Owner had moved into the property). Id. Cbalige order no. 237 seeks 
additional costs associated with lumber and carpentry. Id . . Gary Storey acknowledged during his 
deposition that at least some of the costs sought in change order no. 237 were incurred months in 
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advance of those costs ever appearing in a CEJF and/or change order. Storey Depo. 151 :18-
152:12. Yet, SCI now seeks to recover this $412,204.48 · without having ever presented the claim 
to the architect as required by the contract either before those costs were incurred or within 21 
days after the events giving rise to the claim. Ex. 60. 
In Martel v. Bulotti, 65 P.3d 192, 197 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court held that, because 
the plaintiff had notcomplied with the claims procedure.in the contract, that claim was barred as 
a matter oflaw. Like SCI here, the contractor in Martel had a dispute with the owner. The 
. contract provided that such disputes had to be submitted to the architect for decision and that any 
· arbitration had to be filed within 30 days after the architect's decision. There; the parties did 
submit the claim to the architect , but the contractor then failed to file the demand for arbitration 
with the AAA within 30 days. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the contractor's .claim was 
barred because he had failed to substantially comply with the terms of the contract governing the 
resolution of disputes. 
Id. at 197. 
"Entering into this agreement providing for such informal dispute 
resolqtionin a contract fell well within the bounds of the parties' 
freedom to contract. ... This Court will not make for Bulotti a 
betteragreement than he himself was satisfied to make. [Citation]. 
Nor will this Court relieve Bulotti of the consequences of his own 
failure to comply with the requirements for rlemanding arbitration." 
SCI' s complete failure to comply with any of the claim procedures outlined in paragraph 
4.3 of the General Conditions bars its claim. 
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2. The Contract's Guaranteed Mrumnum Price Can Only Be Increased 
Throngh Approved Changes • 
.SCI entered into a cost plus with guaranteed maximum price contract. As opposed to a 
straight cost-plus contract, a cost plus with .guaranteed maximum price contract provides a cap on 
the owner's financial obligations. TRW, lnc. v. FordevelQJ)lllent Corp., 604 N.E.2d 626, _630 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992). The.guaranteed maximum price is the greatest amount the owner is 
required to pay for the contracted services. !\!,. The owner is obligated to pay the contractor for 
· its costs plus a fee up to the guaranteed maximum price only. Id. The contractor is not entitled, 
and the owner is not obligated to pay, for costs and fees in excess of this amount. kl,; see also 
D.A. .Davis Const. Co. v. Palmetto Properties, lnc., 315 S.E.2d 370, 371-72 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1984); 
A.A. & E.B. Jones Co, v. Boucher; 530 P.2d 974, 980-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). 
·· For example, in TRW, the owner and contractor entered into a guaranteed maximum 
price contract. However, the costs i,ssociated with the construction of the "Solarcrete" walls 
were higher than the. contractor anticipated, causing it to incur costs in excess of the guaranteed 
maximum price. When the owner refused to pay the increased amount, the contractor sued. The 
contractor argued that it had a separate oral agreement with the owner to pay its cost to build the 
Solarcrete Walls.· The contractor testified that the owner had agreed that "whatever its cost" in 
connection with the wall construction, the contractor would be reimbursed for those costs. The 
court held that this evidence was not enough to show an oral modification of the guaranteed 
maximum price. !twas not enough to show an agreement to· pay whatever the contractor's costs 
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· in comJ.ection with the walls, 1,ecause under a "cost plU!J with 'gµaianteed maximum price'' 
contract, the owner was required to pay those costs up to.the guamnteed maximum.price. Rather, 
the contractor had to prove :,peci:fically that the owner agreed to pay such costs even ifin excess 
. of the guaranteed :maximum price .. AB there was "no evidence that TRW agreed to exclude the 
costs of the walls :from the guaranteed maximum price'' provisions in the contract, the claim was 
barred. Id. at 633. 
As noted above, here there is no evidence indicating that-the _Trust or SCI ever agreed to 
waive the. gUaranteed maximum price. Rather, there is overwhe]nring evidence to the· contrary. 
Accordingly, SCI is bound by those provision and may recover ( at best) only those costs that fall 
within the guaranteed maximum price. 
The contract here provides tliat the guaranteed maximum price may be increased only by 
changes. Paragraph 7 of the Addendum governs "Changes in Work" and sets out the type of 
costs which will increase or decrease the Contract Sum. This paragraph provides that the 
"Owner or Architect may request changes to the scope of the Work required by the Contract 
Documents by.adding or deleting work, materials, or equipment."· (emphasis added). Ex. 9, 
Addendum ,r 7, The paragraph provides that any changes must be approved in advance.of the 
work being implemented. It also provides that an approved change modifies the contract, 
binding all parties including scr: id .. Costs incurred in excess of the.guaranteed maximum price 
not contained fu an approved change order are not recoverable. Id., ,r 8.1.8. 
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Recognizing that the Trust has already paidsnbstantially in. excess of the original 
guaranteed maximum price as increased by all approved change orders; SCI will argue that the 
partieswaived change order.approval requirement As discussed above, however, this argument 
is flatly contradicted by the evidence. Throughout the process, until well-after construction was 
complete, the parties continued to follow the change order process. SCI continued to generate 
CEIFs and change orders for approval and. it continued to track them on the CEIFMatrix, 
:;, · including specifically whether the change orders were ''pending" or "approved." See e,g., Exs. 
). 
) 
25, 27, 28, 29, SCI continued to generate the Guaranteed Maximum PriceSpreadsheets, showing 
the impact changes were having on the guaranteed maximum price. See e.g., ;Exs. 26, 30, 31, 32. 
SCI continued to generate payment applications showing the guaranteed maximum price as it had 
been increased by apprt>Yed change orders. ·c. Lister Depo. 17:1-4; 41:4-22. And, again, if the 
change order approval process was abandoned, why was SCI submitting the scores of changes 
orders in dispute to the Trust for approval? 
. In any event, SCI's argument makes no sense because the change orders in dispute to not 
even reflect "changes." SClis limited to recovering·onty costs that result from a change, not cost 
overruns on items already encompassed by the original guaranteed maximum price or prior 
approved change orders. Bouten. 125 Idaho at 967~68, 877 P .2d at 937-38. In Bouten, the court 
did not require the contractor to strictly adhere to the written change order procedure in the 
contract because the parties had periodically waived that requirement throughout the construction 
of the project. Id. at 967, 877 P.2d at 937. However, the court emphasized that the guaranteed 
maximum price provisions, including those dealing with the types costs which could increase the 
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maximum price, were still in place and that, as a result, the. contractor could only recover fo, true 
changes. I<i at 968, 877 P.2d at 939: . However, the contractor could not recover costs simply 
because they were more than it had originally anticipated. Id. at 967, 877 P.2d at 938 ("[W]e 
have already ruled, the contract did not give BCC any right to increase the GMP merely because 
. . the subcontractor bids were higher than BCC estimated they would be."}. 
As in Bouten,. SCI cannot recover its "additional costs" because they were not incurred as 
a result of any change. Rather, they were cost overruns on items already encompassed by the 
original guaranteed maximum price or prior approved change orders. SCI cannot recover such 
costs, because it would defeat the whole intent of a guaranteed maximum price contract, 
transforming it into a pure cost-plus contract. 
SCI will argue that the costs it incurred in the rush to complete the project in June and 
July are recoverable because there would have been no rush but for numerous owner-directed 
changes that had come before. But that is exactly the point. SCI !!fil'.llr requested any additional 
time with respect to any change. Nor did it ever submit a claim for more time to Lake/Flato.lQ/ 
Under the contract, SCI was responsible for the sequence and scheduling of construction, not the· 
Trust. Ex. 9, GC 'll'IJ 3.3.1 and 3.10.1. In any event, SCI took four more months to complete the 
lQ/ In his deposition, Gary Storey testified that he simply chose not to "use" the 
portion of the change order form that allowed him to seek additional time. But when he was 
asked whether anyone had ever told him not to use that portion of the change order fon:µ, he· said 
"no." Storey Depo. at 70:18-19. 
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project than allowed under the contract. Yes, Respondents insisted that SCI get it done. · But it is 
not an owner-directed "change" to insist that SCI perform its obligations under the contract. 
In sum, the evidence will establish without dispute that the additional costs SCI seeks to 
recover were not the result of any change. It just cost SCI more than it said it would, and SCI 
seeks to hold the Trust liable for the difference. 
C. SCI Breached.the Contract in Numerous Respects. 
The Trust treated SCI extremely well under the contract. Indeed, it overpaid SCI by more 
than $200,000. SCI repaid the Trust by breaching the contract in multiple respects. It also failed 
to pay its own subcontractors and filed an improper lawsuit in order to extort an additional 
$613,000 from the Trust. Exs. 69, 70. It violated the confidentiality provisions in the contract 
and invaded Respondents' privacy again and again and again, causing damages of over $162,000. 
. . . 
Ex. 71. It caused the Trust to incur $25,000 in unnecessary charges from their interior designer. 
Ex. 57. And it filed this frivolous case. For that reason, SCI should be ordered to pay 
Respondents damages of $800,000, plus their attorneys' fees and costs. 
Ill 
!ii 
II I 
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The Trust Interpreted the Contract for SCI's Benefit Virtually 
Everywhere It Could, Overpaying SCI by $200,000. 
SCI was not entitled to any additional fee for any changes made to the allowance "items 
as descn"bed in the referenced Plans regardless of the amount of work for those items." Ex, 9, 4f 
5.2,4. Most of the $4 million in changes related to allowance items. When the allowance items 
changed, SCI charged the Trust the fee that it charged on all other changes in scope, 13%. Even 
though it was arguably not entitled to any additional fee for those changes, the Trust interpreted 
the provision in SCI's favor and paid it the 13% fee, Choosing not to focus on the phrase · 
. ''regardless of the amount of Work for those items," the Trust focused on the phrase "as 
described in the referenced Plans," and interpreted that phrase to mean that if the ''Plans" 
changed then the limitation did not apply. This resulted in SCI receiving over $130,000 more 
than had the Trust insisted on the other interpretation - fuat the Plans simply identified the 
allowance items and fuat SCI would receive no fee (oilier fuan its fixed fee under the contract) no 
matter how much work was performed in connection with those items. 
The Trust also interpreted paragraph 7 of the Addendum in SCI's favor. That paragraph 
provides SCI with a no additional fee or overhead on insignificant changes and a fee of 10% on 
significant changes. But SCI did not charge fue Trust simply 0% or I 0%. It charged it 3% or 
13%. SCI presumably reasoned that, because the original cost of the. work encompassed by the 
guaranteed maximum price included 1 % for liability insurance and 2% for overhead, it should be 
.. 
able to recover those same items for changes. But fuat is not how paragraph 7 actually reads. 
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However, because the parties had included the 1% liabilily insurance figure and 2% overhead 
figure as part of the original guaranteed maximmn price, the Trust paid the fees SCI requested, 
resulting in SCI receiving approximately $90,000 more than it otherwise would have. 
2. SCI Extorted An Additional $613,000 from the Trust by Refusing to 
Pay Its Own Subcontractors. 
There is no dispute that SCI breached the contract by failing to pay its subcontractors. It 
was required to do that under the contract, and it did not do it. As a result, Respondents were 
forced to pay $613,000 twice, once to SCI and then again to the subcontractors directly (through 
two-party checks). Ex. 70. SCI should be required to pay that money back to Respondents. 
Moreover, under the contract (Ex. 9, paragraph 2(a) of the Addendum) and Idaho Jaw, SCI 
must pay Respondents' attorneys' fees in connection with this portion of the case. Bouten, 125 
Idaho at 969, 877 P.2d at 940 (holding that a contractor is obligated under Idaho Code § 45-511 
to defend ,the Trust against claims brought by.subcontractors). 
3. SCI Breached the Confidentiality Provisions in the Contract and 
Violated Respondents' Privacy Rights. 
The purpose of the confidentiality provisions in the contract was clear: Wilson aod 
Hanks are celebrities. The property is held in a trust to protect their privacy. The confidential 
arbitration provision was designed to ensure that any dispute arising ont of the construction of the 
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project was resolved through a private.arbitration. Other provisions were designed to ensure that 
third parties did not view theproperty otleamas a result oftheconstrnction that it was 
associated with Wilson and Hanks. 
Their security and privacy concerns are serious. As a result of Hanks' status as a popular 
actor, inappropriate pursuers have challenged Hanks' and his family's safety and privacy by 
making threats. and visiting bis residences. Ex. 72 [DeBecker Affidavit, Falconer Deel. J. · fu 
order to protect themselves and their family from intruders, Wilson _and Hanks have implemented 
security measures including the. hiring of security guards. Id. 
Gary Storey and bis employees understood that Wilson and Hanks' privacy was of the 
utmost concern._ They understood that they were obligated to protect their privacy. Exs. 9, 73 
[01-16-03 Kahn affidavit]; Storey Depo. at 23:22();.24:13; D. Lister Depo. at 65:23-66:2, 
67:3-15; C. Lister at 58:17-59;19. But SCI and Mr. Storey chose to violate the contract and 
Respondents' right of privacy by (1) filing two public lawsuits naming Wilson and Hanks 
personally and (2) by bringing mi!ltiple third parties onto the prt>pertywithout Respondents' 
consent. 
There vias no legitimate purpose in filing the public lawsuits against Wilson and Hanks 
personally. It was done for one obvious reason, to take advantage of their celebrity status in the 
. hope that they would capitulate to SCI' s unreasonable demands. There was also no legitimate 
reason for Gary Storey to bring various third parties, including its litigation counsel, Miles 
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Stanislaw, and its testifying expert onto the p~without permission •. As a result, 
Respondents have incurred substantial security expensesthey o1herwi.sewould not have ne.eded 
to incur. They have been required to pay $18,000 per months for s.ecurity guards since the public 
lawsuits were filed, for a total amount of$162,000 to date. 
Mr. Storey's conduct was not merely a breach of contract It was a tortious invasion of 
.) . privacy, specifically the tort of intrusion. Idaho recognizes the four invasion of privacy torts, 
) 
including intrusion. Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc .• 67 P.3d 29, 32 (Idaho S. Ct. 2003). 
Intrusion is an intentional interference with one's "interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to 
his person or his private affiiirs or concerns," which would be offensive to a reasonable person. 
Id. The right ofprivacy, which is protected by the tort ofintrusion, is the right to be left alone 
and free from unwanted publicity. Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 584. 367 
P.2d 284,287 (S. Ct 1961). The damages recoverable for such an invasion of privacy include 
the mental anguish and worry proximatelycansed by the invasion .. Miller v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1485 (1986). 
There is no question 1hat Mr. Storey' s conduct of bringing third parties onto 
Respondents' private property constituted an intrusion into Respondents' seclusion and solitude 
that would be offensive to a reasonable person. Respondents entrusted Mr. Storey to honor their 
privacy. But he intentionally and repeatedly violated that trust by bringing onto the property 
various third parties who had no right to be there, including his litigation counsel and testifying 
expert in this case. Moreover. Mr.· Storey did not just bring its expert onto the property; he · 
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brought him into Wilson1s and Hank;s home. And he did so without permission and under false 
· pretenses. Gary Storey was permitted to come onto the property for certain purposes, namely to 
perform punch list work. He abus.ed that right by nsing what was supposed to be a normal, 
punch list visit, to sneak his testifying expert into Respondents' home. Not only fa such conduct 
!;!ighly offensive to any reasonab1e person, it constituted a gross violation of trust. 
Wilson has suffered the same mental anguish that anyone would suffer upon learning that 
one's home has been invaded. The emotional distress suffered as a result of the most recent 
invasion is further heightened by the egregious series of events leading up to it. Wilson is in 
intense litigation with fue contractor who built her home. The community where the home is 
located is small, and the contractor well known within it. Despite having expressly agreed not to 
) do so, SGI decided to sue Wilson personally to try its case in.the court of public opinion. Wilson 
''') 
· · ,. · learned during that litigation that .Mr. Storey brought third parties onto the property on repeated 
,l 
occasions during construction, including the lawyer who is representing him fu this case. That 
same lawyer saw fit to confront her on the street while the litigation was pending. And then she 
learned that Gary Storey (perhaps at that same lawyer's direction) brought his expert into her 
home under false pretenses. There is no question that SCI and Gary Storey personally engaged in 
an offensive invasion of privacy, which would cause anyone (let alone someone who is already 
sensitive to her privacy and security concerns) mental anguish. 
This was outrageous conduct: There is no question that it was inteutio11al. There is no 
question it was fraudulent and malicious. Accordingly, SCI and Gary Storey should be ord~ed 
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to-payWilsoncompensatorydamagesof$75,000,pluspunitiveda:rnagesof$150,000; Cf. -
Sandersv. American Broadcasting Companies. 20 Cal.4th 907,913 (1999) (upholding 
compensatory damages award of $335,000 and punitive damages award of$300,000 for intrusion 
based on television reporter's covert videotaping of private conversation). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, SCI's 1:Iaims should be denied in full and Respondents should 
be awarded actual damagesin the sum of$850,000, punitive damages of $150,000. and 
attorneys' fees and costs according to proof. 
Dated this 22nd day of September, 2003 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURTOF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TOM HANKS AND RITA WILSON, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE; AND LILY 
REEVES, 
Defendants. 
NO. CV2007-1043 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION INC.'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
.MOTION TO ENFORCE BAR OF 
RESWDICATA 
In 2007, ld$o's · Supreme Court affirmed a summary judginent which granted 
dismissal on the basis of res judicata becrmse.: 
[W]hen a valid, final judginent is rendered in a proceeding, it 'extingyishes all 
claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out .of wl1ich 
the cause of a,i:;tion .arose.' Id. (quoting Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 
Idaho 146, ISO, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990)). This Court .has noted that the 
'.transactional .concept of a claim is broad' and that claim preclusion 'may apply 
even where there is not a .substantial overlap between the theories advanced in 
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suppo;rt of a claim, .or in the evidence relating to those theories .. ' ld. ( quoting 
Aldape, 105 Jdaho.at J59, 66/JP.2.tl at J:35) . . (Emphasis added:)1 
Rl!s judicata bars Defendants from relitigating their construction defect claim against Storey. 
The transaction out of which both Defendants' past and current claim for defects 
arose was a cons.truction contract dated July 21, 2000. This was the only contract Storey .ever 
entered with Defendants. In 2002, Storey had eompleted all of the construction work 
performed pursuant to that contract. Storey' s work was all •completed prior to the first 
.arbitration, which was held in September-October 2003. Storey never performed .any work 
on the project after the 2003 .arbitration. 
Prior to the ten-day arbitration hearing, D1Jfendants alleged first .in their counterclaim, 
then in their amended counterclaim, .and finally in their second amended counterclilm that . 
Defendants should recover damages caused by Storey's allegedly defective work. 
The three-person panel of arbitrators issued a I 5-page "Final Award" that awarded 
Defendants [respondents in the arbitration] "$0" on their .counterclaim. This Final Award 
was confirmed as a judgment pursuant to l.C. 7"911 by order of this court dated .March 6, 
2008. 
The Panel's award, as confirmed, states: 
At the conclusion of the Arbitration Hearing, the tribunitl inquired .of counsel 
whether, . , . they )lad any further proofs to offer or witnesses to be heard. 
Counsel for each party replied to this inquiry in the. negative, Accordingly, 
the panel finds that all evidenc.e pertinent and material to. the substantive 
issues. in dispute in this controversy that the parties wished to .offer was 
received into evidence and heard at the Arbitration Hearing, and· that the 
parties so stipµlated at the conclusion of the hearing, (Emphasis added.) 
1 Ticor Title Company v. Stanion, ];57 P.3cl .613 Idaho 2007, 
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Deferidants' argument that Defendants should he excused .from the bar ofres judicata 
because Defendants' curtent claim is based on latent defects .has no support in Maho law .and 
creates the real possibility of never-ending litigation. According to the Defendants' 
argument, e.ach time a latent defect is encountered, the right to make .a new claim. for defects 
arises .and defeats a plea of resjudicata, befendants' argument Creates the real possibility of 
mu1tiple lawsuits, is .completely at odds with the Idaho policy on which res Judicata js based 
and the. n\li:Ilerous Idaho authorities enforcing rts Judicata. Defendants' latent defect 
argument amounts to a rejection of the "transaction" analysis required by Idaho's Supreme 
Court in Ticor, supra. Ttcor is one of four Idaho Supreme Court decisions cited herein 
affirming a District Court'.s grant of summary jiidgment on the basis of resjµdicata. 
"Res judicata precludes the relitigation of the same claim .even if there is new 
.evidence to support it."2 Defendants attempt to avoid the Idaho ruk by argJJi:iig that their 
defect claim.s were "latent" at the time of the prior Arbitration. Defendants' 'argume»t is 
11othi11g more than a claim of "new evidenc.e," which, under Idaho Jaw, does not defeat a plea 
17 ofres judicata. 
18 II; ISSUE 
19 Are Defendants barred as a matter of law from pursuing their claim for construction 
20 defects in a second arbitration because Defendants made a claim for construction .defects in a 
21 2003 arbitration and both Defendants' prior and. current claim for defects arises out of the 
22 same construction contract? 
23 
24 ·
2 Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., )28 ldal)o 398,403 .()996). 
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.III. F'ACTS 
A. The Parties. 
Storey Construction lnc .. {"Storey") is an Idaho Corporation .engaged in the general 
.construction bnsiness in Blaine County, Idaho. 3 
Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson ar.e husband and wife.4 
6 Lily Reeves is the .erstwhile ;ind reputed Trustee of The Sun Valley Trust. Lily· 
7. Reeves is the sister of Rita Wilson. 5 "Defendants" refers to Defendants H~, Wilson and 
8 Reeves, .collectively. 
9 B. The Constrnctipn CPntract. 
10 Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson desired to construct a luxiuy residence in Blaine County, 
11 Idaho. Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson retained the servic::es of Lake/Flato A.rchltecti; located in 
12 San Antonio, T.exas, to design and facilitate construction of this re.sidence .and to provide 
13 construction contract administration an<J inspection strvices including the preparation of 
14 · punch lists.6 
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Storey was .asked to be the General Contr.actor for the residence. 7 After protracted 
negotiations that extended over an approxirnately nine-month period, Storey entered a 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
3 See Affidavit of Gary Storey in Support of Motion to Enforce Bar of Res Judicata("Affidavitof Gary· 
$torey"), '1!2, pg. l. · · 
4 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1J 3, pg. 2. 
5 See Affidavit i,f Gary Storey, 1J 4, •pg. 2. 
6 See AffidavitofGary Stor~y, t5, pg. z. 
7 See Affidavit of Gary Storey,~ .6, pg. 2. 
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l detailed and lengthy constnictlon contract that was signed and initialed by Tom Hanks and 
2 Rita Wilson on multiple contract pages.8 
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c. Storey's i'.erforinance of the Construction Contract. 
Storey undertook performance of the Consttuctio.n Contract pursuant to plans and 
specifications prepared by Lake/Flato Architects.9 
Rita Wilson served as .the owner and owner's representative during the entire 
construction project. Rita Wilson directed Storey to perform substantial amounts of extra 
work, additional work, <JUd changed work. Jo 
Storey was owed a muJti.mi1Hon dollar amount of money when Storey's work on the 
project was completed. The money due Storey was for unpaid contract bal<JUce plus Storey' s · 
co.st .of performing extr.a work, additional work, and ch<JUged work, all ll$ directed by Rita 
Wilson.JI 
D. Storey Had to fnstitute Arbitration to Get Paid. 
Storey made numerous demand,; to get paid .the money that remained unpaid after 
Storey' s work was completed. ii When payment was not Tec.eived, Storey filed a mech<JUic' s 
lien. 13 
Defendants ,efused to pay Storey the money Storey was owed for work performed on 
the residence that Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson were living in. 14 
8 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 17, pg:"2. 
9 See Affidavit ofGary Storey, 1f 8, pg. 2. 
IP See Affidavit ofGary Storey, 1f 9, pg . .2. 
11 Se.e Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1f l.O, pg 2. 
12 See.Affidavil ofGary.Stol'.l'y, 'j 11,pg. 2. 
13 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 112, pg. 3. 
'
4 S.ee Affidavit of Gary Stprey, 1f 13,pg. 3. 
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Storey initiated AA arbitration in January 2003 pnrsuAAt to the Construction industry 
Arbitration Rules of the AmericAA ArbitrationAsso.ciation.15 
3 
4 
5 
The AmericAA Arbitration Association appointed three lawyers to serve as Arbitrators 
("PMel''). Eac;h of these lawyers bad extensive prior experience serving .l\S arbitrators in .the 
resolution of construction disputes Md were highly knowledgeable regarding construction 
6 law.16 
7 
8 
9. 
ro 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 
.20 
21 
22 
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E. Defendants Claimed .in tb.e ,Arbitration Proceedings that Storey 
Performed Diifective Work. Defendants Lost that Claim 1md were 
Awarded "$0" on Diifendants' Claim that Stony Perl'ormed Defective· 
Work. · 
DefendAAtS alleged in a counterclaim against Storey dated Febrnaty 26, 2003, that 
Storey bad performed defective work. Paragraph 18 .of that counterclairn states; 
Storey ... has perfonn<ed 'Substandard and defective work. 17 
Paragraph 19 of that counter.claim states.: 
The Counter-Cla.imAAtS are entitled to AA .award of damages f.or the 
costs to remedy Storey' s substAAdard and defective work, in AA amount to be 
determined in this Arbitration. is . 
Defendants filed an amended counterclaim against Storey dated May 14, 2003. 
DefendAAtS again alleged that Storey had performed defective work. Paragraph 17 of the 
amended counterclaim states: 
Storey further breached the Construction Contract by performing 
substAAdard and defective work. 19 
15 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1! 14, pg. 3. 
16 See Affidavit ofGacy,Stprey, ~ 15,pg. 3. 
17 See Affidavit <;>fOacySiorey, f!6, pg. 3, Ex. A. 
18 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 117, pg. 3; Ex. A. 
19 See Affidavit ofGar)'St!irey, 118,pg. 3; Ex. B. 
QTnfH1V f'f'IN~TRT Tf'TT()N TN<: '8 Stanislaw Ashbaugh 
,"')' 
"'\.' l . Paragraph 18 of the amended countercfoim states: 
2 Accordingly, Co1mter-Claimant is entitled to an award of damages 
against Storey for the.se breaches 'in .an amollllt to .be determin~ in this 
3 · Arbitration, in excess of$800,000. ;m . 
4 Defendants filed a second amended counterclaim against Storey dated S.eptember 17, 
5 2003 {the .arbitration hearing commenced on September 29, 2003). Defendal)ts again alleged. 
6 that Storey had performed defective wotk. Paragraph 17 of the second amended 
7 counterclaim states: 
8 Storey further breached. the Construction Contract by performing 
substandard and defective work. 21 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Paragraph 18 of the second amended counterclaim states.: 
Accordingly; th.e Tmst is entitled tp. an. award of damages against 
Storey for these bre.a.ches in an amount to be determined in this Arbitration in 
excess of $800,000. 22 
The Panl"l · conducted an Arbitration Hearing !th.at began on Septei'nber 29 and 
14 concluded on October 12, 2003.23 
15 The Panel issue.d its written decision, "Final Award," under date of January 27, 2004. · 
16 The Arbitration Panel made a sp.ecific finding that Defendants were given full opportunity to 
17 present .any and all evidence to support their counterclaim alleging that Storey had performed 
18 defective work. The Final Award .states: 
19 At the conclusion of the Arbitration Hearing, the tribunal inquired of 
counsel whether ... they had any further proofs to offer or witnesses to bl! 
. 20 heard. Counsel for .e.ach party replied to this inquiry in the negative. 
Accordingly, the panel fjnds that all evidence pertinent and material to the 
21 substantive issues in dispute in this controversy thatthe parties wished to offer 
22 
23 
24, 
20 See Affidavit of(laryStorey, ~ 19, pg. 4., Ex. l3. 
21 see Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1 ZO,:pg. 4, Ex. 0. 
22 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1 ZI, pg. 4, Ex. C, 
23 See Affiilavit of Gary Storey,., ZZ, pg. 4. 
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was recei..zed into evidence and heard at the Arbitration Hearing . . . 24 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendiints alleged in thre.e separate co:unterclaims filed over M eight-month period· 
that Storey performed defective work, ]Jefendi,nts had full opportunity at the Arbitration 
Hearing to present any evidence they could muster in support of theit co:unterclaim that 
Storey had performed defective work.25 
Defendants completely lost .and the Panel totally rejected Defendants' claim that 
Storey perfonned defective work, Defendiints were awarded ''$0" by the Piinel on their. 
s· 
10. 
1.1 .I 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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.20 .. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
co:unterclaim that Storey had performed defective work. The Piinel's Final Award states .at· 
page 7: 
Responds;nl:s' [Tom Hanks, Rita Wilson, and Lily Reeves] co:unterclaims .. arl'l 
denied .and are .hereby dismisse.d with prejudice in their .entirety. Respondents 
are awarded $0 on their Co:untercl.ai.ms. 26 
There was only one trMsaction between Storey .and ;Defendants and Defendants were 
awarded "$0" for their claim arising from that transaction. 
Defendants had their day in court and Jost Using new lawyers, Defendants 
are now trying to .resusc:itate their failed const,Uction defect claim under the guise the 
defects were ''latent;" Defendants' current allegation of latent defects arises out of 
the same transaction as Defendants' prior defect c)aim. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
24 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1]23, pgs. 4-5, Ex. D. 
25 See Affidavit ofGary Storey, 1] 24, pg. 5. 
26 Se.e Affidavit ofGary Storey, ~25, pg. 5, Ex. D .(emphasis added). 
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F. Alm11st F1nirY cars After the Final Award, Storey Received a Demand f()r 
Arbitration, which Again Alleges Stl!rey Performed Defective Work at th.e · 
R¢sidence ofTum Hanks a.nd Rita Wilsl!n . 
Storey received an unsigned, µndated Demand for Arbitration fi;om Defendants' new 
lawyers on Novembet 14, '.?007.21 This Demand for Ar)Jitration alleges that Storey 
performed defective work. Defendants .also claimed in the 2003 Arbitration i.n three separate 
coµntetclaims that Storey had p.erfortned defective work. The Arbitration Panel totally 
7 , rejected Ddendants' defective work ,claim and this Court has entered Judgment on that 
Award.23 
.8 
. 9 
to 
ll 
12 
13 
14 
G . The Last Time Storey Performed Any Wo.rk on the Projed was in .2002 Prior to 
the Arbitration. · 
Storey had no communication, verbal or written, with Tom Hanks, Rita Wilson, or' 
Lily Reeves betwee11 the time in 2004 when Storey was paid in full forthe runo1Il1tawatded 
by the Panel and November 14, 2007, the date of receipt by Storey of l)efendants' new 
Demand for Arbitration which seeks $2.5 million in damages caused by alleged 
construetion/desig11 etrors.Z9 
15 Storey completed its work on the project in 2002.3° Storey never performed any work 
1.6 on the project after the 2003 arbitration?J 
17 
18 
19 
?0 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Defendants' current Demand for Arbitration . states, "This Claim arises oµt of 
defective construction or design of the improvements. . . . Bach of these conditions have 
resulted from both constrl.lction .and design deficiencies, errors and omissions." 32 Storey 
21 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1126, pg. 5, Ex. 'E. 
28 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, 1{27, pg. 5. 
29 See Affidavit ofGary Storey, ~ 28, pgs. 5-6. 
'
0 See Affidavit .of Gary Storey, 1f 29, pg: 6. 
'
1 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, l! 30, pg. 6 .. 
12 See Affidavit of Gary Storey, V l, pg. 6, Ex. E. 
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Jll)rformed no design work.33 Defendants have filed a separ1;1te Demand for Arbitration 
against the designer, Lake/Flato. Storey is .not a party to those proceedings,34 Defendants are· 
free to pJJTSue the::ir defect claim cau.sed by design errors and omissions against ths1 .architect, 
a party with whom Defendants have not previously litigated. 
Defendants' .current d.emand for arbitration against Storey also states, "Claimant's· 
investigation is ongoing and the list of defects and design errors set forth above is not· 
intended to be a complete !fot. Claimmit wiU amend its demand as to the defects and .errors 
and damages related thereto.''35 lt is now six full months after Defendants' current c.lemand 
was filed. Defendants' demand has .not been amended. anp., no notice of any additional. 
defects has evet snrfaced.36 However, if additional latept defects are found .by Defepdant~ 
after the arbitration currently sought, Defendants' latentdefect argument, if adopted, would 
allow a third .arbitr.ation and perhaps even a fourth pr fifth. Defendants' latent defect 
argument is that discovery of latent defects is an exception to the doctrine of res judicata and· 
Defendants should be allowed to once again claim damages from Storey for the "latent" 
defects. 
Ill 
Ill 
/II 
)fl 
Ill 
Ill 
33 See Affidavit ofG;uyStorey, ~ 32, pg. 6. 
34 See Affidavit of Gary Storey,~ 33, pg. 6. 
"See Affidavit of G;uy Storey, P4, pg. 6,.Ex. E. 
36 SeeAffidavitofGaryStorey, ~ 35, pg. 6. 
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IV. LEGAL A:RGUMENT 
IDAHO LAW PRECLUDES RELITlGATJON OFA CLAIM A:RISlNG 
FROM TlIE SAME TRANSACTION. 
A. There is .a Strong Policy fo Idaho Law which Disfavors the Relitigation of . 
Claims. 
I<Jaho has a substantial body of case law .addressing res judicata. In 2007, the Idaho 
6 · Supreme Com-t 1n Ticot, .su!!ra, wove together many of its prior res judicata discussions and 
7 provided.a textbook analysis of res judtcata.31 
8 In doing so, Idaho's Supreme Court affirmed the lower .com-t's granting of Summary 
9 Jµdgment of.dismissal on the grounds .pf res judicata and defined the policy underlying res 
10 judicata as follows: 
11 
12 
13 
14 
. 15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
.21 
22. 
23 
24 
Res judicata serves thr.ee fundamental pµrposes: (l) it preserve.s the 
accepmbility of judicial . disputes resolution against the corrosive disr<)spect . 
that would follow if .the B.ame matter were · twice Ijtigated to inconsistent 
results; (2) it serves !:he public interest in protecting the courts against the . 
burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in 
repose from the harassment ofrepetitive claims. HiY1dmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 
57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.Zd 130, 
133 (Ct .. App. 1983)). . 
Each of those three ~lements reco15nized in Tica~, supra, directly applies to 
this case. Storey has already successfully defended against Defendants' false 
accusation.s of construction defects - .accusations made to avoid paying· Storey money 
that was due. Defendl!ilts are seeking to relitigate a claim they previously lost, and in 
doing so, are irtflicting severe harassment on Storey. Simply labeling alleged defects 
31 Ticor Title Company v. Stanion, 157 P)d 613 Idaho 2007. 
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1 "latent" does not entitle J)efendartts to arbitrate again concerning the same exact 
2 transaction - the construction ofDefendants' home. 
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B. Tb.e TbreeRequircements of.Claim Preclusi1m ar!l Met by St1>rey. 
In its textbook analysis and lengthy decision,· Ticw, supra, explains .and distinguishes 
issue preclusion / .collateral est~ppel from claim preclusion / res judicata, . The fonner has · 
five requirements that must be satisfied; the latter has three, and those three requirements are: . 
For claim precluskin to bar a subsequent action there are three 
requirements: (I) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final 
Judgment. Hindmarsh, 138 .Idaho at 94, .57 P.3d .at 805; Farmers Nat'/ 
Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994). 
It is undisputed that two ofthe three elements of res judicatci are satisfied. This case 
involve.s the same parties as the prior arbitration. A final judgment confirming the .Final 
Award in the prior arbitration was entered by this Court on March 6, 2008. 
The third requirement of res judicaf,p is the "sarne claim.'' According to Ticor, supra, 
the test to determine whethe.r a .claim in .a subsequent p.ction is the ''same claim" as a claim in 
a prioi: action is whether the claim ads.es out of the "Slillle transaction.'' It is l!hdisput!:'d that 
the one and only transaction Storey had with Defendants was performance of the 
construction. contract. 
. . . when .a valid, final judgment is rendered .in .a ·proceeding, h 
"extinguishes all dairns arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Id. (quoting 
Diamondv. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, J 50, 804 J>.2d 319, 
323 (1990)), This Court .has noted that the ''.transactional .concept of a 
claim is broad" and that claim preclusion "may apply even where there · 
is not a substantial overlap betw.een the theories advanced in support 
ofa claim, or in the evidence relating to those theories." 1d. (quoting 
Aldape, 105 Idaho at259, 668 P.2d aU 35). (Emphasis added.) 
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. The Supreme Court's 2007 dec.lsion .in T/cor, supra, upheld the District Court's grant· 
of a summary Judgment on .fue basis .of res judicata relyjng .on these facts: l) Ti.cot overpaid· 
a debtor in bankruptcy; 2) the debtor's debts were discharged in bankruptcy .court; 3) Ticor 
brought a subseq:uent action; and 4) the debtor .asse.rted res judicata and won. The Idaho 
5 Supreme Court rejected "Ticor's current claim of unjust enrichment which arose post-
6 . petiti<m" because 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 . 
13 
14 
Ticot's present claim· Mises out of the same transaction addressed by 
the bankruptcy court in the prior adjudication, 
* • * 
Thus, the operative underlying facts of the pripr motions made .in 
bankruptcy court and 'ficpr's present uajust enrichment claim against Stanion 
are the same. Both situations stem from the factual transaction of Ticor's 
agreement to handle the sale of StanJon's property and its overpayment ofsale 
proceeds to St.anion. The transactional concept of claim is ,broad, Magic 
Valley J23 Idaho at 437, 849.P.2d at 110. (Emphasis added.) 
Defendants' present Demand for Arbitration arises· out of the same "transaction" as · 
the prior arbitration, namely the construction contracL 
15 A .review of three prior Idaho cases analyzed in detail in Ticor, supra, illustrates just 
16 how ''broad" IdalJo 's transaction standard is. 
17 The first case involved successive quiet title actions.38 Adverse possession was 
18 asserted in the first action .and accretion in the second as the ground for quieting title. In 
19 upholding the bar of r13s fudicata, /4/dape, supra, like Ticor, supra, also contained a te.xtbook · 
. 20 analysis of res judicata and traced the development of.the "broad" concept of "trans11ction.'' 
21 Res judicata d.enote.s "a thing or matter settled by judgment." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (rev. 5th i;,d .. 1979). The dqctrine of 
.22 res judicata precludes the relitigation of a matter previously 
23 
24 
3
·
8 A/<!ape y. Akins, 105 fdaho254, 257, 668 P.2.d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983). 
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adjudicated. Functionally, .the doctrin!') has two coinppner,its ~ claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. 
"[Claim] preclusion,'' or truer.es judicata ... treats a 
judgment, once tendered, as the full measure of relief to 
l;,e accorded between the same parties on the same 
"c!Eih:n" -0r "c.ause of action." ,. * * When the plaintiff 
0bt11ins a jud~ent in his favor, his claim ''merges" in 
the judgment; he may seek .no further relief on that 
clai.m in a separate action. Conversely, when a 
judgment is rendered for a .defendant, the plaintiff's 
claim is extinguished; the judgment then acts as .a "bar,'' 
* * * Under the.se rules .of daim preclusion, the 
effect of a judgment extends to the litigation .of ,all 
issues relevant to the same ¢labp between the same 
patties, whether or not raised 11t .trial. 
Kaspar Wir/i Works, .Inc. v. L¢cO Enginliering & Machine, Inc., 
575 F.2d 530, 535-36(5.th Cir. 1978). 
* * * 
Dissatisfaction with the cause of action as th<:: foundation .of res 
judicatil has led to reformulation of the dpctrine ih the rec,intly 
completed RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF' JUDGMENTS (1982) 
(h,irein cited as th,i S,icond Restatement). The Second Restatement is 
familiar to many Idaho judges and practitioners. Tentative drafts of 
the Second Restatement have been dted with approval by our Supreme 
Court in Houser andRamseyrr, supra. 
The Second Restatement expressly recognizes the difference 
between claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The bar of claim 
preclusion is succin1otly stated at § 19: 'A valid and final personal 
jud~ent rendered in favor of the .defendant bars another action by the 
plaintiff on the same claim.' The limits .of tl1is. rule of bar ate 
determined by the dimensions of the •concept of a 'claim.' The Se.cond 
RestatemenLadopts a transactional view toward claims. 
When a valid and final judgment .rendered in an 
action extingµishes the plaintiffs daim .... the claim 
extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to 
remedies against the defendiintwith respect to all or 
any part of the tmnsaction . . . out of Which the 
action aros.e. (Emphasis added.) 
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Storey had but one transaction with Pefendants. Defendants had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate all of .O.efendants' claims arising out of that transaction. Neither the 
rule underlined above, nor the Second Restatement make My exception fot subsequently 
discovered evidence. _Under Idµho Jaw, "Res Judicata precludes relitigatlon of the ,s~e 
.5 claim even if there is new evidence to support it"39 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Part of the reason no exception exists for ;rl'ter acquired evidence is because the · 
"transactional concept" is "broad" as further explained in Aldape, s. upra: 
. . . 
39 Wolfe, supra. 
Second Restatement at § ;M. Comment a to §24 .makes it cle.ar 
that the transaction.al .concept .of a claim is broad and that the bar of 
claim preclusiqn is similarly broad: 
[In) the days when c.ivil procedure still bore the 
imprint of the forms of .action and the division be.tween 
law and e.quity, the .courts were prone to associate claim 
with a single theory of recovery, so that, with respect to 
ons, transaction, a plaintiff might have as many claims 
as ths:re were theories of the substantive law upon 
which he could seek reliefagalnst the defendant. 
**** 
The present trend is to see claim in facturil ts,rms 
and to make it coterminous with the trMsaction 
regardless of th.e number of .substantive theories, or 
variant forms of relief flowing from those lheorii,s, that 
may be available to be the plaintiff. . ... 
Accordi)1gly, the bar of claim .preclusion may apply even where 
there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in 
support of a claim, or in the evidencs, relating to those. theories. 
Comment b to§ 24. This conclusion is more folly stated in § 25 of the 
Second Restats,ment: 
Th.e r.ule of§ 24 applies to extinguish a claim by 
the plaintiff ag11inst the .defendant .even though t.he 
plaintiffisprep11red ill the second .action: 
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and 
(1) To . present evidence or 
grounds or theories of th.e case not 
presented in the firstnction, !)r 
(2) To s.eek remedies .cir forms of 
rflliefuot demanded in the first action. 
Comment d in this section further explains the effect of claim 
preclusion: 
Having be.en defeated on the merits in one acfioµ, .a 
plaintiff sometimes atterppts another action seeking. the 
same or approximately. the. same relief but adducing a 
different substantive law premise or ground. This .does 
not .constitute. the presentation of a new. claim when the 
new premise or ground is related to the same transaction 
or series of trapsactions, and accordingly. the s.econd 
action should be held barred. .CEmphasfaadded,) 
- ' ' . ' ' 
Applying the rule just stated to this case, Defendants were defeated .in one arbitration 
now seek another arbitration based on the same claim - construction defects. 
Defendants' claim of defects in both instances arises from the same transaction - the 
construction contract. Defendants' argument is Defendants have "new evidence:" of 
construction defocts. Storey did not perform any work for Defendants after .the first• 
.arbitration and Defendants' failed defect claim is not revived by Defendants' claimed pust-
arbitration discovery of latent defects .. 
The next case analyzed by Ticor, supra. contains .still another lengthy textbook 
diseussion.40 lfr Diamond, supra, Idaho's Supreme Court specifically adopted and approved 
the holding in Aldape, supra, in the face of an argument to reverse Aldape, supra. 
We approve the Court of Appeals holding in Aldape that a valid and 
.final j.udgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the 
same .transaction· or serie.s of transactions out of which the cause of action 
arose. (Emphasis added.) · 
40 (J{ampnrJv. Farmers Group, inc., 119 jdaho 146, 804 P.2d 319. 
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The Restatement (Second), in Section 24, similarly precludes a second 
action with regard to claims which were necessarily involved as part of 
the transaction or.series oftransac.tions out of which the action arose. 
The Restatement, in Section 24, clarifies the 
dimensions of the ''.same claim" rule, adopting a 
transactional approach. 
Magic Vall~y, su»ra, the third case 41 relied upon by Ticor, ·.fill!lill, also contains a 
lengthy discussion of and then adopts, quotes, @d apprpves both ,Aldape, supra, and 
Diamond, supra. Once again the plea pf res judicata was upheld: 
Although the theory of this liabHity tlnd the evidence necessary to 
prove the liability are different .h~re thiUl they were in Magic Valley I 
and 11, the transaction is the same: Therefore, this c11;1im against Helen 
and Margaret's estate js barred bytes judicata (claim preclusion). 
Th\l undisputed factu1;1l basis for Storey's plea ·of res judicata is actually much 
stronger thiUl Ticor, supra, Aldapr, supra, Diamond, supra, and Magic Valley, supra. It is 
undisputed that Storey had one and only one transaction with Defendants - performance of a 
construction contract. It is undisputed that Defendant;<;' claim of construction defects was 
raised in successive counterclaims that were filed over an .eight-month tirne span. It is 
undisputed that the Arbitratipn Panel found that Defendants had every opportunity to pr.esent 
all desired evidence .and testimony in support of Defendants' claim of defects. It is 
undispµted that Defendants were awarded "$0" t\ll<l that .aWl\fd was been confirmed by this 
Court. 
41 Magic Valley 1?,adiology, P.A.. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,437, 849 !'.2d 107, 110 (1993). 
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1 Other Idaho Supreme Court decisions have consistently reinforced the res 
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.. judicatalclaim preclusion principle based on the "transaction" anaJysis above. "Tho doctrine 
of .claim preclusion bars not only sµbsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but 
also sµbsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the srune cause of action which wore 
actually made or might have bee.n made."42 "Res judir::ata precludes the relitigation of the 
same claim even if there is new .evidence to support it. ,,4) Defendants' latent defects c!a:in1 is 
nothiµg more than Defendants' "new evidence." "This Court re!Jffirmed the 'transactional' 
approach to claim preclusion ... [be.cause] in this case the operative facts ... are comprised 
in the dairy sale agreement.',44 The dairy .. sale agreement in Farmers, supra, was the only 
agreement between Farmer,-; i!Ild Shirey. The operative facts in this case are "comprised" in 
the parties' construction contract just .as they were "comprised" in thed11iry saJe 11greement 111 
Farm?rs, supra. Equally important is that Farmers, supra, affirmed the District Court's grant 
7. 
.$ 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 of summary judgment on the doctrine of res judicata. 
14 In April 2008 the .Idaho Supreme Court issued still another decision addressing res 
1.5 . Jud/cata .and affirmed the grant of a summary judcgment.45 C Systems, supra, just like Ticor, 
16 supra, .and Farmers, supra, .also affirms the District Court's summary judgment ruling and 
17 states: 
18 · Therefore, .this issue 'should have been litigated in the first suit.' It is part of 
the same ·transaction as the first suit lllld is barred by res iudicata. (Emphasis 
19 added.) 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
42 Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92; $7 P.3d 803; 2002 Ida. LEXIS I 63 .. 
43 Wolfe v. Farm ]Jureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,403 (1996), sunra. 
44 Fm:mers Nat'/ Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63; 878 P.2d 7.62; 1994 Ida. LEXIS 83; 25 U.C.C.Rep. Serv. 2µ 
(Callaghan) 566. 
~s C System v . .Gee, 2008 Ida Lexis 6:3. 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION INC.'S Stanislaw Ashbaugh 
-/:·,., 
. I 
j 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
H 
) 12 
; 
.. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
C System, supra, was issued just over one month ago. There is no room for doubt that the 
one transaction .rule is Idaho''s test for.determining res judicata. 
C. The "Royal Flµsh" ca.se holds that subsequ.el)tly discovered defects are 
. irrefoval)t and wj'IJ not revive a defect cfaim ·previously made. 
Thiere was no Idaho case found which .addresses res judicata in the .conte1,t of a 
construction ·defect case. f!owever. the Supreme Court of Vlrginia46 has squarely .addressed 
res judicata in a factual setting identical to this case. Virginia also relies on the single · 
transaction test for determinif\g res judicata. 
Even· if Defendants prove I) defects caused by Storey exist; 2) Defendants were 
unaware of those .defects at the time of the last arbitration; .and 3) those defects could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diHgence, res judicata w111,sfill apply. The 
reason res judicata applies is the.application ofthe single transaction test. 
Wati,lrfrOnt ("WMC") built a bulkhead for 49ers, a .homeowners a;;sociation, WMC 
sought payment of sums remaining unpaid on the construction contract. 49ers 
counterclaimed alleging .that WMC's btilkhe.ad construction work was defective. An AAA 
arbitration occurred pursuant to an arbitration provision .in the parties' construction contract 
"Following a hearing, the panel entered an .award on.March 7.1991. denying the 49ers' claim 
[for defective work] .and granting WMC's claim [for sums due]." Waterfront and 49ers 
litigated a construction defect claim just as Storey and the Defendants did in the prior· 
arbitration, The outcome of the prior arbitration between Storey and Defendants was al.so 
46 WaterfrontM;arine Construction Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bu/kh¢r,d Groups A, B •. and C, 251 Va. 
417,468S,E.2/IB94, 1.996 Va.LEXIS 52 (1996). 
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1 identical: the contractor was awarded money and the owner's construction defect claim was 
2 denied. 
.3 In 
4 occurring 
1999, 49ers filed a second demand for arbitration with AAA after a storm 
after the first arbitration did new and additional damage to the bulkhead 
S constructed by WMC. 49ers' second .arbitration demand claimed the storm damage was 
6 caused by WMC's faulty construction. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the second 
7 demand for arbitration was barred by res judicata bec.ause I) WMC had performed no work 
8 on the bulkhead after .the first arbitration; and 2) the claim for defects in the s\;lcond 
' 
9 arbitration arose out of performance of Jhe same construption contract as the defects claimed 
lO in the first .arbitration. 
J 1 The 49ers assert that the second demand claiming breach of 
warranty as a result of the damaged bulkhead w.as not identical to the 
12 first, and could not have been, because the bulkhead hitd not failed at 
the time of the first .demand. .. . . Thus, th<;Jy assert, since the event 
13 giving rise to th<;J cause of action, i.e., the· partial collapse .pf the 
bulkhead, had not occurred at the time of the first arbitration, the 
14 claims could not have been the same. 
15 * * * 
In this case, .the legal rights asserted by the 49ers inthe first 
16 arbitration action were based on .its CONTRAC'.CUAL .RIGBT to 
construction of a bulkhead free .of design .or construction defects. The 
17 storm ,damage to tl1e bulkhead after the :first arbitration did not increase 
or alter the contractual rights .the 49ers acquired at the time the 
I 8 contract. was executed. Furthermore, no plans were altered .and no 
work was .performed on the bulkhead between the filing of the first and 
19 second demands for arbitration. · The damages suffered as a result of 
the alleged defects mily have increased when the bulkhe.ad collapsed, 
20 but any defects in construction and design which existed at the time of 
the first i'trbitration had not changed at the time of these.cond demand 
21 for arbitration. (Emphasis added.) 
22 Waterfront Marine, supra, follows the "transactional approach" .adopted in Ticor, 
23 suprii, and otherldaho cases cited in this brief. The key phrase used in the Waterfront, -supra,· 
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decision is "contractual right." The construction contract is the transiiction just like the ''dairy 
sale agreement," was the transaction that barred subsequent litigation ~n Farmers, supra. 
The facts of Waterfront Marine, .supra, are identical to this case.. Storey entered just 
one contract and Storey perfonned absolutely no work of any kind after the first arbitration. 
As stated in Waterfront, supra, Pefendants' rights "were bas.ed on its contraetual right to 
construction of [a house] free of.,, construction defects .. {Defocts discovered] •after the first 
.arbitration did not increase or alter the contractual rights the I defendants] acquired at the 
time the contract was executed." The "transaction'' .creates the "contractual right." The 
transaction gives rise to only one legal proceeding betwl;len the Sam<:l parties. 
10 
1J 
12 
Application of the "tr.ansaction" ®!'! to construction defoct cases makes ab:undant 
sense .and effectuates the policy lmderlying res j1,1dicata ~ "protects the courts agmnst the 
burd€:n of repetitious litigation .... advance the private interest ... from the harassment of 
13 repetitive claims." 
14 Absent the bar of res judicata, each tJme a construction project owner discovered a 
15 latent defect, the owner would have grounds for a m,w lawsuit if Defendants' argument is 
16 adopted.47 These Defendants in their current demand for arbitration allege n)ne defects. 
'l 7 According to Defendants' latent defect argument, each of those nine alleged .latent defects 
18 could have given rise to nine separate and successive demands for arbitration ifeach defect 
19 was latent and discovered after a prior arbitration. According to Defendants' argument, a 
20 trial on the merits of one of Defendants' alleged latent defects would not allow res judicata 
21 to be a bat to eight suosequent latent defect lawsuits assuming discovery of a defect after a 
22 
23 
24 
41 The c1mcept oflatent defects is important in construction defect cases .when the statµte of limitations fo in 
issue. The dls.covery rule applies and the stallJte. be~ins to run When the defects are or reasonably·shoul<I have 
been dlscovered. L.atent defects are not a relevant inquiry when res judicata is plead. The "transaction" ls the 
relevant inquiry. 
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• ) 1 prior arbitration. Resjudicata bars Defendants' current demand to arbitrate any of the nine 
2 defects. 
. . 
3 lf res Judicata is not .a bar to Defendants' .cwrent demand for arbitration, nothing 
4 . womd prevent Defendants from filing a third demand for arbitration alleging i,till more latent.· 
5 defects .after completion of the arbitI:atlon now sought. And after the third .arbitration, a. 
6 foutth demand could be filed upon discovery by Defendants of still more latent defects.· 
7 The purpose of re~ judicata Is to put an end to litigation involving a single 
8 transaction. Adoption of Defendants' .latent defect argument would clearly eviscerate the 
9 .Idaho rule that ''new evidence" Will not.defeat a pka of res judicata. 48 
10 No Idaho authority permits multiple arbitrations/lawsuits based on dfocovery ofiatent 
11 defects. In fue lnstant case; l) the constniction contract is the transaction that fixed the rights· 
12 of the parties; 2) the Defendants' current dispute about defects arose from that .one and 011ly 
13 transaction; and 3) Defendants' contractual rights have not been .enlarged or altered since the 
14 first arbitration, because Storey .has performed no work since then. This case is tQtally 
15 . .consistent with all Idaho authorities and is exactly what was decided in Waterfront, supra. 
16 
17 
D. The Application of R.es Judicata to Ll!tent Defects is the Same as Applying 
1?.es Judicata to Subsequently Discovered Injuries .in a Personal Jnjuty 
Action .. 
18 ·· A person bringing an action for personal injuries gets one shot at recovering. Once 
1.9 the personal injury action is tried, the injured party is barred by res judicata from bringing a· 
20 second action for injuries / symptoms / problems that did not manifest until after the first 
21 trial. Latent defects arising from a construction contract should be (and are) treated no 
22 differently under Idaho res judicata case law. When a single event causes personal injuries, 
23 
24 . 
48 Wolfe, supra. 
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1 the injured perSon has a right to just one trial caused by the event. Wheu a construction 
2 project owner claims defects, the owner likewise has the right to just one trial. The event 
3 causing personal injuries is the functional equivalent of th!:l transaction out of which ,the, 
4 defects arise, and there fo simply no analytical justification for allowing a property damage 
5 claimant to uncover new evide.nce after a first trial, when a personal injury victim has no . 
6 such right. 
71 
8 
9, 
10 
u 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reached' just that conclusion regarding personal injury 
c.laims .. 49 While working, Mr. Ho.user foll from .his truck injuring his knee. Mr. Houser filed· 
a workman's .compensation claim. After a hearing on the merits, the Commission ruled 
Mr. Honser's injuries were not as s.erious as claimed by Mr. Houser. Mr. Houser appealed. 
During the penclency of the ,appeal, Mr. Houser filed ,a second workman's compensation 
claim iilleging injury to his back .caused by his injured knee. Mr. Houser'.s second claim was 
dismiss<::d on the basis of res jurlicata. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the Commission's 
summary dismissal of Mr. Houser' s second claim on the basis of resjudicata stating, 
In. sljII)., the proceeding in th,:, instant .case and in the prior proceeding 
arose out of the same operative facts between the same parties. 50 (Emphasis 
added.) 
17 
18 
19 
The prior arl;)itration between Storey and Defendants arose out ofthe "same operative 
facts'' as the facts forming the .basis for Defendants' current arbitration demand against 
Storey - those facts are the entering of a construction contract and Storey's performance of 
20 that contract. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
49 Houserv. Southern Idaho Pipe&. Steel,Jnc., 103 Idaho44], 649 P.2d 1197 (19S2), 
'
0 Rell)arl<;ably, Houser, supra, was one oftwo Idaho cases relied upon by Defendants in oral argument opposin/, 
Storey's Motion to Stay Arbitration. Houser, supra, provides no support for Defendants' argument. 
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V, CONCLUSION 
:Oiider Idaho law discovery of conditions whl.ch are "latent'' after a trial or arbitration. 
of clllims involving a single transaction does n.ot .avoii! a plea of res judicata. There is no 
issue of fact but that Storey holds a valid judgment awarding Defendants "$0'' for 
construc.tion defects stel)ll1).ing from the one .and only transaction between the parties . 
S=ary judgment Oh Storey's plea of res judicata should be granted. 
Dated this 13th dayofMay, 2008. 
STANIS~~ . 
~~ By . . . 
R. Miles Stanislaw, ISB# 4912 
STOREY CONSTRUCTION INC..'S 
Christopher A. Wright, Pro Jfac Vice 
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